151-534: Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 The Channel Dash ( German : Unternehmen Zerberus , Operation Cerberus) was a German naval operation during the Second World War . A Kriegsmarine (German Navy) squadron comprising two Scharnhorst -class battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ,
302-575: A German electro-mechanical rotor cipher machine . The decryption was carried out at the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park and the information was passed on to operational commands. From May 1941, Bletchley could read the Enigma Home Waters setting used by surface ships with few failures or interruptions, which combined with the PRU and reports from agents kept watch on
453-506: A battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy. Scharnhorst's superior speed allowed Bey to shake off his pursuers, after which he turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them and attack the undefended convoy. Burnett, instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers' speed to 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph), correctly guessed Bey's intentions and positioned Force 1 so as to protect
604-427: A brief stop, her party crossed the border at 07:45. Meanwhile, Hereditary Grand Duke Jean and two of his sisters, accompanied by an aide-de-camp , Guillaume Konsbruck , were to wait at the border for confirmation of occupation. Around 08:00 the prime minister and his entourage passed over the border before making contact with French troops at Longlaville . Last minute telephone calls with Luxembourg City revealed
755-684: A careful non-belligerent stance towards its neighbours. In accordance with the treaty's restrictions, the only military force Luxembourg maintained was its small Volunteer Corps under Captain Aloyse Jacoby , reinforced by the Grand Ducal Gendarmerie under Captain Maurice Stein . Together they formed the Corps des Gendarmes et Volontaires under Major-Commandant Émile Speller . At noon on 1 September Radio Luxembourg announced that in order for
906-723: A common communications system. The preliminaries of the German manoeuvre, especially minesweeping in the Channel and the transit of destroyers to Brest, led the Admiralty to issue a forecast that a sortie into the Atlantic was improbable and that a move to sheltered waters by a dash up the Channel rather than via the Denmark Strait or into the Mediterranean to Italian ports was to be expected. Next day
1057-583: A crossroads manned by German units, and was forced to detour through the countryside to avoid capture. French Ambassador Jean Tripier followed the government party but was stopped by the Germans and forced to return to the capital. Belgian Ambassador Kervyn de Meerendré was also stopped by German soldiers at the border and ordered to turn back, as was the Luxembourgish Minister of Education, Nicolas Margue, who had attempted to escape by taxi. Bodson later fled
1208-518: A day operation by 41 heavy bombers on the afternoon of 18 December, escorted by ten fighter squadrons. Gneisenau was slightly damaged and dock gates were smashed, stranding Scharnhorst for a month, for the loss of six bombers. Attacks continued all month and another day raid by Halifaxes was made on 30 December. From 1 August to 31 December, 1,175 long tons (1,194 t) of high explosive and 10 long tons (10 t) of incendiaries were dropped, eleven heavy bombers were shot down and considerable damage
1359-545: A direct phone call to his superiors at Longwy. Also that day a German national working in Luxembourg as a gardener and a member of the German fifth column warned his Luxembourgish employer, Carlo Tuck, that an invasion was impending. Tuck passed the warning on to government officials. Late that evening, the Grand Ducal government came into possession of a document from a German divisional command. Dated 23 April 1940, it detailed
1510-423: A flight of Fairey Battle bombers from the 226 Squadron to attack German tank columns. They went unescorted and encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire. Most were damaged by flak but managed to escape. One received a direct hit and crashed near Bettendorf . German soldiers pulled the three injured crew from the burning wreckage, one of whom later died in a local hospital. The Grand Ducal Gendarmerie resisted
1661-474: A full broadside to bear. At 16:17 Scharnhorst was detected by Duke of York ' s Type 273 radar at a range of 45,500 yd (41,600 m) and by 16:32 Duke of York ' s Type 284 radar indicated that the range had closed to 29,700 yd (27,200 m). At 16:48, Belfast fired star shells to illuminate Scharnhorst which was unprepared, with her turrets trained fore and aft, and clearly visible from Duke of York . Duke of York opened fire at
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#17328451314051812-441: A loss of 13 bombers; La Pallice was bombed again by fifteen Halifaxes . The formation was met by 12–18 Bf 109s and anti-aircraft fire ( FlaK ) and five bombers were shot down, five were seriously damaged and Scharnhorst was hit five times. While returning to Brest containing 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) of seawater, Scharnhorst was attacked by a Beaufort but shot it down before it could drop its torpedo. By late July 1941,
1963-608: A military conflict between Germany and France grew. Germany stopped the export of coke for the Luxembourgish steel industry . Abwehr agents under Oskar Reile infiltrated the country, posing as tourists. This was observed by Captain Fernand Archen, an undercover senior French intelligence officer in Luxembourg City , posing as a wine merchant. He reported his findings to his superiors at Longwy on 7 May, understanding that
2114-506: A mixture of E-boats, R-boats and small craft would join at Cap Gris Nez . During January, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe rehearsed for the operation but the ships had lost seaworthiness and many technicians and experts had been transferred from Brest to more pressing duties. By 9 February, the ships had completed their trials in Brest roads and the sortie was set for 11 February. Morale of
2265-482: A plan to thwart a British invasion of Norway. OKM preferred the Denmark Strait passage to Germany and Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder called a journey along the English Channel impossible. Hitler said that the break-out should be planned with no training period, since British intelligence was bound to find out and have the ships bombed. Hitler ordered that a period of bad weather should be chosen, when
2416-515: A point 10 nmi (12 mi; 19 km) north of Calais. The escorts of 121 Squadron and 401 Squadron were late and tried to rendezvous en route to the ships but missed them and turned back to search for the Swordfish at Manston. The Spitfires of 72 Squadron flying close escort sighted the German ships at 12:40 p.m. but were bounced by Bf 109s and FW 190s and lost contact with the Swordfish. The first section of three torpedo-bombers pressed on through
2567-479: A range of 11,920 yd (10,900 m) and scored a hit on the first salvo, disabling Scharnhorst ' s foremost turrets ("Anton" and "Bruno"), while another salvo destroyed the ship's aeroplane hangar. Bey turned north, but was engaged by the cruisers Norfolk and Belfast , and turned east at a high speed of 31 kn (36 mph; 57 km/h). Scharnhorst was now being engaged on one side by Duke of York and Jamaica while Burnett's cruisers engaged from
2718-547: A range of 31,600 yd (28,900 m) and then 36,300 yd (33,200 m) with supercharging. (After the fall of France, Axis ships could avoid the Dover mine barrage by sailing close to the French coast.) A supercharged naval 14 in (356 mm) gun could fire shells 48,000 yd (44,000 m) but was difficult to use against moving targets. The South Foreland Battery of the Dover guns, with their new K-type radar set, tracked
2869-631: A range of about 80 nmi (92 mi; 150 km) and with the five standing air patrols, the planners expected a dash up the Channel easily to be discovered, even at night or in bad weather. As soon as the alarm was raised, the offensive provisions of Fuller would begin. The 32 Motor Torpedo Boats of the Dover and Ramsgate flotillas, with a Motor Gun Boat (MGB) escort, would make torpedo attacks from 4,000 yd (2.3 mi; 3.7 km). The boats would be followed up by Fairey Swordfish torpedo-bombers with fighter escorts and by Beaufort torpedo-bombers;
