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80-431: ISWA may refer to: Islamic State – West Africa Province International Solid Waste Association International School of Western Australia International Sign Writing Alphabet Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title ISWA . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change

160-535: A Salafi jihadist movement centred in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The movement launched an insurgency against the Nigerian government following an unsuccessful uprising in 2009 , aiming at establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, and neighbouring regions of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Its de facto leader Abubakar Shekau attempted to increase his international standing among Islamists by allying with

240-652: A "hearts and minds" policy toward the local communities. It encourages locals to live in de facto rebel-held communities. Among its taxes, ISWAP also collects the zakat , a traditional Muslim tax and form of almsgiving which is used to provide for the poor. ISWAP's zakat has been featured in propaganda distributed by IS's newspaper, al-Naba . ISWAP's "Zakat Office" is known to operate fairly systematically and effectively, raising substantial funds to support both ISWAP as well as local civilians. Experts Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner have described ISWAP's taxation system as being locally less corrupt and more fair than that of

320-540: A "minimal resurgence". Heavy fighting continued, however, as Nigerian forces began an assault on Baga to retake it from ISWAP. Meanwhile, ISWAP began to experience extensive internal struggles, as its commander Ba Idrisa was deposed. Bo Lawan (alias "Lawan Abubakar") succeeded him, and promptly purged ISWAP's shura of suspected dissenters, reportedly imprisoning Ba Idrisa and four top commanders loyal to him, namely Mohammad Bashir, Mustapha Jere, Ali Abdullahi, and Baba Mayinta. Unidentified sources claimed that ISWAP experienced

400-649: A "red zone" in Lac Region where it had previously banned fishing and grazing. This "red zone" had been intended to separate the rebels from the population and reduced their access to food, yet had been allowed to lapse. On 25 May, Shekau's Boko Haram faction released a video eulogizing dead fighters, one of whom was Man Chari (alias "Abu Sadiq al-Bamawi"). Chari had been a high-ranking commander and long-time Shekau loyalist; analyst Jacob Zenn argued that Chari had probably been killed in combat. In September, rebels launched several raids against villages and military posts along

480-1002: A military base at the village of Miringa in Borno State on 27 March, though Nigerian soldiers were able to fend off an assault on the village itself. On 4 April, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs warned of a "rapid deterioration of the security situation" in the Lake Chad region. Insurgents launched numerous raids in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in April. These included minor attacks on checkpoints, suicide bombings, and larger cross-border operations involving inghimasi elite fighters. Notable rebel raids targeted Diffa, Bohama in Lac Province and Tchakamari in

560-637: A military base in Borno State. Rebel forces also targeted some villages in northern Cameroon, prompting local authorities to reactivate a number of village self-defense militias. The Islamic State fighters continued their offensive in Borno State by attacking and reportedly capturing Arege on 30 November after a failed attempt two days earlier, and also launched further raids on Nigerian Army positions. Military bases which were attacked, though not captured by ISWAP, included Gambaru (1 December), Buni Gari (3 December), Mallam Fatori (3 December), and Gudumbali (4 and 14 December). In contrast, ISWAP managed to capture

640-492: A mutiny on 26–27 February that resulted in the execution of the five imprisoned commanders, the desertation of another commander, Mustapha Kirmimma, while former ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi was shot in the confusion, his fate initially unclear. However, this information remained unverifiable. Despite the infighting among its forces, ISWAP remained operational and continued to release propaganda as well as initiate attacks in northern Nigeria and southeastern Niger. Soon after

720-511: A powerful shura or committee that gave the group an element of "democracy". As result, ISWAP gained more popular support, yet also became more prone to leadership struggles. As ISWAP grew closer to its parent organization, it also became more hardline in its policies, resulting in a renewed internal struggles. Following the Dapchi schoolgirls kidnapping in February 2018, ISIL central command ordered

800-421: A pro-IS faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (which continued to call itself "Islamic State's West Africa Province"). These two groups have since clashed with each other, though they possibly occasionally cooperated against the local governments. In addition, Shekau never officially renounced his pledge of allegiance to IS as a whole; his forces are thus occasionally regarded as "second branch of ISWAP". Overall,

