Point 5353 (also called Point 17561 , and Marpo La Peak ) is in Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir in the vicinity of Dras in the Kargil district . It is the highest peak along the Marpo La ridge and dominates the entire area on both the sides of the Line of Control.
150-768: The peak became a subject of controversy after the Kargil War . Soon after the war had ended The Hindu correspondent Praveen Swami and an Indian opposition party leader , Ram Kumar Anand claimed that the peak was inside the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) and it was captured by the Pakistan Army during the Kargil War. They also claimed that the Indian troops had unsuccessfully tried to recapture Point 5353 on 18 May 1999. The Pakistani military has held possession of Point 5353 from
300-751: A ceasefire line . After another Kashmir War in 1965, and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (which saw Bangladesh become independent), only minor modifications had been effected in the original ceasefire line. In the ensuing Simla Agreement in 1972, both countries agreed to convert the ceasefire line into a "Line of Control" (LoC) and observe it as a de facto border that armed action should not violate. The agreement declared that "neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations". The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) had
450-412: A Pakistani interlocutor called Colonel Saqlian in mid-August 1999, both sides committed themselves to leave the points 5353, 5240, 4251 and 4875 unoccupied. In October 1999, according to the report, Brigadier Aul decided to take control of the point 5240 as well as point 5353. 16 Grenadiers successfully took control of 5240. However, 1-3 Gurkha Rifles, tasked with taking control of 5353, did not proceed with
600-664: A bone of contention in 1984. To the south of the Line of Control, (Sangam, Chenab River, Akhnoor ), lies the border between Pakistani Punjab and the Jammu province, which has an ambiguous status: India regards it as an "international boundary", and Pakistan calls it a "working border". Another ceasefire line separates the Indian-controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir from the Chinese-controlled area known as Aksai Chin . Lying further to
750-568: A defensive mindset to counter infiltration. The reduction in infiltration also points to a reduction in support of such activities within Pakistan. During the 2019 Balakot airstrike , Indian planes crossed the LoC for the first time in 48 years. Pakistan and India officially designated five crossing points following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake —Nauseri-Tithwal; Chakoti-Uri; Hajipur-Uri; Rawalakot-Poonch and Tattapani-Mendhar. According to Azad Jammu and
900-589: A detailed contour map" that the Pakistani soldiers from a point 12 km away could observe only about 0.5 to 1 km of the road. The 1972 Line of Control is part of the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, whereby the two countries agreed to respect the line without prejudice to their respective positions in the Kashmir dispute . The line divided the Indian and Pakistani administered portions of Kashmir. It
1050-448: A few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realise that the plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to between 130 and 200 km (50 and 80 sq mi). The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay,
1200-666: A few others, who had all been removed from the command, had also accused the army, among other instances of command dereliction, of losing Point 5353 to Pakistan. This prompted the then Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Nirmal Chander Vij to issue a press release, with detailed maps and notes, in which he asserted that the LoC passes through Point 5353 as per the Simla Agreement . "This point", he stated, "was never under our control either before or after Operation Vijay in Kargil." However, Praveen Swami stood by his report, stating that The Hindu had in its possession copies of
1350-406: A final assault on the peak in which ten Pakistani soldiers and five Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks—most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them—which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat . As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in
1500-429: A manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise due to the likely expansion of the theatre of war and reduced international support for its cause. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached upon by the infiltrators; according to the official count, an estimated 75–80% of the intruded area and nearly all the high ground were back under Indian control. Following
1650-569: A mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the brigade or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in
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#17328582043691800-475: A more direct threat to the highway. Point 5353 was not cleared during the war. Its status, along with that of the nearby peaks—Points 5165 and 5240—was settled during the negotiations after the end of hostilities. The two sides had then agreed to leave Point 5353 as well Points 5165 and 5240, the heights which surround it on either side on the Marpola ridge, unoccupied, based on the consensus that had been reached during
1950-547: A number of other direct and indirect weaponry. Military personnel on both sides risk being shot by snipers in moving vehicles, through bunker peepholes and during meals. The civilian population at the LoC, at some points ahead of the forward most post, has complicated the situation. Shelling and firing by both sides along the LoC has resulted in civilian deaths. Bunkers have been constructed for these civilian populations for protection during periods of CFV's. India and Pakistan usually report only casualties on their own sides of
2100-615: A number of tall peaks. The point 5353, so named because of its height in metres, is the tallest peak on the Marpo La ridge. Its older name is Point 17561, representing its height in feet. The Line of Control in this area is flanked by the Shingo River valley of Pakistani-administered Kashmir in the north and the Dras River valley of Indian-administered Kashmir in the south. Both these valleys represent major lines of east–west communication in
2250-585: A succession of mountain peaks that overlook the Mashkoh and Dras valleys in the Indian-administered Kashmir. It dominates the entire Dras sector. Point 5353 is a prominent peak on this ridge, overlooking the strategic National Highway 1 of India linking Srinagar to Leh . It is at an aeral distance of 12 km from Dras, which lies on the National Highway 1. In 1999, Pakistani forces occupied
2400-514: A territorial swap by taking positions on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control in the Batalik sector, which lies to the east of Kargil. He noted that, in one such operation on 14 April 2000, the troops of the 14 Sikh Regiment occupied the until then unheld Point 5310 , which was situated one kilometre inside the Pakistani side of the LoC. Swami concluded by noting that "the end of the conflict is...not quite yet in sight." Brigadier Surinder Singh, and
2550-481: A trade facilitation centre are being planned on the Indian side. The English name for the bridge in Uri translates as " bridge of peace . The Indian Army rebuilt it after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake when a mountain on the Pakistani side caved in. This route was opened for trade in 2008 after being closed for 61 years. The Srinagar–Muzaffarabad Bus crosses this bridge on the LoC. A road connects Kotli and Tatrinote on