3020-760: A remote farm near the Moselle . At 11:45 on 9 May he radioed Longwy: "Reports of important German troop movements on the German-Luxembourg frontier." Throughout the night his messages became more and more frantic. Two Luxembourgish customs officials at Wormeldange heard horses and soldiers across the Moselle, but were unable to make out the Germans' activities due to heavy fog. At around midnight, Captain Stein, Minister of Justice Victor Bodson , and Police Commissioner Joseph Michel Weis held an emergency meeting. Bodson requested that
3171-573: A ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today". After the battle Admiral Fraser sent the following message to the Admiralty : "... Please convey to the C-in-C Norwegian Navy. Stord played a very daring role in the fight and I am very proud of her...". In an interview in the Evening News on 5 February 1944
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#17328451314053322-538: A sortie by the German ships against Atlantic convoys, a return to German ports by circumnavigating the British Isles, or a dash up the English Channel. The Royal Navy had to keep ships at Scapa Flow in Scotland in case of a sortie by the German battleship Tirpitz from Norway. The RAF had sent squadrons from Bomber and Coastal commands overseas and kept torpedo bombers in Scotland ready for Tirpitz , which limited
3473-655: A turret and her radar. Burnett's destroyers were also unable to get close enough to Scharnhorst to launch a torpedo attack on the German ship. Following this exchange, Bey decided to return to port, while he ordered his destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by the U-boat earlier in the morning. The reported position was out of date, and the destroyers missed the convoy. Scharnhorst ran south for several hours, once again taking advantage of its superior speed. Burnett pursued, but both Sheffield and Norfolk suffered engine problems and were forced to drop back, leaving
3624-637: The Luftwaffe and on 12 January 1942, Hitler gave orders for the operation. The British exploited decrypts of German radio messages coded with the Enigma machine , air reconnaissance by the RAF Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) and agents in France to watch the ships and report the damage caused by the bombing. Operation Fuller , a joint Royal Navy–RAF contingency plan, was devised to counter
3775-487: The 100 bombers on two hours' notice had been loaded with semi-armour-piercing bombs which were effective only if dropped from 7,000 ft (2,100 m) or higher. Visibility was poor with rain and 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud cover, down to 700 ft (210 m) and unless there were breaks in the cloud just when needed the task was impossible. Peirse ordered general-purpose bombs to be loaded, which could only cause superficial blast damage and attacks at low altitude, in
3926-915: The Bay of Biscay . On 6 February, HMS Sealion the only modern submarine in home waters, was allowed to sail into Brest Roads, the commander using information supplied through Ultra on minefields, swept channels and training areas. The six operational Swordfish torpedo-bombers of 825 Squadron FAA (Lieutenant-Commander Eugene Esmonde ) were moved from RNAS Lee-on-Solent to RAF Manston in Kent , closer to Dover. The RAF alerted its forces involved in Operation Fuller to indefinite readiness and on 3 February, 19 Group, Coastal Command began night reconnaissance patrols by Air to Surface Vessel Mk II radar (ASV) equipped Lockheed Hudsons , supposedly able to detect ships at 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) range. Patrol line Stopper
4077-512: The Faroe Islands and Scotland . Despite protests from Dönitz, another twelve U-boats were reserved for Norway, along with the surface ships being concentrated in Norwegian waters. Hitler preferred the Channel route and responsibility was delegated to Marine-Gruppenkommando West (Naval Command West, Admiral Alfred Saalwächter ) for planning and operational directions; Ciliax was commander of
4228-716: The coastal guns at Dover would fire for as long as the ships were in range; Bomber Command would attack any ship damaged enough to have been slowed or brought to a stop. As the German ships moved beyond the Straits of Dover, six Harwich -based destroyers of the Nore Command would make torpedo attacks and the RAF would continue bombing and also lay mines in the paths of the ships. Bomber Command intended to have 100 aircraft at four hours' notice (about 1 ⁄ 3 of its operational strength), by reserving around 20 aircraft from each group. Of
4379-600: The Allied war effort in the Arctic theatre and further altered the strategic balance at sea in their favour. The Battle of the North Cape took place only a few months after the successful Operation Source , which had severely damaged the German battleship Tirpitz with midget submarines as she lay at anchor in Norway. With Scharnhorst destroyed and Germany's other battleships out of service,
4530-513: The Allies were now for the first time in the war free from the threat of German battleships raiding their convoys in the Arctic and Atlantic. This would allow the Allies to reallocate their naval resources that had been previously tied up to counter the threat of the German ' fleet in being '. This would prove to be the final battle of battleships in European waters and was one of few major surface actions in
4681-597: The Beauforts reached Manston they circled with numerous fighters which appeared to ignore them. Two Beauforts flew to the French coast, found nothing and landed at Manston where the confusion was resolved. The other two aircraft had already landed at Manston, where the crews found out what was going on and set off for the Belgian coast, arriving at 3:40 p.m. (when the Nore Command destroyers were attacking). Both bombers flew through
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4832-520: The Brest Group (flagship, Scharnhorst ). Care was taken to choose the best route to avoid British minefields and to steam at high speed. Minesweepers cleared channels through the British mines and marked with buoys (from 3 to 9 February, Bomber Command laid 98 mines in the channels). U-boats were sent for meteorological observations and several destroyers steamed westward down the Channel to Brest to strengthen
4983-486: The British fiasco. The Kriegsmarine judged the operation a tactical success and a strategic failure because the threat to Atlantic convoys had been sacrificed for a hypothetical threat to Norway. On 23 February, Prinz Eugen was torpedoed off Norway and after being repaired, spent the rest of the war in the Baltic. Gneisenau went into dry dock and was bombed on the night of 26/27 February, never to sail again; Scharnhorst
5134-426: The British ships, the German battleship was struck twice, with one shell destroying the forward Seetakt radar controls and leaving Scharnhorst virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the German battleship were forced to aim at the enemy's muzzle flashes . This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant. Bey, believing he had engaged
5285-426: The British ships. Thinking he had overshot the enemy, he detached his destroyers and sent them southward to increase the search area, and the destroyers subsequently lost contact with their flagship. Fraser, preparing for the German attack, had diverted the returning empty convoy RA 55A northward, out of the area in which it was expected, and ordered JW 55B to reverse course to allow him to close. He later ordered four of
5436-557: The French 3rd Light Cavalry Division under General Petiet, supported by the 1st Spahi Brigade under Colonel Jouffault and the 2nd company of the 5th Armoured Battalion, crossed the southern border to conduct a probe of German forces; these units later retreated behind the Maginot Line . Five Spahis were killed. British Air Marshal Arthur Barratt , impatient with the reluctance of the French Air Force to conduct air strikes , ordered
5587-474: The French coast at 10:10 a.m., while the other pilots were grounded due to the bad weather. The pair spotted two Messerschmitt Bf 109s (Bf 109) and attacked, then found themselves over a German flotilla of two big ships, a destroyer screen and an outer ring of E-boats. The Spitfires were dived on by about 12 German fighters and escaped through anti-aircraft fire from the ships, strafed an E-boat and made off at wave-top height. After they landed at 11:09 a.m.,