880-491: A renewed attempt to establish an Islamic state in the region. These attacks, especially those by ISWAP, met with considerable success and resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The member states of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), namely Nigeria, Niger , Chad , and Cameroon responded to the increased insurgent activity with counter-offensives. These operations repulsed

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960-505: A state despite having lost its territory in the Middle East , ISWAP's ability to run a basic government is ideologically important for all of IS. Despite not fully controlling the areas where it is present, ISWAP maintains more control over large swaths of the countryside than the Nigerian government and had created four governorates by 2021. These governorates, centered at Lake Chad, Sambisa Forest, Timbuktu, and Tumbuma, are each headed by

1040-417: A wali and have their own governing structures. Each governorate has its own military commanders, and sends at least two representatives to ISWAP's shura. By early 2022, ISWAP acknowledged five sub-divisions or governorates, namely Lake Chad, Sambisa, Al Farouq (covering Timbuktu-Alagarno), Kerenoa (close to Lake Chad), and Banki (central Borno). Another sub-division or "cell", "Central Nigeria", became active in

1120-495: Is also capable of building armored improvised fighting vehicles , using parts of captured military vehicles. In addition, ISWAP has established a "Khilafah Cadet School" for 8-16 old boys. These are carefully selected, indoctrinated and given physical as well as military training. The child soldiers were featured in an ISWAP propaganda video titled "The Empowerment Generation", showing them executing captured Nigerian soldiers. IS-Central had utilized child soldiers known as " Cubs of

1200-418: Is officially termed "Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā" (Arabic: ولاية غرب أفريقيا‎), meaning "West African Province". It is known by a variety of other names and abbreviations such as "ISWAP", "IS-WA", and "ISIS-WA". After ISWAP formally absorbed IS-GS, it was also differentiated by experts into two branches, namely "ISWAP-Lake Chad" and "ISWAP-Greater Sahara". ISWAP's origins date back to the emergence of Boko Haram ,

1280-492: Is subordinate to IS's core group headed by its caliph . Initially, ISWAP was headed by a single commander, termed the wali (governor). The group's first overall wali was Abubakar Shekau who was succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi in 2016. The latter was replaced by Ba Idrisa in March 2019 who was in turn purged and executed in 2020. He was replaced by Ba Lawan. In general, the shura , a consultative assembly, holds great power within

1360-496: The hisbah . In ISWAP-held areas, the sharia law is enforced, including severe punishments such as the amputation of hands of thieves and the execution of adulterers. The sharia courts also offer to settle disputes over cattle rustling and various other crimes, winning some acceptance among the rural population. ISWAP also punishes its own fighters who commit unauthorized abuses toward civilians. The group makes considerable efforts to win local grassroots support, and has employed

1440-507: The Amirul Jaish (military leader) and the shura. There is no longer an overall wali, and the shura's head instead serves as leader of ISWAP's governorates, while the Amirul Jaish acts as chief military commander. "Sa'ad" served as new Amirul Jaish , while Abu Musab al-Barnawi became head of the shura. However, non-IS sources still claim that a position referred to as the overall "wali" or "leader of ISWAP" continues to exist. This position

1520-515: The Far North Region . At the same time, coalition forces continued their counter-insurgency campaign. One major joint Nigerian-Chadian operation aimed at evicting insurgents from the Ngala - Gamboru area in Borno State, where they had reportedly sought refuge after retreating from advancing government forces. Heavy clashes took place at the villages of Wulgo, Tumbuma, Chikun Gudu and Bukar Maryam, with

1600-453: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), a coalition of Nigeria , Chad , Niger , and Cameroon , discontent grew among the rebels. Shekau had always refused to fully submit to ISIL's central command, and the latter consequently removed him as leader of ISWAP in August 2016. Shekau responded by breaking with ISIL's central command, but many of the rebels actually stayed loyal to ISIL. As result,

1680-476: The "Islamic State in the Greater Sahara") had lost numerous of its fighters to defections to al-Qaeda. ISWAP began to launch a series of intense attacks on Nigerian Army positions near Lake Chad from early November 2018, scoring a number of victories (most notably near Metele) and killing over a hundred government troops between 18 and 22 November. Following the success of these raids, ISWAP overran and captured