2700-427: A view of our side. Besides, air observation posts (artillery observers on aircraft) can also mount a watch to direct fire. The view from Point 5353 does not seriously threaten our supply lines." It also quoted the then Indian Defence Minister , George Fernandes , as saying in 1999 that "5353 is the point over which the Line of Control goes. The fact is our troops never occupied it. The normal practice has been that where
2850-437: Is electrified and connected to a network of motion sensors, thermal imaging devices, lighting systems and alarms. They act as "fast alert signals" for the Indian troops, who can be alerted and ambush the infiltrators trying to sneak in. The barrier's construction began in the 1990s but slowed in the early 2000s as hostilities between India and Pakistan increased. After a November 2003 ceasefire agreement, building resumed and
3000-557: Is Tiger Hill and the Mushkoh Valley. In 1999, Pakistani intruders occupying the heights in this sector were directing artillery fire on Dras and National Highway 1A and were alleged to have planned to secure routes for infiltration into the Valley." The newspaper quoted army officers as saying that, "There are heights from which we have a view of the PoK side and there are heights from where they have
3150-467: Is based on distorted facts as borne out from maps of delineation between India and Pakistan in 1972." It further stated that "the ground situation is well-known to the government and India’s posture along the LoC is militarily sound with an edge over the other side". Ashok Mehta said that in the encounter with RK Anand, the Indian Army was "forced to reveal certain information, which in national interest should have remained under wraps", adding that "Pakistan
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#17328582043693300-549: Is usually open only during the summer months, and unlike the other two crossings is open only for the movement of people, not for trade. The Tithwal bridge, first built in 1931, has been rebuilt twice. The Salamabad crossing point, or the Kamran Post, is on the road between Chakothi and Uri in the Baramulla district of Jammu and Kashmir along the LoC. It is a major route for cross LoC trade and travel. Banking facilities and
3450-471: Is wooded while the peaks rise higher. Winter is snowy while summers are mild. From Gurez to Akhnoor , the area is mountainous and hilly respectively and is generally forested. There are tracks and minor roads connecting settlements. The mix of flora and elevation affects visibility and line of sight significantly. In 2018, two corps and a number of battalions of the Border Security Force manned
3600-410: The 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff thousands of acres of land along the LoC were mined. Both civilians and military personnel on both sides have died in mine and improvised explosive device (IED)-related blasts, and many more have been injured. Between January 2000 to April 2002, 138 military personnel were killed on the Indian side. Reinforced sandbagged and concrete posts and bunkers are among
3750-588: The ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC. Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the LOC and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes. A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry. Four Param Vir Chakras and 11 Maha Vir Chakras were awarded. The following units were awarded
3900-517: The COAS' unit citations for their exemplary role in the war - Two Pakistani soldiers received the Nishan-e-Haider , Pakistan's highest military gallantry award: Line of Control 34°56′N 76°46′E / 34.933°N 76.767°E / 34.933; 76.767 Other conflicts Border skirmishes Strikes The Line of Control ( LoC ) is a military control line between
4050-663: The First Kashmir War and the following cease-fire line, with minor adjustments made in 1972. India constructed a 550-kilometre (340 mi) barrier along the 740 kilometres (460 mi) –776 kilometres (482 mi) LoC by 2004. The fence generally remains about 150 yards (140 m) on the Indian-controlled side. Its stated purpose is to exclude arms smuggling and infiltration by Pakistani-based separatist militants. The barrier, referred to as an Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS), consists of double-row of fencing and concertina wire 8–12 feet (2.4–3.7 m) in height, and
4200-547: The Indian - and Pakistani -controlled parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir —a line which does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary, but serves as the de facto border. It was established as part of the Simla Agreement at the end of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 . Both nations agreed to rename the ceasefire line as the "Line of Control" and pledged to respect it without prejudice to their respective positions. Apart from minor details,
4350-629: The India–Pakistan border ) which began on 13 December 2001, in response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament . By this time the area north and east of Zojila Pass , including Leh, came under the newly raised XIV Corps . In August 2002, The Hindu correspondent Praveen Swami reported that Pakistani troops had occupied Point 5070 in the early summer of 2002, and in July, "after eight weeks of steady skirmishes, India reoccupied Point 5070 in
4500-560: The Kargil district of Ladakh (erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir ) and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LoC). In India, the conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay ( Sanskrit : विजय , lit. ' Victory ' ), which was the codename of the Indian military operation in the region. The Indian Air Force acted jointly with the Indian Army to flush out the Pakistan Army and paramilitary troops from vacated Indian positions along
4650-515: The Leh–Manali Highway . The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers , were also armed with mortars , artillery and anti-aircraft guns . Many posts were also heavily mined , with India later stating to have recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by
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4800-816: The Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River , on the heights above of the Chorbat La sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtuk sector south of the Siachen area. Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for
4950-732: The Mirage 2000 fleet, which commenced operations on 30 May. The Indian Navy also prepared to blockade the Pakistani ports (primarily the Karachi port ) to cut off supply routes under Operation Talwar . The Indian Navy's western and eastern fleets joined in the North Arabian Sea and began aggressive patrols and threatened to cut Pakistan's sea trade. This exploited Pakistan's dependence on sea-based oil and trade flows. Later, then– Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan
5100-454: The military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who provided additional artillery support. The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of
5250-575: The wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −15 to −11 °C (5 to 12 °F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics , much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, creating a siege . Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LOC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistani soil, however,
