153-614: The Coventry Blitz ( blitz : from the German word Blitzkrieg meaning "lightning war" listen ) was a series of bombing raids that took place on the British city of Coventry . The city was bombed many times during the Second World War by the German Air Force ( Luftwaffe ). The most devastating of these attacks occurred on the evening of 14 November 1940 and continued into
306-545: A star fix and giving the navigator room to do his calculations in an illuminated workspace. This system was put to use as soon as the war began and was initially regarded as successful. In reality, the early bombing effort was a complete failure, with the majority of bombs landing miles from their intended targets. The Luftwaffe continued to research accurate night bombing against smaller targets. Not depending on celestial navigation, they invested their efforts in radio navigation systems. The Luftwaffe concentrated on developing
459-483: A better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy". According to Anna Freud and Edward Glover , London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock , unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation . The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of
612-495: A bombing direction system based on the Lorenz concept through the 1930s, as it made night navigation relatively easy by simply listening for signals on a radio set, and the necessary radios were already being installed on many aircraft. For bombing use, the modifications to Lorenz were fairly minor. Much larger antennas were needed to provide the required accuracy. This was achieved by using aerials with many more elements, but it retained
765-631: A combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs . There were two types of incendiary bomb, those made of magnesium and those made of petroleum. The high explosive bombs and the larger air-mines hindered the Coventry fire brigade and were intended to damage roofs, making it easier for the incendiary bombs to fall into buildings and ignite them. Coventry's air defences consisted of twenty-four 3.7 inch AA guns and twelve 40 mm Bofors . The AA Defence Commander of 95th (Birmingham) Heavy Anti–Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery , had prepared
918-561: A crowd surge after a woman fell down the steps as she entered the station. A single direct hit on a shelter in Stoke Newington in October 1940 killed 160 civilians. Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940 and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used
1071-587: A disaster with or without German air superiority. Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Hitler was frustrated it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening and the Luftflotten suffering many losses, OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, strategy changed to prefer night raids, giving the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness. It
1224-597: A few months. An estimated 568 people were killed in the raid (the exact figure was never precisely confirmed), with another 863 badly injured and 393 sustaining lesser injuries. Given the intensity of the raid, casualties were limited by the fact that a large number of Coventrians " trekked " out of the city at night to sleep in nearby towns or villages following the earlier air raids. Also, people who took to air raid shelters suffered very little death or injury. Out of 79 public air raid shelters holding 33,000 people, very few had been destroyed. Although
1377-514: A greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender. The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by OKL. It
1530-484: A key figure for Ultra and supervised the "Special Liaison Officers" who delivered Ultra material to field commanders. Winterbotham's claim has been rejected by other Ultra participants and by historians. They state that while Churchill was indeed aware that a major bombing raid would take place, no one knew what the target would be. A few days before the attack, Ultra had identified Mondschein Sonate (Moonlight Sonata) as
1683-498: A much more accurate version of the same basic concept, which was eventually delivered as X-Gerät (X-Apparatus). X-Gerät used a series of beams to locate the target, each beam named after a river. The main beam, Weser , was similar in concept to the one used in Knickebein but operated at a much higher frequency. Due to the nature of radio propagation, this allowed its two beams to be pointed much more accurately than Knickebein from
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#17328517752761836-410: A new instrument was being used that automatically decoded the dots and dashes and moved a pointer on a display in the cockpit in front of the pilot. This device was fitted with a very sharp filter which was sensitive only at 2,000 Hz, and not to the early British 1,500 Hz counter-signals. While the jammers were modified accordingly, this came too late for the raid on Coventry on 14 November; but
1989-476: A one-eyed god, and might refer to a single-beam navigation system. Jones agreed, and knew that a system with one beam would have to include a distance-measurement system. He concluded that it might work on the basis described by the anti-Nazi German mathematician and physicist Hans Mayer , who while visiting Norway had provided a large amount of information in what is now known as the Oslo Report . Y-Gerät used
2142-562: A policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was—for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself—that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all. A major problem in
2295-404: A positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs , while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate. The British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities, making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise
2448-483: A probable code for a planned group of attacks on three possible targets over several possible days. The targets had the code names Einheitpreis , Regenschirm and Korn . The day before the Coventry raid, a prisoner mentioned Regenschirm ( umbrella ), which was assumed to mean umbrella man (Neville Chamberlain) who was born in Birmingham, it would be bombed on 19/20 November. Einheitpreis ( unit-price )
2601-417: A series of concentrations to be fired using sound-locators, GL Mk. I gun-laying radar and 128 concentrations were fired before the bombing severed all lines of communication and the noise drowned out sound-location. The anti-aircraft batteries then fought on in isolation. Some gun positions were able to fire at searchlight beam intersections, glimpsed through the smoke and guessing the range. Although
2754-403: A series of long tones followed by short pauses, meaning the aircraft was on the "dash" side of the antenna. Hearing the "dashes", they would know that they had to veer to the left to fly down the centreline. In the centre, the radio would receive both signals, where the dots filled in the gaps in the dashes and produced a continual signal, the so-called "equisignal". Flying in the known direction of
2907-405: A series of three very narrow single beams, Rhine , Oder and Elbe . They were carefully aimed to define a precise bomb release trajectory. First a bomb release point along Weser was determined, by calculating the range or distance the bombs would travel between release and impact, and picking a point at that range to target. The Elbe beam intersected Weser 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) before