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1760-580: The "Sahel Province". Regardless, ISWAP maintained influence over IS forces in Mali, Burkina Faso , and Niger . In the following months, however, Nigeria continued its attacks on ISWAP's leadership, killing more top commanders. In June 2022, the Nigerian National Security Council declared that ISWAP was probably responsible for the Owo church attack . As of October 2022, ISWAP had absorbed most of

1840-582: The "leader" or "wali" of ISWAP. Post-2021 leaders: Note: The al-Furqan Office serves as a coordination center for several IS branches, including ISWAP, IS-GS, and IS-Central. It is headquartered in IS-GS territory. In contrast to Boko Haram which mostly raided and enslaved civilians, ISWAP is known for setting up an administration in the territories where it is present. By 2022, International Crisis Group researchers estimated that 800,000 to over 3 million civilians lived under ISWAP rule. As IS maintains to be

1920-593: The Boko Haram leader proved to be "too extreme even by the Islamic State's standards". Shekau had always refused to fully submit to ISIL's central command, and the latter consequently removed him as leader of ISWAP in August 2016. Shekau responded by breaking with ISIL's central command, but many of the rebels stayed loyal to IS. As a result, the rebel movement split into a Shekau-loyal faction ("Jama'at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad", generally known as "Boko Haram"), and

2000-1051: The Caliphate " from 2014 to 2017. Chad Basin campaign (2018%E2%80%932020) Partial Multinational Joint Task Force victory Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) [REDACTED]   Islamic State [REDACTED] Abu Musab al-Barnawi  ( WIA ) (until March 2019) [REDACTED] Ba Idrisa ("Abu Abdullah Idris ibn Umar al-Barnawi") ( MIA ) (from March 2019) [REDACTED] Bo Lawan ("Lawan Abubakar") [REDACTED] Mustapha Kirmimma ( MIA ) [REDACTED] Mohammad Bashir  [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Mustapha Jere  [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Ali Abdullahi  [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Baba Mayinta  [REDACTED] Military of ISIL Boko Haram forces ISWAP: c. 3,000–3,500 (2018 estimate) 5,000–18,000 (2019 estimate) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 The Chad Basin campaign of 2018–2020

2080-563: The Cameroonian military retreated from Rann, whereupon the Nigerian soldiers also withdrew, as they considered the town undefendable without Cameroonian help. About 35,000 residents of Rann promptly fled, believing that Boko Haram would surely return with the government troops gone. Most relocated to Goura in Cameroon, and this time the authorities allowed them to stay. As expected, Boko Haram indeed raided Rann after its garrison had left, setting

2160-531: The Chad Basin in 2014, and its de facto leader Abubakar Shekau consequently attempted to increase his international standing among Islamists by allying with the prominent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Boko Haram thus became the " Islamic State's West Africa Province " (ISWAP). When the insurgents were subsequently defeated and lost almost all of their lands during the 2015 West African offensive by

2240-402: The Lake Chad subdivision which deploys large numbers of uniformed, well-armed troops to the members of the "Central Nigeria" cell that is small in numbers and specializes in covert warfare and terrorist attacks. In times of manpower shortages, ISWAP forcibly conscripts civilians into its ranks. Though these conscriptions can be direct in the form of militants entering villages and rounding up men,

2320-858: The MJTF coalition launched an offensive codenamed Operation Yancin Tafki around Lake Chad in order to drive the rebels back, and destroy their bases in the Lake Chad region. As part of this operation, about 500 Chadian soldiers entered Nigeria to assist the Nigerian military in its home areas. Nevertheless, terror attacks and continued offensive operations by the insurgents greatly hindered the general elections in northeastern Nigeria on 23 February 2019. Most notably, ISWAP fired several Grad rockets at Magumeri, and launched an unsuccessful attack on Geidam , while Boko Haram assaulted Gwoza . Several other, smaller clashes also took place on 23 February. As part of Operation Yancin Tafki , MJTF increasingly began to apply pressure on

