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160-700: The museum opened on April 23, 2005. It is nicknamed the Yamato Museum due to the display in the lobby of a 1/10 scale model of the battleship Yamato , the flagship of the Japanese Combined Fleet in World War II. It was sunk south of the Japanese island of Kyushu in 1945. The museum is located where the battleship was completed. The museum includes an experiment work room, library, citizens' gallery, meeting rooms, and gift shop, and an observation terrace on

320-442: A boiler and electrical power for three minutes. The near miss damaged her hull so badly, White Plains never saw frontline service again and was demoted to an aircraft ferry. At 7:30, Yamato spotted a US "cruiser" and prepared to rain fire. The "cruiser" in question was actually the destroyer USS  Johnston , which had just finished a torpedo charge which blew off the bow of the heavy cruiser Kumano without being hit by

480-417: A bow section comprising the front one third of the ship, and a separate stern section. On 16 July 2015, a group of Japanese Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers began meetings to study the feasibility of raising the ship from the ocean floor and recovering the remains of crewmembers entombed in the wreckage. The group said it plans to request government funds to research the technical feasibility of recovering

640-408: A crew of 2,150, 1,650 officers and men were lost. TF 58 sailed west during the night to attack the Japanese at dawn. Search patrols were put up at first light. Ozawa had transferred to the destroyer Wakatsuki , but the radio gear on board was incapable of sending the number of messages needed, so he transferred again, to the carrier Zuikaku , at 13:00. He then learned of the disastrous results of

800-404: A debriefing after the first two air battles, a pilot from USS  Lexington remarked "Why, hell, it was just like an old-time turkey shoot down home!" The outcome is generally attributed to a wealth of highly trained American pilots with superior tactics and numerical superiority, and new anti-aircraft ship defensive technology (including the top-secret anti-aircraft proximity fuze ), versus

960-400: A decoy group composed of one fleet aircraft carrier ( Zuikaku ), three light carriers, two Ise -class hybrid battleship-carriers, and their escorts. The deception was a success, drawing away five fleet carriers and five light carriers with more than 600 aircraft among them, six fast battleships, eight cruisers, and over 40 destroyers. During the hours of darkness, Kurita's force navigated

1120-558: A dockyard that had to be adapted to accommodate her enormous hull. The dock was deepened by one meter, and gantry cranes capable of lifting up to 350 tonnes were installed. Extreme secrecy was maintained throughout construction, a canopy even being erected over part of the dry dock to screen the ship from view. Yamato was launched on 8 August 1940, with Captain (later Vice Admiral) Miyazato Shutoku in command. Yamato ' s main battery consisted of nine 45-caliber 46-centimetre (18.1 in) Type 94 guns—the largest ever fitted to

1280-405: A few carrying torpedoes, the rest four 500-pound bombs) and 77 dive bombers (51 Helldivers and 26 Dauntlesses ). The TF 58 aircraft arrived over the Japanese fleet just before sunset. The 35 or so fighters Ozawa was able to put up were overwhelmed by the 226 incoming aircraft of Mitscher's attack. While the few Japanese aircraft were often skillfully handled and the Japanese anti-aircraft fire

1440-410: A fire room that had already been hit, one impacted a different fire room, and the third hit the hull adjacent to a damaged outboard engine room, increasing the water flow into that space and possibly flooding nearby locations. The fourth hit, unconfirmed, may have struck aft of the third; Garzke and Dulin believe this would explain the rapid flooding reported in that location. This attack left Yamato in

1600-473: A hangar deck full of aircraft vulnerable to a Japanese bomb attack. The recall had been ordered after several ships in TF 58 picked up radar contacts 150 miles (240 km) to the west around 10:00. This was the first of the raids from the Japanese carrier forces, with 68 aircraft. TF 58 started launching every fighter it could; by the time they were in the air the Japanese had closed to 70 miles (110 km). However,

1760-578: A large task force formed in response to American raids on the Tarawa and Makin atolls . She sortied in late September with Nagato , three carriers, and smaller warships to intercept U.S. Task Force 15, and again a month later with six battleships, three carriers, and eleven cruisers. Intelligence had reported that Naval Station Pearl Harbor was nearly empty of ships, which the Japanese interpreted to mean that an American naval force would strike at Wake Island . But there were no radar contacts for six days, and

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1920-488: A naval aviation pioneer and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, demanded that Spruance be relieved. The request was denied by Nimitz. Moreover, Spruance was supported in his decision by Admiral Kelly Turner and Admiral Ernest King , Chief of Naval Operations. Spruance's caution (in particular, his suspicion of a diversionary force) can be compared with Admiral William Halsey's headlong pursuit of an actual diversionary force at Leyte Gulf four months later. Halsey left

2080-535: A part of the second raid when Albacore fired the torpedo spread. Of the six torpedoes fired, four veered off-target. Japanese pilot Sakio Komatsu had recently launched and from his aircraft sighted one of the two torpedoes which were heading for Taihō . Komatsu dived into the path of the torpedo which then detonated. The sixth torpedo struck the carrier on her starboard side and ruptured two aviation fuel tanks. The carrier's escorting destroyers made depth charge attacks but caused only minor damage to Albacore . Initially,

2240-480: A perilous position, listing 15–18° to port. Counterflooding of all remaining starboard void spaces lessened this to 10°, but further correction would have required repairs or flooding the starboard engine and fire rooms. Although the battleship was not yet in danger of sinking, the list meant the main battery was unable to fire, and her speed was limited to 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph). The third and most damaging attack began around 13:40. At least four bombs hit

2400-399: A profound sense of confidence in their navy." Yamato ' s symbolic might was such that some Japanese citizens held the belief that their country could never fall as long as the ship was able to fight. Decades after the war, Yamato was memorialised in various forms by the Japanese. Historically, the word "Yamato" was used as a poetic name for Japan; thus, her name became a metaphor for

2560-441: A single Japanese shell. From a distance of 20,300 yards, Yamato fired a full broadside, gouging Johnston with three direct 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hits. Yamato then fired off her secondary guns, hitting Johnston with an additional three 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells. With the crippled Johnston disappearing behind a rain squall, Yamato recorded the "cruiser" as sunk, though her AP shells allowed Johnston to survive for

2720-497: A single day away from Truk between her arrival in August 1942 and her departure on 8 May 1943. On that day, she set sail for Yokosuka and from there for Kure, arriving on 14 May. She spent nine days in dry dock for inspection and general repairs, and after sailing to Japan's western Inland Sea she was again dry-docked in late July for significant refitting and upgrades. On 16 August, Yamato began her return to Truk, where she joined

2880-756: A third was able to put out fires and get underway. The carrier Hiyō was attacked and hit by bombs and aerial torpedoes from four Grumman TBF Avengers from Belleau Wood . Hiyō was set afire after a tremendous blast from leaking aviation fuel. Dead in the water, she sank stern first, with the loss of 250 officers and men. The rest of her crew, about one thousand, were rescued by Japanese destroyers. The carriers Zuikaku , Junyō and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs. Returning American strike pilots generally assessed these carriers as more crippled than they actually were, mistaking for devastating direct hits what Japanese post-war records revealed to have actually been huge geysers caused by near misses. The battleship Haruna

3040-546: A time being. Still, the damage inflicted was devastating as Yamato ' s 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells mostly landed on her superstructure. One hit amidships, taking out an anti-aircraft fire director, while the remaining two hit forward, destroying her torpedo director and shredding her bridge, injuring Commander Ernest E. Evans by blowing off two of his fingers and his entire shirt, and killing much of his command staff. Meanwhile, two 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells hit amidships, cutting Johnston ' s speed to 17 knots, while