5738-690: The German flak and attacked Prinz Eugen , dropping their torpedoes at 1,000 yd (910 m), to no effect. German invasion of Luxembourg The German invasion of Luxembourg was part of Case Yellow ( German : Fall Gelb ), the German invasion of the Low Countries — Belgium , Luxembourg and the Netherlands —and France during World War II . The battle began on 10 May 1940 and lasted just one day. Facing only light resistance, German troops quickly occupied Luxembourg. The Luxembourgish government, and Grand Duchess Charlotte , managed to escape
5889-513: The German route, which was passed on by the Admiralty at 12:29 p.m. on 12 February. (The daily naval Enigma Home Waters settings for 10–12 February took Bletchley Park until 15 February to break.) The ships at Brest were scheduled to depart at 8:30 p.m. on 11 February but an air raid by 18 Wellington bombers delayed the departure. The all clear sounded at 10:15 p.m. and Scharnhorst , Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen , accompanied by six destroyers sailed thirty minutes later. A British agent in Brest
6040-546: The German ship to a deluge of shells, and the cruisers Jamaica and Belfast fired their remaining torpedoes at the slowing target. Scharnhorst ' s end came when the British destroyers Opportune , Virago , Musketeer and Matchless fired a further 19 torpedoes at her. Wracked with hits and unable to flee, Scharnhorst finally capsized and sank at 19:45 on 26 December, her propellers still turning, at an estimated position of 72°16′N 28°41′E / 72.267°N 28.683°E / 72.267; 28.683 . She
6191-622: The German ships at Brest; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrived at the port on 22 March 1941. From 10 January to mid-April 1941, Bomber Command aimed 829 long tons (842 t) of bombs at the ships in Brest harbour. Winston Churchill issued the Battle of the Atlantic directive on 9 March, directing the priority of the British war effort temporarily to counter the German campaign against Atlantic convoys. The RAF photographic reconnaissance unit (1 PRU) discovered Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in port on 28 March. Bomber Command flew about 1,161 sorties against
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6342-407: The German squadron and were unable to get into a position to attack before deteriorating weather and engine problems forced them to turn back. Several Whirlwind fighters on a routine patrol were intercepted by the fighter screen at 2:00 p.m. The seven Beauforts at Thorney Island were closest to the Brest Group when it was sighted. Two Beauforts had been bombed up and one went unserviceable, before
6493-516: The German troops, but to little avail; the capital city was occupied before noon. The Gendarmerie chain of command in the south was thrown into disarray by the influx of refugees and the arrival of German and French troops. Most gendarmes escorted refugees over the border, while some abandoned their posts and fled to France. Total Luxembourgish casualties amounted to six gendarmes and one soldier wounded, while 22 soldiers (six officers and 16 non-commissioned officers ) and 54 gendarmes were captured. By
6644-449: The Hudson patrol was not there, having been ordered to return when its ASV failed. Joubert was short of aircraft and sent no replacement, also because Stopper had reported nothing untoward and if the Brest Group had sailed before Stopper began, it would already have passed Line South East . Habo , the third patrol line, from Cherbourg to Boulogne was conducted as usual, until a dawn fog
6795-449: The Hudson was flying south-west as the ships turned towards Ushant and received no contact. The last eight minutes of the next Stopper sortie came within about 9 nmi (10 mi; 17 km) of the ships but received no contact on the radar. Line South East ran past Ushant to the vicinity of Jersey , to find a sortie from Brest which had turned up the Channel. The Brest Group crossed Line South East at 0:50am on 12 February, but
6946-464: The K-set clearly showed the ships zig-zagging but not where the shells were landing. Full battery salvo firing began and the four 9.2-inch guns fired 33 rounds at the German ships, which were moving out of range at 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h) and all missed. German sources state that the fleet had already passed Dover when the coastal artillery opened fire and that the shells landed well astern of
7097-460: The Luxembourgish government and Grand Ducal court of the invasion. Foreign Minister Joseph Bech , in the presence of Prime Minister Pierre Dupong , attempted to contact the German ambassador at the legation and at his private residence, but they were informed that he was present at neither. At 06:30 the majority of the government, including Dupong and Bech, evacuated the capital by motorcade to
7248-507: The No. 1 boiler room. Scharnhorst ' s speed dropped to only 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), and though immediate repair work allowed it to recover to 22 kn (25 mph; 41 km/h), Scharnhorst was now vulnerable to torpedo attacks by the destroyers. Five minutes later, Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command: "We will fight on until the last shell is fired." At 18:50 Scharnhorst turned to starboard to engage
7399-485: The Nore Command was ordered to keep six destroyers on call in the Thames and be ready to send six torpedo boats to reinforce those at Dover. The fast Abdiel -class minelayers HMS Manxman and HMS Welshman were detached to Plymouth Command to mine the Brest approaches and to Dover to mine the eastern exit of the Channel respectively. Most submarines were in the Mediterranean but two training boats were sent into
7550-519: The North Atlantic. Next day Enigma and RAF photographic reconnaissance (PR) found that the number of German ship reinforcements from Brest to the Hook of Holland had risen to seven destroyers, ten torpedo-boats, more than 30 minesweepers, 25 E-boats and many smaller craft. During 1941, Hitler decided that the Brest Group should return to home waters in a "surprise break through the Channel", as part of
7701-547: The Schuster Line's tank traps. Fire was exchanged, but the Germans did not encounter any significant resistance except for some bridges destroyed and some land mines since the majority of the Luxembourgish Volunteer Corps stayed in their barracks. The border was defended only by soldiers who had volunteered for guard duty and gendarmes . A handful of Germans secured the Moselle bridge at Wormeldange and captured
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#17328451314057852-550: The Spitfire patrol landed at 10:50 a.m., having kept radio silence , the pilots reported a flotilla off Le Touquet (near Boulogne) but not the capital ships. News of the sighting was rushed to 11 Group and the Navy at Dover by 11:05 a.m. (One pilot then mentioned a big ship and a certain sighting was received as he was being debriefed .) By coincidence, two senior fighter pilots from RAF Kenley had decided to fly an intruder mission to
8003-466: The advantage would end as soon as the ships were sufficiently damaged. Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax outlined a plan for a standing start at night to gain surprise and to pass the Strait of Dover, 21 mi (34 km) wide and the narrowest part of the Channel, during the day, to benefit from fighter cover at the danger point. The Luftwaffe refused to guarantee that the 250 fighters available could protect
8154-657: The agents were to be used to seize key bridges over the Sauer , Moselle and Our rivers. Luxembourg authorities also took notice, and Captain Stein worked to stop the Germans' activities. On 3 March, the French Third Army was ordered to occupy Luxembourg in the event of a German attack. On the evening of 8 May, the Grand Ducal Government ordered for the first time that all doors of the Schuster Line be closed at 11:00 and remain so regardless of circumstance until 06:00
8305-466: The area was convoy RA 55A, returning to the United Kingdom from Russia, consisting of 22 cargo ships, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and four other vessels, and an ocean escort of six Home Fleet destroyers led by HMS Milne . It had arrived safely at Murmansk with its normal escorts and the additional protection by Force 1, commanded by Vice Admiral Robert Burnett , consisting of