2400-471: The Niger Armed Forces responded with counter-attacks near Lake Chad. At the same time, reports emerged according to which Abu Musab al-Barnawi had been deposed as governor of ISWAP, and been replaced by Ba Idrisa (better known by his alias "Abu Abdullah Idris ibn Umar al-Barnawi"). The leadership change was initially not confirmed by either the Islamic State or ISWAP, leading to speculation about whether

2480-586: The Nigerian state; some local traders argue that ISWAP creates a better environment for trade in rice, fish, and dried pepper. However, ISWAP militants are also known to kill those who refuse to pay taxes. The group also provides various health services, builds public toilets and boreholes , and has implemented its own education system based on Jihadist literature. At the same time, ISWAP is known for targeting agencies providing humanitarian aid , thereby depriving locals of basic necessities in government-held areas. It has also massacred civilians who collaborate with

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2560-546: The Nigerian-Cameroonian border. Many civilians and several soldiers were killed, while the insurgents retreated with captured livestock, weapons, and ammunition. Cameroon's chief of defense staff General René Claude Meka responded by shifting more troops to the border. The sporadic border raids into Cameroon were continuing as of December 2019. By this time, the Cameroonian government declared that "122 Boko Haram terrorists" had surrendered to Cameroonian security forces in

2640-695: The Nigerian-Nigerien border in early February, with both sides claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on their opponents. From 14 to 16 February, insurgents launched a number of major attacks, targeting Maiduguri, Buni Yadi in Yobe State, and the border village of Chetima Wangou in Niger. Whereas the rebels managed to capture a military base near Maiduguri, the assaults on Buni Yadi and Chetima Wangou were reportedly repelled amid heavy insurgent casualties, including several military vehicles. Around 21 February 2019,

2720-551: The Nigerien government claiming to have killed 287 rebels by 2 January 2019. The Cameroonian Armed Forces also mobilized their troops in the north to counter the Islamist rebels. On 13 January, ISWAP attacked a military base near Magumeri . On the following day, Shekau's Boko Haram attacked the refugee town of Rann which had been reportedly abandoned by its Nigerian garrison shortly before. The insurgents proceeded to destroy much of

2800-699: The coalition claiming that they had won a victory. About 2,000 civilians were forcibly relocated from Jakana near Maiduguri by the Nigerian Army. Officials declared that this was part of preparations for offensive operations against ISWAP routes between their bases in Buni Yadi (Yobe) and Benisheikh forest (Borno). Fighting also continued in the area around Cross Kauwa on 15–16 April, with both sides claiming to have eliminated enemy vehicles and troops. On 25 April, Nigerian Defense Minister Mansur Dan Ali declared that "the Boko Haram terror network has been overwhelmed and

2880-457: The conclusion of Operation Yancin Tafki, the MJTF launched another counter-insurgency operation codenamed "Boma's Wrath" . ISWAP also launched a southward offensive with several brigades, attacking Garkida in northern Adamawa State and Damboa in southern Borno. In March, the Nigerian and Nigerien militaries claimed to have killed Boko Haram commander Bakura Doro, a statement which was subsequently revealed to be false. In contrast, attempts by

2960-427: The course of 2019. By February 2020, Operation Yancin Tafki was concluded, and the 1,200 Chadian troops which had been operating in Nigeria as part of the operation were withdrawn. Nigerian Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai declared that the insurgent forces had been driven back to a large degree. Though admitting that the rebels remained active, he downplayed the latter's more recent successes as being part of

3040-583: The exact extent of ties is debated among researchers. ISWAP aligns ideologically with IS, and has also adopted many of its technologies and tactics. ISWAP uses suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and drones typical for IS. Researchers consider these as proof of support and advice by IS members from Syria and Iraq . IS's core group has probably provided ISWAP with not just technical, but also financial aid. Note: The office of overall wali appeared to have been abolished by 2021, but outside sources continue to claim that certain individuals are

3120-455: The first ones carried out by the newly organized "Bakura Faction", a Boko Haram sub-unit led by Bakura Doro . Bakura served as Shekau's amir ul-fiya (zone commander) of Lake Chad and had earned a "reputation for shrewdness and independence". In June, ISWAP launched a series of attacks around Lake Chad, targeting Nigerian and Chadian forces. In response, the Chadian government decided to restore