3060-583: A similarly sized antenna; the equi-signal area was only about 100 yards (91 m) wide at a distance of 200 miles (320 km) from the antenna. The beams were so narrow that bombers could not find them without help, so a low-power wide-beam version of Knickebein was set up at the same station to act as a guide. The main Weser antenna was set up just to the west of Cherbourg in France. The "cross" signal in X-Gerät used
3213-401: A single narrow beam pointed over the target, similar to earlier beam systems, transmitting a modulated radio signal. The system used a transponder ( FuG 28a ) that received the signal from the beam and immediately re-transmitted it to the ground station. The ground station listened for the return signal and compared the phase of its modulation to the transmitted signal, which accurately determined
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#17328517752763366-420: A specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe 's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned
3519-400: A temporary basis, and many nearby residents had to be evacuated. Campbell found that the bomb was fitted with a delayed action fuse that was impossible to remove, so he transported it to a safe place. That was done by lorry, and he lay alongside the bomb so that he could hear if it started ticking and could warn the driver to stop and run for cover. Having taken it a safe distance, he disposed of
3672-458: Is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe . Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It
3825-502: The Luftwaffe had an unclear strategy and poor intelligence. The OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, the OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against
3978-459: The Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft— Dornier Do 17 , Junkers Ju 88 , and Heinkel He 111s —were capable of carrying out strategic missions but were incapable of doing greater damage because of their small bomb loads. The Luftwaffe 's decision in
4131-450: The Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed Bomber Command, Coastal Command , and
4284-509: The Reichsmarschall 's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe 's most advanced equipment at Rechlin , to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case. Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent,
4437-715: The Air Ministry fought back with a variety of their own increasingly effective means, involving jamming and deception signals . The period ended when the Wehrmacht moved their forces to the East in May 1941, in preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union . The idea of beam radio navigation was developed during the 1930s, initially as a blind landing aid. The basic concept is to produce two directional radio signals that are aimed slightly to
4590-609: The British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries. Although only a small number of Londoners used the mass shelters, when journalists, celebrities and foreigners visited they became part of the Beveridge Report , part of a national debate on social and class division. Most residents found that such divisions continued within
4743-590: The Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1.2 million wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War , such as the bombing of Barcelona , supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938, experts generally expected that Germany would try to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high-explosive and incendiary bombs ,
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4896-518: The Indian ". Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as pre-war expectations, thus making an equal comparison impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote, "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in
5049-412: The Knickebein headache were codenamed "Aspirin". Initially, modified medical diathermy sets transmitted interference. Later, local radio transmitters broadcast an extra "dot signal" at low power on nights where raids were expected. The German practice of turning on the beams long before the bombers reached the target area aided the British efforts. Avro Ansons fitted with receivers would be flown around
5202-527: The London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them for shelter during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids but by the second week of heavy bombing,
5355-499: The Oder to Elbe distance equalled the Elbe to release point distance, a bomber flying at constant speed arrived at the release point as the moving hand reached zero, when the bombs were automatically released. X-Gerät operated at a much higher frequency than Knickebein (around 60 MHz) and thus required the use of new radio equipment. There was not enough equipment to fit all bombers, so
5508-667: The Phoney War , civilians were aware of the deadly power of aerial attacks through newsreels of Barcelona, the Bombing of Guernica and the Bombing of Shanghai . Many popular works of fiction during the 1920s and 1930s portrayed aerial bombing, such as H. G. Wells ' novel The Shape of Things to Come and its 1936 film adaptation , and others such as The Air War of 1936 and The Poison War . Harold Macmillan wrote in 1956 that he and others around him "thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear war today". Based in part on
5661-588: The Royal Air Force over the United Kingdom). By September 1940, the Luftwaffe had lost the Battle of Britain and the German air fleets ( Luftflotten ) were ordered to attack London, to draw RAF Fighter Command into a battle of annihilation . Adolf Hitler and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring , commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, ordered the new policy on 6 September 1940. From 7 September 1940, London
5814-565: The Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority. The Luftwaffe 's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's during the Battle of Britain by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew
5967-479: The United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) adopted much of this apocalyptic thinking. The policy of RAF Bomber Command became an attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry. The Luftwaffe took a cautious view of strategic bombing , but the OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of industries or cities. It believed it could greatly affect
6120-480: The Weser beam and reached Rhine , the radio operator heard a brief signal and set up his equipment. This consisted of a special stop-clock with two hands. When the Oder signal was received the clock automatically started and the two hands simultaneously swept up from zero. When the Elbe signal was received, one hand stopped and the other reversed, sweeping back towards zero. The stopped hand indicated an accurate measurement of travel time from Oder to Elbe . Since
6273-467: The Wotan system badly. It operated at 45 MHz, which happened to be the frequency of the powerful-but-dormant BBC television transmitter at Alexandra Palace . All Jones had to do was arrange for the return signal to be received from the aircraft and then sent to Alexandra Palace for re-transmission. The combination of the two signals modified the phase shift, and thus the apparent transit delay. Initially,
