118-577: Operation Thunderbolt may refer to: Operation Donnerkeil or Operation Thunderbolt, a World War II air-support campaign Operation Thunderbolt (1951) , an offensive operation during the Korean War Operation Entebbe or Operation Thunderbolt, a hostage rescue mission in 1976 Operation Thunderbolt, a mission to rescue hostages from the 1991 Singapore Airlines Flight 117 hijacking Operation Thunderbolt (1997) , an offensive operation during
236-566: A "real menace". Radar-jamming, counter-measures and other innovations escalated from that point onward. Donnerkeil had been an outstanding success for the Luftwaffe. The measure of success lay not in the ratio of losses, which amounted to 2:1 in the German favour but the failure of the RAF, FAA and Royal Navy to intercept or at least inflict severe damage to the German warships. The meagre forces committed by
354-548: A U-turn and sped back to the dock. The RAF bombers released their bombs but did little damage. Fortunately for the German ships the British did not notice anything untoward. Ultra intercepts had put the British on alert. Mistakes and bad luck enabled the Germans to evade detection. Three Hudsons of Coastal Command conducted a patrol at three positions. The first, named "Stopper", maintained surveillance between sunset and first light off
472-494: A doctrine of "precision" bombing in daylight. When the German defences inflicted costly defeats on British raids in late 1939, a switch to night bombing was forced upon the Command. The problems of enemy defences were then replaced with the problems of night navigation and target-finding. In the early years of the war bombers had to rely on dead reckoning navigation supported by radio fixes and astro-navigation. Bomber Command comprised
590-467: A further one at 21:34 GMT. Gneisenau also struck a mine at 18:55 GMT. Both ships recovered and steamed on. Scharnhorst had been stopped dead in the water with engine damage after the first hit. The failure to alert Bomber Command earlier meant a chance was missed to deliver an attack on Scharnhorst when it was most vulnerable. The second and third mine hits came after nightfall, which enabled both vessels to avoid further attacks. The last RAF sighting of
708-653: A group of elite, specially trained and experienced crews who flew ahead of the main bombing forces and marked the targets with flares and special marker-bombs. No. 8 Group controlled the Pathfinder squadrons. A number of other groups were part of the command, including, in June 1944, No. 26 Group RAF , three operational training groups – No. 91 Group RAF at Morton Hall, Swinderby, which was merged into No. 21 Group RAF , part of RAF Flying Training Command , on 1 May 1947; Nos 92 and 93 Groups ; and No. 100 Group RAF (of which last
826-643: A high casualty rate: 55,573 were killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew, a 44.4% death rate. A further 8,403 men were wounded in action, and 9,838 became prisoners of war. Bomber Command stood at the peak of its post-war military power in the 1960s, the V bombers holding the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent and a supplemental force of Canberra light bombers. In 1968 it was merged with Fighter Command to form Strike Command . A memorial in Green Park in London
944-500: A hit on Gneisenau but the ship turned away, just avoiding the salvo. Later, a wave of 134 to 137 bombers intercepted the ships between 16:00 and 17:05. Only 20 crews managed to attack owing to poor training (Bomber Command crews were not trained for naval targets), a low cloud base [2,300 ft (700 m)] and poor visibility [visibility at sea level was between 1,000–2,000 yd (910–1,830 m)]. Nine bombers were lost. Another formation of 35 Vickers Wellington aircraft attempted
1062-411: A number of Groups . It began the war with Nos. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 Groups. No. 1 Group was soon sent to France and then returned to Bomber Command control after the evacuation of France. No. 2 Group consisted of light and medium bombers who, although operating both by day and night, remained part of Bomber Command until 1943, when it was removed to the control of Second Tactical Air Force , to form
1180-416: A number of which were lost to anti-aircraft fire. The bomber unit III./KG 2 had participated in raids against RAF airfields. The Luftwaffe had flown 300 fighter and 40 bomber missions during 11–12 February. The German flotilla had reached home ports on the evening of 12 February. The threat from RAF bombers in daylight had gone but Bomber Command was soon making night attacks on Kiel harbour. Gneisenau
1298-553: A possibility. At the end of January he had warned that the German warships were preparing to put to sea and a major operation should be expected. Dening sent a message to First Sea Lord Dudley Pound : The short cut of the German ships is via the English Channel. It is 240 miles from Brest to Cherbourg and another 120 miles from Cherbourg to the Dover straits. While ships could make the passage from Brest to Cherbourg or from Cherbourg to
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#17328480039661416-592: A raid got lost due to poor navigation and bombed London. Prime Minister Winston Churchill consequently ordered a retaliatory raid on the German capital of Berlin. The damage caused was minor but the raid sent Hitler into a rage. He ordered the Luftwaffe to level British cities, thus precipitating the Blitz . Like the United States Army Air Forces later in the war, Bomber Command had first concentrated on
1534-534: A signals officer to communicate with Luftwaffe units during the operation. Eight dummy operations, involving around 450 sorties, were made from 22 January to 10 February to train for the mission. It is unclear whether the British were aware of these training missions. To disrupt British radio transmissions, the Funkhorchdienst (Radio Monitoring Service, Signals intelligence , commanded by Wolfgang Martini ) attempted to jam radio-telephone frequencies. They created
1652-680: A strategic withdrawal from the Atlantic. From that point onwards, the German campaign in the Atlantic was to be carried by the U-boats, unsupported by a surface fleet. With the German ships removed from the French Atlantic ports, the British fleets could contain them much more effectively in Norway and the North Sea. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been damaged by mines and required extensive repairs. Prinz Eugen
1770-410: A strike between 17:50 and 18:15, losing two of their number. The most notable raid in this action was by six Beauforts from No. 86, three from No. 217 and three from No. 22 Squadron. Wing Commander C. Flood, No. 86 Squadron led the attack in the only ASV-equipped aircraft. Locating the German ships in the darkness they attacked but anti-aircraft fire scattered the bombers and no successes were achieved. Of