3200-667: A vulnerable position, and the low visibility coupled with radar confusion let a Japanese bomber slip through and severely damage USS  Franklin . Although the American carrier aircraft strikes caused less destruction to enemy naval vessels than earlier battles, American submarines made up for it by sinking two of the three Japanese fleet carriers, which left Zuikaku as the only remaining operational IJN fleet carrier. The American F6F Hellcat fighter proved its worth, as its powerful engine generated superior speed, while its heavier armor and firepower made it rugged and deadly. The Japanese on

3360-625: A warship, although the shells were not as heavy as those fired by the British 18-inch naval guns of World War I . Each gun was 21.13 metres (69.3 ft) long, weighed 147.3 tonnes (162.4 short tons), and was capable of firing high-explosive or armor-piercing shells 42 kilometres (26 mi). Her secondary battery comprised twelve 155-millimetre (6.1 in) guns mounted in four triple turrets (one forward, one aft, two amidships), and twelve 12.7-centimetre (5 in) guns in six twin mounts (three on each side amidships). These turrets had been taken off

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3520-674: A warship. Yamato was designed to counter the numerically superior battleship fleet of the United States , Japan's main rival in the Pacific. She was laid down in 1937 and formally commissioned a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Throughout 1942, she served as the flagship of the Combined Fleet , and in June 1942 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto directed the fleet from her bridge during

3680-399: Is a tale about the sailors aboard the doomed battleship and the concepts of honour and duty. The film was shown on more than 290 screens across the country and was a commercial success, taking in a record 5.11 billion yen at the domestic box office. The 2019 Japanese film The Great War of Archimedes (アルキメデスの大戦, Archimedes no Taisen) based on a manga by Norifusa Mita tells

3840-412: Is commonly attributed as the most fatal hit to the flat top as an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hit Gambier Bay ' s engine room below the waterline, immediately cutting her speed to 10 knots as she gradually slowed until dead in the water, with Yamato following up with another hit at 8:23. By 8:30, American destroyers covered Gambier Bay , leading to a number of Japanese warships switching fire from

4000-530: The Mogami -class cruisers when those vessels were converted to a main armament of 20.3-centimetre (8 in) guns. In addition, Yamato carried twenty-four 25-millimetre (1 in) anti-aircraft guns, primarily mounted amidships. When refitted in 1944 and 1945 for naval engagements in the South Pacific, the secondary battery configuration was changed to six 155 mm guns and twenty-four 127 mm guns, and

4160-466: The Admiralty Islands —from Yokosuka to Truk, Yamato and her task group were intercepted by the American submarine Skate about 180 miles (290 km) out at sea. Skate fired a spread of four torpedoes at Yamato ; one struck the battleship's starboard side toward the stern. A hole 5 metres (16 ft) below the top of her anti-torpedo bulge and measuring some 25 metres (82 ft) across

4320-570: The Battle of Midway , a disastrous defeat for Japan. Musashi took over as the Combined Fleet flagship in early 1943, and Yamato spent the rest of the year moving between the major Japanese naval bases of Truk and Kure in response to American threats. In December 1943, Yamato was torpedoed by an American submarine which necessitated repairs at Kure, where she was refitted with additional anti-aircraft guns and radar in early 1944. Although present at

4480-591: The Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, she played no part in the battle. The only time Yamato fired her main guns at enemy surface targets was in October 1944, when she was sent to engage American forces invading the Philippines during the Battle of Leyte Gulf . While threatening to sink American troop transports, they encountered a light escort carrier group of the U.S. Navy 's Task Force 77 , "Taffy 3", in

4640-450: The Battle off Samar , sinking or helping to sink the escort carrier USS  Gambier Bay and the destroyers USS  Johnston and Hoel . The Japanese turned back after American air attacks convinced them they were engaging a powerful U.S. carrier fleet. During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945 its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in

4800-908: The Enterprise group. Many others did not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers. A fourth Japanese raid was launched between 11:00 and 11:30, but pilots had been given an incorrect position for the U.S. fleet and could not locate it. They broke into two loose groups and turned for Guam and Rota to refuel. One group flying toward Rota stumbled upon Montgomery's task group. Eighteen aircraft joined battle with American fighters and lost half their number. A smaller group of nine Japanese dive bombers of this force evaded U.S. aircraft and attacked Wasp and Bunker Hill but scored no hits; eight were shot down. The larger group of Japanese aircraft had flown to Guam and were intercepted over Orote Field by 27 Hellcats while landing. Thirty of

4960-458: The Guadalcanal campaign because of a lack of 46 cm ammunition suitable for shore bombardment , uncharted seas around Guadalcanal, and her high fuel consumption. Before the year's end, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Chiaki Matsuda was assigned to command Yamato . On 11 February 1943, Yamato was replaced by her sister ship Musashi as flagship of the Combined Fleet. Yamato spent only

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5120-587: The Lingga Islands , arriving on 16–17 July. By this stage of the war, Japan's tanker fleet had been much reduced by marauding American submarines, so major fleet units were stationed in the East Indies to be near the source of their fuel supply. The battleships remained at the islands for the next three months. Between 22 and 25 October 1944, as part of Admiral Takeo Kurita 's Center Force (also known as Force A or First Striking Force), Yamato took part in one of

5280-615: The Marianas , convincing Admiral Soemu Toyoda that the U.S. was preparing to invade. This move came as a surprise; the Japanese had expected the next U.S. target to be farther to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus , and had protected the Marianas with only 50 land-based aircraft. On 13–15 June, American carriers made additional airstrikes while surface forces bombarded the Marianas. On June 15,

5440-740: The Russo-Japanese War , the Pearl Harbor victor was planning a decisive engagement with the United States Navy at Midway Island . After participating in war games Yamato departed Hiroshima Bay on 27 May for duty with Yamamoto's main battleship group. U.S. codebreakers were aware of Yamamoto's intentions, and the Battle of Midway proved disastrous for Japan's carrier force, with four fleet carriers and 332 aircraft lost. Yamamoto exercised overall command from Yamato ' s bridge, but his battle plan had widely dispersed his forces to lure

5600-527: The San Bernardino Strait , and shortly after dawn attacked an American formation that had remained in the area to provide close support for the invading troops. Known as "Taffy 3", this small group comprised six escort carriers , three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts . At 6:57, from a distance of 35,000 yards, Yamato fired frontal salvos against the American warships, her first and only surface action against enemy vessels. However, Kurita mistook

5760-713: The United States Navy 's Fifth Fleet against ships and aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Mobile Fleet and nearby island garrisons. This was the largest carrier-to-carrier battle in history, involving 24 aircraft carriers , deploying roughly 1,350 carrier-based aircraft . The aerial part of the battle was nicknamed the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot by American aviators for the severely disproportional loss ratio inflicted upon Japanese aircraft by American pilots and anti-aircraft gunners. During

5920-497: The home islands . In a desperate attempt to slow the Allied advance, Yamato was dispatched on a one-way mission to Okinawa in April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island. The task force was spotted south of Kyushu by U.S. submarines and aircraft, and on 7 April 1945 she was sunk by American carrier-based bombers and torpedo bombers with

6080-431: The "single decisive battle" in early 1944. On 31 March 1944 Koga was killed when his aircraft (a Kawanishi H8K ) flew into a typhoon and crashed. Koga's chief of staff, Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome , was flying in an accompanying plane and carrying the Z Plan documents, and also crashed. Fukudome survived, but the Z Plan briefcase did not sink with the destroyed aircraft and was recovered by Filipino guerillas who over