8456-474: The bombing left the three large ships in Brest undergoing extensive repairs. Lützow had been seriously damaged by a torpedo on 13 June; Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were undergoing maintenance in German shipyards, Tirpitz was still working up and Bismarck had been sunk. British code breakers had contributed to the destruction of the German supply-ship network in the Atlantic that supported surface ship actions against Allied convoys. From 28 March to
8607-467: The border town of Esch . Bodson stayed behind at the Saint-Esprit Barracks to monitor the situation. In Esch a group of 125 German special operations troops had landed by Fieseler Storch , with orders to hold the area until the main invasion force arrived. A gendarme confronted the soldiers and asked that they leave, but he was taken prisoner. The government motorcade encountered a roadblock at
8758-563: The bulk of the Jagdwaffe being absent in the Soviet Union . The Funkhorchdienst (signals intelligence service, General Wolfgang Martini ) attempted to jam British radio-telephone frequencies by using a technique to increase atmospheric interference and reduced the performance of British coastal radars by slowly increasing their jamming. Dornier Do 217s of Kampfgeschwader 2 (Bomber Wing 2) were to fly electronic deception sorties over
8909-446: The bulk of the RAF would be grounded. Vizeadmiral (vice admiral) Kurt Fricke (Chief of Staff of the SKL) opposed Hitler but was allowed only a short time to review the policy. On 12 January 1942, Raeder again opposed the channel route but planned for it, provided that Hitler took the final decision. Hitler noted that the ships at Brest had diverted British bombing from Germany but that
9060-480: The capital and, having learned many of the secondary roads by memory, was able to avoid German roadblocks and navigate his way to France. Following consultation with her ministers, Grand Duchess Charlotte decided to abandon the palace. Accompanied by her husband, Prince Felix , her mother, Dowager Grand Duchess Marie Anne , and members of the Grand-Ducal suite, she departed for the border village of Redange . After
9211-448: The capital be reinforced by gendarmes from the south, and told Weis to forward this information to the capital's district commissioner to give the necessary orders. Weis later tried to contact the district commissioner by phone, but failed to reach him; reinforcements never came. A short time later the gendarmes at Diekirch were ordered to patrol the local railway bridge and be wary of unfamiliar persons. Luxembourgish authorities received
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#17328451314059362-460: The capital to be completely surrounded. Charlotte's party was able to link up with the government motorcade at Longwy. Meanwhile, Jean's party's car was strafed by a German aircraft while stopped at a cafe. Near Esch, the group was delayed by a German roadblock, and they escaped when their chauffeur drove straight through the soldiers. The party ultimately joined Charlotte and the Grand Ducal government at Sainte-Menehould . At 08:00, elements of
9513-498: The commanding officer of HMS Duke of York , Captain Guy Russell , said: "... the Norwegian destroyer Stord carried out the most daring attack of the whole action...". The loss of Scharnhorst demonstrated the vital importance of radar in modern naval warfare. While the German battleship should have been able to outgun all of her opponents save the battleship Duke of York , the early loss of radar-assisted fire control combined with
9664-487: The convoy. It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about as it would result in the cruisers losing contact with Scharnhorst , and the decision was criticised by some of the British force's other officers but supported by Fraser. To Burnett's relief, shortly after noon, Scharnhorst was once again detected by the cruiser's radars as it attempted to approach the convoy. As fire was again exchanged, Scharnhorst scored two hits on Norfolk with 11-inch shells, disabling
9815-546: The country and a government-in-exile was created in London . On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland , initiating World War II . This put Luxembourg's Grand Ducal government in a delicate situation. On one hand, the population's sympathies lay with the UK and France; on the other hand, due to the country's policy of neutrality since the Treaty of London in 1867, the government adopted
9966-439: The country to remain unambiguously neutral it would cease broadcasting. Exceptions were a daily 20 minute-long message at midday and in the evening reserved for government announcements. For the rest of the month, the government supplied full transcripts of its broadcasts to the foreign legations in the country. Later that day several German stations posed as Radio Luxembourg by broadcasting in the Luxembourgish wavelength, making, in
10117-413: The country's gold reserves to Belgium, and began stockpiling funds in its Brussels and Paris legations in the event it was forced to flee due to German attack. The Paris legation was also given a sealed envelope detailing a formal request of military assistance from the French government in case communications were cut-off in an invasion. After several false alarms in the spring of 1940, the probability of
10268-515: The country. Since an invasion had not yet occurred they still enjoyed diplomatic privilege and the police were forced to release them. One group of fifth columnists was arrested while attempting to reach the legation. Meanwhile, Captain Archen had received his subordinate's report, but by that point, he had been told by informants in the Gendarmerie that shots had been exchanged with German operatives at
10419-454: The crews was high, no sabotage had occurred at Brest and the crews went ashore freely. Among locals there was no doubt that the ships were preparing to depart and as a deception, tropical helmets were brought on board, French dock workers loaded oil barrels marked "For Use in the Tropics" and false rumours were spread around town. Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe chief of staff, refused to guarantee
10570-457: The cruiser HMS Belfast , the flagship, and the cruisers HMS Norfolk and Sheffield . Escorting the convoys to Russia was the responsibility of the Home Fleet and its commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser . Fraser wished to neutralise Scharnhorst , a major threat to the convoys, and planned a confrontation over Christmas 1943 in which convoy JW 55B would be used to draw
10721-532: The dash would be 32 fighters. In April 1941, the Royal Navy and the RAF devised Operation Fuller, a plan for combined operations against the ships in Brest should they sortie. Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay of the Dover Command was to be responsible for operations to confront a German squadron sailing up the Channel, with continuous co-ordinated attacks by Coastal Command, the Navy and RAF. British coastal radar had
10872-508: The destroyer screen and Esmonde's aircraft was shot down before he could launch his torpedo. The other two aircraft continued through the German anti-aircraft barrage, dropped torpedoes and then ditched their aircraft which had been hit by flak. The second section of three Swordfish were seen to cross over the destroyer screen and disappear in the cloud and smoke. While the German fighter escorts were absent, two sections (eight aircraft) of 452 Squadron RAAF strafed several German ships and silenced
11023-440: The destroyer's sailors being killed as the ship attempted to close with Scharnhorst . HMS Norfolk suffered most of the remaining casualties with seven of her men being killed while the destroyer Scorpion also had one of its men missing in action. The Norwegian destroyer Stord also suffered losses when the rough sea washed two men over board during the chase; one was washed back onto the ship by another wave, and wounded, while
11174-415: The destroyers Savage and Saumarez , but this allowed Scorpion and the Norwegian destroyer Stord to attack with torpedoes , scoring two hits on the starboard side. As Scharnhorst continued to turn to avoid the torpedoes, Savage and Saumarez scored three hits on her port side. Saumarez was hit several times by Scharnhorst ' s secondary armament and suffered 11 killed and 11 wounded. Due to