1888-537: A subtle jamming technique which increased atmospheric interference which degraded the performance of British coastal radars. Dornier Do 217s of Kampfgeschwader 2 (Bomber Wing 2) was ordered to fly electronic deception missions over the western channel to divert enemy aircraft. Fliegerkorps IX ( Joachim Coeler ) prepared to strike at RAF bases in south-western England and to engage and slow down British naval forces that might attempt an interception. Fernaufklärungsgruppe 123 (strategic or long-range reconnaissance)
2006-511: A total of 125,000 aircrew (a 44.4 per cent death rate), a further 8,403 were wounded in action and 9,838 became prisoners of war. This covered all Bomber Command operations. A Bomber Command crew member had a worse chance of survival than an infantry officer in World War I; more people were killed serving in Bomber Command than in the Blitz, or the bombings of Hamburg or Dresden. By comparison,
2124-408: Is such an operation. It must be attempted". Not much operational detail was discussed. The Luftwaffe was ordered to provide air cover and diversion raids against British targets. Jeschonnek promised around 250 aircraft. OKL was not happy about Cerberus ; Jeschonnek remarked to Galland that if Cerberus failed then the Luftwaffe would be made a scapegoat . Jeschnonnek was to be proved right. During
2242-579: The Jagdwaffe was in the Soviet Union owing to Operation Barbarossa ). The route was divided into three sectors based upon the Jafü (Fighter Sector) boundaries but to ensure local control Max Ibel , former Geschwaderkommodore (Wing Commander) of Jagdgeschwader 27 (Fighter Wing 27) was appointed Jagdfliegerführer Schiff , shortened to Jafü Schiff (Fighter Controller Ship) and embarked on Scharnhorst as
2360-618: The Advanced Air Striking Force . This action had two aims: to give the British Expeditionary Force some air-striking power and to allow the Battles to operate against German targets, since they lacked the range to do so from British airfields. In May 1940, some of the Advanced Air Striking Force was caught on the ground by German air attacks on their airfields at the opening of the invasion of France. The remainder of
2478-518: The Battle of the Ruhr on Essen. The bombers destroyed 160 acres (65 ha) of the city and hit 53 Krupps buildings. The Battle of Hamburg in mid-1943 was one of the most successful Bomber Command operations, although Harris' extension of the offensive into the Battle of Berlin failed to destroy the capital and cost his force more than 1,000 crews in the winter of 1943–44. In August 1943, Operation Hydra ,
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#17328480039662596-705: The Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190 . JG 2 and JG 26 operated the FW 190, while JG 1 operated the Bf 109. Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 was also pressed into service. Its Messerschmitt Bf 110s operated in much smaller numbers. Kampfgeschwader 2 operated in a support role, mainly maritime interdiction and air raids on enemy airfields in southern England, to distract the RAF from the Channel. The Germans had 252 fighters, 30 heavy fighters and 32 bombers. JG 1 and JG 2 operated
2714-697: The Royal Air Force 's bomber forces from 1936 to 1968. Along with the United States Army Air Forces , it played the central role in the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II . From 1942 onward, the British bombing campaign against Germany became less restrictive and increasingly targeted industrial sites and the civilian manpower base essential for German war production. In total 501,536 operational sorties were flown, 2.25 billion pounds (1.02 million tonnes ) of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action. Bomber Command crews also suffered
2832-520: The Ruhr , including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces (which were visible at night). The first attack took place on the night of 15/16 May, with 96 bombers setting off to attack targets east of the Rhine, 78 of which were against oil targets. Of these, only 24 claimed to have found their targets. Bomber Command itself soon fully joined in
2950-564: The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau [and Prinz Eugen ] up the channel". In May 1942 Joubert succeeded in procuring the new Bristol Beaufighter , which entered service in November 1942 but only one squadron was made operational. Despite the need for anti-shipping strike aircraft, the service continued to struggle until 1943, when Portal fulfilled his promise and more of these aircraft, including the de Havilland Mosquito , became available. Donnerkeil
3068-462: The larger British bombs were highly destructive. 15 years after the war's end, Speer was unequivocal about the effect, The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion in Europe ;... Defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over
3186-550: The light bomber component of that command. Bomber Command also gained two new groups during the war: the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) squadrons were organised into No. 6 Group and the Pathfinder Force was expanded to form No. 8 (Pathfinder) Group from existing squadrons on 8 January 1943. Many squadrons and personnel from Commonwealth and other European countries flew in Bomber Command. No. 6 Group, which
3304-511: The 'black men' (mechanics) had to rearm and refuel aircraft in 30 minutes or less. Galland insisted that the aircraft should be split between high and low altitude to provide sound cover. The low altitude groups would be able to evade detection by British coastal radar. Galland demanded an umbrella of at least 16 fighters over the ships at any one time along the whole length of the channel. The fighters would be split into formations of eight aircraft for their respective patrol altitudes. Each formation
3422-498: The 12 January 1942 meeting, the Navy demanded maximum fighter cover and won Hitler's support. During the meeting Jeschonnek stood his ground against Galland and refused to guarantee reinforcements to the Western fighter forces from other theatres. Galland was given executive power for the air operation which was given the code name Unternehmen Donnerkeil (Operation Thunderbolt). The existence of
3540-536: The 242 bombers that took part in the missions, it is likely only 39 conducted attacks, with a possible that a 16, suggesting a total of 54 aircraft released bombs against the ships, of which 15 were shot down. RAF Fighter Command also threw in fighter-bombers to try and inflict damage, operating Hawker Hurricanes over the Dover area. The British managed to damage both the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst (the latter seriously). Scharnhorst hit two mines, one at 14:31 GMT and