5400-411: The "army's own one-inch maps" as well as orders issued to the commanders to capture Point 5353 on 18 May 1999. Swami then said that the "Army's denial" had answered "none" of the questions he had raised, starting from the "army's own one-inch maps", which he claimed showed the summit and southern side of Point 5353 to be "unmistakenly on the Indian side of the LoC", and ending with the army's actions across
5550-459: The Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands", although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed. Pakistan also attempted to internationalise
5700-477: The Dras sector, was still under Pakistan's control. After this, the Indian Army said that the media reports were an "inspired" campaign to malign their image. They said that the peak was never in Indian possession. In August 2000, a noted Indian journalist, Praveen Swami , authored reports in The Hindu Business Line on this subject, wherein he claimed, citing copies of "army's own one-inch maps", that
5850-488: The Dras sector." He further said: "Point 5070, named for its altitude in metres, dominates the strategically vital Mushkoh nullah in the Dras sub-sector." The Telegraph of 27 August 2002, reported that "In a map shown to The Telegraph today at the army headquarters, Point 5353 is depicted on the Line of Control, at an aerial distance of about 12 km from Dras", and a battalion of the Pakistan Army's Baloch Regiment
6000-493: The Indian Army then said, the Point 5353 is "within our LoC and that we have every right to patrol the area," while claiming that this peak offered a 40 km view of the Pakistani side of the LoC. He also claimed that an Indian Army platoon , led by Major Navneet Mehta had tried to recapture the peak on 18 May 1999 but the attempt had failed. He demanded that "a fact-finding team of five Parliamentarians should be constituted to go to
6150-516: The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, 1,504 "terrorists" attempted to infiltrate India in 2002. Infiltration was one of India's main issues during the 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff . There has been a decrease in infiltration over the years. Only a select number of individuals are successful; in 2016, the Ministry reported 105 successful infiltrations. The Indian LoC fence has been constructed with
Point 5353 - Misplaced Pages Continue
6300-501: The Indian Parliament had been told. He claimed that Point 5353 was 300 to 500 metres inside the Indian territory. He supplied reporters with several documents to challenge the Indian Army's claim that Point 5353 was never in Indian possession. He claimed that India stationed army personnel on Point 5353 in 1992–93, who then cut off the supply routes of the Pakistani positions along the Line of Control for almost two months. He said that
6450-563: The Indian side of the LOC. Following the Washington accord of 4 July 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LoC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. The Indian army launched its final attacks in
6600-421: The Indian side of the LoC. The Rawalpindi Corps manned the Pakistani side. Ceasefire violations (CFV's) are initiated and committed by both sides and show a symmetry. The response to a CFV at one location can lead to shooting at an entirely different area. Weapons used on the LoC include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades , recoilless rifles , mortars , automatic grenade launchers , rocket launchers and
6750-432: The Indian side. Crossing legally for civilians is not easy. A number of documents are required and verified by both countries, including proof of family on the other side. Even a short-term, temporary crossing invites interrogation by government agencies. The Indian and Pakistani military use these crossing points for flag meetings and to exchange sweets during special occasions and festivals. On 21 October 2008, for
6900-560: The Indian supplies are moved along a path hugging the Sando nullah, Pakistani supplies are moved through the Palawar-Bunyal road, which runs along the Shingo river. Their supplies are first off-loaded in nearby villages such as Gultari and Farnshat, then sent to frontline positions including Point 5353. The Indian deployment on the 18,400 feet (5608 metres) mountain feature in the Kaksar sector along
7050-404: The Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilising forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing most of
7200-464: The Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998. After the war, Nawaz Sharif , Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about
7350-415: The Kargil war, the Pakistani military planners had been becoming increasingly concerned about their vulnerabilities in this region, having lost posts on the LoC at Marpo La to India before in the pre-Kargil period. To the south of the feature on the Pakistani side, however, lies a strongly glaciated tract, rendering the terrain inhospitable to the Pakistani army, which as a result has been pushed 5–6 km at
7500-492: The Kargil war: seize Point 5353. While throughout April and May 2002, Point 5353 was pulverised with metal from Bofors guns , sometimes 10,000 rounds a day, Concourse missiles, cargo ammunition and air defence guns in direct fire, by May-end, Point 5070, a pivotal feature about 10 km west of Point 5353, was quietly seized in a brilliant stealth operation. The post was named Balwan after the Jat regiment that took it. Balwan had turned
7650-497: The Kashmir Cross LoC Travel and Trade Authority Act, 2016, the following crossing points are listed: Trade points include: Chakothi – Salamabad and Rawalakot (Titrinote) – Poonch (Chakkan-da-Bagh). The ordinance passed in 2011. Between 2005 and 2017, and according to Travel and Trade Authority figures, Muzaffarabad, Indian Kashmiris crossing over into Pakistan was about 14,000, while about 22,000 have crossed over to
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#17328582043697800-517: The Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict , but such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage. As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet US President Bill Clinton on 4 July to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in
7950-814: The Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Jammu and Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Pakistani Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz , and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed there were no mujahideen but only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil War. "There were no Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition", Lt Gen Aziz wrote in his article in The Nation daily in January 2013. Some writers have speculated that
8100-458: The LOC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war. G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC. China , a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LOC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organisations like
8250-547: The LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas , Kargil has a continental climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F). An Indian national highway ( NH 1 ) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160-kilometre (100 mi) long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on
