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109-404: The architecture of the mausoleum was sumptuous. It was largely destroyed in the aerial bombardments of World War II . The mausoleum was constructed for Tokugawa Hidetada, who died in 1632. His Buddhist posthumous name is Taitoku-in. The location was in the southern part of Zojo-ji. The main construction took around six months and was made largely with wood. The complex with its 15 structures

218-855: A potential United States invasion. In late 1943, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal to begin the strategic air campaign against the Japanese home islands and East Asia by basing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers in India and establishing forward airfields in China. This strategy, designated Operation Matterhorn , involved the construction of large airstrips near Chengdu in inland China which would be used to refuel B-29s traveling from bases in Bengal en route to targets in Japan. Chennault, by now

327-492: A result of combat or mechanical faults and a further 42 damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Following the attack on Tokyo, the Japanese government ordered the evacuation of all schoolchildren in the third to sixth grades from the main cities, and 87 percent of them had departed to the countryside by early April. XXI Bomber Command followed up the firebombing of Tokyo with similar raids against other major cities. On 11 March 310 B-29s were dispatched against Nagoya. The bombing

436-513: A result, the B-29s were able to inflict severe damage on urban areas while suffering few losses. The Allied bombing campaign was one of the main factors which influenced the Japanese government's decision to surrender in mid-August 1945. However, there has been a long-running debate over the morality of the attacks on Japanese cities, and the use of atomic weapons is particularly controversial . The most commonly cited estimate of Japanese casualties from

545-1043: A result, the forces were unable to react to a sudden air attack. Japanese cities were highly vulnerable to damage from firebombing due to their design and the weak state of the country's civil defense organization. Urban areas were typically congested, and most buildings were constructed from highly flammable materials such as paper and wood. In addition, industrial and military facilities in urban areas were normally surrounded by densely populated residential buildings. Despite this vulnerability, few cities had full-time professional firefighters and most relied on volunteers. Such firefighting forces that did exist lacked modern equipment and used outdated tactics. Air raid drills had been held in Tokyo and Osaka since 1928, however, and from 1937 local governments were required to provide civilians with manuals that explained how to respond to air attacks. Few air-raid shelters and other air defense facilities for civilians and industry were constructed prior to

654-506: A series of raids against the Kurils to suppress the Japanese air units stationed there. The first of these attacks was made against southern Shumshu and northern Paramushiru by eight B-25s on 10 July. The Kurils were attacked again on 18 July by six B-24 Liberator heavy bombers, and the unopposed liberation of Kiska ( Operation Cottage ) took place on 15 August. The Eleventh Air Force and US Navy units continued to make small-scale raids on

763-749: A small force of B-29s destroyed an airframe factory at Konan. XXI Bomber Command reached its full strength in April when the 58th and 315th Bombardment Wings arrived in the Marianas; at this time the command comprised five wings equipped with a total of 1,002 B-29s and was the most powerful air unit in the world. After being released from supporting the Okinawa campaign, XXI Bomber Command conducted an intensive firebombing campaign against Japan's main cities from mid-May. A force of 472 B-29s struck Nagoya by day on 13 May and destroyed 3.15 square miles (8.2 km ) of

872-506: A training program and improved the organization of the B-29 maintenance units during August and September. A raid against Ōmura on 25 October destroyed the city's small aircraft factory, though a follow-up raid on 11 November ended in failure. The city was attacked again by 61 B-29s on 21 November and by 17 bombers on 19 December. XX Bomber Command made its ninth and final raid on Japan on 6 January 1945 when 28 B-29s once again struck Ōmura. During

981-451: The Battle of Iwo Jima . However, these attacks were frustrated by high winds and cloud cover and little damage was inflicted. A firebombing raid conducted against Tokyo by 172 B-29s on 25 February was considered successful as it burnt or damaged approximately one square mile of the city's urban area. This attack was a large-scale test of the effectiveness of firebombing. Several factors explain

1090-500: The Home Ministry directed households in the major cities to build their own shelters, though these were normally only trenches . A small number of sophisticated shelters were constructed for air defense headquarters and to protect key telephone facilities. However, less than two percent of civilians had access to bombproof air-raid shelters, though tunnels and natural caves were also used to protect civilians from B-29 raids. Following

1199-545: The Ryukyu Islands also frequently struck targets in Japan during 1945 in preparation for the planned invasion of Japan scheduled for October 1945. During early August 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were struck and mostly destroyed by atomic bombs . Japan's military and civil defenses were unable to stop the Allied attacks. The number of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns assigned to defensive duties in

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1308-507: The invasion of Okinawa , an island only a few hundred miles south of the home islands. Prior to the landings on 1 April, the Command bombed airfields in Kyushu at Ōita and Tachiarai as well as an aircraft plant at Ōmura on 27 March, and struck Ōita and Tachiarai again on the 31st of the month. No B-29s were lost in these raids. From 6 April the Japanese conducted large-scale kamikaze air raids on

1417-600: The 1960. The So-mon gate was moved 45 metres to the east of the original location in 1959, to make space for a hotel. A large miniature model of the main two halls was commissioned by the city of Tokyo for the 1910 Japan–British Exhibition in London. It was given as a gift to King George V and was later displayed at the Royal Botanical Gardens in Kew then dismantled and stored in an obscure location along with other treasures of