6240-552: The 1st Battleship Division was disbanded, and Yamato became the flagship of the Second Fleet. On 21 November, while transiting the East China Sea in a withdrawal to Kure Naval Base, Yamato ' s battle group was attacked by the submarine USS  Sealion . The battleship Kongō and destroyer Urakaze were lost. Yamato was immediately dry docked for repairs and anti-aircraft upgrades on reaching Kure, where several of

6400-492: The 25,675-ton carrier Shōkaku by about noon. The submarine fired a spread of six torpedoes, three of which struck Shōkaku on her starboard side. Badly damaged, the carrier came to a halt. One torpedo had hit the forward aviation fuel tanks near the main hangar, and aircraft that had just landed and were being refueled exploded into flames. Ammunition and exploding bombs added to the conflagration, as did burning fuel spewing from shattered fuel pipes. With her bows subsiding into

6560-441: The 27 aircraft which remained, some made attacks on the picket destroyers USS Yarnall and Stockham but caused no damage. Between three and six bombers broke through to Lee's battleship group and attacked; one bomb hit the main deck of USS  South Dakota , killing or injuring over 50 men but failing to disable her. South Dakota was the only American ship damaged in this attack. No aircraft of Ozawa's first wave got through to

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6720-479: The 4th floor where people can view the area. Temporary exhibits are also held in the 2nd floor' room. On front of the museum are displayed a 41 cm/45 3rd Year Type naval gun , an anchor, a rudder, and a screw from the Japanese Battleship Mutsu . Behind the museum there is a brick park, a lawn plaza, and the "Yamato Wharf", a 1:1 scale silhouette of Yamato's bridge. West of the museum are located

6880-480: The 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50 one of these, a Mitsubishi A6M Zero , found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, the bomb-carrying Zero attacked picket destroyer Stockham but was shot down by the destroyer Yarnall . Alerted, the Japanese began launching their Guam-based aircraft for an attack. These were spotted on radar by U.S. ships. A group of thirty Grumman F6F Hellcats were dispatched from USS  Belleau Wood to deal with

7040-520: The 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. The naval game franchise Kantai Collection and its parent company C2 Praparat Co., Ltd. are official partners of the museum, organizing various events with the museum and the Kure colectivity, being notably the main patreon for the lathe N° 15299's restoration. Japanese battleship Yamato Yamato ( Japanese : 大和 , named after the ancient Yamato Province )

7200-478: The Allied forces assembled on and around Okinawa. Yamato would then be beached to act as an unsinkable gun emplacement and continue to fight until destroyed. In preparation for the mission, Yamato had taken on a full stock of ammunition on 29 March. According to the Japanese plan, the ships were supposed to take aboard only enough fuel for a one way voyage to Okinawa, but additional fuel amounting to 60% of capacity

7360-743: The Allies was it greatly benefited General MacArthur's invasion of Biak in Dutch New Guinea which started weeks before the Mariana Islands operations started. The Japanese military had designated Biak as its most important island of defense in the Southwest Pacific theater . 13 June was the original starting date of a massive operation, spearheaded by the battleships Yamato and Musashi , to challenge MacArthur's paltry naval forces , which had no aircraft carriers or battleships and consisted of only

7520-494: The American carriers. At 11:07, radar detected another, larger attack. This second wave consisted of 107 aircraft. They were met while still 60 miles (97 km) out, and at least 70 of these aircraft were shot down before reaching the ships. Six attacked Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery 's group, nearly hitting two of the carriers and causing casualties on each. Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Enterprise , with one torpedo exploding in

7680-539: The American government would be convinced to sue for peace and allow Japan to keep its conquests . Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had grown wary of this strategy, but he was killed in Operation Vengeance on 18 April 1943. The following day, Admiral Mineichi Koga succeeded Yamamoto as commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet , and Koga wanted the Imperial Japanese Navy to engage the American fleet in

7840-440: The American invasion fleet weakly protected during the Battle off Samar , nearly resulting in a devastating attack on the landing force by Japanese heavy surface units. It was prevented only by the heroic and desperate attack of 5 small American surface ships, which put up such an intense fight that the 23-ship-strong Japanese fleet thought they were engaging a much larger force and withdrew. In addition, by focusing on defense first,

8000-602: The Americans into a trap, and the battleship group was too far away to take part in the engagement. On 5 June, Yamamoto ordered the remaining ships to return to Japan, so Yamato withdrew with the main battleship force to Hashirajima , before making her way back to Kure. Yamato left Kure for Truk on 17 August 1942. After 11 days at sea, she was sighted by the American submarine USS  Flying Fish , which fired four torpedoes, all of which missed; Yamato arrived safely at Truk later that day. She remained there throughout

8160-570: The East China Sea in 1982 produced some results, but the wreckage discovered could not be clearly identified. A second expedition returned to the site two years later, and the team's photographic and video records were later confirmed by one of the battleship's designers, Shigeru Makino, to show the Yamato ' s last resting place. The wreck lies 290 kilometres (180 mi) southwest of Kyushu under 340 metres (1,120 ft) of water in two main pieces;

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8320-412: The Japanese acknowledged by using them as sacrificial decoys at Leyte Gulf. With the effective crippling of her best striking arm, Japan chose to rely increasingly on land-based kamikaze suicide aircraft in a last-ditch effort to make the war so costly that the U.S. would offer peace terms better than unconditional surrender. Spruance was heavily criticized after the battle by many officers, particularly

8480-443: The Japanese began circling to regroup their formations for the attack. This 10-minute delay proved critical, and the first group of Hellcats met the raid, still at 70 miles (110 km), at 10:36. They were quickly joined by additional groups. Within minutes, 25 Japanese aircraft had been shot down, against the loss of only one U.S. aircraft. The Japanese aircraft that survived were met by other fighters, and 16 more were shot down. Of

8640-518: The Japanese force. Asashimo , which had fallen out of formation with engine trouble, was caught and sunk by a detachment of aircraft from USS  San Jacinto . The Surface Special Attack Force increased speed to 24 knots (28 mph; 44 km/h), and following standard Japanese anti-aircraft defensive measures, the destroyers began circling Yamato . The first aircraft swooped in to attack at 12:37. Yahagi turned and raced away at 35 knots (40 mph; 65 km/h) in an attempt to draw off some of

8800-399: The Japanese naval aviation forces by killing most of the remaining trained pilots and destroying their operational reserves of naval aircraft, a blow that effectively shattered the Japanese naval air arm, from which it never recovered. Without the time or resources to build sufficient aircraft and train new pilots, the surviving Japanese carriers were almost useless in an offensive role, a fact

8960-647: The Japanese plans known as Plan A-Go or Operation A-Go. Operation A-go did not change much from the Z Plan, so the U.S. Navy knew exactly what was going to happen during the upcoming naval battle. The plan was adopted in early June 1944. Within weeks, an opportunity arose to engage the American fleet now detected heading for Saipan . The Japanese had some advantages they hoped would turn the battle in their favor. Though outnumbered in ships and aircraft, they planned to supplement their carrier airpower with land-based aircraft. Meanwhile, IJN aircrew losses, suffered during earlier carrier battles at Coral Sea , Midway , and

9120-405: The Japanese tried desperate measures to break up the attack. Yamato ' s main guns were loaded with " beehive " shells fused to explode one second after firing – a mere 1,000 m (3,300 ft) from the ship – but these had little effect. Three or four torpedoes struck the battleship on the port side, and one to starboard. Three hits, close together on the port side, are confirmed: one struck

9280-518: The Japanese use of replacement pilots with not enough flight hours in training and little or no combat experience. Furthermore the Japanese defensive plans were directly obtained by the Allies from the plane wreckage of the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet , Admiral Mineichi Koga , in March 1944. During the course of the battle, American submarines torpedoed and sank two of