3658-461: The 88 mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was also a deadly destroyer of tanks, and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front. Mine laying operations were a major contribution to the disruption of German naval activities. Aerial minelaying was used on the iron ore routes from Scandinavia and U-boat training areas in
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3776-508: The Baltic; in North-West Europe aerial mines sank seven times more ships than naval mines laid from ships. In operations Bomber Command laid 47,278 mines while losing 468 aircraft; Coastal Command contribution was 936 mines. Bomber Command and Coastal Command minelaying is credited with the loss of 759 vessels totalling 1.62 billion pounds (0.73 million tonnes). German production
3894-545: The Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy .... and that in the first quarter of 1943 steel production fell by 448 million pounds (203,209 tonnes), leading to cuts in the German ammunition production programme and a sub-components crisis ( Zulieferungskrise ). German aircraft output did not increase between July 1943 and March 1944: Bomber command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks. The greatest contribution to winning
4012-552: The Battles proved to be horrendously vulnerable to enemy fire. Many times, Battles would set out to attack and be almost wiped out in the process. e.g. 10 May 1940 when a significant number of Battles were shot down or damaged. Following the Rotterdam Blitz of 14 May, RAF Bomber Command was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on 15 May; the Air Ministry authorized Air Marshal Charles Portal to attack targets in
4130-486: The Belgian coast. No. 72 Squadron claimed three Fw 190s destroyed and four damaged in the battles around 13:00. No. 410 Squadron claimed two Bf 109s destroyed and two damaged in the same dogfights. The German ships consumed very little ammunition, as the action had been carried out largely by the Luftwaffe. The stand down order had meant RAF Bomber Command's contribution to the proceedings came relatively late in
4248-714: The Bf ;109, while JG 26 maintained a "monopoly" on the FW ;190. Confidence in the British bomber force was low. Having had no anti-shipping attack training, their ability to inflict damage to the ships was poor. The main hope was placed in the torpedo bomber force made up mainly of the Beaufort and Swordfish aircraft of Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm. Beauforts of No. 42 Squadron RAF , No. 86 Squadron RAF and No. 217 Squadron RAF were made available from Coastal Command for
4366-505: The Brest harbour and 171 in daylight. A raid on 24 July lost 12 percent of its strength. Night bombing was safer as the Germans lacked night-fighters and the 18 losses to enemy action were claimed by anti-aircraft guns . During their campaign the RAF used more sophisticated navigation aids; on the night of the 7/8 December 1941 the Oboe navigation aid was employed for the first time. Concerned after
4484-700: The British bombing component was intended to be based on Okinawa . Bomber Command groups were re-organised for Operation Downfall but the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred before the force had been transferred to the Pacific. In Europe Bomber Command's final operation was to fly released Allied prisoners of war home to Britain in Operation Exodus . Bomber Command crews suffered an extremely high casualty rate: 55,573 killed out of
4602-575: The British survey found that actual arms production decreases were a mere 3 per cent for 1943, and 1 per cent for 1944. However they did find decreases of 46.5 per cent and 39 per cent in the second half of 1943 and 1944 respectively in the metal processing industries. These losses resulted from the devastating series of raids the Command launched on the Ruhr Valley . A contrasting view was offered by Adam Tooze that by referring to contemporary sources rather than post-war accounts: there can be no doubt that
4720-860: The British, the Air Ministry and the three RAF commands, RAF Coastal Command, RAF Bomber Command and RAF Fighter Command , believed the Germans would use the darkness for the longest and most dangerous part of the journey through the straits and would leave in daylight. The far from adequate forces at their disposal, they believed, would be best used at night. Most of RAF Bomber Command was ordered to stand down accordingly. Such an order made it unready to operate in daylight on 12 February. Coastal Command had agreed to provide three squadrons of Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers . The Fleet Air Arm (FAA) contributed one squadron of Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers. RAF Bomber Command had some 300 bombers on standby for an operation. The Swordfish were very slow and escorting them
4838-500: The Channel Dash the Luftwaffe defeated British air attacks on the German ships, allowing them to reach German waters. In the air battles that took place over the Channel the British suffered many losses for no return; German losses were modest and the operation achieved its objective. The first German Capital ships to dock at Brest were Scharnhorst and Gneisenau , on 22 March 1941. In the previous eight weeks they had participated in
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4956-401: The Channel.... Taking all factors into consideration, it appears that the Germans can pass east up the Channel with much less risk than they will incur if they attempt an ocean passage. Air Marshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté , commander-in-chief of RAF Coastal Command agreed this was the probable route. He expected the Germans to make an attempt any time after 10 February. Unfortunately for
5074-461: The Dover straits in the same dark period, they could not make the complete passage from Brest to Dover in one dark period. At first sight this passage from up the Channel seems hazardous for the Germans. It is probable, however, that as their heavy ships are not fully efficient, they would prefer such a passage, relying for their security on the destroyers and aircraft which are efficient, and knowing full well that we have no heavy ships to oppose them in
5192-480: The English Channel. General der Jagdflieger (General of the Fighter Force) Adolf Galland prepared the aircraft for the operation. Cerberus and its supporting operation, Donnerkeil , began on 11 February 1942. During the first phase of the operation the Germans achieved surprise. The German ships reached Germany on 13 February 1942, two days after the start of Cerberus and Donnerkeil . During