1526-418: The 251 aircraft dispatched were shot down. B-29s also began to drop propaganda leaflets over Japan during March. These leaflets called on Japanese civilians to overthrow their government or face destruction. The USAAF assessed that the firebombing campaign had been highly successful, and noted that American losses during these attacks were much lower than those incurred during day precision raids. Accordingly,

1635-469: The Allied invasion fleet, during which suicide aircraft damaged or sank many warships and transports. As part of the Allied response to these attacks, XXI Bomber Command conducted major raids on airfields in Kyushu on 8 and 16 April, though the first of these attacks was diverted to strike residential areas in Kagoshima after the airfields were found to be covered by clouds. From 17 April until 11 May, when

1744-455: The Allied invasion of Japan, LeMay and some members of Arnold's staff believed that it alone would be sufficient to force the country's surrender. The Japanese government was concerned about the results of the March firebombing attacks as the raids had demonstrated that the Japanese military was unable to protect the nation's airspace. As well as the extensive physical damage in the targeted cities,

1853-428: The B-29 force was intercepted by over 100 fighters. Twelve of the sixty-one Superfortresses that reached the target area were shot down, including one which was destroyed in a suicide ramming attack. Japanese government propaganda claimed that 100 bombers had been downed during this attack, and one of the crashed B-29s was placed on display in Tokyo. XX Bomber Command's performance improved after LeMay instituted

1962-498: The B-29s were released for other duties, about three-quarters of XXI Bomber Command's effort was devoted to attacking airfields and other targets in direct support of the Battle of Okinawa; this included 2,104 sorties flown against 17 airfields. These raids cost the Command 24 B-29s destroyed and 233 damaged and failed to completely suppress kamikaze attacks from the targeted airfields. A few attacks on Japanese cities were conducted during

2071-435: The B-29s' defensive guns removed; by reducing the weight of the aircraft in this way they were able to carry more bombs. These changes were not popular with XXI Bomber Command's aircrew, as they believed that it was safer to fly heavily armed aircraft at high altitude. The first firebombing attack in this campaign—codenamed Operation Meetinghouse —was carried out against Tokyo on the night of 9/10 March, and proved to be

2180-749: The Battle of Okinawa. On 1 April, a night precision bombing raid was flown against the Nakajima engine factory in Tokyo by 121 B-29s and three similar attacks were conducted against engine factories in Shizuoka , Koizumi and Tachikawa on the night of 3 April. These raids were unsuccessful as XXI Bomber Command lacked the specialized equipment needed to strike targets accurately at night, and LeMay decided not to conduct similar operations. Small forces of B-29s also struck Tokyo and nearby Kawasaki on 4 April. Two successful large-scale precision bombing raids were flown against aircraft factories in Tokyo and Nagoya on 7 April;

2289-555: The Central Pacific during October and November in preparation for their first attack on Japan. On 1 November, an F-13 photo reconnaissance variant of the B-29 from the 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron overflew Tokyo ; this was the first American aircraft to fly over the city since the Doolittle Raid. Further F-13 sorties were conducted during early November to gather intelligence on aircraft factories and port facilities in

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2398-723: The Crown. It was restored largely due to the work of Australian Professor William Howard Coaldrake who was invested as a member of the Royal Victorian Order at the behest of Queen Elizabeth II for his work. The model was returned in 2015 to Japan to be shown at a special exhibition at the Zojo-ji temple in Tokyo. Air raids on Japan Second Sino-Japanese War During the Pacific War , Allied forces conducted air raids on Japan from 1942 to 1945, causing extensive destruction to

2507-474: The Doolittle Raiders had intended to land. This offensive achieved its objectives and resulted in the deaths of 250,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians; many of these civilian deaths were due to war crimes . The destruction of the airfields and heavy casualties badly damaged China's war effort. The IJA also began developing fire balloons capable of carrying incendiary and anti-personnel bombs from Japan to

2616-575: The Fourteenth Air Force from undertaking more effective operations against Japanese positions and shipping. The official history of the USAAF judged that the difficulty of transporting adequate supplies to India and China was the most important factor behind the failure of Operation Matterhorn, though technical problems with the B-29s and the inexperience of their crews also hindered the campaign. The adverse weather conditions common over Japan also limited

2725-488: The IJAAF and IJN formations in the home islands were training units which had only a limited ability to counter Allied attacks. The Army also operated a network of military and civilian observation posts to provide warning of air attack and was in the process of building radar stations. Command and control of the air defenses was fragmented, and the IJAAF and IJN did not coordinate their activities or communicate with each other. As

2834-460: The Japanese aircraft industry. Three months later Chennault told United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt that a force of 105 modern fighters and 40 bombers (including twelve heavy bombers) would be able to "accomplish the downfall of Japan" within six to twelve months. The USAAF's headquarters did not regard these claims as credible, and Chennault's requests for reinforcements were not granted. The Japanese government's pre-war plans to protect

2943-555: The Joint Target Group (JTG), which was the Washington, D.C.-based organisation responsible for developing strategies for the air campaign against Japan, developed plans for a two-stage campaign against 22 Japanese cities. The JTG also recommended that precision bombing attacks on particularly important industrial facilities continue in parallel to the area raids, however. While this campaign was intended to form part of preparations for

3052-724: The Kuril Islands until the closing months of the war. The USAAF attacks were broken off for five months following a raid on 11 September 1943 when nine of the 20 B-24s and B-25s dispatched were lost, but raids by US Navy PBY Catalinas continued. In response to the American attacks, the IJN established the North-East Area Fleet in August 1943, and in November that year Japanese fighter strength in