9440-417: The Japanese were still intent on concealing the ship's characteristics. The same day, under Captain (later Vice Admiral) Gihachi Takayanagi, she joined fellow battleships Nagato and Mutsu in the 1st Battleship Division. On 12 February 1942, Yamato became the flagship of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 's Combined Fleet . A veteran of Japan's crushing victory over Russia at the Battle of Tsushima in

9600-470: The Japanese's primary objectives, the American troop convoys, remained untouched by Japanese surface forces. In the aftermath of the battle, Yamato was attacked by aircraft from USS  Hornet and damaged by two more bomb hits, one destroying some crew quarters and the other impacting on her turret 1, rounding out her engagement in the battle. Following the engagement, Yamato and the remnants of Kurita's force returned to Brunei . On 15 November 1944,

9760-659: The Sibuyan Sea hurt the Center Force badly with the loss of one more heavy cruiser, eliminating a substantial part of the fleet's anti-aircraft defence. During the course of the day, American carrier aircraft sortied 259 times. Aircraft from the USS ; Essex struck Yamato with two armor-piercing bombs and scored one near miss; Yamato suffered moderate damage and took on about 3,370 tonnes (3,320 long tons) of water but remained battleworthy. However, her sister ship Musashi became

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9920-511: The Solomons), assumed that battle line commander Willis Lee would welcome the opportunity. But Lee strongly opposed such an encounter. Having personally experienced a confused night action off Guadalcanal , Lee was not enthusiastic about a night engagement with Japanese surface forces, believing that his crews were not adequately trained for it. Shortly after learning Lee's opinion, Mitscher requested permission from Spruance to move TF 58 west during

10080-604: The Surface Special Attack Force at 08:23; two flying boats arrived soon thereafter, and for the next five hours, Yamato fired " Common Type 3 or beehive " ( 3 Shiki tsûjôdan ) shells at the Allied seaplanes but could not prevent them from shadowing the force. Yamato obtained her first radar contact with aircraft at 10:00; an hour later, American F6F Hellcat fighters appeared overhead to deal with any Japanese aircraft that might appear. None did. At about 12:30, 280 bomber and torpedo bomber aircraft arrived over

10240-479: The U.S. fleet continued its advance in a steady progression across the islands of the central Pacific. While U.S. commanders, particularly Admiral Spruance , were concerned about the Japanese trying to attack U.S. transports and newly landed forces, the Japanese objective was actually to engage and defeat the Fast Carrier Task Force in a decisive battle. On 12 June 1944 U.S. carriers made air strikes on

10400-485: The World War II battleship and the ideals she symbolises. In 2005, the Yamato Museum was opened near the site of the former Kure shipyards. Although intended to educate on the maritime history of post Meiji era Japan, the museum gives special attention to its namesake; the battleship is a common theme among several of its exhibits, which includes a section dedicated to Matsumoto's animated series. The centrepiece of

10560-643: The animated series proved popular and established a foundation for anime in the North American entertainment market. The motif in Space Battleship Yamato was repeated in Silent Service , a popular manga and anime that explores issues of nuclear weapons and the Japan–U.S. relationship. It tells the story of a nuclear-powered super submarine whose crew mutinies and renames the vessel Yamato , in allusion to

10720-485: The attackers; it drew off only an insignificant number. Yamato was not hit for four minutes, but at 12:41 two bombs obliterated two of her triple 25 mm anti-aircraft mounts and blew a hole in the deck. A third bomb destroyed her radar room and the starboard aft 127 mm mount. At 12:45 a single torpedo struck Yamato far forward on her port side, sending shock waves throughout the ship. These had only minor effects, but no detailed information about this hit survived

10880-432: The aviators, for his decision to fight the battle cautiously rather than exploiting his superior forces and intelligence data with a more aggressive posture. By failing to close on the enemy earlier and more forcefully, his critics argue, he squandered an opportunity to destroy the entire Japanese Mobile Fleet. "This is what comes of placing a non-aviator in command over carriers" was the common refrain. Admiral John Towers ,

11040-519: The battle, Yamato withdrew with the Mobile Fleet to the Hashirajima staging area near Kure to refuel and re-arm. With Musashi she left the fleet on 24 June for the short journey to Kure, where she received five more triple 25 mm anti-aircraft mounts. The opportunity was taken to put in place "emergency buoyancy keeping procedures". These resulted in the removal of almost every flammable item from

11200-423: The battle. At 12:46, another two bombs struck the port side, one slightly ahead of the aft 155 mm centreline turret and the other right on top of the gun. These caused a great deal of damage to the turret and its magazines; only one man survived. Shortly afterward, two or three more torpedoes struck Yamato : two impacts, on the port side near the engine room and on one of the boiler rooms, are confirmed;

11360-483: The battleship's older anti-aircraft guns were replaced. On 25 November, Captain Aruga Kōsaku was named Yamato ' s commander. On 1 January 1945, Yamato , Haruna and Nagato were transferred to the newly reactivated 1st Battleship Division. Yamato left dry dock two days later for Japan's Inland Sea. This reassignment was brief; the 1st Battleship Division was deactivated once again on 10 February, and Yamato

11520-452: The battleship, including linoleum , bedding, and mattresses. In place of the latter, men slept on planks which could be used to repair damage. Flammable paints received a silicone -based overcoat, and additional portable pumps and fire fighting apparatuses were installed. Leaving Japan on 8 July, Yamato —accompanied by the battleships Musashi , Kongō , Nagato , and 11 cruisers and destroyers—sailed south. Yamato and Musashi headed for

11680-622: The better part of a year (following the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands ) reconstituting their depleted carrier air groups, and the American Fast Carrier Task Force had destroyed 90% of it in two days. The Japanese had only enough pilots left to form the air group for one of their light carriers. As a consequence, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf four months later, they sent out a decoy carrier group with only 108 aircraft, across six carriers (two were hybrid-carriers ), that

11840-487: The bulk of its carrier air strength and would never recover. This battle, along with the Battle of Leyte Gulf four months later, marked the end of Japanese aircraft carrier operations. The few surviving carriers remained mostly in port thereafter. From the very start of the conflict in December 1941, the Japanese war plan had been to inflict such severe and painful losses on the US military that its public would become war weary and

12000-481: The carrier forces under Spruance at Philippine Sea suffered no significant harm. This was in contrast to Leyte Gulf when Halsey's carriers were trying to neutralize the enemy airfields and attack the enemy fleet simultaneously, such that a Japanese bomber managed to evade the Combat Air Patrols to fatally cripple the light carrier USS Princeton . Likewise, during the carrier-based air raids , U.S. carriers were in

12160-440: The carrier to said destroyers. However, Yamato continued to pound Gambier Bay with her main battery, and observed her listing more and more to port. Meanwhile, her 6.1-inch (155 mm) secondary guns reengaged Hoel . After Hoel had been scorched by gunfire from Yamato , the battleship Nagato and the heavy cruiser Haguro , Yamato scored a critical hit that disabled Hoel ' s last boiler, with further gunfire from

12320-484: The carrier's commanding officer, Captain Hiroshi Matsubara . Destroyer Urakaze attacked the submarine, but Cavalla escaped with relatively minor damage despite near misses from depth charges. Meanwhile, Taihō was falling victim to poor damage control. Hoping to clear the explosive fumes, an inexperienced damage-control officer ordered her ventilation system to operate at full blast. This action instead spread

12480-448: The closest carrier as his target, which happened to be Taihō , the largest and newest carrier in the Japanese fleet and Ozawa's flagship. As Albacore was about to fire, however, her fire-control computer failed, and the torpedoes had to be fired "by eye". Determined to go ahead with the attack, Blanchard ordered all six torpedoes to be fired in a single spread to increase the chances of a hit. Taihō had just launched 42 aircraft as