8400-573: The Line of Control bisecting the Ladakh district, with the Skardu tehsil going to Pakistan (now part of Gilgit-Baltistan ). After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 , the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary. The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 mi) from Srinagar , facing the Northern Areas across
8550-399: The LoC assumes significance in this context, for this feature overlooks the Shingo river valley in Pakistan. Sitting at this height, the Indian troops can subject the Palawar-Bunyal road to artillery fire at their convenience. Indian troops are also deployed on the adjacent Point 5240, which is another important feature that allows observation of the area. Both Points 5070 and 5240 also overlook
8700-484: The LoC in the Batalik sector. He further said that it was "unclear" why, if Point 5353 was not on its side or assumed to straddle the LoC, had the army occupied two peaks on the Pakistani side of the LoC with a view to barter them for Points 5353 and 5240. Swami, however, noted that the 16 Grenadiers' records "interestingly" showed Point 5353 as "a minor objective," and so did the entries in the service records of its CO Colonel Oberoi. He went on to note that "this assessment
8850-405: The LoC to verify the facts." Pakistan, the very next day, on 31 August, denied the allegations. BBC News quoted Pakistan's Foreign Ministry 's spokesman as saying that "Pakistan respected the Line of Control (LoC) with India" and its troops had not violated the ceasefire line. The BBC news report noted that Anand's claim "followed a report in an Indian newspaper that a strategic peak, Point 5353,
9000-431: The LoC, in what was designated as Operation Safed Sagar ( Hindi : ऑपरेशन सफेद सागर , lit. ' White Sea ' ). The conflict was triggered by the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants —into strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC, which serves as the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed region of Kashmir . During its initial stages, Pakistan blamed
9150-584: The LoC, with the media blaming the other side for the firing and each side claiming an adequate retaliation. According to Happymon Jacob, the reasons for CFVs along the LoC include operational reasons (defence construction like observation facilities, the rule of the gun, lack of bilateral mechanisms for border management, personality traits and the emotional state of soldiers and commanders), politico-strategic reasons, proportional response (land grab, sniping triggered, "I am better than you", revenge firing), accidental CFVs (civilian related, lack of clarity where
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#17328582043699300-451: The LoC, such as Point 5108, Twin Bumps and Taimur offer it a comparatively better view of the highway. According to a senior Indian army artillery officer who had served in the area, India enjoys the advantage in this region, for it can subject greater stretches of Palawar-Bunyal Road under artillery fire. According to him, a number of Indian posts offer the Indian army an "unrivalled visibility" of
9450-516: The LoC. The Kargil War is the most recent example of high-altitude warfare in mountainous terrain , and as such, posed significant logistical problems for the combatting sides. It also marks one of only two instances of conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states (alongside the Sino-Soviet border conflict ). India had conducted its first successful test in 1974 ; Pakistan, which had been developing its nuclear capability in secret since around
9600-561: The Pakistan side of the LoC to the Indian Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir through the Chakan Da Bagh crossing point. It is a major route for cross LoC trade and travel. Banking facilities and a trade facilitation centre are being planned on the Indian side for the benefit of traders. Most of the flag meetings between Indian and Pakistani security forces are held here. The fourth border crossing between Tattapani and Mendhar
9750-454: The Pakistan side on the LoC have been instrumental in influencing infiltration and ceasefire violations; they have approached nearby Pakistani Army camps directly and insisted infiltration stop, which reduces India's cross LoC firing. Documentaries covering the LoC and related events include A journey through River Vitasta, Raja Shabir Khan's Line of Control and HistoryTV18 's Kargil: Valour & Victory. A number of Bollywood films on
9900-612: The Pakistani Brigade Commander and GOC of the Northern Areas for losing this peak. Subsequently, a new Commander of the Northern Areas was appointed. On 10 June 2002, an Indian Army patrol managed to make their way to Point 5353, where they found several wounded Pakistani soldiers crying for help. Afterwards, the date of the attack on Point 5353 was fixed for 17 June. The then Indian Army's northern area commander , Lieutenant general R.K. Nanavaty went to New Delhi with
10050-491: The Pakistani army could direct artillery fire up to a 20 km stretch of the Indian highway. In the wake of artillery duels during Operation Parakram, however, he noted that the Pakistani soldiers at Point 5353 were unable to do so, whereas the Indians were able to blow up the Pakistani positions on Point 5353 using Bofors howitzers from the surrounding heights of Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100. Indian army officers state, citing what they call an "intervisibility exercise on
10200-674: The Pakistani forces on Point 5353 should have been able to pass on corrections that would have enabled their artillery to obliterate Sando Top. If, that is, the Pakistani troops on Point 5353 had been given the chance. Indian soldiers on three posts, namely Point 5165, Point 5240 and Point 5100, guided their superior 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers with devastating accuracy. Pakistani troops on Point 5353 were first hit with smoke-filled mortar shells, to flush them out of their bunkers, and then with air-burst artillery, which showered down shards of metal at great speed. Well over 40 Pakistanis are believed to have died on Point 5353. Pakistan could not reinforce
10350-426: The Pakistani supply route for Point 5353. Point 5353, in turn, dominates the eastern shoulder of the Marpo La pass and the Sando nullah approach to the pass. Since it is the tallest peak in the immediate area, it is said to be a "dominating feature". For the Pakistani army, the access to this peak has not lead to a significant increase in their capacity to observe the Indian highway. Several of its posts, on its side of
10500-453: The Pakistanis control Point 5353, because that is what the terrain allows. They believed that the tactical advantage to Pakistan from controlling the point 5353 is minimal. At a press conference on 30 August 2000, an opposition party leader, Ram Kumar Anand , alleged that Point 5353, along with five other peaks that belonged to India, was still in the occupation of Pakistan, contrary to what
10650-464: The Point 5353 was "inside the Indian side of the Line of Control" and the Pakistani troops "held the mountain through the Kargil war and continue to do so today." According to Swami, "Artillery observers on peak 5,353 metres can direct accurate artillery fire on to up to 20 km of the National Highway 1A , and cripple Indian defensive positions from Mushkoh to Bhimbet." Swami narrated that, during