3161-458: The Kurils and Hokkaidō peaked at 260 aircraft. The Eleventh Air Force resumed its offensive in February 1944 after it had been reinforced with two squadrons of P-38 Lightning escort fighters, and it continued to attack targets in the Kurils until June 1945. While these raids caused little damage, they caused the Japanese to divert large numbers of soldiers to defend their northern islands against

3270-786: The M-69 incendiary and packing 38 of them into the E-46 cluster bomb; these were shipped across the Pacific and stored for future use. Arnold and the Air Staff wanted to wait to use the incendiaries until a large-scale program of firebombing could be mounted, to overwhelm the Japanese city defenses. In light of the poor results of the precision bombing campaign and the success of the 25 February raid on Tokyo, and considering that many tons of incendiaries were now available to him, LeMay decided to begin firebombing attacks on Japan's main cities during early March 1945. This

3379-663: The Maritime Provinces' and American B-29s would have to be based far to the north of Vladivostok near the mouth of the Amur River in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. It was decided to press for this at Yalta. At the Yalta Conference one year later, Stalin told Roosevelt that American B-29s would be based at the remote Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. Antonov said that they would start preliminary base construction. However,

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3488-621: The Pacific War. The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) conducted a single attack on the Japanese home islands during the Second Sino-Japanese War . On 19 May 1938 two ROCAF Martin B-10 bombers dropped propaganda leaflets on Nagasaki , Fukuoka , Kurume , Saga , and other locations on Kyushu . These leaflets did not have any effect on Japanese civilians, but demonstrated that China could potentially conduct small scale air attacks on

3597-484: The Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The 58th Bombardment Wing was XX Bomber Command's main combat unit, and its movement from Kansas to India took place between April and mid-May 1944. The Japanese military began transferring fighter aircraft to the home islands from China and the Pacific in early 1944 in anticipation of B-29 raids. Japanese intelligence detected the construction of B-29 bases in India and China, and

3706-740: The Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. In spring 1944, the Soviets asked for assistance in creating a long-range bombing force for Japan, with 300 (lend-lease) B-24s and 240 B-29s. In negotiations in July and August, the United States agreed to supply 200 B-24s (50 per month; probably via Abadan) and to train operational and maintenance crews. But with difficulties over the arrangements, the USSR announced on 29 September that they would forego American training in view of

3815-476: The Soviet Union, though several crashed in Japanese-held territory after running out of fuel. Japanese casualties were 50 killed and over 400 wounded. About 200 houses were also destroyed. Although the Doolittle Raid caused little damage, it had important ramifications. The attack raised morale in the United States and its commander, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle , was seen as a hero. The weak state of

3924-460: The Tokyo–Yokosuka area. The F-13s were generally able to evade the heavy anti-aircraft fire they attracted and the large numbers of Japanese fighters that were scrambled to intercept them as they flew at both high speed and high altitude. XXI Bomber Command's initial attacks against Japan were focused on the country's aircraft industry. The first attack, codenamed Operation San Antonio I ,

4033-419: The USAAF commander from criticism if the attacks were unsuccessful. The Twentieth Air Force's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Lauris Norstad , was aware of the change in tactics though and provided support. The decision to use firebombing tactics represented a move away from the USAAF's previous focus on precision bombing, and was believed by senior officials in the military and US Government to be justified by

4142-524: The USAAF heavy bomber force in the Philippines was largely destroyed when Clark Air Base was attacked on 8 December 1941. The USAAF subsequently attempted to send thirteen heavy bombers to China in March and April 1942 to attack the Japanese home islands . These aircraft reached India, but remained there as the Japanese conquest of Burma caused logistics problems and Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek

4251-518: The United States and to avenge the attack on Pearl Harbor , 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers were carried from San Francisco to within range of Japan on the aircraft carrier USS  Hornet . These aircraft were launched on 18 April, and individually bombed targets in Tokyo, Yokohama , Yokosuka , Nagoya and Kobe . The Japanese air defense units were taken by surprise, and all the B-25s escaped without serious damage. The aircraft then continued to China and

4360-464: The area. The Japanese military later incorrectly concluded that the ROCAF had aircraft capable of mounting attacks at a range of 1,300 miles (2,100 km) from their bases, and took precautions against potential raids on western Japan when Chinese forces launched an offensive during 1939. USAAF aircraft bombed Japan for the first time in mid-April 1942. In an operation conducted primarily to raise morale in

4469-483: The arsenal district of Tokyo and destroyed 11.4 square miles (30 km ) of the city, including several armaments factories. On 15 April 303 Superfortresses attacked the Tokyo region and destroyed 6 square miles (16 km ) of Tokyo, 3.6 square miles (9.3 km ) of Kawasaki and 1.5 square miles (3.9 km ) of Yokohama for the loss of 12 bombers. On 24 April the Tachikawa aircraft engine factory at Yamato near Tokyo

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4578-422: The attack on Yawata, and by October, 375 aircraft were assigned to the three air defense air divisions. These divisions remained at about this strength until March 1945. Arnold relieved XX Bomber Command's commander, Brigadier General Kenneth Wolfe, shortly after the raid on Yawata when he was unable to make follow-up attacks on Japan due to insufficient fuel stockpiles at the bases in China. Wolfe's replacement