5310-551: The FAA but arrived over Manston 15 minutes late and missed the rendezvous. The only unit to keep to mission orders was No. 72 Squadron (Squadron Leader Brian Kingcome ). Unaware of the Swordfish squadron's location, they ran into each other by accident. Owing to low cloud, they dropped to between 50 and 100 feet. The German fighter cover put an end to the protection the Spitfire's could provide as
5428-565: The French were even more concerned lest Bomber Command operations provoke a German bombing attack on France. Since the Armée de l'Air had few modern fighters and no defence network comparable to the British Chain Home radar stations, this left France powerless before the threat of a German bombing attack. The final problem was lack of adequate aircraft. The Bomber Command workhorses at the start of
5546-551: The German Operation Berlin against Allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean . The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen also sought refuge in the harbour on 1 June 1941, after the failed Operation Rheinübung (Operation Rhine Exercise). Whilst in port, the ships were in easy range of British air power and suffered frequent attacks and some damage. A ten-month offensive by the RAF from 29 March 1941 comprised 2,928 sorties against
5664-591: The He ;111s. Ramsay's request arrived at RAF Kenley . Two experienced pilots, Group Captain Victor Beamish (10 victories) and Wing Commander Finlay Boyd (14 victories), were sent on patrol to investigate. Flying over the channel in Spitfires, they ran into large numbers of Bf 109s protecting a large fleet of warships and dived away. Holding radio silence they kept their discovery until they landed. They sighted
5782-504: The Navy had been repulsed easily by the German warships and their escorts. Anti-aircraft fire had offered a helpful defence against air attack but the German aircraft had succeeded, along with poor weather, in breaking up RAF attacks on the ships. Galland, responsible for the plan, called it the high point of his career. For the Kriegsmarine , Cerberus had been operational success and a strategic reverse. The situation had forced them into
5900-453: The Navy) and Vice-Admiral Otto Ciliax , who was to lead the battle group ( Kampfgruppe ). During the course of the meeting Hitler likened the German fleet to "a patient with cancer which is doomed unless they submit to an operation. An operation, on the other hand, even though it may have to be drastic, will at least offer some hope that the patient's life may yet be saved. The passage of our ships
6018-566: The Pathfinders, the de Havilland Mosquito , also made its appearance. By 25 July 1943, the Bomber Command headquarters had come to occupy "a substantial set of red brick buildings, hidden in the middle of a forest on top of a hill in the English county of Buckinghamshire". An offensive against the Rhine-Ruhr area ("Happy Valley" to aircrew) began on the night of 5/6 March 1943, with the first raid of
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#17328480039666136-640: The RAF as Boeing Washingtons, to supplement the Avro Lincoln , a development of the Lancaster. The first jet bomber, the English Electric Canberra light bomber, became operational in 1951. Some Canberras remained in RAF service up to 2006 as photo-reconnaissance aircraft. The model proved an extremely successful aircraft; Britain exported it to many countries and licensed it for construction in Australia and
6254-400: The RAF fighters now had to look after themselves. The Spitfires and Swordfish were engaged by Fw 190s of 8. Staffel and 9. Staffel of JG 26 led by Gruppenkommandeur (Group Commander) Gerhard Schöpfel of III./JG 26. The Fw 190s were just relieving fighters of JG 2. Frail and slow, the Swordfish forced German pilots to lower their undercarriages to prevent overshooting
6372-711: The RAF fighters were shot down by the Luftwaffe. A further eight were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, two collided and two were lost to unknown causes. Ten of the fighters were Spitfires, six were Hawker Hurricanes and four were Westland Whirlwinds . During the air battles, mutual overclaiming took place, though the Luftwaffe was significantly worse. RAF Fighters claimed 16 Bf 109s destroyed and 13 damaged. Four Fw 190s were also claimed destroyed and six damaged. German losses were 17 fighters, along with five Do 217s. Human casualties amounted to 23 killed. German fighter units claimed 60 RAF aircraft shot down, with JG 26 awarded seven kills and six probables. British losses were 41,
6490-451: The Rhineland, bombed on 16, 17, 18 and 19 February, was bombed again on 23 March, leaving the city "97 percent destroyed". The last raid on Berlin took place on the night of 21/22 April, when 76 Mosquitos made six attacks just before Soviet forces entered the city centre. By this point, most RAF bombing operations were for the purpose of providing tactical support. The last major strategic raid
6608-532: The Second Sudanese Civil War and First Congo War Operation Thunderbolt (2016) , a Bangladesh Army Special Forces operation to end the Gulshan hostage crisis Operation Thunderbolt (film) , a film about Operation Entebbe Operation Thunderbolt (video game) , a 1988 arcade game by Taito Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with
6726-649: The US Eighth Air Force , which flew daylight raids over Europe, had 350,000 aircrew during the war and suffered 26,000 killed and 23,000 POWs. Of the RAF Bomber Command personnel killed during the war, 72 per cent were British, 18 per cent were Canadian, 7 per cent were Australian and 3 per cent were New Zealanders. Taking an example of 100 airmen: In total 501,536 operational sorties were flown, 2.25 billion pounds (1.02 million tonnes) of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action. Harris
6844-616: The United States. The joint US-UK Project E was intended to make nuclear weapons available to Bomber Command in an emergency, with the Canberras the first aircraft to benefit. The next jet bomber to enter service was the Vickers Valiant in 1955, the first of the V bombers . The Air Ministry conceived of the V bombers as the replacement for the wartime Lancasters and Halifaxes. Three advanced aircraft were developed from 1946, along with
6962-545: The action; in the Battle of Britain , Bomber Command was assigned to bomb invasion barges and fleets assembling in the Channel ports. This was much less public than the battles of the Spitfires and Hurricanes of RAF Fighter Command but still vital and dangerous work, carried out night after night. Bomber Command was also indirectly responsible, in part at least, for the switch of Luftwaffe attention away from Fighter Command to bombing civilian targets. A German bomber on