3200-531: The following months, though this one appeared to solely operate as a guerrilla force instead of trying to capture territory. By late 2022, ISWAP's sub-units enjoyed a high level of autonomy. In addition to funding delivered by IS-Central and supportive international businessmen, ISWAP collects taxes on agriculture, fishing, and trade in its territories. In return, it offers protection as well as some "limited services", including law enforcement. The group appoints its own police chiefs, and its police also enforces

3280-626: The former Boko Haram groups; even one of Shekau's biological sons, known as Abul Musanna, had joined ISWAP as a commander. However, some Boko Haram factions continued their resistance, joined by Boko Haram defectors to ISWAP who had rebelled and rejoined their comrades. These splinter groups generally avoided fighting ISWAP directly, forcing the IS militants to expend considerable efforts to prevent defections and hunt for Boko Haram loyalists. Despite these difficulties, ISWAP had also expanded its operations into central, northwestern, and southwestern Nigeria. In

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3360-662: The group has also used economic pressure by raising very high taxes and then offering tax exemptions for those willing to take up arms. ISWAP is known to employ inghimasi forlorn hope / suicide attack shock troops as well as armoured fighting vehicles (AVFs). Throughout its history, ISWAP has repeatedly seized tanks including T-55s , and armoured personnel carriers such as the BTR-4 EN, and then pressed them into service. The group also relies heavily on motorcycles, technicals , and captured military tactical/utility vehicles such as Kia KLTVs and CS/VP3 "Bigfoot" MRAPs . ISWAP

3440-490: The group. This has led researcher Jacob Zenn to argue that the shura gives the group an element of "democracy". The shura's influence has allowed ISWAP to expand its popular support, yet has also made it more prone to leadership struggles. Appointments to leadership positions such as the shura or the governorships are discussed internally and by ISIL's core group; IS's core group also has to approve new appointments. In general, journalist Murtala Abdullahi argued that ISWAP mirrors

3520-463: The insurgents around Lake Chad from late February. The air forces of the coalition states struck several rebel camps and vehicles around Lake Chad, reportedly weakening ISWAP significantly. Insurgent "logistics bases" near Dorou (west of Damasak ), Arege, Abadam , Dagaya, Tumbum Gini, and Tumbun Rego had reportedly been destroyed by 11 March 2019. Heavy fighting also took place along the Nigerian-Nigerien border, as ISWAP troops attacked Gueskerou and

3600-490: The leadership structure is presently decimated". Analyst Andrew McGregor commented this claim by noting that "despite the Nigerian Army's repeated claims of imminent victory, villagers and forest workers continue to be slaughtered" by the insurgents. Two days later, ISWAP launched a major attack on the military base at Mararrabar Kimba, using motorcycles, 12 technicals as well as three armoured personnel carriers. The Nigerian defenders were overrun, and forced to retreat, whereupon

3680-431: The link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=ISWA&oldid=1131423968 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Islamic State %E2%80%93 West Africa Province The Islamic State's West Africa Province

3760-483: The local civilians alone. With the fall of Baga, rebels controlled most of Lake Chad's shoreline. The MJTF troops that survived the attack on Baga retreated to another harbor base at Fish Dam in Monguno . Militants launched three attacks on Monguno on 29–30 December, though these were repulsed. At the same time, the MJTF member states began to prepare counter-offensives in order to push the insurgents back. The Nigerian Army

3840-602: The local governments or disobey ISWAP orders, as well as persecuted the Christian minority in its territory. In 2022, Nigeria announced its intention to redesign its currency in an effort to combat corruption and the financing of terrorism. ISWAP responded by declaring that from then on, people should pay their taxes to the group in CFA franc . ISWAP's strength has fluctuated over the years, and estimates accordingly vary. In 2017, researchers put its strength at around 5,000 militants. By

3920-508: The local governments which resulted in the Chad Basin campaign from late 2018. Furthermore, ISWAP and Boko Haram agreed to a ceasefire, allowing both groups to focus yet again on their insurgency. It has also been speculated that ISWAP decided to become more aggressive in order to prevent al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin from gaining influence in Nigeria, especially as another Islamic State faction in West Africa (namely