11325-484: The destroyers with RA 55A; Matchless , Musketeer , Opportune and Virago , to detach and join him. The unescorted Scharnhorst encountered Burnett's Force 1 shortly after 09:00. Belfast was the first ship to obtain radar contact on Scharnhorst , and the British cruisers rapidly closed the range. At a distance of nearly 13,000 yd (12,000 m), the British cruisers opened fire and Scharnhorst responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on
11476-522: The division's chief of staff's orders to various units to occupy strategic points within Luxembourg. The Grand Ducal government put all border posts and Grand Ducal Gendarmerie stations on full alert. In Luxembourg City , gendarmes mobilised to defend public buildings and dispatched vehicle patrols to arrest fifth columnists. The economic councillor and the chancellor of the German legation were detained for questioning regarding allegations that they had used legation cars to organise subversive activities within
11627-488: The end of January to early February, torpedo boats, minesweepers and destroyers joined the big ships; together with news that the battleship Tirpitz in Norway had moved to the south, this led the Admiralty to issue an appreciation on 2 February that the three ships were going to attempt to sail up the channel and sent the signal Executive Fuller , the order to begin the operation to prevent the German Fleet from breaking into
11778-443: The end of July, 1,962 long tons (1,993 t) of bombs were dropped in 1,875 sorties, 1,723 by Bomber Command, which also sent 205 minelaying sorties, with another 159 from Coastal Command, laying 275 mines off Brest; the British lost 34 aircraft, three being minelayers. For the next two months, Bomber Command made frequent small attacks, then 56 bombers attacked on the night of 3/4 September, followed by 120 bombers on
11929-556: The enemy out. Fraser expected and hoped that Scharnhorst would attempt to attack JW 55B. At a conference of the captains of the ships in his force Fraser described his plan to intercept Scharnhorst at a position between the convoy and the enemy's Norwegian base. He would then approach the enemy to within 12,000 yd (11,000 m) in the Arctic night , illuminate Scharnhorst with star shell , and open fire using fire-control radar . Convoy JW 55B had left Loch Ewe on 20 December and
12080-466: The escort screen. To have the longest period of darkness possible, the departure was to be four days before the new moon and at 7:30 p.m., to benefit from a spring tide flowing up the Channel, which would add speed and possibly lift the ships over mines. Air cover was to be provided by the Luftwaffe and six destroyers would escort the Brest Group on the first leg, to be joined by ten E-boats at dawn;
12231-450: The evening of 10 May 1940, most of the country, with the exception of the south, was occupied by German forces. More than 90,000 civilians fled from the canton of Esch-sur-Alzette as a consequence of the advance. 47,000 evacuated to France, 45,000 poured into the central and northern part of Luxembourg. On 11 May the Grand Ducal government reached Paris and installed itself in the Luxembourg legation. Fearing German aerial attack and finding
12382-430: The event of a German invasion. Charlotte decided that if possible she and the government would flee abroad in the event of an attack to advocate for the country's sovereignty. During World War I , her elder sister and then-Grand Duchess Marie-Adélaïde had elected to stay during Germany's occupation of the country , bringing the monarchy into disrepute; Charlotte wanted to avoid such problems. The government moved some of
12533-471: The exiled Royal Norwegian Navy . Fraser was anxious not to discourage Scharnhorst from leaving its base, so did not approach before it was necessary to do so. As JW 55B and its escorts approached the area of greatest danger on the same day, the 23rd, travelling slowly eastward 250 mi (220 nmi ; 400 km ) off the coast of north Norway, Burnett and Force 1 set out westward from Murmansk while Fraser with Force 2 approached at moderate speed from
12684-498: The extreme range of 4,000 yd (2.0 nmi; 2.3 mi; 3.7 km) before returning to Dover; the rest were not able to get much closer and torpedoed through the gap between the E-boat lines, mistakenly claiming a hit on Prinz Eugen . Two motor gun boats (MGBs) arrived from Dover in time to defend the last MTB from a German Narvik-class destroyer . Two more MTBs had left Ramsgate at 12:25 p.m. but approached from too far astern of
12835-530: The first reports of exchanged fire at around 02:00 on 10 May when two gendarmes were ambushed near the German border by plainclothes agents. The Germans retreated to the Fels mill near Grevenmacher and around 20 soldiers who volunteered were dispatched to arrest them. The government then ordered all steel doors along the border locked. At 02:15 soldiers stationed in Bous were attacked by Germans in civilian clothes. One soldier
12986-462: The fleeing German ship. With Belfast sending a constant stream of radio signals on the Scharnhorst's position, the battleship Duke of York battled through the rough seas to reach the German ship. Fraser sent his four escorting destroyers to press ahead and try to get into torpedo-launching positions. The main British force soon picked up Scharnhorst on radar at 16:15 and were manoeuvring to bring
13137-451: The following morning. Throughout the day Luxembourgish authorities witnessed much less activity on the far side of the border and made no reports of tank or machine gun movements. On the afternoon of 9 May, a French intelligence officer stationed in Clervaux witnessed German troops preparing pontoon bridges in the Sauer . He attempted in vain to contact Captain Archen, and resorted to making
13288-473: The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and their escorts was evacuated from Brest in Brittany to German ports. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had arrived in Brest on 22 March 1941 after the success of Operation Berlin in the Atlantic. More raids were planned and the ships were refitted at Brest. The ships were a threat to Allied trans-Atlantic convoys and RAF Bomber Command attacked them from 30 March 1941. Gneisenau
13439-428: The hope that the attacks would distract the Brest Group as Coastal Command and the Navy made torpedo attacks. At Dover in 1940, there were four 6 in (152 mm) guns with a range of 12,000 yd (11,000 m), two 9.2 in (234 mm) guns with a range of 18,000 yd (16,000 m), two modern 6-inch batteries with 25,000 yd (23,000 m) range and four more 9.2-inch guns on new mountings with
13590-401: The horizontal, and restarted the gyro-stabiliser so that within a few minutes the radar was working again. (After the battle, a myth arose that Bates had repaired the wires with his bare hands, leading to the nickname "Barehand" Bates.) Scharnhorst' s fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18:20 when a shell fired by Duke of York at extreme range pierced her belt armour and destroyed
13741-402: The invasion, but his reports never reached the 3rd Army at Metz . General Charles Condé, the army's commander, was unclear about the situation and at 05:30 dispatched aerial reconnaissance units to investigate. At 06:00 the French 3rd Light Cavalry Division was ordered to intervene. Telephone and radio messages from the border posts to the Gendarmerie and Volunteer Corps headquarters informed
13892-460: The last post to fall, in Wasserbillig , transmitted until the Germans breached the operating room. The steel doors of the Schuster Line were ordered closed on 10 May 1940 at 03:15, following reports of movement of German troops on the east side of the border rivers Our , Sauer, and Moselle. At 03:30 Luxembourgish authorities released interned French pilots and German deserters. The Royal Family
14043-435: The major German units. The coastal guns ceased fire when light naval forces and torpedo-bombers began to attack and by 1:21 p.m. the German ships passed beyond the effective range of the British radar. The six Swordfish torpedo-bombers of 825 Squadron FAA, took off from Manston at 12:20 p.m., after Esmonde decided that he could wait no longer, meeting the Spitfire escorts of 72 Squadron at 12:28 p.m., all setting off for
14194-464: The nets had been bombed. As dawn arrived the Beaufort flown by Kenneth Campbell attacked and dropped his torpedo as he passed over the mole giving it the maximum distance to arm on its run to its target. There were no torpedo nets and Gneisenau was hit on the starboard side in the region of the after turret; the Beaufort was shot down by anti-aircraft fire, killing all on board. The damage to Gneisenau