10800-536: The Point 5353. Both points 5070 and 5240 are currently held by India, and are situated on the LoC. The Sando nullah (stream) starts just below the Marpo La pass and flows southeast, joining the Drass River. A track running alongside the Sando Nullah is the key communication link between the town of Dras and the Marpo La pass. The Marpo La ridge originates from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control and consists of
10950-452: The US. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the LOC were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and
11100-481: The ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously , confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between
11250-402: The attack for reasons "still not clear". The report further claimed that the Pakistani troops, upon detecting Indian activity at 5240, retaliated at point 5353 and by November 1999, established themselves at the peak. Subsequently, they put up concrete bunkers on the peak and constructed a road linking the base of the peak to Benazir Post. Swami believed that the Indian Army then attempted to force
11400-428: The attack was called off. Praveen Swami wrote on 10 March 2004: When Operation Parakram began a little over three years ago, both the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army began trading ferocious artillery fire up and down the LoC. In the high mountains, sudden winds and unpredictable atmospheric conditions ensure that shells rarely land where gunners intend them to. But, with a direct line of observation available to them,
11550-519: The back, along the Shingo river, for building defences. This, as a result, has greatly degraded the tactical usefulness of this feature. India, in turns, controls Point 5070, a strategically important peak along the Marpo La pass. It lies on the Pakistani side of the LoC, about 10 km west of Point 5353. The rest of the area in this region is glaciated, including what is called the Pariyon Ka Talab (literally meaning, "the pond of fairies"). Whereas
11700-643: The conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict . During the winter of 1998–1999, some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in
11850-433: The east, it is known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). After the partition of India , present-day India and Pakistan contested the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir – India because of the ruler's accession to the country, and Pakistan by virtue of the state's Muslim-majority population. The First Kashmir War in 1947 lasted more than a year until a ceasefire was arranged through UN mediation . Both sides agreed on
12000-481: The feature vacated by us, 16 GREN was directed to occupy Pt 5245 which was southeast of Pt 5353. With this event the war ended in the Mushkoh–Drass sector. The Times of India quoted Indian Army officers saying that the Line of Control in the area follows an "imaginary line" connecting high points such as Points 5070, 5353, 5245 and 5608. It was said that the Indian forces control the highest one, Point 5608, whereas
12150-567: The fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid . The Indian Army, later supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LoC; facing international diplomatic opposition, Pakistani forces withdrew from all remaining Indian positions along
12300-479: The final plan and for the green signal. Richard Armitage , then American Deputy Secretary of State had arrived in Delhi a few days earlier, where he had revealed General Musharraf's pledge, in his words: "To end cross-border terrorism permanently, visibly, irreversibly and to the satisfaction of India." Hence, George Fernandes, then India's defence minister denied permission to General Nanavaty to attack Point 5353 and thus
12450-555: The first line of defence along the LoC. Armed soldiers man these positions with enough supplies for at least a week. The posts and bunkers allow soldiers to sleep, cook, and keep a watch on enemy positions round the clock. Some posts are located in remote locations. Animals are sometimes used to help transport loads, and at some posts animals are reared. The living quarters and the forward facing bunker are located at some distance apart. The locations of some posts do not follow any pre-ordained plan, rather they are in locations used during
12600-525: The first time in 61 years, cross-LoC trade was conducted between the two sides. Trade across the LoC is barter trade. In ten years, trade worth nearly PKR 11,446 crore or ₹ 5,000 crore (equivalent to ₹ 67 billion or US$ 800 million in 2023) has passed through the Chakothi – Salamabad crossing. The Teetwal crossing is across the Neelum River between Muzaffarabad and Kupwara . It
12750-634: The flank of Pakistani defences in the Dras sector. The Indian Army now had a grand view and domination of the Gultari valley through which Pakistani posts are maintained in Dras." The surprise loss of Point 5070 drew furious reaction from Pakistan Army, who used to occupy this peak during summer. The Pakistani troops launched several counter-attacks but failed to retake Point 5070, as the Indians, despite suffering heavy casualties, continued to hold onto this feature. Consequently, an enraged General Pervez Musharraf removed entire Pakistani chain of command , including
12900-459: The guise of mujahideen , into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier , thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise
13050-538: The high altitude and freezing temperatures. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu , which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. A road between Kargil and Skardu exists , which was closed in 1949. After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 , there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving
13200-402: The high peaks that the Indian army had vacated with the onset of the winter in the region and directed artillery fire at the highway, which led to Indian retaliation and the small-scale conflict known as the Kargil War . The Indian Army fought to regain control of peaks it had lost to the intruders on its side of the LoC. These included Tiger Hill and Tololing peaks and ridgelines, which posed
13350-517: The highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their 130+ covertly occupied observation posts , the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was the main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road threatened to cut Leh off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh ,
13500-421: The infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led by Capt Saurabh Kalia , who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within
13650-414: The international arena, its precarious economic situation, and the mounting international pressure, the Pakistani establishment was compelled to negotiate a face saving withdrawal from the residual areas on the Indian side of the LoC, thereby restoring the sanctity of the LoC, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement . Pakistan was heavily criticised by other countries for instigating
13800-443: The invading force back across the LOC. The Battle of Tololing , amongst other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favour. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After
13950-512: The last week of July in co-ordination with relentless attacks by the IAF, both by day and night, in their totally successful Operation Safed Sagar ; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on 26 July. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. In the wake of its successive military defeats in Kargil, diplomatic isolation in