4687-468: The attacks also caused increased absenteeism as civilians were afraid to leave their homes to work in factories which might be bombed. Japanese air defenses were reinforced in response to the firebombing raids, but remained inadequate; 450 fighters were assigned to defensive duties in April. The start of the major firebombing campaign was delayed as XXI Bomber Command was used to attack airfields in southern Japan from late March to mid-May in support of

4796-452: The city and its main factories. Moreover, while improved maintenance procedures implemented by LeMay reduced the number of B-29s that had to return to base during raids due to technical problems, the Command suffered a loss rate of 5.1% in these operations. From 19 February to 3 March, XXI Bomber Command conducted a series of precision bombing raids on aircraft factories that sought to tie down Japanese air units so they could not participate in

4905-465: The city was removed from XXI Bomber Command's target list. The Command's last major raid of May was a daylight incendiary attack on Yokohama on 29 May conducted by 517 B-29s escorted by 101 P-51s. This force was intercepted by 150 A6M Zero fighters, sparking an intense air battle in which five B-29s were shot down and another 175 damaged. In return, the P-51 pilots claimed 26 "kills" and 23 "probables" for

5014-502: The city's aircraft plants. The third raid was a daylight incendiary attack which was conducted after the Twentieth Air Force directed that 100 B-29s armed with M-69 bombs be dispatched against Nagoya to test the effectiveness of these weapons on a Japanese city. Hansell protested this order, as he believed that precision attacks were starting to produce results and moving to area bombardment would be counterproductive, but agreed to

5123-604: The city's central area, including the headquarters of several key government ministries and much of the Tokyo Imperial Palace ; the bomber crews had been briefed to not target the palace as the US Government did not want to risk killing Emperor Hirohito . The Japanese defenses were relatively successful on this occasion, and 26 Superfortresses were shot down and another 100 damaged. By the end of these raids just over half (50.8 percent) of Tokyo had been destroyed and

5232-418: The city's urban area. The Tokyo police force and fire department estimated that 83,793 people were killed during the air raid, another 40,918 were injured and just over a million lost their homes; postwar estimates of deaths in this attack have ranged from 80,000 to 100,000. Damage to Tokyo's war production was also substantial. Japanese opposition to this attack was relatively weak; 14 B-29s were destroyed as

5341-442: The city. The Japanese mounted a strong defense that downed two Superfortresses and damaged another 64; another eight B-29s were lost to other causes. The Americans claimed 18 Japanese fighter "kills" as well as another 30 "probables" and 16 damaged. Nagoya was attacked again by 457 B-29s on the night of 16 May, and the resulting fires destroyed 3.82 square miles (9.9 km ) of the city. Japanese defenses were much weaker by night, and

5450-525: The commander of the Fourteenth Air Force in China, advocated building the B-29 bases near Guilin , closer to Japan, but this area was judged too vulnerable to counterattack. However, the decision to build airstrips at Chengdu meant that Kyūshū was the only part of the home island chain within the B-29's 1,600-mile (2,600 km) combat radius . Construction of the airfields began in January 1944, and

5559-692: The continental United States. Following the Doolittle Raid, the next air attacks on Japan were made against the Kuril Islands in mid-1943. The liberation of Alaska's Attu Island in May 1943 during the Aleutian Islands Campaign provided the USAAF with bases within range of the Kurils. As part of the preparations for the liberation of Kiska Island in the Aleutians, the Eleventh Air Force conducted

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5668-485: The country from air attack focused on neutralizing enemy air bases. Before the war it was believed that Soviet aircraft based in the Russian Far East posed the greatest threat. The Japanese military planned to destroy the air bases within range of the home islands if Japan and the Soviet Union ever went to war. When the Pacific War began, the Japanese government believed that the best way to prevent American air raids

5777-558: The country's air defenses greatly embarrassed the Japanese military leadership, and four fighter groups were transferred from the Pacific to defend the home islands. In an attempt to prevent further naval raids, the IJN launched an offensive in the Pacific Ocean which ended in defeat during the Battle of Midway . The Japanese Army also conducted the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign to capture the airfields in central China at which

5886-502: The country's air defenses. In response, the IJAAF and IJN stepped up their air attacks on B-29 bases in the Mariana Islands from 27 November; these raids continued until January 1945 and resulted in the destruction of 11 Superfortresses and damage to another 43 for the loss of probably 37 Japanese aircraft. The IJA also began launching Fu-Go balloon bombs against the United States during November. This campaign caused little damage and

5995-657: The country's cities and killing between 241,000 and 900,000 people. During the first years of the Pacific War these attacks were limited to the Doolittle Raid in April 1942 and small-scale raids on military positions in the Kuril Islands from mid-1943. Strategic bombing raids began in June 1944 and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. Allied naval and land-based tactical air units also attacked Japan during 1945. The United States Army Air Forces campaign against Japan began in earnest in mid-1944 and intensified during

6104-502: The countryside from December 1943, and a program of evacuating entire classes of schoolchildren was implemented. By August 1944, 330,000 schoolchildren had been evacuated in school groups and another 459,000 had moved to the countryside with their family. Little was done to disperse industrial facilities to make them less vulnerable to attack, however, as this was logistically difficult. XX Bomber Command began flying missions against Japan in mid-June 1944. The first raid took place on