12640-399: The damage to Taihō seemed minor; the flooding was quickly contained and the carrier's propulsion and navigation were unaffected. Taihō quickly resumed regular operations, but gasoline vapor from the ruptured fuel tanks began to fill the hangar decks, creating an increasingly dangerous situation on board. Another submarine, USS  Cavalla , was able to maneuver to an attack position on

12800-608: The damaged South Dakota was able to remain in formation to continue her anti-aircraft duties. Throughout the day, American scout aircraft had been unable to locate the Japanese fleet. However, two American submarines had already spotted Ozawa's carriers early that morning and were about to provide important assistance to the Fast Carrier Task Force. At 08:16 the submarine USS  Albacore , which had sighted Ozawa's carrier group, had maneuvered into an ideal attack position; Lieutenant Commander James W. Blanchard selected

12960-539: The disasters was withheld. Losses on the U.S. side on the first day were 23 aircraft. The second day's airstrike against the Japanese fleet saw most of the aircraft losses for the U.S.; of the 226 aircraft launched on the strike, 115 returned; 20 were lost to enemy action in the attack, and 80 were lost when they ran out of fuel returning to their carriers and had to ditch into the sea, or crashed attempting to land at night. Spruance's conservative battle plan for TF 58, while sinking just one light carrier, severely weakened

13120-528: The end of the Japanese empire. In April 1968, a memorial tower was erected at Cape Inutabu on Tokunoshima , an island in the Amami Islands of Kagoshima Prefecture , to commemorate the lives lost in Operation Ten-Go. In October 1974, Leiji Matsumoto created a television series, Space Battleship Yamato , about rebuilding the battleship as a starship and its interstellar quest to save Earth. The series

13280-458: The entire Japanese navy was inferior in numbers and experience to the U.S. Pacific Fleet . Between June 19 and June 23, Yamato escorted forces of Ozawa's Mobile Fleet during the Battle of the Philippine Sea , dubbed by American pilots "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot". The Japanese lost three aircraft carriers and 426 aircraft; Yamato ' s only significant contribution was mistakenly opening fire on returning Japanese aircraft. Following

13440-678: The epitome of Imperial Japanese naval engineering , and because of their size, speed, and power, visibly embodied Japan's determination and readiness to defend its interests against the Western Powers and the United States in particular. Shigeru Fukudome , chief of the Operations Section of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff , described the ships as "symbols of naval power that provided to officers and men alike

13600-428: The escort carrier USS  Gambier Bay . From 22,000 yards, Yamato fired her main guns, immediately hitting Gambier Bay on her first salvo with an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell that smashed through her hangar bay. Meanwhile, the heavy cruiser Chikuma landed hits to Gambier Bay ' s flight deck that started a large fire visible in several photographs of the ship under attack. At 8:20, Yamato scored what

13760-435: The escort carriers for full-sized fleet carriers, and ordered his ships to fire armor-piercing ammunition that would over penetrate the small ship's unarmored hulls without exploding. Despite this, Yamato scored the first damage of the battle. Immediately on her 3rd salvo from 34,500 yards, a single 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell exploded mere feet underneath the keel of the escort carrier USS  White Plains , knocking out

13920-476: The first American troops went ashore on Saipan . Since control of the Marianas would bring American strategic bombers within range of the Japanese home islands, the IJN decided it was time for the long-awaited Kantai Kessen (decisive battle). Toyoda immediately ordered a fleet-based counterattack, committing nearly all of the Japanese navy's serviceable ships. The main portions of the fleet rendezvoused on 16 June in

14080-586: The first attack group had launched, a third message arrived, indicating the Japanese fleet were 60 miles (97 km) farther out than previously indicated. The first launch would be at their limits of fuel and would have to attempt landing at night. Mitscher canceled the second launch of aircraft but chose not to recall the first launch. Of the 240 planes that were launched for the strike, 14 aborted for various reasons and returned to their ships. The 226 planes that continued consisted of 95 Hellcat fighters (some carrying 500-pound bombs), 54 Avenger torpedo bombers (only

14240-424: The fleet returned to Truk, arriving on 26 October. Yamato escorted Transport Operation BO-1 from Truk to Yokosuka during 12–17 December. Subsequently, because of their extensive storage capacity and thick armor protection, Yamato and Musashi were pressed into service as transport vessels. On 25 December, while ferrying troops and equipment—which were wanted as reinforcements for the garrisons at Kavieng and

14400-402: The fleet's contact-fused bombs had been largely used up in the earlier strikes, and Mitscher was left with only the armor-piercing bombs needed to combat the Japanese fleet, so he informed Spruance he could not launch such strikes. As the morning broke, TF 58 launched search aircraft, combat air patrols (CAP) and anti-submarine patrols and then turned the fleet west to gain maneuvering room from

14560-420: The fleet. Mitscher said to Burke, "Get those fighters back from Guam." The call " Hey, Rube! " was sent out. The fleet held steady until 10:23, when Mitscher ordered TF 58 to turn into the wind on course east-southeast, and ordered all fighter aircraft aloft, deployed in several layers of CAP to await the Japanese. He then sent his bomber aircraft aloft to orbit open waters to the east rather than leaving them in

14720-526: The focus of the American attacks and eventually sank after being hit with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes. Unknown to Kurita, the main American battle group under the command of Admiral William Halsey Jr. , departed the Leyte Gulf area on the evening of 24 October. Convinced that Kurita's Center Force had been turned back, Halsey took his powerful Task Force 38 in pursuit of the Japanese Northern Force,

14880-463: The forty-nine Japanese aircraft were shot down, and the rest were damaged beyond repair. Aboard the Lexington afterward, a pilot was heard to remark "Hell, this is like an old-time turkey shoot!" Including the continued aerial slaughter over Orote Field, Japanese losses exceeded 350 planes on the first day of battle. About 30 American planes were lost, and there was little damage to American ships; even

15040-756: The four surviving destroyers, which withdrew to Japan. From the first attack at 12:37 to the explosion at 14:23, Yamato had been hit by at least 11 torpedoes and 6 bombs. There may have been two more torpedo and bomb hits, but that is not confirmed. The experience of the sinking of the ship was described by a Japanese survivor ( Yoshida Matsuro ) in Senkan Yamato no Saigo , translated into English as Requiem for Battleship Yamato . Because of often confused circumstances and incomplete information regarding their sinkings, it took until 2019 to discover and identify most wrecks of Japanese capital ships lost in World War II. Drawing on U.S. wartime records, an expedition to

15200-461: The garrison and naval defenses of the island of Biak as part of Operation Kon . The mission was cancelled when word reached Ozawa's headquarters of American carrier attacks on the Mariana Islands . Instead, the Imperial Japanese Navy reorganized, concentrating the majority of its remaining fighting strength in the hope of achieving a decisive success against the Americans. By this time though,

15360-426: The gun crews who manned Yamato ' s unprotected 25 mm anti-aircraft weapons, sharply curtailing their effectiveness. The second attack started just before 13:00. In a coordinated strike, dive bombers flew high overhead to begin their runs while torpedo bombers approached from all directions at just above sea level. Overwhelmed by the number of targets, the battleship's anti-aircraft guns were ineffective, and

15520-411: The invasion fleet and provide air support for the landings. Shortly before midnight on 18 June Nimitz radioed Spruance that a Japanese vessel had broken radio silence. The message intercepted was an apparent dispatch from Ozawa to his land-based air forces on Guam . Radio direction-finding placed the sender approximately 355 miles (571 km) west-southwest of TF 58. Mitscher considered whether