7080-577: The airfield at Thorney Island. The mist was threatening to deny a clear landing run for the Hudson, so it was recalled an hour early, just as the German ships were approaching "Habo". II./NJG 1 flew 19 sorties, protecting the ships during the night, until replaced by JG 2 at 08:00. For 11 hours the German fleet sailed from Brest towards the Dover Straits. By chance, a mechanic on the radar station at Fairlight, East Sussex had just finished repairing
7198-426: The area and German reports noted only three explosions. Three Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers were lost to unstated causes. In 1942 Scharnhorst had evaded the worst attacks from RAF Bomber Command. It was ready for redeployment by the summer but accidents, such as striking a mine and running aground meant this was delayed until the turn of the year. It took three attempts to sail to Norway; on 10 January 1943 she
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#17328480039667316-399: The area. As the first outnumbered British units arrived over the ships, the German vessels were now at their closest point to German airfields. It allowed the Luftwaffe to offer maximum protection. Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde , acting as Squadron Leader, No. 825 Squadron FAA, took off with his Swordfish formation at 12:25 to attack the ships. No. 411 and 64 Squadrons were to escort
7434-485: The attacking aircraft, were not trained for attacks against naval targets. The only anti-shipping torpedo-bomber squadrons were No. 42 and 217 Squadrons of Coastal Command, which owing to supply difficulties, were five torpedoes short. Joubert de la Ferté blamed the failure of Operation Fuller on the neglect of anti-shipping aviation, not to those directing the forces during the operation or intelligence services. Joubert called for all anti-shipping units to be handed over to
7552-435: The biplanes. In the event all six Swordfish were shot down. The Spitfires destroyed three Fw 190s in return. Several Swordfish managed to drop torpedoes but none found their mark. Esmonde was shot down and killed by a FW 190. He was awarded the Victoria Cross . Only five of the original eighteen Swordfish crew survived. No. 41 Squadron RAF claimed three Bf 109s (most likely from JG 1) destroyed and one damaged off
7670-464: The bombing of the Peenemünde V-2 rocket facility opened the secondary Operation Crossbow campaign against long-range weapons. By April 1944, Harris was forced to reduce his strategic offensive as the bomber force was directed (much to his annoyance) to tactical and transport targets in France in support of the invasion of Normandy . The transport offensive proved highly effective. By late 1944, bombing such as Operation Hurricane (to demonstrate
7788-429: The capabilities of the combined British and US bomber forces), competed against the German defences . Bomber Command was now capable of putting 1,000 aircraft over a target without extraordinary efforts. Within 24 hours of Operation Hurricane, the RAF dropped about 22 million pounds (10,000 tonnes) of bombs on Duisburg and Brunswick , the greatest bomb load dropped in a day during the Second World War. Wesel in
7906-417: The commanders of the operation at his Headquarters in East Prussia (the Wolf's Lair ). Present were Wilhelm Keitel , Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces), Hans Jeschonnek (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff), Alfred Jodl (Chief of Staff for Military Operations) and Adolf Galland , General der Jagdflieger (General of the Fighter Forces), Erich Raeder (Commander-in-Chief of
8024-482: The country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time ... No one has yet seen that this was the greatest lost battle on the German side. In terms of production decrease resulting from the RAF area attacks, the US survey, based upon limited research, found that in 1943 it amounted to 9 per cent and in 1944 to 17 per cent. Relying on US gathered statistics,
8142-426: The cycle again. However, during Donnerkeil , the relieving sortie arrived after only 20 minutes which increased the fighter cover to 32 fighters for half of the operation. Galland made it clear to fighter pilots the ships must be protected at all costs. They were expected to fly at least four sorties on the day of the operation. Success would not be measured by numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. RAF aircraft leaving
8260-631: The day. It dispatched 73 bombers from 13:55 to 14:50 GMT. None of the attackers hit their targets. At 14:35 nine Beauforts from No. 42 Squadron led by W.H Cliff took off. Arriving over Manston at 14:50 they found other aircraft from No. 407 Squadron RCAF orbiting. It took nearly 30 minutes to form a proper formation. With several other squadrons they attacked the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen at heights of between 60 and 100 feet but their torpedoes missed. No losses were suffered by No. 42 Squadron. The Hudsons struck at between 400 and 900 feet. Two RCAF bombers were lost without success. No. 217 Squadron nearly achieved
8378-554: The enemy vessels. The performance of the radar was suppressed because of jamming measures ( Ballstöranlage ) undertaken by two Heinkel He 111s which had been flying off the south coast from their airfield near Paris . The flights ceased at 09:00 when installations along the French coast had taken over. The detection by Fairlight was a piece of good fortune, the Germans had assumed it to be out of action. Ten Do 217s from III./KG 2 flew missions against Plymouth harbour and airfield, while 15 flew diversions to keep RAF fighters clear of
8496-401: The equipment when he picked up 27 echoes at 10:15 on 12 February, south of Cap Gris Nez . The information was relayed to Ramsay, who ordered his Air Officer liaison to contact No. 11 Group RAF to ask for armed reconnaissance. Ramsay also warned No. 16 Group RAF and the FAA squadron from RAF Manston that possible targets were in the Channel, though he did not know the exact number or size of
8614-468: The failure of Fuller. Adding to RAF difficulties, most of Coastal Command's anti-shipping units were transferred to the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations (MTO), leaving Coastal Command short of naval strike aircraft in 1942. Air Marshal Charles Portal agreed this needed to change arguing, "We agree on the importance of torpedo bomber aircraft, and this was proved completely during the passage of