6213-561: The effectiveness of the Superfortresses, as crews that managed to reach their target were often unable to bomb accurately due to high winds or cloud cover. In 1944, the bombing of Japan from the Soviet Union by American aircraft with American or Soviet crews was considered. Following a request from Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference , Stalin agreed on 2 February 1944 that the United States could operate 1,000 bombers from Siberia after

6322-410: The end of the first phase of XXI Bomber Command's attack on Japan's cities. During May and June the bombers had destroyed much of the country's six largest cities, killing between 112,000 and 126,762 people and rendering millions homeless. The widespread destruction and high number of casualties from these raids caused many Japanese to realize that their country's military was no longer able to defend

6431-415: The firebombing campaign, and was attacked by 331 B-29s on the night of 16/17 March. The resulting firestorm destroyed 7 square miles (18 km ) of the city (equivalent to half its area), killed 8,000 people and rendered 650,000 homeless. Three B-29s were lost. Nagoya was attacked again on the night of 18/19 March, and the B-29s destroyed 2.95 square miles (7.6 km ) of buildings. Only one Superfortress

6540-548: The first day of the month 521 B-29s escorted by 148 P-51s were dispatched in a daylight raid against Osaka. While en route to the city the Mustangs flew through thick clouds, and 27 of the fighters were destroyed in collisions. Nevertheless, 458 heavy bombers and 27 P-51s reached the city and the bombardment killed 3,960 Japanese and destroyed 3.15 square miles (8.2 km ) of buildings. On 5 June 473 B-29s struck Kobe by day and destroyed 4.35 square miles (11.3 km ) of buildings for

6649-829: The four regional military districts (the Northern , Eastern , Central and Western districts) which reported directly to the Ministry of War . As a result, the GDC's functions were limited to coordinating communications between the Imperial General Headquarters —Japan's highest military decision-making body—and the military districts. In early 1942, forces allocated to the defense of Japan comprised 100 Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) and 200 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) fighter aircraft, many of which were obsolete, as well as 500 Army-manned and 200 IJN anti-aircraft guns. Most of

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6758-620: The high costs of the B-29 program and also threatened their goal of demonstrating the effectiveness of independent air power. In 1943, USAAF planners began assessing the feasibility of a firebombing campaign against Japanese cities. Japan's main industrial facilities were vulnerable to such attacks as they were concentrated in several large cities and a high proportion of production took place in homes and small factories in urban areas. The planners estimated that incendiary bomb attacks on Japan's six largest cities could cause physical damage to almost 40 percent of industrial facilities and result in

6867-528: The home islands and return without refueling. Japanese aircraft made several attacks on the airfield at Saipan while it was under construction. The Twentieth Air Force's XXI Bomber Command began arriving in the Mariana Islands during October 1944. The Command was led by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell , who had also participated in Eighth Air Force operations against Germany. XXI Bomber Command B-29s flew six practice missions against targets in

6976-471: The home islands was inadequate, and most of these aircraft and guns had difficulty reaching the high altitudes at which B-29s often operated. Fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, and a lack of coordination between units also constrained the effectiveness of the fighter force. Despite the vulnerability of Japanese cities to incendiary bombs , the firefighting services lacked training and equipment, and few air raid shelters were constructed for civilians. As

7085-424: The home islands. American losses were low compared to Japanese casualties; 136 B-29s were downed during the campaign. In Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, and Kawasaki, "over 126,762 people were killed ... and a million and a half dwellings and over 105 square miles (270 km ) of urban space were destroyed." In Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, "the areas leveled (almost 100 square miles (260 km )) exceeded

7194-560: The loss of 11 bombers. A force of 409 B-29s attacked Osaka again on 7 June; during this attack 2.21 square miles (5.7 km ) of buildings were burnt out and the Americans did not suffer any losses. Osaka was bombed for the fourth time in the month on 15 June when 444 B-29s destroyed 1.9 square miles (4.9 km ) of the city and another 0.59 square miles (1.5 km ) of nearby Amagasaki ; 300,000 houses were destroyed in Osaka. This attack marked

7303-588: The loss of 7.6 million man-months of labor. It was also estimated that these attacks would kill over 500,000 people, render about 7.75 million homeless and force almost 3.5 million to be evacuated. The USAAF tested the effectiveness of incendiary bombs on Japanese-style buildings at Eglin Field and the " Japanese Village " at Dugway Proving Ground . The American military also attempted to develop " bat bombs ", using incendiary bombs attached to bats dropped by aircraft to attack Japanese cities, but this project

7412-561: The loss of three fighters. The 454 B-29s that reached Yokohama struck the city's main business district and destroyed 6.9 square miles (18 km ) of buildings; over 1000 Japanese were killed. Overall, the attacks in May destroyed 94 square miles (240 km ) of buildings, which was equivalent to one seventh of Japan's total urban area. The Minister of Home Affairs , Iwao Yamazaki , concluded after these raids that Japan's civil defense arrangements were "considered to be futile". The firebombing campaign against major cities ended in June. On

7521-466: The majority of the losses were due to flying accidents. The attacks had a limited impact on Japanese civilian morale but forced the Japanese military to reinforce the home islands' air defenses at the expense of other areas. These results did not justify the large allocation of Allied resources to the operation, however. Moreover, the diversion of some supply aircraft flown between India and China to support XX Bomber Command's efforts may have prevented