15680-537: The islands. The U.S. Navy had developed a sophisticated air control system, which vectored CAP fighters by radar to intercept enemy bombers well before they reached the fleet. Any attackers that got through the CAP would then face a "gun line" of screening battleships and cruisers that would put up devastating barrages of VT-fuzed anti-aircraft fire before the attackers reached the aircraft carriers. The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols, using some of

15840-429: The largest Japanese fleet carriers taking part in the battle. The American carriers launched a protracted strike, sinking one light carrier and damaging other ships, but most of the American aircraft returning to their carriers ran low on fuel as night fell. Eighty American planes were lost. Although at the time the battle appeared to be a missed opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy had lost

16000-413: The largest naval engagements in history—the Battle of Leyte Gulf . In response to the American invasion of the Philippines, Operation Shō-Gō called for a number of Japanese groups to converge on the island of Leyte, where American troops were landing . On 18 October, Yamato was given a coating of black camouflage in preparation for her nighttime transit of the San Bernardino Strait ; the main ingredient

16160-532: The long Solomon Islands campaign of 1942–43, had greatly weakened the Japanese Navy's ability to project force with its carriers. Losses suffered in the Solomons drastically reduced the number of skilled carrier pilots available to fill the carrier air groups . It took nearly a year for the Japanese to reconstitute their groups following the Solomons campaign. Japan no longer had enough oil tankers to transport

16320-579: The loss of most of her crew. During the 1930s the Japanese government adopted an ultranationalist militancy with a view to greatly expand the Japanese Empire . Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1934, renouncing its treaty obligations. After withdrawing from the Washington Naval Treaty , which limited the size and power of capital ships, the Imperial Japanese Navy began their design of

16480-731: The main mast was altered. Her radar suite was also upgraded to include infrared identification systems and aircraft search and gunnery control radars. She left the dry dock on 18 March and went through several trials beginning on 11 April. Yamato left Kure on 21 April and embarked soldiers and materiel the following day at Okinoshima for a mission to Manila, reaching the Philippines on 28 April. She then moved on to Malaya to join Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa 's Mobile Fleet at Lingga ; this force arrived at Tawi-Tawi on 14 May. In early June 1944, Yamato and Musashi were again requisitioned as troop transports, this time to reinforce

16640-399: The museum, occupying a large section of the ground floor, is a 26.3-metre (86 ft) long model of Yamato (1:10 scale). In 2005, Toei released a 143-minute movie, Yamato , based on a book by Jun Henmi , to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II; Tamiya released special editions of scale models of the battleship in conjunction with the film's release. The film

16800-498: The new Yamato class of heavy battleships. Their planners recognized Japan would be unable to compete with the output of U.S. naval shipyards should war break out, so the 70,000-ton vessels of the Yamato class were designed to be capable of engaging multiple enemy battleships at the same time. The keel of Yamato , the lead ship of the class, was laid down at the Kure Naval Arsenal , Hiroshima , on 4 November 1937 in

16960-585: The next few weeks transported the documents to General Douglas MacArthur's Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in Brisbane , Australia. MIS forwarded the translated Z Plan to Admiral Chester Nimitz in Honolulu, and the Japanese plans were quickly dispatched to the fleet commanders in the Philippine Sea in June. A new commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda , was appointed, and he finalized

17120-502: The night, despite the risk of attack from Japanese submarines and night-flying aircraft. Mitscher backed up the decision, and soon every ship in Task Force 58 was lit up, in spite of the risks involved. Picket destroyers fired starshells to help the aircraft find the task groups. Planes were given clearance to land on any available flight deck (not just their home carriers, as usual), and many did land on other carriers. Despite this, 80 of

17280-417: The night, to reach a launch position at dawn that would allow for a maximum aerial assault on the enemy force. Spruance considered for an hour, then refused Mitscher's request. Mitscher's staff was disappointed with Spruance's decision. Burke later commented: "We knew we were going to have hell slugged out of us in the morning. We knew we couldn't reach them. We knew they could reach us." Spruance's decision

17440-425: The number of 25 mm anti-aircraft guns was increased to 162. During October or November 1941 Yamato underwent sea trials , reaching her maximum possible speed of 27.4 knots (50.7 km/h; 31.5 mph). As war loomed, priority was given to accelerating military construction. On 16 December, months ahead of schedule, the battleship was formally commissioned at Kure, in a ceremony more austere than usual, as

17600-580: The other hand were still flying the A6M Zero which, though highly maneuverable and revolutionary during the early stages of the Pacific War, was now underpowered, fragile and essentially obsolete by 1944. In addition, the D4Y "Judy" , though fast, was also fragile and easily set on fire. The Japanese naval airmen were also inadequately trained. The Japanese training programs could not replace the quality aviators lost during

17760-509: The past two years of the Pacific Campaign. Flying against the well-trained and often veteran U.S. aviators, it was a one-sided contest. The Americans lost fewer than two dozen Hellcats in air-to-air combat. Naval aviation and anti-aircraft fire shot down nearly 480 Japanese aircraft, 346 of those carrier aircraft on 19 June alone. A very fortunate result of the Battle of the Philippine Sea for

17920-420: The previous day and that he had about 150 aircraft left. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the attacks, thinking there were still hundreds of aircraft on Guam and Rota and started planning new raids for 21 June. The main problem for TF 58 was locating the enemy, who had been operating at a great distance. Early-morning American searches on 20 June found nothing. An extra mid-day search by Hellcat fighter pilots

18080-410: The protracted strike, it became clear that most of the aircraft returning to their carriers were running dangerously low on fuel, and to worsen matters, night had fallen. At 20:45, the first returning U.S. aircraft reached TF 58. Knowing his aviators would have difficulty finding their carriers, Admiral Joseph J. Clark of Hornet decided to illuminate his carrier, shining searchlights directly up into

18240-412: The radio messages were a Japanese deception, as the Japanese were known to send a single vessel off to break radio silence, to mislead their adversaries about the actual location of the main force. Mitscher realized that there was a chance of a night surface encounter with Ozawa's forces. Arleigh Burke , Mitscher's chief of staff (a former destroyer squadron commander who had won several night battles in

18400-667: The raid from doing too much damage to the base and assembled ships, while Yamato ' s ability to maneuver – albeit slowly – in the Nasami Channel benefited her. As the final step before their planned invasion of the Japanese mainland, Allied forces invaded Okinawa on 1 April. The Imperial Japanese Navy's response was to organise a mission codenamed Operation Ten-Go that would commit much of Japan's remaining surface strength. Yamato and nine escorts (the cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers) would sail to Okinawa and, in concert with kamikaze and Okinawa-based army units, attack

18560-508: The required volume of petroleum from the Dutch East Indies to Japanese refineries. Without adequate supplies of refined residual fuel oil, Japanese aircraft carriers refueled with unrefined Tarakan petroleum in June 1944. This un desalted petroleum damaged boiler tubes, and the unremoved naphtha fraction volatilized the fuel to form explosive atmospheres incompatible with aircraft carrier damage control procedures. In early 1944

18720-423: The returning aircraft were lost. Some crashed on flight decks, but the majority ditched into the sea. Some pilots intentionally went down in groups to facilitate rescue, and more ditched individually either in a controlled landing with a few gallons of fuel left or in a crash after their engines ran dry. Approximately three-quarters of the crews were rescued from the sea, either that night from crash locations within

18880-422: The sea and fires out of control, the captain gave orders to abandon ship. Within minutes, there was a catastrophic explosion of aviation fuel vapor which had built up between decks, which blew the ship apart. The carrier rolled over and sank about 140 miles (230 km) north of the island of Yap . 887 crew and 376 men of the 601st Naval Air Group , 1,263 men in all, were killed. There were 570 survivors, including