4000-553: The local governments. In addition, Shekau did never officially renounce his pledge of allegiance to ISIL as a whole; his forces are thus occasionally regarded as "second branch of ISWAP". Overall, the relation of Shekau with ISIL remains confused and ambiguous. As the Islamist rebels were driven back into more remote areas and became embroiled in infighting, local governments claimed that the insurgency had been defeated. After their massive losses in 2015, Barnawi's ISWAP and Shekau's Boko Haram both reconsolidated, though ISWAP grew into

4080-656: The local security forces. At the same time, it experienced a violent internal dispute which resulted in the deposition of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the execution of several commanders. In the course of 2020, the Nigerian Armed Forces repeatedly attempted to capture the Timbuktu Triangle from ISWAP, but suffered heavy losses and made no progress. In April 2021, ISWAP overran a Nigerian Army base around Mainok, capturing armoured fighting vehicles including main battle tanks , as well as other military equipment. In

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4160-579: The loss of several ISWAP bases at Lake Chad, though heavy fighting continued during the next months. From March to June 2023, ISWAP greatly increased the number of small-scale raids in Cameroon's Far North Region , targeting Gassama, Amchide , Fotokol , and Mora among other locations. According to researcher Jacob Zenn, these attacks appeared to be mostly operations to gather loot and supplies as well as spread terror among civilians who refused to pay taxes to IS. The repeated raids caused "severe economic disruption" in northern Cameroon. ISWAP's leadership

4240-681: The more powerful group. Whereas Shekau had about 1,000 to 1,500 fighters under his command by late 2018, the Islamic State loyalists counted about 3,000 to 3,500 troops. Furthermore, ISWAP displayed signs of increasing sophistication and growing connections to ISIL's core group. Barnawi's followers did not just align ideologically with ISIL, but also adopted its technologies and tactics. They began using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and drones which experts considered proofs of support and advice by exiled ISIL members from Syria and Iraq . In addition, ISWAP deviated from Shekau's brutal and autocratic leadership style by organzining

4320-465: The new IS caliph, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi. In March 2019, IS's core group began to portray ISWAP as being responsible for all operations by pro-IS groups in West Africa . Accordingly, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) was formally put under ISWAP's command. ISWAP and IS-GS maintain logistical connections, but the former's actual influence on the latter is limited. IS-GS

4400-427: The new leading commander. By January 2022, ISWAP began to increase its presence in Nigeria's Borno State , occupying villages and setting up markets. On 24 January 2022, the small town of Gudumbali was captured, whereupon the insurgents declared it the province's new capital and drove away the local chieftains. Gudumbali is of strategic as well as symbolic importance, as it is placed at a well defendable position and

4480-488: The next month, ISWAP attacked and overran Boko Haram's bases in the Sambisa Forest and Abubakar Shekau killed himself. As a result, many Boko Haram fighters defected to ISWAP, and the group secured a chain of strongholds from Nigeria to Mali to southern Libya . Despite this major victory, ISWAP was forced to deal with Boko Haram loyalists who continued to oppose the Islamic State. In August 2021, Abu Musab al-Barnawi

4560-492: The next year, it was believed to have shrunk to circa 3,000. The group experienced a surge and regained much power in 2019, resulting in researchers estimating that it had grown to 5,000 or up to 18,000 fighters. By 2020, the United States Department of Defense publicly estimated that ISWAP had 3,500 to 5,000 fighters. By late 2022, ISWAP's governorates appeared to differ in their tactics and equipment, ranging from

4640-419: The night of 26–27 December, and overran its garrison after heavy fighting. The local military base was plundered, the local Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) headquarters destroyed, and the naval base set aflame, while the militants managed to take control of tanks, APCs, boats, and much other equipment. Hundreds of local civilians fled the town after the takeover, even though the rebels had pledged to leave

4720-512: The overall number of refugees in the wider Diffa region rose to 250,000, half of them Nigerians who had fled the violence in their home country. Following the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani 's official end on 23 March, ISIL affiliates around the world launched a "Vengeance for Sham " campaign. ISWAP took part in the revenge campaign as well, bombarding Diffa with Grad rockets in late March and early April. The Islamic State loyalists also attacked and destroyed