14345-454: The next day. The German ships had been scheduled to depart Brest at 7:30 p.m. but were delayed by a Bomber Command raid, which had been ordered after photo-reconnaissance had found the ships still in harbour with torpedo booms deployed at 4:15 p.m. For the previous week, Enigma had been providing information that the Germans were minesweeping on a route that made a dash up the Channel a certainty and with reference to captured charts gave away
14496-503: The night fighters of Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (Night Fighter Wing 1), were swiftly to prepare aircraft for the next sortie by rearming and refuelling in no more than thirty minutes. Galland decided that the aircraft should fly high and low cover, the low groups flying under British coastal radar. A standing patrol of least 16 fighters was to be maintained, in two formations of eight aircraft for their patrol altitudes, with each formation in two Schwärme of four aircraft. One Schwarm
14647-473: The night of 13/14 September. Frequent small attacks were resumed and about 1,000 sorties were flown from July to December. At the start of the month, the Brest Group was made the Bomber Command priority again and from 11 December, bombing and minelaying took place nightly. When Prinz Eugen was found out of dry dock on 16 December, a 101-bomber attack was made on the night of 17/18 December followed by
14798-535: The number of aircraft available against a dash up the Channel, as did the winter weather which reduced visibility and blocked airfields with snow. On 11 February 1942, the ships left Brest at 10:45 p.m. (German time) and escaped detection for more than twelve hours, approaching the Strait of Dover without discovery. The Luftwaffe provided air cover in Unternehmen Donnerkeil (Operation Thunderbolt) and as
14949-422: The opinion of United States Chargé d'Affaires George Platt Waller , "grossly unneutral announcements". On the evening of 21 September, the Grand Ducal government suspended all broadcasts pending the resolution of the war. On 14 September the volunteer corps was bolstered by the addition of a 125-strong auxiliary unit. German military manoeuvres and river traffic made the population increasingly nervous, so in
15100-485: The other 200 aircraft, half would continue operations against Germany and the rest would be preparing for operations next day. The aircraft reserved for Fuller were rotated and weather permitting, 20–25 would bomb Brest. Fighter Command would escort the torpedo-bombers with fighters from 10 Group in the south-west and the 16 fighter squadrons of 11 Group in the south-east. Each service arm had exchanged liaison officers at headquarters and operations rooms but did not use
15251-513: The other four took off at 1:25 p.m. The four Beauforts were late to meet their fighter escorts at Manston and the torpedo-bombers and fighters were ordered independently to the German ships. The position, course and speed of the Brest Group was given by voice ( R/T ) to the Spitfires and Morse ( W/T ) to the Beauforts. The torpedo-bombers failed to receive the orders, because 16 Group forgot that they had been fitted with R/T for Operation Fuller. When
15402-454: The other side. The Germans took continuing heavy punishment from Duke of York's 14-inch shells, and at 17:24 a desperate Bey signalled to Germany "am surrounded by heavy units". Bey was able to put some more distance between Scharnhorst and the British ships to increase his prospects of success. Two 11-inch shells from one of her salvoes damaged the foremast of the Duke of York , severing some of
15553-458: The other was lost at sea. Fraser ordered the force to proceed to Murmansk, making a signal to the Admiralty: " Scharnhorst sunk", to which the reply came: "Grand, well done." Later in the evening of 26 December, Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on board Duke of York : "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead
15704-423: The outgunned Belfast as the sole pursuer and dangerously exposed for a while. The lack of working radar aboard Scharnhorst prevented the Germans from taking advantage of the situation, allowing Belfast to reacquire the German ship on her radar set. Bey was unaware that his ship was now sailing into a trap, with Admiral Fraser's main force steaming towards Scharnhorst's position and perfectly placed to intercept
15855-495: The pilots reported that the German ships had been 16 nmi (18 mi; 30 km) off Le Touquet at 10:42 a.m. by 11:25 a.m., the alarm had been raised that the Brest Group was entering the Straits of Dover with air cover. At 11:27 a.m. Bomber Command had been alerted that the Brest Group was near Dover and warned the groups to be ready. Including aircraft that had flown the night before and those at four hours' notice, Air Marshal Richard Peirse had about 250 aircraft but
16006-446: The plots were moving north-east at 20–25 kn (23–29 mph; 37–46 km/h) and sent two Spitfires to reconnoitre at 10:20 a.m., about the time that news reached Fighter Command headquarters that radar-jamming had begun at 9:20 a.m. and that the station at Beachy Head was detecting surface ships. Radar stations in Kent reported two large ships off Le Touquet at 10:52 a.m. and when
16157-403: The portfolios for Interior, Transportation, and Public Works; Joseph Carmes managed Finance, Labour, and Public Health; Louis Simmer oversaw Education, and Mathias Pütz directed Agriculture, Viticulture, Commerce, and Industry. In the days after the invasion Luxembourgish officers walked about the capital freely, though the regular soldiers were mostly confined to their barracks. Colonel Speller
16308-466: The problem of inclement weather left her at a significant disadvantage. Scharnhorst was straddled by 31 of the 52 radar-fire-controlled salvoes fired by Duke of York . In the aftermath of the battle, the Kriegsmarine commander, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment." The sinking of the Scharnhorst was a major victory for
16459-462: The question of the suitability of Brest for heavy surface units; Raeder disagreed and wanted more air defences instead. Scharnhorst was not damaged but the bomb hits on the docks delayed its refit, which included a substantial overhaul of its machinery; the boiler superheater tubes had a manufacturing defect that had plagued the ship throughout Operation Berlin. Repairs had been expected to take ten weeks but delays, exacerbated by British minelaying in
16610-503: The recent exercises, led the Admiralty to predict an impending departure. On 8 February, in a break in the weather, PR found that the ships were still in harbour, Scharnhorst was in dock and that another two destroyers had arrived. Air Chief Marshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté , Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Coastal Command, sent an appreciation to Fighter and Bomber commands, that a sortie could be expected any time after 10 February. The Coastal Command groups were alerted and 42 Squadron
16761-586: The responsibility of civilian engineers, while technical advice was sought from the French, who took great interest in the line's establishment. A series of nine radio outposts were established along the German border, each manned by gendarmes, with a central radio receiver in Captain Stein's official office near the volunteers' Saint-Esprit Barracks in the capital. On 4 January 1940, the Cabinet convened under Grand Duchess Charlotte and outlined steps to be taken in
16912-421: The return fire of a destroyer, for a cracked perspex hood to one Spitfire. The five operational Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) based at Dover left harbour at 11:55 a.m. and sighted the German warships at 12:23 p.m. The RAF fighter cover for this attack was not airborne in time, one MTB had engine-trouble and the rest found their approach blocked by twelve E-boats in two lines. The defective MTB fired torpedoes at
17063-589: The roundabout route via the Denmark Strait the next day, reaching Kiel on 28 March. The commerce raids in the north Atlantic during the winter of 1940–1941 by Scharnhorst -class battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau , the heavy cruisers Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper sank British shipping at a higher rate than German surface ships achieved for the rest of the war. The British reformed 19 Group for Coastal Command in January 1941, which kept watch on