14100-574: The line goes over a peak, nobody occupies it." Nonetheless, it noted that "even if Fernandes is taken at his word, the continued occupation of Point 5353 by the Baluch battalion means that Pakistan has departed from “normal practice”." Ashok Mehta, in his article in The Tribune , said, "Parakram had opened a window of opportunity in the Kargil sector for the new 14 Corps to complete the Army's unfinished agenda for
14250-414: The line is roughly the same as the original 1949 cease-fire line . The part of the former princely state under Indian control is divided into the union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh . The Pakistani-controlled section is divided into Azad Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan . The northernmost point of the Line of Control is known as NJ9842 , beyond which lies the Siachen Glacier , which became
14400-490: The line is) and other reasons (like testing the new boys, honour, prestige and humiliation, fun, gamesmanship). Jacob ranks operational reasons as the main cause for CFVs, followed by retributive and politico-strategic reasons . Mines have been laid across the India–Pakistan border and the LoC in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 2001. The small stretch of land between the rows of fencing is mined with thousands of landmines . During
14550-481: The map that was shown to them, the Point 5353 was on the LoC. In his book, MASHKOH: Kargil as I saw it , Brigadier Umesh Singh Bawa, who was the commanding officer of his unit 17 Jat at that time, writes that in June 1998, when his unit was sent to Uplona, Baramulla for a mountain warfare course, he knew "something was brewing" over the LoC in the wake of the nuclear explosions that the two countries had carried out earlier in
14700-492: The militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral] talks". On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing
14850-406: The military forces of the two neighbours—notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir , some of which were supported by Pakistan, as well as
15000-570: The mobilisation of Indian land forces on 26 May. The Indian government cleared limited use of Air Power only on 25 May, for fear of undesirable escalation, with the fiat that IAF fighter jets were not to cross the LOC under any circumstance. This was the first time any air war was fought at such high altitudes globally, with targets at altitudes between 1,800 to 5,500 metres (6,000 to 18,000 ft) above sea level . The rarified air at these altitudes affected ballistic trajectories of air to ground weapons, such as rockets, dumb and laser guided bombs. There
15150-580: The negotiations. However, the consensus did not survive the immediate post-Kargil period. The Indians reoccupied Point 5240, besides Point 5165, in August 1999, while the Pakistanis, in turn, took control of Point 5353. For Pakistan, the strategic significance and their purpose for holding onto this feature lie in the fact that it provides them a view of the strategically important Marpo La pass, which India dominates. According to one assessment, without Point 5353, they had been finding it difficult to do so. Even before
15300-499: The operation's objective may also have been retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier. According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik , and many scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders ( Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto ) similar proposals for infiltration into
15450-454: The orientation of Point 5353 or the Army's intent to recapture it. For instance, PTI reported in August 1999, "Meanwhile, fighting is still going on for recapturing the point 5353 in Mushkoh valley, situated on the Line of Control (LOC), which Islamabad claims to be part of Pakistan." Soon after the Kargil War was over, some Indian media reported that Point 5353, a strategically important peak in
15600-421: The outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel , who was then an aide to President Bill Clinton , reported that US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from
15750-423: The outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 5,500 metres (18,000 ft). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for
15900-521: The peaks, which the local commanders of the two armies had agreed to leave unoccupied, were Points 5165, 5353 and 5240, which, he wrote, were all on the LoC. It is in this context, he noted that "None of these was ever with the Indian Army. Nor were these at the time in Pakistani possession." He said that Point 5240 was captured by the Indian troops in late October 1999. Thereafter, they took Point 5165 as well in order to forestall their capture by Pakistanis. According to Ashok Mehta, "Taking Points 5240 and 5165
16050-402: The planning that the task at hand was going to be daunting, and fraught with peril. The feature had extremely steep slopes on the front face, due to which an assault from the front could not be mounted. The rear slopes were found to be more gradual, but attacking from the rear, Bawa said, entailed crossing the LoC at night and the risk of getting detected by dawn as the area lacked any cover. Bawa
16200-403: The posts that were in the line-of-sight . The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy it. The Indian Air Force was tasked to act jointly with ground troops on 25 May. The code name assigned to their role was Operation Safed Sagar It
16350-652: The recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route. This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier . The recapture of Point 4590 on Tololing by Indian troops on 14 June
16500-426: The region. But Bawa states, "I had a task in hand and had to complete what come may". Bawa proceeded about his task collecting information and drawing up his plan. He wanted the 16 grenadiers to send patrols to guide his unit as they were new to the area, but as it turned out the 16 grenadiers themselves had no idea about the terrain, for they had not sent patrols across the LoC hitherto themselves. Bawa realized during
16650-459: The regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on 132 vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries . According to General Ved Malik , the bulk of the infiltration occurred in April. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along
16800-489: The respective regions of Kashmir. The Shingo and Dras rivers join together further east near Kakshar . To the south of the Line of Control is India's Kargil district and to the north is Pakistan's Skardu district . A dominating feature in the area is Point 5608, which lies about 15 km to the east of Point 5353 in the Kaksar sector. It overlooks the Shingo Valley in Pakistan. Indian troops took control of this feature in
16950-524: The ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 m (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 m (17,995 ft). Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushkoh Valley and the town of Drass , southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas northeast of Kargil. Kargil was targeted partly because