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6426-436: The X-Gerät signals. About 60 bombers did not contribute to the attack, either turning back or attacking alternative targets. The first wave of follow-up bombers dropped high explosive bombs , knocking out the utilities (the water supply, electricity network, telephones and gas mains) and cratering the roads, making it difficult for the fire engines to reach fires started by the later waves of bombers. These later waves dropped
6579-643: The 13th or 14th century. The devastating raid on the night of 14/15 November 1940, and its aftermath, were vividly described by several civilians interviewed by the BBC several days later. The speakers included Mr. E. Letts, Muriel Drewe, Miss G. M. Ellis and the Very Reverend R. T. Howard. These archive 1940 recordings feature on The Blitz , an audiobook CD issued in 2007. The Blitz Britain The Blitz 1942–1945 The Blitz
6732-621: The Air Ministry, led by R. V. Jones , became aware of the system when the Royal Aircraft Establishment analysed a downed German bomber's Lorenz system and observed it was far more sensitive than required for a mere landing aid. Secretly recorded transcripts from German prisoner of war pilots indicated this may have been a bomb aiming aid. Winston Churchill had also been given Ultra intelligence from decrypted Enigma messages that mentioned 'bombing beams'. When Jones mentioned
6885-423: The Blitz. The programme favoured back garden Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters. Many of the latter were abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. Authorities expected that the raids would be brief and in daylight, rather than attacks by night, which forced Londoners to sleep in shelters. Deep shelters provided most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before
7038-449: The British government had advance warning of the attack from Ultra ; intercepted German radio messages encrypted with the Enigma cipher machine and decoded by British cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park . He further claimed that Winston Churchill ordered that no defensive measures should be taken to protect Coventry, lest the Germans suspect that their cipher had been broken. Winterbotham was
7191-484: The British had somehow learned to bend radio signals. When the problem became widespread, the Germans introduced a new system that worked on different principles, the Y-Gerät . Having guessed the nature of this system from a passing mention, the British had already deployed countermeasures that rendered the system useless almost as soon as it was used. The Germans eventually abandoned the entire concept of radio navigation over
7344-462: The British into surrender or do much damage to the war economy; eight months of bombing never seriously hampered British war production, which continued to increase. The greatest effect was to force the British to disperse the production of aircraft and spare parts. British wartime studies concluded that most cities took 10 to 15 days to recover when hit severely, but some, such as Birmingham, took three months. The German air offensive failed because
7497-467: The British to fool the Germans into dropping their bombs where they wanted them. A side effect was that as the German crews had been trained to navigate solely by the beams, many crews failed to find either the true equisignal or Germany again. Some Luftwaffe bombers even landed at RAF bases, believing they were back at base. As good as Knickebein was, it was never intended to be used in the long-range role. Plendl had been working for some time to produce
7650-402: The Coventry guns fired 10 rounds a minute for the whole 10 hour raid (a total of over 6,700 rounds), only one German bomber was shot down. At around 20:00, Coventry Cathedral (dedicated to Saint Michael ), was set on fire by incendiaries for the first time. The volunteer firefighters managed to put out the first fire but other direct hits followed and soon new fires broke out in
7803-420: The German transmitters, making it impossible to tell which signal was which. In this case the navigators would receive the equisignal over a wide area, and navigation along the bomb line became impossible, with the aircraft drifting into the "dash area" and no way to correct for it. Thus the beam was seemingly "bent" away from the target. Eventually, the beams could be inclined by a controlled amount which enabled
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#17328517752767956-560: The Germans could use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939, military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war. London hospitals prepared for 300,000 casualties in the first week of war. British air raid sirens sounded for the first time 22 minutes after Neville Chamberlain declared war on Germany . Although bombing attacks unexpectedly did not begin immediately during
8109-465: The Germans might give up on the entire concept. British monitors soon started receiving intelligence from Enigma decrypts referring to a new device known as Y-Gerät , which was also sometimes referred to as Wotan . Jones had already concluded the Germans used code names that were too descriptive, so he asked a specialist in the German language and literature at Bletchley Park about the word Wotan . The specialist realised Wotan referred to Wōden ,
8262-600: The Luftwaffe High Command ( Oberkommando der Luftwaffe , OKL) did not develop a methodical strategy for destroying British war industry. Poor intelligence about British industry and economic efficiency led to OKL concentrating on tactics rather than strategy. The bombing effort was diluted by attacks against several sets of industries instead of constant pressure on the most vital. In the 1920s and 1930s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell claimed that air forces could win wars, obviating
8415-466: The Netherlands. Knickebein was used in the early stages of the German night-bombing offensive and proved to be fairly effective, but the tactics for using the system in a widespread bombing effort were not yet developed, so much of the early German night bombing offensive was limited to area bombing. Efforts in Britain to block the Knickebein system required time to implement. British intelligence at
8568-658: The RAF, and the Blitz became a night bombing campaign after October 1940. The Luftwaffe attacked the main Atlantic seaport of Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz . The North Sea port of Hull , a convenient and easily found target or secondary target for bombers unable to locate their primary targets, suffered the Hull Blitz . The port cities of Bristol , Cardiff , Portsmouth , Plymouth , Southampton , Sunderland , Swansea , Belfast , and Glasgow were also bombed, as were
8721-535: The Tube and other large shelters, 9% in public surface shelters and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter , which could be used inside homes. Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but
8874-512: The UK, concluding the British would continue to successfully jam it. Before the start of the war on 1 September 1939, Lufthansa and the German aircraft industry invested heavily in the development of commercial aviation, and in systems and methods that would improve safety and reliability. Considerable effort went into blind-landing aids which allowed aircraft to approach an airport at night or in foul weather. The primary system developed for this
9027-508: The air staff that war with Britain or even Russia was a possibility. The amount of firm operational and tactical preparation for a bombing campaign was minimal, largely because of the failure by Hitler as supreme commander to insist upon such a commitment. Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This had important implications. It showed