17214-446: The ships at Brest. By April 1941, the British knew that the three ships had been hit but not the extent of the damage. From 16 to 23 December, Enigma decrypts showed that the gunners of the ships were on the Baltic, conducting gunnery training. Next day, the Admiralty warned that an attempt to break out was likely. On 25 January 1942, the ships were photographed in the harbour and two short periods in dry dock by two ships were seen. From
17365-443: The ships but Hitler accepted the plan. Hitler ordered that the battleship Tirpitz , already in Norway, was to be moved south to Trondheim . At a conference on 22 January, Hitler announced that all ships and U-boats should assemble for the defence of Norway and on 25 January, Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz ( Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote , BdU, Commander of Submarines) was ordered to withdraw eight submarines to patrol off Iceland ,
17516-406: The ships in Brest, through poor weather over the next two months. Gneisenau needed an engine room overhaul and entered dry dock on 4 April and an unexploded bomb was found between the stocks under the ship. Gneisenau had to be refloated and removed to defuse the bomb. Gneisenau was moored in an exposed position in the roadstead , where it was photographed by a 1 PRU Spitfire on 5 April. A raid
17667-467: The ships neared Dover, the British belatedly responded. Attacks by the RAF, Fleet Air Arm , Navy and bombardments by coastal artillery were costly failures but Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were damaged by mines in the North Sea ( Scharnhorst was out of action for a year). By 13 February, the ships had reached German ports; Winston Churchill ordered an inquiry into the debacle and The Times denounced
17818-412: The ships of the Brest Group coming up the Channel towards Cap Gris Nez. At 12:19 p.m., the Dover guns fired their first salvo but with visibility down to 5 nmi (5.8 mi; 9.3 km), there could be no observation of the fall-of-shot . The gunners hoped that the radar would detect the shell splashes and allow corrections to be made, although this method had never been tried before. "Blips" on
17969-518: The small facilities unsuitable, the government moved further south, first to Fontainebleau , and then Poitiers . It later moved to Portugal and the United Kingdom, before finally settling in Canada for the duration of the war. In exile, Charlotte became an important symbol of national unity. Her eldest son and heir, Jean, volunteered for the British Army in 1942. The only official representative left behind
18120-467: The spring of 1940 fortifications were erected along the borders with Germany and France. The so-called Schuster Line , named after its chief constructor, consisted of 41 sets of concrete blocks and iron gates; 18 bridgeblocks on the German border, 18 roadblocks on the German border, and five roadblocks on the French border. Since the Corps des Gendarmes et Volontaires had no pioneer unit, construction fell to
18271-419: The success of Cerberus or to reinforce the fighter forces in the west. Adolf Galland was given command of the air operation, to be called Unternehmen Donnerkeil (Operation Thunderbolt). Details of the plan were arranged with Oberst ( Colonel ) Karl Koller , chief of staff of Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3 Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle ). Some training units were mobilised to make up for
18422-446: The summer the new RAF heavy bombers attacked Gneisenau , Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst . Prinz Eugen was hit on the night of 1/2 July and put out of action. The sailing on 21 July of Scharnhorst to La Pallice forestalled a surprise attack by Bomber Command. Scharnhorst was attacked by six Stirling bombers on the evening of 23 July; German fighters shot down one bomber. The attack on Brest took place in daylight on 24 July, with
18573-465: The threat of these ships' presence was enough to cause disastrous consequences for the convoys, such as Convoy PQ 17 that was scattered and mostly sunk by German forces after false reports of the Tirpitz sailing to intercept them. To ward off the threat of Germany's capital ships in the Arctic and to escort convoys with a high level of success, the Royal Navy had to outlay great assets. Operation Ostfront
18724-406: The torpedo hits, Scharnhorst ' s speed again fell to 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), allowing Duke of York to rapidly close the range. With Scharnhorst illuminated by star shells "hanging over her like a chandelier", Duke of York and Jamaica resumed fire, at a range of only 10,400 yd (9,500 m). At 19:15, Belfast joined in from the north. The British vessels subjected
18875-555: The two customs officers there, who had demanded that they halt but refrained from opening fire. The partly demolished bridge over the Sauer at Echternach was quickly repaired by engineers of the Großdeutschland regiment , allowing the passage of the 10th Panzer Division. Planes flew overhead, heading for Belgium and France, though some stopped and landed troops within the country. Captain Archen repeatedly alerted his superiors at Longwy of
19026-419: The vicinity, caused them to miss Unternehmen Rheinübung (Operation Rhine Exercise). The sortie by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen into the North Atlantic went ahead and Bismarck was sunk; Prinz Eugen returned to Brest on 1 June. The loss of Bismarck severely limited the freedom of action of the German surface fleet, after Hitler ordered that capital ships must operate with much greater caution. During
19177-542: The west. On 25 December, Scharnhorst (under Captain Fritz Hintze) with the Narvik-class destroyers Z29 , Z30 , Z33 , Z34 and Z38 left Norway's Altafjord under the overall command of Konteradmiral Erich Bey . Scharnhorst set course for the convoy's reported position as a south-westerly gale developed. Fraser received confirmation from the Admiralty in the early hours of 26 December that Scharnhorst
19328-547: The western Allies to the Soviet Union , was brought to battle and sunk by the Royal Navy 's battleship HMS Duke of York with cruisers and destroyers, including an onslaught from the destroyer HNoMS Stord of the exiled Royal Norwegian Navy , off the North Cape, Norway . The battle was the last between British and German big-gun capital ships . The outcome increased the British advantage in major surface units. It
19479-430: The western Channel to divert British aircraft. Fliegerkorps IX ( General der Flieger [Air Force General] Joachim Coeler ) prepared to bomb RAF bases in south-western England and to attack British naval forces attempting to intercept the Brest Group. Fernaufklärungsgruppe 123 (Long-range Reconnaissance Wing 123) was to keep watch on both ends of the Channel and support Fliegerkorps IX . The convoy route
19630-447: The wireless aerials and spraying the superstructure and the upper deck with splinters, and, more serious still, knocking over the radar aerial to the Type 284 gunnery control radar set. These hits could not have been known to Bey, and Lt. Harold Bates, the electrical officer, despite the appalling conditions (a force 8 gale, darkness and substantial ice), climbed the mast, returned the aerial to
19781-487: Was Albert Wehrer [ de ] , head of the Ministry of State Affairs, as well as the 41 deputies. By the end of May Wehrer and several high ranking functionaries established a provisional "Administrative Commission" to govern Luxembourg in lieu of the Grand Ducal family and the other ministers. Wehrer retained the Ministry of State Affairs and assumed responsibility for Foreign Relations and Justice; Jean Metzdorf held
19932-603: Was already being flown off Brest and Line South East from Ushant to the Isle de Bréhat and Habo from Le Havre to Boulogne began. Coastal Command had three Beaufort torpedo-bomber squadrons in Britain, 42 Squadron at RAF Leuchars in Scotland, 12 Beauforts of 86 Squadron and 217 Squadron in Cornwall and seven 217 Squadron aircraft at Thorney Island (Portsmouth). Two days later, Enigma showed that Ciliax had joined Scharnhorst and with
20083-717: Was also the penultimate engagement between battleships in history, the last being the October 1944 Battle of Surigao Strait . Since August 1941, the western Allies had run convoys of ships from the United Kingdom and Iceland to the northern ports of the Soviet Union to provide essential supplies for their war effort on the Eastern Front . These endured much hardship, frequently attacked by German naval and air forces stationed in occupied Norway. A key concern were German Kriegsmarine battleships such as Tirpitz and Scharnhorst . Even