17100-458: The road. The Indian Army says that the Pakistani occupation of Point 5353 does not pose a great threat to the National Highway or to its supply lines, and that the peak is not comparable in strategic importance to Tololing and Tiger Hill. Former Lt. Col. Kuldip Singh Ludra states, Point 5353 "dominates, by observation and fire, the complete area on both side of the Line of Control." In 2000, Praveen Swami claimed in his reports that from Point 5353,
17250-478: The role of investigating ceasefire violations (CFVs), however their role decreased after 1971. In 2000, US President Bill Clinton referred to the Indian subcontinent and the Kashmir Line of Control, in particular, as one of the most dangerous places in the world. The LoC from Kargil to Gurez comprises mountain passes and valleys with small streams and rivers. The area up to around 14,000 feet (4,300 m)
17400-458: The same time, conducted its first known tests in 1998 , just two weeks after a second series of tests by India . Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was a tehsil of Ladakh , a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 concluded with
17550-416: The same year. At that time, the Pakistani army had been shelling the Indian highway to specifically target the Indian vehicles that were being used to transport supplies for the forthcoming winter. In retribution for the shelling, the Indian senior commanders had ordered Bawa's 17 Jat, besides 14 JAK RIF, which was till then held in reserves, for carrying out offensive operations across the LoC. Bawa's unit
17700-494: The situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee , his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies ", a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan. Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on 20 February. There were three major phases to
17850-406: The summit and southern side of Point 5353 were "unmistakenly on the Indian side of the LoC". In his later works, however, Swami noted that the LoC passed through the summit of Point 5353. A couple of other Indian newspapers have stated that Point 5353 was in Indian territory. While several other newspapers and commentators state that the point lies on the LoC. In 2002, The Telegraph reported that in
18000-444: The summit of Point 5353. He wrote, "Consider, for example, the case of Point 5353, named for its height in metres above sea level, from the summit of which the LoC takes a gentle southeastern turn. In the wake of the Kargil War, a series of local tactical errors allowed Pakistan to occupy the southern face of Point 5353, allowing enemy forces a clear view of Sando Top, an important post." In this context, General Ved Prakash Malik , who
18150-432: The terrain was conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to that of a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by
18300-473: The territories held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the LOC after international pressure. During February 1999, the Pakistan Army sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of
18450-561: The then editor-in-chief, C.R. Irani (who passed away on 23 July 2005), a journalist known for his courage and convictions, he promptly wrote an editorial entitled 'Sorry Chief! We Apologize for the Publication Yesterday'. In this column, he not only apologized but also condemned political leaders tending to denigrate the Army by making unverified statements. The Point 5353 controversy erupted once again during " Operation Parakram " (India's Code name for its military mobilization along
18600-404: The time of the war. The Marpo La pass is one of very few passes in the high Himalayas of Ladakh that allows north–south communication. The 1949 Cease-Fire Line between India and Pakistan as well as the 1972 Line of Control pass through the Marpo La pass. The ridge adjoining the pass to the east, which is also referred to as the 'Marpo La ridge', runs in a northwest-southeast axis and contains
18750-452: The troops since the Indian soldiers on Point 5165 and Point 5240 were in a position to hit their supply lines. Kargil War Indian victory Indian official figures: Pakistani claims: Independent figures: Pakistani figures: Indian claims: Other conflicts Border skirmishes Strikes The Kargil War , also known as the Kargil conflict , was fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in
18900-421: The wake of Operation Parakram. According to the Indian Army sources, the Point 5353 itself is on the Line of Control. However, after the end of the Kargil War , a controversy erupted in India as to which side of the Line of Control the peak lay. Point 5070, 3 km west of Point 5353 is the closest peak to the Marpo La pass. The second tallest peak on the Marpo La ridge, Point 5240, is 1.2 km southeast of
19050-628: The wake of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 . It, too, was delineated on maps during the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. The LoC corresponds virtually to the 1949 CFL, save for minor deviations. It runs from the India–Pakistan border in the south to Point NJ9842 , covering a length of 740 kilometre. In this region, both the 1949 CFL and the 1972 LoC pass through high peaks, starting from Point 17561 (5353m), thence through Point 17352 (5289m) and finally through Point 18400 (5608m). Praveen Swami, based on Army's one-inch maps, had estimated that
19200-445: The war, as its paramilitary forces and insurgents had crossed the LOC ( Line of Control ). Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters ", was in the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" would neither have
19350-513: The war, the Indian commander Amar Aul of the 56 Mountain Brigade was given the objective of securing point 5353, but he occupied two peaks on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, point 4875 and point 4251 before the ceasefire came into force. Aul's tactics, according to Swami, were "designed to secure a subsequent territorial exchange." In the negotiations carried out between the Brigadier Aul and
19500-460: The zero line. Pakistan has not constructed a border fence, however a number of villages lie near the zero line. In the Tithwal area, 13 villages are in front of the Indian fence. The total number between the fence and zero line on the Indian side is estimated to be 60 villages and at least one million people are spread over the districts adjacent to the LoC from Rajouri to Bandipora . According to
19650-594: Was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds. One Indian Mi-8 helicopter was also lost due to Stinger SAMs . French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces and flew its first sortie on 30 May. The effects of the pinpoint non-stop bombing by the Mirage-2000, by day and by night, became evident with almost immediate effect. In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge
19800-470: Was completed in late 2004. LoC fencing was completed in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu region on 30 September 2004. According to Indian military sources, the fence has reduced the numbers of militants who routinely cross into the Indian side of the disputed region by 80%. In 2017, a proposal for an upgraded smart fence on the Indian side was accepted. A number of villages lie between the Indian fence and
19950-412: Was delineated by six army officers each of India and Pakistan and signed on 11 December 1972. Its territorial precision is remarkable, according to scholar Brian Cloughley. Along with the agreement, a series of maps indicating the boundary were also prepared and exchanged by the two sides. The LoC upon coming into effect superseded the erstwhile ceasefire line (CFL) of 1949. The CFL had come into effect in