9180-411: The airport would tune one of their radios to the Lorenz frequency. If the crew was on the left side of the centreline, they would hear a series of short tones followed by long pauses, meaning the aircraft was on the "dot" side of the antenna. Hearing the "dots", they would know that they had to veer to the right to fly down the centreline. If the crew was on the right side of the centerline, they would hear
9333-415: The amount of space available and made detailed preparations for transporting evacuees. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939 and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, a blackout began at sunset. Lights were not allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, even more than rationing . The relocation of the government and
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#17328517752769486-472: The area including a factory producing aircraft). In the aftermath of the war, Coventry city centre was extensively rebuilt according to the Gibson Plan compiled by the town planner Donald Gibson : a then innovative scheme which created a pedestrianised shopping precinct. Coventry Cathedral was left as a ruin, and is today still the principal reminder of the bombing. A new cathedral was constructed alongside
9639-402: The attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neurosis" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that
9792-435: The balance of power on the battlefield by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale. OKL did not believe air power alone could be decisive, and the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official policy of the deliberate bombing of civilians until 1942. The vital industries and transport centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. It could be claimed civilians were not to be targeted directly, but
9945-523: The beam from Kleve, on 31.5 MHz. It subsequently located the cross beam from Stollberg (its origin was unknown prior to this flight). The radio operator and navigator were able to plot the path of the beams and discovered that they intersected above the Rolls-Royce engine factory at Derby , at that time the only factory producing the Merlin engine. It was subsequently realised that the argument over whether
10098-553: The beams would bend around the Earth was entirely academic, as the transmitters were more or less in line-of-sight to high altitude bombers. British sceptics started regarding the system as proof that the German pilots were not as good as their own, who they believed could do without such systems. The Butt Report proved this to be wrong; aerial reconnaissance returned photographs of the RAF bombing raids, showing that they were rarely, if ever, anywhere near their targets. Efforts to block
10251-485: The beams would bend around the Earth. Jones saved the flight by pointing out that Churchill himself had ordered it, and he would make sure that the Prime Minister would learn who cancelled it. The crew were not told specifics, and were simply ordered to search for radio signals around 30 MHz having Lorenz characteristics and, if they found any, to determine their bearing. The flight took off and eventually flew into
10404-534: The beginning of the National Socialist regime until 1939, there was a debate in German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment, with some contributors arguing along the lines of the British and Americans. General Walther Wever (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff 1 March 1935 – 3 June 1936) championed strategic bombing and the building of suitable aircraft, although he emphasised
10557-447: The best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing, avoidance of the evacuation programmes grew. The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work. Pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's . People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed
10710-399: The bomb successfully but was killed whilst dealing with another bomb the next day. Campbell was posthumously awarded a George Cross for his actions on 17 October 1940. One notable casualty of the October raids was Ernest Hugh Snell FRSE , a retired local Medical Officer of Health. The raid that began on the evening of 14 November 1940 was the most severe to hit Coventry during
10863-410: The bombing of opponents than air defence, although he promoted the development of a bomber force in the 1930s and understood it was possible to use bombers for strategic purposes. He told OKL in 1939 that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist would follow when the moment was right. Hitler quickly developed scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by
11016-418: The bombs dropped were placed within 100 yards (91 m) of the mid-line of the Weser beam, spread along it for a few hundred yards. This was the sort of accuracy that even daytime bombing could rarely achieve. The raid on Coventry with full support from other units dropping on their flares almost destroyed the city centre. X-Gerät proved more difficult to stop than Knickebein . Initial defences against
11169-653: The bombs kilometres short of the target. Setting up this false beam proved very difficult as the Germans, learning from their mistakes with Knickebein , did not switch the X-Gerät beams on until as late as possible, making it much more difficult to arrange the "false Elbe " in time. As the British slowly gained the upper hand in the Battle of the Beams, they started considering what the next German system would entail. Since Germany's current approaches had been rendered useless, an entirely new system would have to be developed. Jones believed that if they could defeat this system quickly,
11322-840: The break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France , and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high. A Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940. Another poll found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July. A third poll found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers . Workers worked longer shifts and over weekends. Contributions rose to
11475-431: The breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of attacking vital war industries—and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale—was ruled as acceptable. From
11628-451: The buildings. The foundation stone of the new cathedral was laid by Elizabeth II on 23 March 1956. It was consecrated on 25 May 1962, and Benjamin Britten 's War Requiem , composed for the occasion, was premièred in the new cathedral on 30 May to mark its consecration. Spon Street was one of the few areas of the city centre to survive the Blitz largely intact, and during
11781-415: The cathedral; accelerated by a firestorm , the flames quickly spread out of control. During the same period, more than 200 other fires were started across the city, most of which were concentrated in the city centre, setting the area ablaze and overwhelming the firefighters. The telephone network was crippled, hampering the fire service's command and control and making it difficult to send firefighters to