8732-497: The fighting. RAF Bomber Command contributed No. 5 Group RAF , containing some 242 of the 300 aircraft available to the service. Fighter Command committed No. 1 , 19 , 91 , 41 , 118 , 129 , 137 , 234 , 401 , 403 , 607 , 316 , 411 , 452 , 485 , 137, 128 , 64 , 65 , 72 , and 11 squadrons. During the evening of the 10 February 1942 the German flotilla prepared to undertake their operation. As they slipped anchor RAF bombers appeared overhead. The German ships conducted
8850-402: The late 1930s, this statement was effectively true. Attacking bombers could not be detected early enough to assemble fighters fast enough to prevent them reaching their targets. Some damage might be done to the bombers by anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and by fighters as the bombers returned to base, but that was not as effective as a proper defence. Consequently, the early conception of Bomber Command
8968-562: The loss of Bismarck , Adolf Hitler ordered the Kriegsmarine to move the ships to Germany for overhauls in preparation for their deployment to Norway. There they were to serve as a fleet in being and as the premier naval defense for German-occupied Norway. After lengthy discussions the Oberkommando der Marine opted for the shorter but arguably more dangerous route, through the English Channel . On 12 January 1942 Hitler met with
9086-457: The mission but were short of torpedoes. The three torpedo squadrons were the only ones available on 12 February 1942; about 57 Beauforts had been diverted to other theatres, leaving a chronic shortage of torpedo bombers in Britain at a time when a major enemy naval operation was expected. No. 415 and No. 489 Squadron RAF had been withdrawn to convert to Handley Page Hampdens . No. 22 Squadron RAF
9204-462: The operation was so secret that both Jeschonnek and Galland had to sign secrecy pledges as they left Hitler's Headquarters in East Prussia. The details of the plan were worked out with Oberst ( Colonel ) Karl Koller , the chief of staff of Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3, Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle ). To assemble sufficient strength some training units had to be mobilized (the bulk of
9322-495: The order of the previous year instructing Bomber Command to conserve its forces; this resulted in a large campaign of area bombardment against the Ruhr area. Professor Frederick Lindemann 's "de-housing" paper of March identified the expected effectiveness of attacks on residential and general industrial areas of cities. The aerial bombing of cities such as the Operation Millennium raid on Cologne continued throughout
9440-477: The port of Brest. The Second, "Line SE" watched due north of the port and the third, "Habo", covered the area between Le Havre and Boulogne . The patrols lasted between 01:00 hours to dawn on 11 February. At 19:25 on 11 February, "Stopper" took off as usual but was intercepted by a Bf 110 night fighter of NJG 1. The Hudson evaded the Bf 110 but its ASV radar equipment was unserviceable. The aircraft headed back to St. Eval, landing at 20:40. Its replacement headed over
9558-580: The ports to Royal Air Force (RAF) airfields allowed a large number of sorties to be flown against the targets in quick succession. Oberkommando der Marine (the Naval High Command), and Adolf Hitler desired to move the ships out of range of potential air raids. In December 1941, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air Force) was ordered to plan an operation to protect the three German capital ships to escape from Brest to Germany through
9676-548: The rest of the war, culminating in the controversial bombing of Dresden in 1945. In 1942, the main workhorse-aircraft of the later part of the war came into service: the four-engined heavies. The Halifax and Lancaster made up the backbone of the Command; they had a longer range, higher speed and much greater bomb load than earlier aircraft. The older four-engined Short Stirling and twin-engined Vickers Wellington bombers were not taken out of service, but moved to less demanding tasks such as mine-laying. The classic aircraft of
9794-399: The same area, reaching the location at 22:38. During the interlude, Ciliax and his ships had slipped their moorings. The "Line SE" Hudson should have picked up the German fleet but its ASV failed at 20:55. At 21:50 attempts to repair it failed and the Hudson returned to base. No replacement took its place. Everything now depended on "Habo" but Ciliax's luck held. At dawn, mist began to form over
9912-456: The service. Better training, more aircraft and a higher quality of equipment would allow the RAF to avoid a repeat of the Channel Dash. The Air Ministry refused his request and instead put No. 2 Group RAF Bomber Command in support of Coastal units against enemy shipping between Cherbourg and Wilhelmshaven. Production and procurement remained in favour of Bomber Command, producing types for the strategic bombing campaign over Germany, even after
10030-489: The sextant was sufficient. ) The fourth problem was the limited accuracy of bombing, especially from high level. When the war began on 1 September 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt , President of the neutral United States, issued an appeal to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to military targets. The French and British agreed to abide by the request, provided "that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents". British policy
10148-533: The ships at 10:42 and landed at 11:09. It was another 16 minutes before Bomber Command was alerted and Ramsay did not know of the situation until 11:30. At around 12:16 GMT , the first naval actions began between escorting Schnellboots and British Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) and the British commands were finally alerted. Galland ordered all low flying to cease and allowed Max Ibel and his team aboard Scharnhorst to break radio silence. Ibel then began directing Fw 190 and Bf 109s towards RAF units heading to
10266-458: The ships had occurred at 18:00 GMT. It is unclear who was responsible for the damage on the German ships. It is possible that the mines were dropped by Hampden bombers. Should this be the case, the bombers achieved far more damage than the Royal Navy and the rest of the RAF combined. In protecting the RAF bombers, Fighter Command lost 20 fighters, 14 pilots killed and three captured. Only eight of
10384-556: The tanks ignited and the ship was engulfed in fire from her bow to turret Anton. The forward part of the bow needed to be replaced. She steamed to Gdynia, in Poland on 4 April where she was decommissioned out of range of RAF bombers. Gneisenau did not put to sea again. The raid cost three aircraft, one Hampden and two Wellingtons. German casualties amounted to 16 civilians and 116 sailors dead. On 27/28 February 1942 33 bombers flew over Wilhelmshaven looking for Scharnhorst . Cloud obscured