7630-623: The military began to develop plans to counter air raids originating from China. The three IJAAF air brigades stationed in Honshū and Kyūshū were expanded to air divisions between March and June (these were designated the 10th , 11th and 12th Air Divisions ). By late June the air defense units in the home islands were assigned 260 fighters, and could draw on approximately 500 additional aircraft during emergencies. Additional anti-aircraft gun batteries and searchlight units were also established to protect major cities and military bases. The GDC's authority

7739-556: The naval attaché to the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo reported that Japan's civil defenses were weak, and proposals were made for American aircrew to volunteer for service with Chinese forces in the Second Sino-Japanese War . The first American Volunteer Group (the " Flying Tigers ") began operations as part of the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) in late 1941 using P-40 Warhawk fighter aircraft. A second American Volunteer Group

7848-455: The need to rapidly bring the war to an end. To maximize the effectiveness of the firebombing attacks, LeMay ordered the B-29s to fly at the low altitude of 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and bomb by night; this represented a significant change from the Command's standard tactics, which focused on high-altitude daylight bombing. As Japan's night fighter force was weak and the anti-aircraft batteries were less effective at night, LeMay also had most of

7957-457: The night of 15/16 June when 75 B-29s were dispatched to attack the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata in northern Kyūshū. This attack caused little damage and cost seven B-29s, but received enthusiastic media coverage in the United States and indicated to Japanese civilians that the war was not going well. The Japanese military began expanding the fighter force in the home islands after

8066-446: The number of radar stations capable of providing early warning of raids was insufficient. The Japanese government also sought to improve the country's civil defenses in response to the Doolittle Raid and the threat of further attacks. The national government placed the burden of constructing civilian air-raid shelters on the prefectural governments . However, few shelters were built due to shortages of concrete and steel. In October 1943

8175-630: The operation after he was assured that it did not represent a general shift in tactics. Despite the change in armament, the 22 December raid was planned as a precision attack on an aircraft factory using only 78 bombers, and bad weather meant that little damage was caused. XXI Bomber Command raided the Musashino aircraft plant in Tokyo again on 27 December, but did not damage the facility. On 3 January 1945, 97 B-29s were dispatched to conduct an area bombing raid on Nagoya. This attack started several fires, but these were quickly brought under control. Arnold

8284-525: The outbreak of war, the Home Ministry expanded the number of firefighters, though these generally remained volunteers who lacked adequate training and equipment. Civilians were also trained to fight fires and encouraged to swear an "air defense oath" to respond to attacks from incendiary or high explosive bombs. From autumn 1943 the Japanese government took further steps to prepare the country's major cities for air attacks. An air defense general headquarters

8393-514: The outbreak of war. Japanese successes during the opening months of the Pacific War nullified pre-war US plans for attacks against the Japanese homeland and a series of attempts to start a small-scale campaign from bases in China were unsuccessful. Before the outbreak of war, the USAAF had planned to bomb Japan from Wake Island , Guam , the Philippines and coastal areas in China. However, these areas were rapidly captured by Japanese forces, and

8502-470: The poor results of XXI Bomber Command's precision bombing campaign. The most important of these was the weather; the American raiders frequently encountered cloudy conditions and high winds over Japan which made accurate bombing extremely difficult. Moreover, the bomber forces often had to pass through severe weather fronts between the Mariana Islands and Japan, which broke up formations and caused navigation problems. XXI Bomber Command's effectiveness

8611-478: The problems at XXI Bomber Command, and replaced Hansell with him. Hansell was informed of Arnold's decision on 6 January, but remained in his position until mid-January. During this period, XXI Bomber Command conducted unsuccessful precision bombing attacks on the Musashino aircraft plant in Tokyo and a Mitsubishi Aircraft Works factory in Nagoya on 9 and 14 January respectively. The last attack planned by Hansell

8720-611: The professional firefighting units were short-handed. Civilians were to observe a blackout from 10:00 pm. Japanese positions in the Bonin Islands were normally able to provide an hour's warning of American raids and air raid sirens were sounded in cities threatened by attack. The first attacks conducted under LeMay's leadership achieved mixed results. XXI Bomber Command flew six major missions between 23 January and 19 February with little success, though an incendiary raid against Kobe on 4 February caused significant damage to

8829-475: The project involved around 300,000 conscripted Chinese labourers and 75,000 contracted workers. XX Bomber Command was assigned responsibility for Operation Matterhorn, and its ground crew began to leave the United States for India during December 1943. The Twentieth Air Force was formed in April 1944 to oversee all B-29 operations. In an unprecedented move, the commander of the USAAF, General Henry H. Arnold , took personal command of this unit and ran it from

8938-665: The proposal subsequently lapsed. During the Mariana Islands campaign , US forces captured Japanese-held islands in the Battles of Guam , Saipan and Tinian between June and August 1944. USAAF and US Navy engineers subsequently constructed six airfields on the islands to accommodate hundreds of B-29s. These bases were more capable of supporting an intensive air campaign against Japan than those in China as they could be easily supplied by sea and were 1,500 miles (2,400 km) south of Tokyo, which allowed B-29s to strike most areas in

9047-613: The raid on Tokyo was the first to be escorted by Iwo Jima-based P-51 Mustang very-long-range fighters from the VII Fighter Command , and the Americans claimed to have shot down 101 Japanese aircraft for the loss of two P-51s and seven B-29s. Over 250 B-29s struck three different aircraft factories on 12 April; during this operation the 73rd Bombardment Wing inflicted heavy damage on the Musashino aircraft plant and fought off 185 Japanese fighters without loss. LeMay resumed night firebombing raids on 13 April when 327 B-29s attacked