11934-692: The city centre suffered the heaviest raids, districts of the city including Stoke Heath , Foleshill and Wyken were also heavily bombed. The raid reached such a new and severe level of destruction that Joseph Goebbels later used the term coventriert ("coventried") when describing similar levels of destruction of other enemy towns. During the raid, the Germans dropped about 500 t (490 long tons; 550 short tons) of high explosives, including 50 parachute air-mines , of which 20 were incendiary petroleum mines , and 36,000 incendiary bombs. The raid of 14 November combined several innovations which influenced all future strategic bomber raids during
12087-417: The city's buildings were damaged. Most of the city centre was destroyed. Two hospitals, two churches and a police station were also damaged. The local police force lost no fewer than nine constables or messengers in the blitz. Approximately one third of the city's factories were destroyed or severely damaged, another third were badly damaged, and the rest suffered slight damage. Among the destroyed factories were
12240-461: The civil service was also planned but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale. Not only was there evacuation over land, but also by ship. The Children's Overseas Reception Board was organised by the government to help parents send their children overseas to four British Dominions —Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The programme evacuated 2,664 boys and girls (ages 5–15) until its ending in October after
12393-470: The commander of Luftflotte 3 (1 February 1939 – 23 August 1944) and Hans Jeschonnek , Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff (1 February 1939 – 19 August 1943). The Luftwaffe was not pressed into ground support operations because of pressure from the army or because it was led by ex-soldiers; indeed, the Luftwaffe favoured a model of joint inter-service operations rather than independent strategic air campaigns. Hitler paid less attention to
12546-412: The country to find the beams' location to be reported to nearby broadcasters. The low-power "dot signal" was initially transmitted essentially at random, so German navigators would hear two dots. This meant there were many equisignal areas, and no easy way to distinguish them except by comparing them with a known location. The British transmitters were later modified to send their dots at the same time as
12699-696: The distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving. London had nine million people—a fifth of the British population—living in an area of 750 square miles (1,940 square kilometres), which was difficult to defend because of its size. Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated that 50 casualties—with about one-third killed—would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. In 1937
12852-471: The early stages of " The Blitz " with great effect, in one case laying a strip of bombs down the centerline of a factory deep in England. Tipped off about the system's operation by pre-war military intelligence , the British responded by sending their own Morse code signals so that the aircraft crew believed they were always properly centred in the beam while they flew wildly off course. The Germans became convinced
13005-428: The ever-increasing performance of bombers , which were beginning to have the capability to strike across Europe with useful bomb loads. These aircraft were slow and lumbering, easy prey for interceptors , but this threat could be essentially eliminated by flying at night. A bomber, painted black, could be spotted only at very short ranges. As the bomber's altitude and speed increased, the threat from ground-based defences
13158-402: The experience of German bombing in the First World War, politicians feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attacks and the collapse of civil society. In 1938, a committee of psychiatrists predicted three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under
13311-430: The experimental unit Kampfgruppe 100 ( KGr 100) was given the task of using their X-Gerät equipment to guide other aircraft to the target. To do this, KGr 100 aircraft would attack as a small group first, dropping flares which other aircraft would then see and bomb visually. This is the first use of the pathfinder concept that the RAF improved to great effect against the Germans some three years later. The system
13464-471: The extent to which Hitler mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare , with the collapse of morale as a bonus. Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin
13617-552: The government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4:00 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940, about 150,000 people a night slept in the Underground, although by winter and spring the numbers declined to 100,000 or less. Battle noises were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many people were killed from direct hits on stations. In March 1943, 173 men, women and children were crushed to death at Bethnal Green tube station in
13770-432: The guidance beam at the point where the bombs should be dropped. The aerials could be rotated to make the beams from two transmitters cross over the target. The bombers would fly into the beam of one and ride it until they started hearing the tones from the other (on a second receiver). When the steady "on course" sound was heard from the second beam, they dropped their bombs. The first of these new Knickebein transmitters
13923-413: The importance of aviation in operational and tactical terms. Wever outlined five points of air strategy: Wever argued that OKL should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters but also in grand strategy, war economics, armament production and the mentality of potential opponents (also known as intelligence analysis ). Wever's vision was not realised, staff studies in those subjects fell by
14076-523: The industrial centres of Birmingham , Coventry , Manchester , and Sheffield . More than 40,000 civilians were killed by Luftwaffe bombing during the war, almost half of them in the capital, where more than a million houses were destroyed or damaged. In early July 1940, the German High Command began planning Operation Barbarossa , the invasion of the Soviet Union . Bombing failed to demoralise
14229-434: The interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939, the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force, and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war. Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage,
14382-490: The left and right of a runway 's midline. Radio operators in the aircraft listen for these signals and determine which of the two beams they are flying in. This is normally accomplished by sending Morse code signals into the two beams, to identify right and left. For bombing, the Luftwaffe built huge versions of the antennas to provide much greater accuracy at long range, named Knickebein and X-Gerät . These were used during
14535-579: The main Daimler factory, the Humber Hillman factory, the Alfred Herbert Ltd machine tool works, nine aircraft factories, and two naval ordnance stores. The effects on war production were only temporary, as much essential war production had already been moved to ' shadow factories ' on the city outskirts. Also, many of the damaged factories were quickly repaired and had recovered to full production within
14688-457: The managing of the Luftwaffe was Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over naval aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe ". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into