4800-624: The prominent Islamic State (IS) in March 2015. Boko Haram thus became the "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP). When the insurgents were subsequently defeated and lost almost all of their lands during the 2015 West African offensive by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), discontent grew among the rebels. Despite orders by the ISIL's central command to stop using women and children as suicide bombers as well as refrain from mass killings of civilians, Shekau refused to change his tactics. Researcher Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi summarized that

4880-448: The purge of Mamman Nur and his followers within ISWAP. Although Nur was a close ally of Barnawi and had risen to the de facto leader of ISWAP (with Barnawi serving as figurehead), the order was carried out, and Nur killed by his comrades. As he was believed to be a moderate, Nur's death was interpreted as sign that ISWAP was directed by the ISIL central leadership to fully restart its war against

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4960-530: The reasoning behind his deposition as ISWAP leader remained unclear. Despite suffering several defeats and the leadership change in February and March, ISWAP did not become passive. It continued to launch offensive operations and counter-attacks, and still achieved a number of minor victories against the security forces. The Islamic State forces also became more active in Niger in course of March, repeatedly attacking Diffa , Toumour , and smaller villages. About 18,480 people were displaced due to these attacks, while

5040-410: The rebel movement split into a Shekau-loyal faction ("Jama'at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad", generally known as "Boko Haram"), and a pro-ISIL faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (which continued to call itself "Islamic State's West Africa Province"). These two groups have since clashed with each other, though it is possible that they still occasionally cooperate against their common enemies, namely

5120-564: The rebels captured much military equipment and withdrew with their loot. By late April, analysts estimated that ISWAP had grown to between 5,000 and 18,000 fighters, and had begun to raise taxes around Lake Chad. In early May, ISWAP attacked the town of Gajiganna, Borno, where it destroyed the local barracks before retreating. In the same month, Shekau's Boko Haram faction initiated a series of attacks near Lake Chad, targeting Bama, Banki, Ngom, Tungunshe, and Maiduguri. These operations, far north of Shekau's traditional base of power, were possibly

5200-416: The rebels in many areas but failed to fully contain the insurgency. The Salafi jihadist Boko Haram movement launched an insurgency against the Nigerian government following an unsuccessful uprising in 2009 . Supported by several other Jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda , the group aimed at establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram greatly increased its power and territorial holdings in

5280-428: The relation of Shekau with IS remained confused and ambiguous. In the next years, Barnawi's ISWAP and Shekau's Boko Haram both reconsolidated, though ISWAP grew into the more powerful group. Whereas Shekau had about 1,000 to 2,000 fighters under his command by 2019, the Islamic State loyalists counted up to 5,000 troops. It also changed its tactics, and attempted to win support by local civilians unlike Boko Haram which

5360-459: The reports were true, and why Abu Musab al-Barnawi had been deposed. MJTF claimed that his dismissal was the result of the successes of Operation Yancin Tafki . MNJTF Chief of Military Public Information Col. Timothy Antigha also argued that the coalition's intense air attacks had greatly damaged the insurgents' supply lines as well as undermined their morale. It was later confirmed that Abu Musab al-Barnawi had been demoted to shura member, though

5440-483: The settlement ablaze, and murdering 60 people, including the local elders. More people subsequently fled, with about 60,000 being displaced in the region by early February. Overall, 39 insurgent attacks were recorded in Nigeria's Borno and Yobe States in January 2019, while five attacks took place in Cameroon from 1 to 22 January. A series of clashes between the Nigerian military and ISWAP occurred near Mallam Fatori at

5520-411: The settlement, including local clinics, causing much of the local civilian population to flee, with about 9,000 crossing the border and relocating to Bodo in Cameroon. ISWAP also raided Gajiram on 16 January. In the next days, the Nigerian Army and Cameroonian Armed Forces retook Rann. Authorities consequently forced most of the refugees who had fled to Cameroon to return to Nigeria. On 23 January,