20234-570: Was an attempt by the German Kriegsmarine to intercept the expected Arctic convoys . In late December 1943, there was a Russia-bound convoy JW 55B consisting of 19 cargo vessels under the command of the Commodore, retired Rear-Admiral Maitland Boucher , accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers, HMCS Huron and HMCS Haida , among others, and an ocean escort of eight Home Fleet destroyers led by HMS Onslow . Also in
20385-413: Was at sea and searching for convoy JW 55B. The stormy weather had resulted in the grounding of all Luftwaffe reconnaissance planes. With no ability to search for the British ships from the air and heavy seas hampering the movement of his ships, Rear Admiral Bey was unable to locate the convoy. Despite a German U-boat spotting the convoy and reporting its position, Bey was still not able to make contact with
20536-406: Was badly injured, as was one German who was detained. Shortly thereafter a gendarmerie lieutenant and his chauffeur were ambushed and exchanged fire with German-speaking cyclists; no one was hurt. Fifth columnists successfully severed the telephone wires between the capital and the border posts, forcing the gendarmes to communicate via shortwave radio. German agents gradually seized the radio stations;
20687-567: Was briefly incarcerated by the Gestapo , though he was later released under close supervision. Battle of the North Cape 1941 1942 1943 1944 1942 1943 1944 1945 1942 1943 1944 1945 Associated articles The Battle of the North Cape was a Second World War naval battle that occurred on 26 December 1943, as part of the Arctic campaign . The German battleship Scharnhorst , on an operation to attack Arctic convoys of war materiel from
20838-574: Was divided into three sectors using the Jafü (Fighter Sector) boundaries but to ensure local control Max Ibel , the former commander of Jagdgeschwader 27 (Fighter Group 27) was appointed Jagdfliegerführer Schiff ( Jafü Schiff , Fighter Controller: Ship) and embarked on Scharnhorst as a signals officer to communicate with Luftwaffe units during the operation. Eight rehearsals, involving around 450 sorties, were made from 22 January to 10 February. The Jagdgeschwader (day fighter wings) and
20989-578: Was evacuated from its residence in Colmar-Berg to the Grand Ducal palace in Luxembourg City. Around 30 minutes later, at dawn, German planes were spotted flying over Luxembourg City towards Belgium. The German invasion began at 04:35 when the 1st , 2nd , and 10th Panzer Divisions crossed the border at Wallendorf-Pont , Vianden , and Echternach respectively. Wooden ramps were used to cross over
21140-669: Was forecast over British airfields and the aircraft was called back at 6:30am, when the Brest Group was still west of the line. The only patrol over the Channel was the routine dawn patrol by Fighter Command from Ostend , south to the mouth of the Somme , which the Brest Group passed at 10:00 a.m. From 8:25–9:59 a.m. RAF radar operators under Squadron Leader Bill Igoe , using an un-jammed radar frequency, noticed four plots of German aircraft circling in places north of Le Havre , which at first were thought to be air-sea rescue operations. At 10:00 a.m. 11 Group RAF Fighter Command realised that
21291-458: Was hit by four bombs and suffered two near misses. One of the hits did not explode but the others killed 75 crew members, jammed 'B' turret and distorted the armoured deck near it, made about a third of the crew quarters uninhabitable by fire and blast damage, destroyed the kitchens and bakery and affected some gunnery control systems. The damage to Gneisenau led the Seekriegsleitung to raise
21442-525: Was hit on 6 April 1941 and Scharnhorst on 24 July 1941, after dispersal to La Pallice . In late 1941, Adolf Hitler ordered the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM; German Navy High Command) to plan an operation to return the ships to German bases in case of a British invasion of Norway . The short route up the English Channel was preferred to a detour around the British Isles for surprise and air cover by
21593-451: Was inflicted on the docks and the town but none of the ships were hit again. Gneisenau was damaged on the evening of 6 January; 37 per cent of Bomber Command sorties between 10 December and 20 January 1942 were flown against the ships at Brest. Ultra was the code name used by British military intelligence for signals intelligence obtained by breaking German radio and teleprinter communications, including signals encrypted by Enigma,
21744-630: Was later identified and filmed at 72°31′N 28°15′E / 72.517°N 28.250°E / 72.517; 28.250 . Of her total complement of 1,968, only 36 were pulled from the frigid waters, 30 by Scorpion and six by Matchless . Neither Rear Admiral Bey nor Captain Hintze were among those rescued (although both were reported seen in the water after the ship sank), nor were any other officers. British casualties, in contrast, were relatively light with only 21 killed and 11 wounded. The majority of British casualties occurred on Saumarez , with 11 of
21895-537: Was ordered to fly its 14 Beauforts south to Norfolk (the move was delayed until next day by snow on the airfields in East Anglia ). Air Vice Marshal J. E. A. Baldwin , AOC Bomber Command, stood down half of its bombers and reduced the other 100 aircraft from four to two hours' notice, without informing the Admiralty. On 11 February, Sealion moved towards Brest on the afternoon tide, found nothing and returned at 8:35 p.m. to re-charge batteries, ready for another try
22046-441: Was quickly planned with the six Beaufort torpedo bombers at RAF St Eval for an attack at dawn the next day. Three Beauforts carried bombs to damage the torpedo nets that were presumed to protect the ship and three carried torpedoes. Two of the bombers got stuck in soft ground when taxiing for take-off and the third never found Brest in the thick weather. Two of the torpedo-bombers arrived off Brest, where they were to wait until
22197-423: Was severe, affecting the starboard propeller shaft bearings and shaft tunnel, causing flooding where the explosion destroyed the watertight integrity of stuffing boxes . Fuel and sea-water got into some important compartments and various pieces of equipment had shock damage. A salvage tug was needed to assist in getting flooding under control. Gneisenau went back into dry dock and on the night of 10/11 April, it
22348-465: Was sighted two days later by a Luftwaffe aircraft which commenced shadowing. By 23 December it was clear to the British from intelligence reports that the convoy had been sighted and was being shadowed by enemy aircraft. Fraser then put to sea with Force 2 consisting of his flagship the battleship HMS Duke of York , the cruiser HMS Jamaica and S-class destroyers HMS Savage , Scorpion , Saumarez , and HNoMS Stord of
22499-554: Was sunk at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943. German commerce raiding against British north Atlantic convoys was made easier by the capture of Norway and France in 1940. An abortive sortie by the cruiser Admiral Hipper ended at Brest, at the west end of the Brittany peninsula, on 27 December 1940. After five weeks of attacks by Bomber Command to no effect, the ship put to sea on 1 February 1941, sank numerous ships and returned on 14 February, before sailing to Germany using
22650-425: Was to fly out to sea and one towards land in a zigzag and all Schwärme were to fly back and forth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight, in radio silence. Every sortie was timed to allow the fighters 30 minutes over the ships, just enough time for relieved units to refuel, rearm and return. During Donnerkeil , the relieving sortie arrived after only 20 minutes which meant that fighter cover for half
22801-493: Was unable to signal that the Brest Group was departing because of German wireless jamming; Sealion , patrolling outside the harbour, had withdrawn to recharge its batteries. Patrol Stopper , near Brest, was being flown by an ASV Hudson from 224 Squadron when the Brest Group began assembling outside the port. At the patrol height of 1,000–2,000 ft (300–610 m) the ASV had a range of about 13 nmi (15 mi; 24 km) but
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