10502-577: The target area were to be avoided but attacking aircraft were to be engaged at all costs – if necessary, through ramming . Operation Fuller was the code-name for the RAF plan against a German breakout. The RAF predicted the Germans might opt for the English Channel as their route. Captain Norman Dening, head of the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre was not certain that the Germans would attempt it, though he regarded as
10620-678: The title Operation Thunderbolt . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operation_Thunderbolt&oldid=1152237146 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Operation Donnerkeil Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns Unternehmen Donnerkeil ( Operation Thunderbolt )
10738-495: The war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich; mostly twin engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers Ju 88 . Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns, 20/37 mm. Though
10856-601: The war, the Vickers Wellington , Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and Handley Page Hampden/Hereford , had been designed as tactical-support medium bombers and none of them had enough range or ordnance capacity for anything more than a limited strategic offensive. Of these the Wellington had the longest range at 2,550 miles (4,100 km). Bomber Command became even smaller after the declaration of war. No. 1 Group , with its squadrons of Fairey Battles , left for France to form
10974-403: The weather and the lack of central control of British sea and air forces caused each element to work independently. Several friendly fire incidents occurred, such as the attack by No. 217 Squadron on HMS Mackay . The most serious failure was Fighter Command's failure to protect bomber and naval forces. Although the weather also prevented greater German fighter activity by the time the target area
11092-538: Was a British Army operation, Operation Biting , to steal a Würzburg radar set on 27/28 February 1942. The British removed components and developed counter-measures. The Germans responded by fortifying all radar sets, which only made them more visible to RAF reconnaissance. The British also began the occasional jamming of Freya radar sets. The Germans did not realise this was happening until September 1942. German forces also jammed British radar, to enable fighter-bomber operations over England. The British described them as
11210-566: Was a watershed in electronic warfare, by jamming, Martini removed British inhibitions concerning the use of ECM against the Kammhuber line on the Continent and paved the way for the debut of Window (Chaff) in June 1943, which had a devastating effect on the ability of German night-fighter radar defences to locate and intercept RAF bombers during the Defence of the Reich . The first step in this campaign
11328-573: Was activated on 1 January 1943, was unique among Bomber Command groups, in that it was not an RAF unit; it was a Canadian unit attached to Bomber Command. At its peak strength, 6 Group consisted of 14 operational RCAF bomber squadrons and 15 squadrons served with the group. No. 8 Group, also known as the Pathfinder Force, was activated on 15 August 1942. It was a critical part of solving the navigational and aiming problems experienced. Bomber Command solved its navigational problems using two methods. One
11446-439: Was advised by an Operational Research Section (ORS-BC) under a civilian, Basil Dickins, supported by a small team of mathematicians and scientists. ORS-BC (under Reuben Smeed ) was concerned with analysing bomber losses. They were able to influence operations by identifying successful defensive tactics and equipment, though some of their more controversial advice (such as removing ineffectual turrets from bombers to increase speed)
11564-464: Was as an entity that threatened the enemy with utter destruction. The Italian general Giulio Douhet , author of The Command of the Air , was of that view. In 1936, Germany's increasing air power was feared by British government planners who commonly overestimated its size, reach and hitting power. Planners used estimates of up to 72 British deaths per tonne (2,200 lb) of bombs dropped, though this figure
11682-421: Was difficult. The Beaufort squadrons were spread out and it was difficult to bring them together. One squadron was based at Leuchars , Scotland , one at Thorney Island , Portsmouth and one near St Eval , Cornwall . The Luftwaffe contributed five wings to the operation. Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1 or JG 1), Jagdgeschwader 2 (JG 2), Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) equipped with day fighters, mostly
11800-422: Was diverted into construction and manning of minesweepers and the deployment of flak batteries to protect ports and estuaries. Around 100 vessels, mostly cargo types and around 11 million pounds (5,080 tonnes), were converted to Sperrbrecher mine barrage breakers to sail ahead of ships leaving harbour and of these about half of were lost to mines. Bomber Command acquired B-29 Superfortresses , known to
11918-565: Was grossly exaggerated. As well, the planners did not know that German bombing aircraft of the day (not quite 300 Junkers Ju 52 medium bombers) did not have the range to reach the UK with a load of bombs and return to the mainland. British air officers did nothing to correct these perceptions because they could see the usefulness of having a strong bombing arm. At the start of the Second World War in 1939, Bomber Command faced four problems. The first
12036-510: Was ignored. The very high casualties suffered give testimony to the dedication and courage of Bomber Command aircrew in carrying out their orders. The overall loss rate for Bomber Command operations was 2.2 per cent, but loss rates over Germany were significantly higher; from November 1943 – March 1944, losses averaged 5.1 per cent. The highest loss rate (11.8 per cent) was incurred on the Nuremberg raid (30 March 1944). The disparity in loss rates
12154-497: Was in the midst of a transfer to the Middle East . No. 825 Squadron FAA and their Fairey Swordfish were also made available. Lockheed Hudsons of No. 224 Squadron RAF and No. 233 Squadron RAF were also committed for reconnaissance operations. No. 22 Squadron RAF was recalled from leave to take part in an operation over the Channel. Hudsons from No. 407 Squadron RCAF were also available, were placed on high alert and took part in
12272-546: Was lack of size; Bomber Command was not large enough effectively to operate as an independent strategic force. The second was rules of engagement; at the start of the war, the targets allocated to Bomber Command were not wide enough in scope. The third problem was the Command's lack of technology; specifically radio or radar derived navigational aids to allow accurate target location at night or through cloud. (In 1938, E. G. "Taffy" Bowen proposed using ASV radar for navigation, only to have Bomber Command disclaim need for it, saying