9156-524: The raids is 333,000 killed and 473,000 wounded. Other estimates of total fatalities range from 241,000 to 900,000. In addition to the loss of mostly civilian life, the raids contributed to a large decline in industrial production. The United States Army Air Corps (which was subsumed by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in February 1942) began developing contingency plans for an air campaign against Japan during 1940. During that year

9265-766: The same period the command conducted a number of attacks on targets in Manchuria , China and Formosa from its bases in China, as well as striking targets in Southeast Asia from India. The command flew its final mission from India, a raid on Singapore , on 29 March; its constituent units were then transferred to the Mariana Islands. Overall, Operation Matterhorn was not successful. The nine raids conducted against Japan via bases in China succeeded only in destroying Ōmura's aircraft factory. XX Bomber Command lost 125 B-29s during all of its operations from bases in India and China, though only 22 or 29 were destroyed by Japanese forces;

9374-476: The single most destructive air raid of the war. XXI Bomber Command mounted a maximum effort, and on the afternoon of 9 March 346 B-29s left the Marianas bound for Tokyo. They began to arrive over the city at 2:00 am Guam time on 10 March, and 279 bombers dropped 1,665 tons of bombs. The raid caused a massive conflagration that overwhelmed Tokyo's civil defenses and destroyed 16 square miles (41 km ) of buildings, representing seven percent of

9483-465: The threat of air attack as the country's industrial resources were unable to maintain offensive air forces in China and the Pacific as well as a defensive force in the home islands. Few air units or anti-aircraft batteries were stationed in the home islands during the early months of the Pacific War. The General Defense Command (GDC) had been formed in July 1941 to oversee the defense of the home islands, but all combat units in this area were assigned to

9592-671: The three bombers lost in this attack crashed due to mechanical problems. The two raids on Nagoya killed 3,866 Japanese and rendered another 472,701 homeless. On 19 May 318 B-29s conducted an unsuccessful precision bombing raid on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company . XXI Bomber Command made further large-scale firebombing attacks against Tokyo on the nights of 23 and 25 May. In the first of these raids 520 B-29s destroyed 5.3 square miles (14 km ) of southern Tokyo with 17 aircraft lost and 69 damaged. The second attack involved 502 B-29s and destroyed 16.8 square miles (44 km ) of

9701-637: The uncertainty over the B-24s. Stalin had agreed at the 1944 Moscow Conference to the United States having air bases near Vladivostok (where six or seven large aerodromes had been built and reserved ) and the use of Petropavlovsk ( Kamchatka ) as a base; he "virtually ignored" earlier proposals for a Soviet bombing force. However, despite an American team going to Moscow in December 1944 they failed to reach agreement. On 16 December 1944 General Antonov said that Soviet forces would need all their naval and air bases in

9810-416: The war's last months. While plans for attacks on Japan had been prepared prior to the Pacific War, these could not begin until the long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber was ready for combat. From June 1944 until January 1945, B-29s stationed in India staged through bases in China to make a series of nine raids on targets in western Japan, but this effort proved ineffective. The strategic bombing campaign

9919-449: Was Major General Curtis LeMay , a veteran of Eighth Air Force bombing attacks against Germany. Subsequent B-29 raids staging through China generally did not meet their objectives. The second raid took place on 7 July when 17 B-29s attacked Sasebo, Ōmura and Tobata , causing little damage, and on the night of 10/11 August 24 Superfortresses attacked Nagasaki . Another unsuccessful raid was conducted against Yawata on 20 August in which

10028-496: Was abandoned in 1944. During early 1945 the USAAF conducted raids against cities in Formosa to trial tactics which could be later used against Japanese urban areas. Napalm , used by the Americans for flamethrowers and incendiary bombs, was increased in production from 500,000 lb (230,000 kg) in 1943 to 8 million lb (3.6 kt) in 1944. Much of the napalm went from nine US factories to bomb-assembly plants making

10137-519: Was abandoned in March 1945. By this time 9,000 balloons had been dispatched but only 285 were reported to have reached the contiguous United States . The next American raids on Japan were not successful. XXI Bomber Command attacked Tokyo three times between 27 November and 3 December; two of these raids were made against the Musashino aircraft plant while the other targeted an industrial area using M-69 incendiary cluster bombs , specifically developed to damage Japanese urban areas. The aircraft plant

10246-491: Was also formed in late 1941 to attack Japan from bases in China using Hudson and A-20 Havoc medium bombers. The attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 led to open hostilities between the US and Japan and ended the need for covert operations, however, and this unit did not become active. The small number of Second Air Volunteer Group personnel who were dispatched from the United States in November 1941 were diverted to Australia upon

10355-442: Was also limited by poor B-29 maintenance practices and over-crowding at its airfields—these factors reduced the number of aircraft which were available for operations and complicated the process of launching and recovering the bombers. By March 1945 the USAAF's commanders were highly concerned about the failure of the campaigns mounted from China and the Mariana Islands, and believed that the results to date made it difficult to justify