20100-745: Was generated on the status of Pt 5353 after the war. This feature lies on the Pakistan side and to capture it, the attacking troops have to approach from the north entailing crossing the LC . Since the LC was not to be crossed and the feature being on Pakistan side, we had no plans to secure it. The enemy occupied Pt 5353 as an observation post . In turn, we were in occupation of a feature on the LC. The Pakistani CO established radio contact with CO 16 GREN and requested vacation from this feature. We asked him to reciprocate and vacate Pt 5353 to which he agreed. However, he reoccupied Pt 5353 on 2 August and in retaliation besides occupying
20250-412: Was in possession of the peak, which it said was flanked on either side (east and west) by a battalion each of Northern Light Infantry and Punjab Regiment , supported by the Pakistani brigade headquarters at Gultari . It further stated that Point 5353 is on the Marpo La ridgeline that runs on or parallel to the Line of Control. Other spurs of the peak run south into the Dras sector. To its immediate south
20400-411: Was in the area of responsibility of 16 Grenadiers, which was the holding battalion, based in Dras, and had two companies deployed on the LoC in the area. Its commanding officer, Colonel Pushpinder Oberoi, Bawa learned through liaison, was not keen on the prospect of carrying out offensive operations across the LoC, as he thought that would entail changing the status quo, which would have created tensions in
20550-525: Was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used, initially with limited effectiveness. On 27 May 1999, the IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft piloted by Flt. Lt. Nachiketa , which it attributed to an engine failure , and a MiG-21 fighter piloted by Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja which was shot down by the Pakistani army, both over Batalik sector.; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory. According to reports, Ahuja had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but
20700-441: Was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-scale war had broken out. The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1 (India) (NH1) from Srinagar to Leh, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed down traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1 (the actual stretch of
20850-489: Was no opposition at all by the Pakistani Air Force, leaving the IAF free to carry out its attacks with impunity. The total air dominance of the IAF gave the aircrew enough time to modify aiming indices and firing techniques, increasing its effectiveness during the high altitude war. Poor weather conditions and range limitations intermittently affected bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used, except for
21000-466: Was not difficult, keeping them was tough. The mystery was over not taking Point 5353. It appears the unit asked to do so said it was impossible to get there. But Pakistan had breached the local commanders' agreement and turned Point 5353 into a rope-maintained permanent post." Four years later, Swami himself took a contradictory position. Writing in the Frontline , he described the LoC to be passing through
21150-572: Was occupying these posts before the war. Pakistan had occupied it before the war and it was not in our area…", while adding that no attempt was made to capture Point-5353. In his book Kargil: Turning the Tide , Lieutenant general Mohinder Puri, who was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 8 Mountain Division during the Kargil War, gives his account of the matter: A lot of controversy
21300-484: Was once again brought into this political crossfire. It was alleged that the Army had not disclosed the true facts. There were several critical reports in the media the next day. Despite denials by Army Headquarters, and even by the Pakistani military spokesman, the controversy continued. A rather vicious report was published in the Statesman, New Delhi, in the first week of September 1999. When factual details were conveyed to
21450-590: Was opened on 14 November 2005. The Line of Control divided the Kashmir into two and closed the Jhelum valley route, the only way in and out of the Kashmir Valley from Pakistani Punjab . This ongoing territorial division severed many villages and separated family members. Some families could see each other along the LoC in locations such as the Neelum River, but were unable to meet. In certain locations, women on
21600-419: Was prompt to report that it had not violated the Line of Control in Kargil." General Malik, in his book Kargil: From Surprise to Victory , discusses the matter in the context of Anand's allegations: In August 2000, an opposition party leader held a press conference and, without ascertaining facts from the Army, claimed that Pakistan was continuing to occupy six peaks on our side of the LoC in Kargil. The Army
21750-418: Was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict. Although most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war. Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1, the Indian Army turned to driving
21900-543: Was still contemplating about his course of action, when, in late September, 1998, the Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee initiated a peace process with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in the form of back channel efforts. Thereafter, the operations were put on hold and ultimately countermanded by the army. Some correspondents state that during the Kargil War itself there was never any doubt about
22050-497: Was the Indian Army Chief of Staff during the Kargil war, stated: "The LoC in this area was drawn in 1972 by joining several heights (points) with straight lines. The line went over Point-5353. Sometime after 1972 - well before Kargil war - the Pakistan army had occupied it. During the war, 8 Mountain division made no attempt to capture it." Similarly, Lieutenant General Amar Aul, who was named by Swami in his reports, said: "No army
22200-403: Was then moved to Sonamarg in early-September, 1998, and was allowed the time for the requisite acclimatization and preparation. Bawa narrates that his unit was allotted the task of capturing Point 5353, "across the LoC, close to Marpo La", with a view to silence the artillery observation post that had been supervising the shelling on the Indian highway and elsewhere in Dras. Bawa's objective
22350-413: Was under Pakistani occupation." The Indian government, on its part, dismissed Anand's allegations as "motivated" and "harmful to the security interests of the country. Indian defence ministry on 1 September 2000 issued a press release that stated: "It is clarified that Point 5353 is on the line of control and not inside the territory under India's control" and "the controversy being raked up on this issue
22500-559: Was vindicated during the artillery clashes in 2001-2002, when the Pakistani observation posts on Point 5353 were unable to bring accurate fire to bear on either the highway or nearby Indian positions. The Indian troops were able to tie down the Pakistani position with accurate fire, rendering it near-impossible for its superior altitude to be used to good effect." Writing in The Tribune in 2004, Ashok K. Mehta , an independent security analyst based in New Delhi, India, however pointed out that
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