14841-570: The mass grave in London Road Cemetery . Around 80 per cent of them had been killed in the raids of 14/15 November 1940 and 8–10 April 1941. The Blitz gave rise to the German verb Koventrieren ( lit. ' to Coventrate ' ), meaning "to annihilate or reduce to rubble". Immediate reconstruction was undertaken by a committee headed by motor-industry magnate William Rootes (the Rootes Group had several factories in
14994-441: The military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe , which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937,
15147-441: The modified jammers were able to successfully disrupt a raid on Birmingham on 19 November. X-Gerät was eventually defeated in another manner, by way of a "false Elbe " which was set up to cross the 'Weser' guide beam at a mere 1 kilometre (0.6 mi) after the Oder beam — much earlier than the expected 5 kilometres (3.1 mi). Since the final stages of the release were automatic, the clock would reverse prematurely and drop
15300-451: The morning of 15 November. At the start of the Second World War , Coventry was an industrial city of around 238,000 people which, like much of the industrial West Midlands , contained metal and wood-working industries. In Coventry's case, these included cars, bicycles, aeroplane engines and, since 1900, munitions factories. In the words of the historian Frederick Taylor , "Coventry was therefore, in terms of what little law existed on
15453-402: The most dangerous blazes first; as the Germans had intended, the water mains were damaged by high explosives, meaning there was not enough water available to tackle many of the fires. The raid reached its climax around midnight with the final all clear sounding at 06:15 on the morning of 15 November. In one night, more than 4,300 homes in Coventry were destroyed and around two-thirds of
15606-463: The need for land and sea combat. It was thought that " the bomber will always get through " and could not be resisted, particularly at night. Industry, seats of government and communications could be destroyed, depriving an opponent of the means to make war. Bombing civilians would cause a collapse of morale and a loss of production in the remaining factories. Democracies, where public opinion was allowed, were thought particularly vulnerable. The RAF and
15759-482: The offensive over Britain to failure before it began. In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net
15912-413: The opened midpoint connection of each reflector in turn, sending the beam slightly to the left and then slightly to the right of the centreline of the runway. The beams widened as they spread from the antennas, so there was an area directly off the runway approach where the two signals overlapped. The switch was timed so it spent longer on the right side of the antenna than the left. An aircraft approaching
16065-473: The operating principle based on the name Wotan was entirely by luck. Later documents showed that the original X-Gerät was known as Wotan I, and the Y-Gerät as Wotan II. Had he known the name was also associated with X-Gerät it was unlikely he would have concluded the system used a single beam. The British were ready for this system even before it was used. By chance, the Germans had chosen the operating frequency of
16218-583: The opportunity given them by the attack on Coventry to try a new tactic against Germany, which was carried out on 16 December 1940 as part of Operation Abigail Rachel against Mannheim . The British had been waiting for the opportunity to experiment with an incendiary raid, considering it a kind of retaliation for the German raid on Coventry. This was the start of a British drift away from attempting precision attacks on military targets and towards area bombing attacks on cities. In his 1974 book The Ultra Secret , Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham asserted that
16371-451: The overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defense of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which
16524-430: The period of heaviest bombing had passed before they were finished. By the end of 1940 improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters, to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as
16677-490: The possibility of bombing beams to Churchill, he ordered further investigation. The British codenamed the system Headache. Many in the Air Ministry did not believe that the system was in use. Frederick Lindemann , leading scientific adviser to the government, argued that any such system would not be able to follow the curvature of the Earth, although T. S. Eckersley of the Marconi company had said it could. Eckersley's assertion
16830-463: The post-war redevelopment of Coventry, several surviving mediaeval buildings from across the city were relocated to Spon Street. The 14th century St. Mary's Guildhall in Bayley Lane opposite the ruined cathedral also survived and stands to this day. However, in addition to destroying many historic buildings, the bombing revealed a mediaeval stone building on Much Park Street, thought to date from
16983-573: The pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis". Panic during the Munich crisis , such as the migration by 150,000 people to Wales, contributed to fear of social chaos. The government planned the evacuation of four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, conducted an extensive survey to determine
17136-561: The raid was Christ Church , most of which was destroyed, leaving only the spire. It was after this raid that the then-Mayor of Coventry, Alfred Robert Grindlay , led the early reconstruction of much of the city centre. The final air raid on Coventry came on 3 August 1942, in the Stoke Heath district approximately one mile to the east of the city centre. Six people were killed. By the time of this air raid, some 1,236 people had been killed by air raids on Coventry; of these, 808 rest in
17289-693: The raid was to be on London". The scientist Reginald Victor Jones , who led the British side in the Battle of the Beams , wrote that "Enigma signals to the X-beam stations were not broken in time" and that he was unaware that Coventry was the intended target. The British were yet unaware that the Luftwaffe had moved from their pilots manually listening to the signals to an automatic narrow-band receiver on board, which caused jamming countermeasures to be ineffective. Jones also noted that Churchill returned to London that afternoon, which indicated that Churchill believed that London
17442-412: The release point. The Oder beam intersected Weser 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) before the release point, or 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) before Elbe . Rhine did not require the same precision and was approximately 30 kilometres (18.6 mi) before the release point. The beams' width added a small error to the intersection coordinates, on the order of tens to hundreds of meters. As the bomber followed
17595-409: The rest of the city, including monuments and residential areas, would be considerable. The initial wave of 13 specially modified Heinkel He 111 aircraft of Kampfgruppe 100 , which were equipped with X-Gerät navigational devices, accurately dropped marker flares at 19:20. The British and the Germans were fighting the Battle of the Beams and on this night the British failed to disrupt
17748-408: The results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe 's inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be impeded effectively by air raids ... usually, the prescribed targets are not hit". While the war was being planned, Hitler never insisted upon the Luftwaffe planning a strategic bombing campaign and did not even give ample warning to