12390-563: Was launched followed by Operation Rheinübung in May 1941. The dominance of the Royal Navy 's surface fleet prevented the German units returning to ports in the Baltic Sea or Germany. The surviving ships, the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen , docked in the port of Brest, France . Throughout 1941 RAF Bomber Command attacked the ships in dock. The proximity of
12508-466: Was moved into an inner basin alongside her depot ship, Monte Olivia . The hatches were left open and her tanks, still containing a large amount of fuel, were left unattended. RAF Bomber Command made its first attack on the night of 25/26 February, when 61 bombers flew over Kiel. Monte Olivia was destroyed but Gneisenau escaped. On 26/27 February another 61 RAF bombers returned. A bomb penetrated Gneisenau ' s foredeck and exploded. The oil fumes from
12626-402: Was reached, valuable time had been lost by bomber formations searching for their fighter escorts over the rendezvouses which either never arrived or were given incorrect orders or direction too late to be acted upon. Little communication was enabled between fighter and bomber units but also between the strike units. Compounding the problems, RAF Bomber Command's crews, which made up the majority of
12744-716: Was reflected in that, at times, Bomber Command considered making sorties over France only count as a third of an op towards the "tour" total and crews derisively referred to officers who only chose to fly on the less dangerous ops to France as "François". The loss rates excluded aircraft crashing in the UK on return, even if the machine was a write-off and there were crew casualties, which amounted to at least another 15 percent. Losses in training were significant and some courses lost 25 per cent of their intake before graduation; 5,327 men were killed in training from 1939 to 1945. RAF Bomber Command had 19 Victoria Cross recipients . Albert Speer , Hitler's Minister of Armaments, noted that
12862-510: Was responsible for development, operational trial and use of electronic warfare and countermeasures equipment). In 1941, the Butt Report revealed the extent of bombing inaccuracy: Churchill noted that "this is a very serious paper and seems to require urgent attention". The Area Bombing Directive of 14 February 1942 ordered Bomber Command to target German industrial areas and the "morale of...the industrial workers". The directive also reversed
12980-400: Was responsible for maintaining reconnaissance in the east and west ends of the Channel and was to support Fliegerkorps IX . To ensure constant air support, Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings) and Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (Night Fighter Wing 1) were ordered to achieve a frantic pace in servicing and preparing aircraft for their next mission. To keep a constant aerial vigil over the task force,
13098-452: Was split into two Schwärme of four aircraft. The Schwärme tactics involved one formation flying to sea and one to land in a zigzag pattern. All Schwärme were ordered to fly back and forth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight while maintaining radio silence. Every sortie was meticulously timed to allow the fighters 30 minutes over the ships, enough to maintain cover and allow the relieved units to refuel, rearm and return to start
13216-610: Was spotted by RAF aircraft and turned back after reaching the Skagerrak . Another attempt was in January failed. On 3 March 1943 Scharnhorst finally made it to Norway. She would survive another eight months before being sent on her last wartime mission, Operation Ostfront . During her sortie Scharnhorst was sunk at the Battle of the North Cape . The failure to coordinate the FAA, RAF and Navy dispersed any counterstrike. Confusion owing to
13334-581: Was the codename for a German military operation of the Second World War . Donnerkeil was an air superiority operation in support of Operation Cerberus , also known as the Channel Dash by the Kriegsmarine (German Navy). In 1941 Kriegsmarine surface vessels had carried out commerce raiding in support of the German U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic . In January 1941 Operation Berlin
13452-434: Was the destruction of the oil refinery at Vallø (Tønsberg) in southern Norway by 107 Lancasters, on the night of 25/26 April 1945. Once the surrender of Germany had occurred, plans were made to send a "Very Long Range Bomber Force" known as Tiger Force to participate in the Pacific war against Japan. Made up of about 30 British Commonwealth heavy bomber squadrons, a reduction of the original plan of about 1,000 aircraft,
13570-406: Was the use of a range of increasingly sophisticated electronic aids to navigation and the other was the use of specialist Pathfinders . The technical aids to navigation took two forms. One was external radio navigation aids, as exemplified by Gee and the later highly accurate Oboe systems. The other was the centimetric navigation equipment H2S radar carried in the bombers. The Pathfinders were
13688-438: Was to restrict bombing to military targets and infrastructure , such as ports and railways which were of military importance. While acknowledging that bombing Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced deliberate bombing of civilian property (outside combat zones) as a military tactic. The British government did not want to violate its agreement by attacking civilian targets outside combat zones and
13806-735: Was torpedoed and her stern collapsed just weeks after Cerberus . All three ships were out of action for extended periods. More bad luck followed, with Gneisenau being knocked out for good in February 1942 and the sinking of the Scharnhorst in December 1943. None of the ships sailed in the Atlantic again, leaving the Battle of the Atlantic to be carried on by U-boat forces. RAF Bomber Command 1942: Manchester , Stirling , Halifax , Lancaster , Mosquito . 1945: Lincoln 1950: Washington B.1 1951: Canberra . 1955: Vickers Valiant 1956: Avro Vulcan RAF Bomber Command controlled
13924-459: Was unveiled by Queen Elizabeth II on 28 June 2012 to commemorate the high casualty rate among the aircrews. In April 2018 The International Bomber Command Centre was opened in Lincoln. At the time of the formation of Bomber Command in 1936, Giulio Douhet 's slogan " the bomber will always get through " was popular, and figures like Stanley Baldwin cited it. Until advances in radar technology in
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