10464-516: Was attacked on 27 November and 3 December and was only lightly damaged as high winds and clouds prevented accurate bombing. The incendiary raid conducted on the night of 29/30 November by 29 Superfortresses burnt out one tenth of a square mile, and was also judged to be unsuccessful by the Twentieth Air Force's headquarters. Four of XXI Bomber Command's next five raids were made against targets in Nagoya . The first two of these attacks on 13 and 18 December used precision bombing tactics, and damaged

10573-517: Was destroyed by 131 B-29s. An attack on the aircraft arsenal at Tachikawa six days later was aborted due to cloud cover; some of the heavy bombers attacked the city of Hamamatsu instead. Another precision raid was made against the Hiro Naval Aircraft Factory at Kure on 5 May when 148 B-29s inflicted heavy damage on the facility. Five days later B-29s successfully attacked oil storage facilities at Iwakuni , Ōshima and Toyama . On 11 May

10682-483: Was disappointed with what XXI Bomber Command had achieved, and wanted the Command to produce results quickly. In addition, Hansell's preference for precision bombing was no longer in accordance with the views of the Twentieth Air Force headquarters, which wanted a greater emphasis on area attacks. In late December 1944 Arnold decided to relieve Hansell of his command. Seeing LeMay's success in improving XX Bomber Command's performance, Arnold thought LeMay could solve

10791-462: Was established in November and a program of demolishing large numbers of buildings in major cities to create firebreaks began the next month. By the end of the war 614,000 housing units had been destroyed to clear firebreaks; these accounted for a fifth of all housing losses in Japan during the war and displaced 3.5 million people. The government also encouraged old people, children and women in cities that were believed likely to be attacked to move to

10900-650: Was greatly expanded from November 1944 when bases in the Mariana Islands became available as a result of the Mariana Islands Campaign . Initial attempts to target industrial facilities using high-altitude daylight "precision" bombing were largely ineffective. From February 1945, the bombers switched to low-altitude night firebombing against urban areas as much of the manufacturing process was carried out in small workshops and private homes: this approach resulted in large-scale urban damage and high civilian casualties. Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and

11009-496: Was in line with Arnold's targeting directive for XXI Bomber Command, which specified that urban areas were to be accorded the second-highest priority for attacks after aircraft factories. The directive also stated that firebombing raids should be conducted once M-69 bombs had been tested in combat and the number of B-29s available was sufficient to launch an intensive campaign. LeMay did not seek Arnold's specific approval before launching his firebombing campaign, however, to protect

11118-414: Was listed as a National Treasure in May 1930. The Tokyo air raids of May 1945 destroyed most of the structures. The ashes of the shōgun were reburied in 1958. The complex consisted of various gates leading into the inner sanctuary where two main buildings and a pagoda stood. Of these, only four buildings survived the war, with damages. Three of these structes were moved to Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture in

11227-431: Was made against the Musashino aircraft plant in the outskirts of Tokyo on 24 November 1944. Only 24 of the 111 B-29s dispatched attacked the primary target, and the others bombed port facilities as well as industrial and urban areas. The Americans were intercepted by 125 Japanese fighters but only one B-29 was shot down. This attack caused some damage to the aircraft plant and further reduced Japanese civilians' confidence in

11336-566: Was more successful, however: a force of 77 B-29s crippled a Kawasaki Aircraft Industries factory near Akashi on 19 January. During XXI Bomber Command's first three months of operations, it lost an average of 4.1% of aircraft dispatched in each raid. In late January 1945 the Imperial General Headquarters belatedly adopted a civil defense plan to counter the American air raids. This plan assigned responsibility for fighting fires to community councils and neighborhood groups as

11445-687: Was reluctant to allow them to operate from territory under his control. A further 13 B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were dispatched from the United States to operate from China in May 1942 as the HALPRO force, but were re-tasked to support Allied operations in the Mediterranean. In July 1942, the commander of the American Volunteer Group, Colonel Claire Lee Chennault , sought a force of 100 P-47 Thunderbolt fighters and 30 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers, which he believed would be sufficient to "destroy"

11554-493: Was shot down during this attack, and all members of its crew were rescued after the aircraft ditched into the sea. This raid marked the end of the first firebombing campaign as XXI Bomber Command had exhausted its supplies of incendiary bombs. The Command's next major operation was an unsuccessful night precision attack on the Mitsubishi aircraft engine factory conducted on the night of 23/24 March; during this operation five of

11663-403: Was spread over a greater area than had been the case at Tokyo, and the attack caused less damage. Nevertheless, 2.05 square miles (5.3 km ) of buildings were burnt out and no B-29s were lost to the Japanese defenses. On the night of 13/14 March, 274 Superfortresses attacked Osaka and destroyed 8.1 square miles (21 km ) of the city for the loss of two aircraft. Kobe was the next target in

11772-595: Was strengthened when the army units in the Eastern, Central and Western military districts were placed under its command in May. The IJN defensive fighter units stationed at Kure , Sasebo and Yokosuka were also assigned to the GDC in July, but cooperation between the GDC's Army units and the much smaller number of naval units was poor. Despite these improvements, Japan's air defenses remained inadequate as few aircraft and anti-aircraft guns could effectively engage B-29s at their cruising altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 m) and

11881-453: Was to capture and hold the areas in China and the Pacific from which such attacks could be launched. It was expected that the Allies would not be able to re-capture these bases. However, the Japanese anticipated that the Allies might still make small-scale attacks against the home islands using naval aircraft flying from aircraft carriers . The government chose not to develop strong defenses to meet

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