17901-426: The ruin in the 1950s, designed by the architect Basil Spence . Spence (later knighted for this work) insisted that instead of re-building the old cathedral it should be kept in ruins as a garden of remembrance and that the new cathedral should be built alongside, the two buildings together effectively forming one church. The use of Hollington sandstone for the new Coventry Cathedral provides an element of unity between
18054-406: The runway and keeping the equisignal on the radio, Lorenz-equipped crews could guide an aircraft down a straight line with a relatively high degree of accuracy, so much so that pilots could then find the runway visually except in the worst conditions. During the early 1930s, the concept of a night bombing strategic campaign began to become paramount in military aviation circles. This was due to
18207-524: The shelters and many arguments and fights occurred over noise, space and other matters. Anti-Jewish sentiment was reported, particularly around the East End of London, with anti-Semitic graffiti and anti-Semitic rumours, such as that Jewish people were "hogging" air raid shelters. Contrary to pre-war fears of anti-Semitic violence in the East End, one observer found that the "Cockney and the Jew [worked] together, against
18360-435: The signal was re-transmitted at low power, not powerful enough for the Germans to realise what was happening, but enough to spoil the accuracy of the system. Over subsequent nights, the transmitter power was gradually increased. As Y-Gerät ' s use went on, the aircrew accused the ground station of sending bad signals and the ground station alleged the aircraft had loose connections. The whole scheme appealed to Jones as he
18513-486: The simple switching of two of the reflector elements to alter the beam directions very marginally. The beam angles were so dramatically reduced that it was only a few tens of yards wide over the target. It was the shape of the aerials that gave the system its code name, Knickebein , which means "crooked leg", although the word is also the name of a magical raven in Germanic mythology . For the required range, transmitted power
18666-641: The sinking of the SS ; City of Benares with the loss of 81 children out of 100 on board. Much civil defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities and many areas such as Birmingham , Coventry , Belfast , and the East End of London did not have enough shelters. The unexpected delay to civilian bombing during the Phoney War meant that the shelter programme finished in June 1940, before
18819-535: The subject, a legitimate target for aerial bombing". During the First World War , the advanced state of the mechanical tooling industry in the city meant that pre-war production could quickly be turned to war production purposes, with industries such as the Coventry Ordnance Works assuming the role of one of the leading munition centres in the UK, manufacturing 25% of all British aircraft produced during
18972-401: The system were deployed in a similar fashion to Knickebein in an attempt to disrupt the Coventry raid but proved to be a failure. Although Jones had correctly guessed the beam layout (and acknowledges it was only a guess), the modulation frequency had been measured incorrectly as 1,500 Hz, but was in fact 2,000 Hz. At the time it was believed that this would not make any difference, as
19125-630: The target or a date. It said that transmission of a figure 9 would denote KORN and hindsight has recognised that to be the code name for Coventry. This was not known at the time even though PAULA had been identified as Paris and LOGE as London. KORN was used in two reports from an aircraft taking part in a raid on Southampton on 30 November, two weeks after the Coventry Blitz. Another decrypt on 11 November or early on 12 November gave navigational beam settings for Wolverhampton , Birmingham, and Coventry but no dates. There
19278-448: The target, returning to base in France for more bombs. Thus the attack was spread over several hours, and there were lulls in the raid when firefighters and rescuers could reorganise and evacuate civilians. As Arthur Harris , commander of RAF Bomber Command , wrote after the war "Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space [to start a firestorm], but all the same there was little concentration in point of time". The British used
19431-463: The tones were close enough that an operator would have a hard time distinguishing them in a noisy aircraft. The mystery was eventually revealed after an X-Gerät -equipped Heinkel He 111 crashed on 6 November 1940 on the English coast at West Bay , Bridport. Although the aircraft sank during the recovery operation, the waterlogged X-Gerät equipment was recovered. On examination, it was learned that
19584-430: The transit time of the signal, and hence the distance to the aircraft. Coupled with the direction of the beam (adjusted for a maximum return signal), the bomber's position could be established with considerable accuracy. The bombers did not have to track the beam, instead the ground controllers could calculate it and then give radio instructions to the pilot to correct the flight path. Jones later learned that his guess on
19737-595: The war because of cost, time to build and fears that their safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large congregations of civilians. The government saw the leading role taken by the Communist Party in advocating the building of deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. The most important existing communal shelters were
19890-576: The war. Like many of the industrial towns of the English West Midlands region that had been industrialised during the Industrial Revolution , many of the small- and medium-sized factories in the city were woven into the same streets as the workers' houses and the shops of the city centre. However, it developed many large interwar suburbs of both private and council housing , which were relatively isolated from industrial buildings. The city
20043-401: The war. It was carried out by 515 German bombers, of Luftflotte 3 shuttling to the target from their bases in northern France with guidance from the pathfinders of Kampfgruppe 100 . The attack, code-named Unternehmen Mondscheinsonate ("Operation Moonlight Sonata"), was intended to destroy Coventry's factories and industrial infrastructure, although it was clear that damage to
20196-405: The war. These were: In the Allied raids later in the war, 500 or more heavy four-engine bombers all delivered their 3,000–6,000 lb (1,400–2,700 kg) bomb loads in a concentrated wave lasting only a few minutes. At Coventry, the German twin-engined bombers carried smaller bomb loads (2,000–4,000 pounds (910–1,810 kg)), and attacked in smaller waves. Each bomber flew several sorties over
20349-724: The wayside, and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology and operational planning rather than on independent strategic air offensives. In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash, and the failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his successors. Ex-army personnel and his successors as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Albert Kesselring (3 June 1936 – 31 May 1937) and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1 June 1937 – 31 January 1939) are usually blamed for abandoning strategic planning for close air support . Two prominent enthusiasts for ground-support operations (direct or indirect) were Hugo Sperrle ,