19040-566: The second day of the battle, losses totaled three carriers, more than 350 carrier aircraft, and around 200 land-based aircraft. In the five major "carrier-on-carrier" battles, from the Battle of the Coral Sea to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the IJN had lost nine carriers, while the USN had lost four. The aircraft and trained pilots lost at Philippine Sea were an irreplaceable blow to the already outnumbered Japanese fleet air arm. The Japanese had spent

19200-501: The sector to prepare for surface action against Yamato . These orders were countermanded in favor of strikes from Admiral Marc Mitscher 's aircraft carriers, but as a contingency the battleships together with 7 cruisers and 21 destroyers were sent to interdict the Japanese force before it could reach the vulnerable transports and landing craft. Yamato ' s crew were at general quarters and ready for anti-aircraft action by dawn on 7 April. The first Allied aircraft made contact with

19360-484: The ship lost maneuverability and became stuck in a starboard turn. The fourth torpedo most likely hit the starboard outer engine room, which, along with three other rooms on the starboard side, was being counterflooded to reduce the port list. The torpedo strike accelerated the rate of flooding and trapped many crewmen. At 14:02, the order was belatedly given to abandon ship. By this time, Yamato ' s speed had dropped to 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) and her list

19520-437: The ship's superstructure and caused heavy casualties among her 25 mm anti-aircraft gun crews. Many near misses drove in her outer plating, compromising her defense against torpedoes. Most serious were four more torpedo impacts. Three exploded on the port side, increasing water flow into the port inner engine room and flooding yet another fire room and the steering gear room. With the auxiliary steering room already under water,

19680-581: The ship. In May 2016, the wreckage was surveyed using digital technology, giving a more detailed view and confirming the earlier identification. The resulting video revealed many details such as the Imperial chrysanthemum on the bow, the massive propeller, and the detached main gun turret. The nine-minute video of this survey is being shown at the Yamato Museum in Kure. From the time of their construction, Yamato and her sister Musashi carried significant weight in Japanese culture. The battleships represented

19840-407: The ship. When the roll reached approximately 120°, one of the two bow magazines detonated in a tremendous explosion. The resulting mushroom cloud – over 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) high – was seen 160 kilometres (99 mi) away on Kyūshū . Yamato sank rapidly, losing an estimated 3,055 of her 3,332 crew, including fleet commander Vice Admiral Seiichi Itō . The few survivors were recovered by

20000-479: The story of a dispute within the Japanese Navy over whether to fund the construction of aircraft carriers or a new battleship that would become Yamato . The film begins with the sinking of Yamato and ends with its commissioning. 30°22′N 128°04′E  /  30.367°N 128.067°E  / 30.367; 128.067 Battle of the Philippine Sea The Battle of the Philippine Sea

20160-465: The submarine USS  Flying Fish sighted a Japanese carrier and battleship force coming out of San Bernardino Strait . An hour later USS  Seahorse spotted a battleship and cruiser force steaming up from the south, 200 miles (320 km) east of Mindanao . The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. Fifth Fleet commander Spruance

20320-531: The submersible research ship Shinkai , as well as the original Kure naval arsenal' big lathe (N° 15299) which was used to craft the Yamato's 46 cm/45 Type 94 naval gun . The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Kure Museum , which includes the retired JMSDF Yūshio -class submarine Akishio (SS-579) , is located immediately North to the museum. The sunken Yamato was surveyed previously, but in May 2015, digital technology

20480-459: The task forces, or over the next few days for those further out, as search planes and destroyers criss-crossed the ocean looking for them. That night, Toyoda ordered Ozawa to withdraw from the Philippine Sea. U.S. forces gave chase, but the battle was over. The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 243 were lost and 130 returned to the carriers; many of them were subsequently lost when Taiho and Shōkaku were sunk. After

20640-401: The third 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hit aft, disabling three of Johnston ' s five 5-inch (127 mm) guns . According to the state of her wreck, Johnston later split in two where she was hit by an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell from Yamato while under fire from Japanese destroyers. Yamato resumed firing on the escort carriers, but due to the extreme range failed to score any hits for

20800-457: The third is disputed but regarded by Garzke and Dulin as probable, as it explains the flooding reported in Yamato ' s auxiliary steering room. The attack ended around 12:47, leaving the battleship listing 5–6° to port; deliberately counterflooding flooding compartments on the other side of the ship reduced the list to just 1°. One boiler room had been disabled, slightly reducing Yamato ' s top speed, and strafing had incapacitated many of

20960-466: The threat. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field . Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A battle broke out in which 35 Japanese aircraft were shot down for the loss of a single Hellcat. It was a pattern that would be repeated throughout the day. At 09:57 large numbers of Japanese aircraft were picked up approaching

21120-504: The three ships finishing her off by 8:50. Meanwhile, by 9:07, Yamato observed Gambier Bay capsizing and sinking under her sustained gunfire. The Japanese ships were taking a toll on Taffy 3, sinking four ships, with Yamato either sinking or helping to sink all besides the destroyer escort USS  Samuel B. Roberts . However, relentless air attacks sank three Japanese heavy cruisers. Suzuya 's torpedoes were detonated, and her propellers were blown off from bomb hits, while Chōkai

21280-424: The time being. Around 7:50, the Japanese battleships were attacked by the destroyers USS  Hoel and Heermann . Both ships opened fire, with Hoel hitting Yamato with two 5-inch (127 mm) shells, though neither caused any notable damage. By 7:54, both destroyers launched their torpedoes, which missed their intended target, the battleship Haruna , but headed towards Yamato . Turning to evade them, she

21440-443: The vapors throughout Taihō , putting the entire vessel at risk. At approximately 14:30, a spark from an electric generator on the hangar deck ignited the accumulated fumes, triggering a series of catastrophic explosions. After the first explosions, it was clear that Taihō was doomed, and Ozawa and his staff transferred to the nearby destroyer Wakatsuki . Soon thereafter, Taihō suffered a second series of explosions and sank. From

21600-426: The wake of the ship. Three other torpedo aircraft attacked the light carrier Princeton and were shot down. In all, 97 of the 107 attacking aircraft were destroyed. A third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from the north. It was intercepted by 40 fighters at 13:00, while 50 miles (80 km) out from the task force. Seven Japanese aircraft were shot down. A few broke through and made an ineffective attack on

21760-421: The western part of the Philippine Sea and completed refueling on 17 June. Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa commanded this force from his newly commissioned flagship , Taihō . In addition to extensive command facilities, reinforced torpedo blisters and a large air group, Taihō was the first Japanese carrier with an armor-plated flight deck , designed to withstand bomb hits with minimal damage. At 18:35 on 15 June

21920-456: Was soot taken from her smokestack. While en route to Leyte, the force was attacked in the Palawan Passage on 23 October by the submarines USS  Darter and Dace , which sank two Takao -class heavy cruisers including Kurita's flagship, Atago , and damaged a third. Kurita survived the loss of Atago and transferred his flag to Yamato . The following day the Battle of

22080-411: Was a huge success, spawning eight feature films and four more TV series, the most recent of which was released in 2017. The series popularised the space opera . As post-war Japanese tried to redefine the purpose of their lives, Yamato became a symbol of heroism and of their desire to regain a sense of masculinity after their country's defeat in the war. Brought to the United States as Star Blazers ,

22240-468: Was a major naval battle of World War II on 19–20 June 1944 that eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy 's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions . It took place during the United States' amphibious invasion of the Mariana Islands during the Pacific War . The battle was the last of five major "carrier-versus-carrier" engagements between American and Japanese naval forces, and pitted elements of