5600-425: The tendence of the IS core group to release little information on its leaders to the public, making even top commanders like Abu Musab al-Barnawi "elusive" figures. In May 2021, the shura was temporarily dissolved and Abu Musab al-Barnawi was appointed "caretaker" leader of ISWAP. By July 2021, the shura had been restored, and ISWAP's internal system had been reformed. The regional central command now consists of

5680-501: The village of Kangarwa near Lake Chad, where it also seized military equipment such as one tank. Though Kangarwa is a small settlement, and strategically not important, it demonstrated the militants' ability to still conquer and hold territory. Insurgents also launched several raids into Niger in course of November, kidnapping about a dozen girls from border villages. Shekau's Boko Haram launched at least one major attack in November, raiding

5760-453: The villages of Cross Kauwa , Kukawa , Kekeno, and Bunduram sometime in December, and also overran a base at Mairari on 17 December, though retreated from it shortly afterward. Meanwhile, Shekau's Boko Haram also increased its attacks, though to a lesser extent than ISWAP, and began to greatly increase its propaganda output. ISWAP attacked the harbor town of Baga at the shore of Lake Chad on

5840-482: The west, it began to compete with a reemerged Ansaru , while organizing anti-government ambushes, terrorist attacks, and assassinations. In December, the group pledged allegiance to the new IS caliph, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi . Meanwhile, the Battles of Toumbun Allura Kurnawa and Toumbun Gini erupted between ISWAP and Boko Haram. By January 2023, these clashes had ended in a substantial Boko Haram victory and

5920-488: Was a major Boko Haram stronghold during the latter group's peak in power. However, Nigerian troops immediately counter-attacked this time, retaking the settlement, destroying the local ISWAP headquarters, and a nearby night market associated with the group. By this point, researchers Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh argued that ISWAP had become one of IS' most important strongholds. In March, IS central command recognized its Greater Sahara branch as an autonomous province, called

6000-428: Was a series of battles and offensives in the southern Chad Basin , particularly northeastern Nigeria , which took place amid the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency . The Chad Basin witnessed an upsurge of insurgent activity from early November 2018, as rebels belonging to the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram launched offensives and several raids to regain military strength and seize territory in

6080-470: Was known for its extensive indiscriminate violence. ISWAP begun to build up basic government services and focused its efforts on attacking Christian targets instead of Muslim ones. However, the group also continued to attack humanitarian personnel and select Muslim communities. In the course of the Chad Basin campaign (2018–2020) , ISWAP had extensive territorial gains before losing many to counter-offensives by

6160-496: Was later separated from ISWAP, becoming its own province. Regardless, ISWAP and IS-GS continued to cooperate through the al-Furqan Office in the General Directorate of Provinces. The al-Furqan Office is located in IS-GS territory, but headed by ranking ISWAP commander Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki (alias "Abubakar Mainok"). In general, ISWAP is known to maintain substantial contacts with IS's core group, although

6240-650: Was preparing a counter-attack to retake Baga by 31 December, though ISWAP still held the town by mid-February 2019. In contrast, an offensive by Niger reportedly met with more success. The Niger Armed Forces began to target islands on Lake Chad, and the area along the Yobe River at the Niger-Nigeria border from 28 December. While the Niger Army advanced on the ground, the Niger Air Force launched intense airstrikes, with

6320-480: Was reportedly filled by ex-chief wali Ba Lawan (also "Abba Gana") before passing to Abu-Dawud (also "Aba Ibrahim"), Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Malam Bako, Sani Shuwaram , Bako Gorgore, and Abu Ibrahim in quick succession in late 2021 and early 2022. In course of 2022, ISWAP continued its reorganization efforts. The group's sub-units (or governorates) were granted a considerable level of autonomy, allowing them to operate as they saw fit and to separately pledge allegiance to

6400-583: Was reportedly killed, either in battle with the Nigerian Army or during inter-ISWAP clashes. The accuracy of this claim was questioned by Humangle Media researchers who gathered "multiple sources" suggesting that al-Barnawi had disappeared due to being promoted. Later that month, ISWAP suffered a defeat when attacking Diffa , but successfully raided Rann , destroying the local barracks before retreating with loot. In October and November, there were further leadership changes in ISWAP, as senior commanders were killed by security forces, with Sani Shuwaram becoming

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