20502-544: The £5,000 " Spitfire Funds" to build fighters and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history. Battle of the Beams The Battle of the Beams was a period early in the Second World War when bombers of the German Air Force ( Luftwaffe ) used a number of increasingly accurate systems of radio navigation for night bombing in the United Kingdom . British scientific intelligence at
20655-458: Was a German bombing campaign against the United Kingdom , from 7 September 1940 to 11 May 1941, for a little more than 8 months during the Second World War . The Germans conducted mass air attacks against industrial targets, towns, and cities, beginning with raids on London towards the end of the Battle of Britain in 1940 (a battle for daylight air superiority between the Luftwaffe and
20808-467: Was a hiatus in Ultra decrypts from 01:15 GMT on 13 November until 02:40 on 15 November by which time the raid was well underway: Churchill could not have acted on new Ultra intelligence on the afternoon or evening of the attack because there was none to give him. Intelligence from captured airmen and documents did not offer an unambiguous picture either. On the night of 8/9 April 1941 Coventry
20961-438: Was a natural practical joker, and remarked that he was able to play one of the largest practical jokes with virtually any national resource that he required. The gradually increasing power conditioned the Germans such they did not realise that the system was being interfered with, but believed that it suffered several inherent defects. Eventually, as the power was increased enough, the whole Y-Gerät system started to ring with all
21114-466: Was also at the centre of Britain's car industry, with many carmakers being based at different locations in Coventry, although many of these factories had switched to help supply the war effort. There were 17 small raids on Coventry by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain between August and October 1940 during which around 198 tons of bombs fell. Together, the raids killed 176 people and injured around 680. The most notable damage
21267-479: Was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion),
21420-463: Was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities, in daylight to begin with. The main focus was London. The first major raid took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October,
21573-499: Was eventually demonstrated after Churchill ordered a flight to try to detect the beams. The RAF lacked equipment capable of detecting 30–33 MHz Lorenz signals, so they purchased an American Hallicrafters S-27 amateur radio receiver from a shop in Lisle Street, London. The receiver was fitted into an Avro Anson and operated by a member of the Y Service . The flight was nearly cancelled when Eckersley withdrew his assertion that
21726-408: Was first tested on 20 December 1939 when a bomber from KGr 100 flown by Oberleutnant Hermann Schmidt flew over London at 7,000m (23,000 ft). X-Gerät was used effectively in a series of raids known to the Germans as Moonlight Sonata, against Coventry , Wolverhampton and Birmingham . In the raid on Birmingham only KGr 100 was used and British post-raid analysis showed that the vast majority of
21879-518: Was greatly reduced. Planners believed that " the bomber will always get through ". The problem with night bombing is that the same limitations in visibility meant the bomb crew would have a difficult time finding their targets, especially a blacked-out target at night. Only the largest targets, cities, could be attacked with any probability of success. To support this mission, the RAF invested heavily in navigation training, equipping their aircraft with various devices, including an astrodome for taking
22032-469: Was identified later, which was tied to sixpence at Woolworths, meaning Wolverhampton. Korn was unidentified at the time. Peter Calvocoressi was head of the Air Section at Bletchley Park, which translated and analysed all deciphered Luftwaffe messages. He wrote "Ultra never mentioned Coventry. ... Churchill, so far from pondering whether to save Coventry or safeguard Ultra, was under the impression that
22185-501: Was increased considerably. The Knickebein receivers were disguised as a standard blind landing receiver system, consisting apparently of the EBL-1 and the EBL-2 receivers. The beam from a single transmitter would guide the bombers towards the target, but could not tell them when they were over it. To add this ranging feature, a second transmitter similar to the first was set up so its beam crossed
22338-428: Was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British aircrew could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing
22491-509: Was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to co-operate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had a strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire. The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of
22644-613: Was set up in 1939 on Stollberg hill in Nordfriesland near the border with Denmark ; at Kleve (Cleves) near the Dutch border, almost the most westerly point in Germany, and at Lörrach near the border with France and Switzerland in south-western Germany. Following the fall of France in June 1940, additional transmitters were installed on the French coast. Stations were also constructed in Norway and
22797-553: Was subject to another large air raid when 230 bombers attacked the city, dropping 315 tons of high explosive and 25,000 incendiaries. In this and another raid two nights later on 10/11 April about 451 people were killed and over 700 seriously injured. Damage was caused to many buildings including some factories, the central police station, the Coventry & Warwickshire Hospital , King Henry VIII School , and St. Mary's Hall. The main architectural casualty of
22950-507: Was systematically bombed by the Luftwaffe for 56 of the following 57 days and nights. Notable attacks included a large daylight attack against London on 15 September , a large raid on 29 December 1940 against London resulting in a firestorm known as the Second Great Fire of London , and a large raid on the night of 10–11 May 1941. The Luftwaffe gradually decreased daylight operations in favour of night attacks to evade attacks by
23103-460: Was the Lorenz system , developed by Johannes Plendl , which was in the process of being widely deployed on large civilian and military aircraft. The Lorenz system worked by feeding a special three-element antenna system with a modulated radio signal. The signal was fed to the centre dipole , which had a slightly longer reflector element on either side set slightly back. A switch rapidly alternated
23256-537: Was the likely target for the raid. Since 1996, the Ultra decrypts for the period have been available in the UK National Archives. Between 07:35 GMT on 10 November 1940 and 05:00 on 11 November, a German signal was deciphered and given the serial number CX/JQ/444, paragraph 4. The message set out code words to be used by aircraft on an operation named Mondschein Sonat but did not give Coventry as
23409-733: Was to the new Rex Cinema which had been opened in February ;1937 and had already been closed by an earlier bombing raid in September. On 17 October 1940, Second Lieutenant Sandy Campbell of the Royal Engineers Bomb Disposal Company was called upon to deal with an unexploded bomb that had fallen at the Triumph Engineering Company's works in Canley. Because of it, war production in two factories had ceased on
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