22400-457: Was acting appropriately to the Japanese plans that called for a diversion to draw the fleet far away so there would be a great opportunity for land-based Japanese planes to also augment the carrier aircraft to attack Spruance's fleet. Before daybreak, Spruance suggested that if the daybreak searches revealed no targets, the bombers could be sent to crater the airfields on Rota and Guam . However,

22560-462: Was allotted to the 1st Carrier Division. On 19 March, American carrier aircraft from TG 58.1 attacked Kure Harbour . Although 16 warships were hit, Yamato sustained only minor damage from several near misses and from one bomb that struck her bridge. The intervention of a squadron of Kawanishi N1K1 "Shiden" fighters (named "George" by the Allies) flown by veteran Japanese fighter instructors prevented

22720-418: Was also hit by two bombs, including one directly on a main battery turret. Damage was contained, and she was able to keep station because her captain promptly called to flood the turret's magazine to avoid the possibility of an explosion. Twenty American aircraft in the strike were destroyed by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire that made up for a relative lack of accuracy with high volume of fire. After

22880-422: Was also unsuccessful. Finally at 15:12 a garbled message from an Enterprise search plane indicated a sighting. At 15:40 the sighting was verified, along with distance, course, and speed. The Japanese fleet was 275 miles (443 km) out, moving due west at a speed of 20 knots. The Japanese were at the limit of TF 58's strike range, and daylight was slipping away. Mitscher decided to launch an all-out strike. After

23040-423: Was caught in between both spreads, and forced to steam out of the battle for around 10 minutes. While earlier accounts of the battle by US sailors state Yamato was forced out of the battle permanently by this point, Japanese records firmly disprove this. Once the torpedoes ran out of fuel she turned around and raced back to the battle, making contact with Taffy 3 again at around 8:10, immediately training her guns on

23200-520: Was convinced that a major battle was at hand. After consulting with Nimitz at Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Hawaii, he ordered Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher , commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force (Task Force 58), who had sent two carrier task groups north to intercept aircraft reinforcements from Japan, to reform and move west of Saipan into the Philippine Sea. TF 52's battleships, cruisers and escort carrier groups were ordered to remain near Saipan to protect

23360-445: Was dry-docked until 3 February. During this time, armor plate sloped at 45° was fitted in the area of damage to her hull. It had been proposed that 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of steel be used to bolster the ship's defense against flooding from torpedo hits outside the armored citadel, but this was rejected out of hand because the additional weight would have increased Yamato ' s displacement and draft too much. While Yamato

23520-479: Was dry-docked, Captain Nobuei Morishita—former captain of the battleship Haruna —assumed command. On 25 February, Yamato and Musashi were reassigned from the 1st Battleship Division to the Second Fleet. Yamato was again dry-docked at Kure for further upgrades to all her radar and anti-aircraft systems from 25 February to 18 March 1944. Each of the two beam-mounted 6.1 inch (155-mm) triple turrets

23680-415: Was hit by a bomb down the stack that destroyed her engines, leading to both cruisers being scuttled. Finally, Chikuma was outright sunk by American torpedo bombers. With Kurita concluding he had sunk at least two fleet carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers, and under fear of follow up air attacks causing more losses, he ordered the Japanese ships, Yamato included, to retreat from the battle, meaning

23840-432: Was increasing. Fires raged out of control, and alarms on the bridge warned of critical temperatures in the forward main battery magazines. Protocol called for flooding the magazines to prevent explosion, but the pumping stations had been knocked out. At 14:05, Yahagi sank, the victim of twelve bombs and seven torpedoes. At the same time, a final flight of torpedo bombers attacked Yamato from her starboard side. Her list

24000-411: Was influenced by his orders from Nimitz, who had made it clear that the protection of the invasion fleet was the primary mission of TF 58. Spruance had concerns that the Japanese would attempt to draw his main fleet away from the Marianas with a diversionary force while slipping an attack force in to destroy the landing fleet. Locating and destroying the Japanese fleet was not his primary objective, and he

24160-416: Was intense, the U.S. planes were able to press in on the attack. The first ships sighted by the U.S. strike were oilers, 30 miles (48 km) before the carrier groups. The strike group from Wasp , more concerned with their low fuel levels than with finding the more important Japanese carriers and battleships, dived on the tankers. Two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled, while

24320-458: Was issued on the authority of local base commanders. Designated the "Surface Special Attack Force", the ships left Tokuyama at 15:20 on 6 April. However, the Allies had intercepted and decoded their radio transmissions, learning the particulars of Operation Ten-Go. Further confirmation of Japanese intentions came around 20:00 when the Surface Special Attack Force, navigating the Bungo Strait ,

24480-423: Was removed and replaced by three pairs of 5-inch (127-mm) AA guns in double mounts. In addition, 8 triple and 26 single 25mm AA mounts were added, increasing the total number of 127 mm and 25 mm anti-aircraft guns to 24 and 162, respectively. Shelters were also added on the upper deck for the increased AA crews. A Type 13 air search and Type 22, Mod 4, surface search/gunnery control radar were installed, and

24640-412: Was ripped open in the hull, and a joint between the upper and lower armored belts failed, causing the rear turret's upper magazine to flood. Yamato took on about 3,000 tons of water but reached Truk later that day. The repair ship Akashi effected temporary repairs, and Yamato departed on 10 January 1944 for Kure. On 16 January Yamato arrived at Kure for repairs of the torpedo damage and

24800-410: Was sacrificed in an attempt to draw the American fleet away from protecting the troops and supplies being landed for the Battle of Leyte . The Japanese military, which had hidden the extent of their previous losses from the Japanese public, continued this policy. Though the occurrence of the simultaneous Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Saipan were made known to the public, the extent of

24960-502: Was spotted by the American submarines Threadfin and Hackleback . Both reported Yamato ' s position to the main American carrier strike force , but neither could attack because of the speed of the Japanese ships – 22 knots (25 mph; 41 km/h) – and their extreme zigzagging . The Allied forces around Okinawa braced for an assault. Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered six battleships already engaged in shore bombardment in

25120-422: Was such that the torpedoes – set to a depth of 6.1 m (20 ft) – struck the bottom of her hull. The battleship continued her inexorable roll to port. By 14:20, the power went out, and her remaining 25 mm anti-aircraft guns began to drop into the sea. Three minutes later, Yamato capsized . Her main 46 cm turrets fell off, and as she rolled suction was created that drew swimming crewmen back toward

25280-422: Was the lead ship of her class of battleships built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) shortly before World War II . She and her sister ship , Musashi , were the heaviest and most powerfully armed battleships ever constructed, displacing nearly 72,000 tonnes (71,000 long tons ) at full load and armed with nine 46 cm (18.1 in) Type 94 main guns, which were the largest guns ever mounted on

25440-488: Was unwilling to allow the main strike force of the Pacific Fleet to be drawn westward, away from the amphibious forces. Mitscher accepted the decision without comment. Spruance's decision in this matter, although subsequently criticized, was certainly justified; by this point in the war, it was well known that Japanese operational plans frequently relied on the use of decoys and diversionary forces. Spruance, as it turned out,

25600-551: Was used for the first time. The footage shows many identifiable parts of the wreckage, such as the chrysanthemum crest on the bow, one of the 5 m (16 ft)-diameter propellers, and a detached main gun turret. The museum plans to show the nine-minute video repeatedly in its theater. In 2015, the museum announced that it had entered into a sister museum partnership with the USS Missouri Memorial Association in Pearl Harbor , Hawaii. The agreement commemorates

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