The United States Third Fleet is one of the numbered fleets in the United States Navy . Third Fleet's area of responsibility includes approximately fifty million square miles of the eastern and northern Pacific Ocean areas including the Bering Sea , Alaska, the Aleutian Islands , and a sector of the Arctic. Major oil and trade sea lines of communication within this area are critically important to the economic health of the United States and friendly nations throughout the Pacific Rim region.
91-730: The Fast Carrier Task Force ( TF 38 when assigned to Third Fleet , TF 58 when assigned to Fifth Fleet ) was a group of ships in World War II . It was the main striking force of the United States Navy in the Pacific War from January 1944 through the end of the war in September 1945. The task force was made up of several separate task groups, each typically built around three to four aircraft carriers and their supporting vessels. The support vessels were screening destroyers , cruisers , and
182-550: A bombardment would not allow him time to replenish his ships' ammunition before the landings; he thus refused Schmidt's request. Schmidt then asked for nine days of shelling; Blandy again refused and insisted upon a three-day bombardment. This decision was resented among the Marines in the landing force. After the war, Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith , commander Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56, which consisted of Schmidt's Fifth Amphibious Corps), bitterly complained that
273-418: A combination of cruisers , destroyers , and frigates . They also have more than 30 submarines and a dozen supply ships to support the strike groups. Third Fleet's air forces comprises more than 400 Navy aircraft, including Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets , Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes , McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II , Bell AH-1Z SuperCobra and Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopters. The Third Fleet
364-981: A conflict to carry out the primary wartime mission of Third Fleet—the defense of the western sea approaches to the United States, including Alaska and the Aleutian Islands . There are four Carrier Strike Groups reportedly assigned to the Third Fleet: USS ; Nimitz (CVN-68) and Carrier Strike Group Eleven ; USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and Carrier Strike Group One ; USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and Carrier Strike Group Nine ; and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and Carrier Strike Group Three . In peacetime, Third Fleet continually trains Navy and U.S. Marine Corps forces for their expeditionary warfare mission. Third Fleet training has been designed to ensure that deploying forces are fully prepared for joint operations. All training
455-507: A fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24. More than four carriers in a task group cannot be advantageously used due to the amount of air room required. Less than four carriers requires an uneconomical use of support ships and screening vessels." The ships of each task group sailed in a circle formation centered on the carriers. The supporting ships sailed relatively close by, and added their anti-aircraft fire to that of
546-487: A frequent lack of supporting naval gunfire had cost Marine lives throughout the Allied island-hopping campaign. Each heavy warship was assigned an area on Iwo Jima to saturate with shells, ultimately covering the entire island. Each warship fired for approximately six hours before stopping for a certain amount of time. Poor weather on D-3 (three days before the landings) led to uncertain results for that day's bombardment. On D-2,
637-578: A major operation was underway the task force would concentrate all four groups together. Each group would remain distinct but operate in close proximity to the other groups to provide the task force with maximum protection and maximum striking power. The Fast Carrier Task Force worked in conjunction with the other two major components of the Pacific Fleet: the Amphibious Force, which was much larger overall and which carried and provided direct support to
728-718: A single Sea Service. It strengthens relations between the U.S. and its allies and partners through joint, inter-agency and multinational exercises and operations like Rim of the Pacific, Pacific Partnership, and Fleet Weeks. The Third Fleet ensures realistic, relevant training to its personnel so they have the necessary skills to promote peace and prevail in conflict. The Third Fleet is a combat-ready power in control of ships, submarines, and aircraft stationed in California , Washington , and Hawaii . The Third Fleet's sea-going force includes five aircraft carrier strike groups, each consisting of
819-652: A specific event or contingency. As such, the JTF commander reports via a joint chain of command to a unified commander. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is the unified commander in the Pacific theater. To allow 7th Fleet to focus more resources on a potential North Korean contingency, the 3rd Fleet is building up its ability to operate forces beyond the International Date Line , in areas of the Western Pacific hitherto commanded by 7th Fleet. The "3rd Fleet Forward" concept
910-485: A two-pronged attack to neutralize this position. 2nd Lieutenant Benjamin Roselle, part of a ground team directing naval gunfire, described the following experience: Within a minute a mortar shell exploded among the group ... his left foot and ankle hung from his leg, held on by a ribbon of flesh ... Within minutes a second round landed near him and fragments tore into his other leg. For nearly an hour he wondered where
1001-407: A vast tunnel system, equipped with heavy machine guns and artillery. Takeichi Nishi 's armored tanks were camouflaged and utilized as static artillery positions. Because the tunnel linking Mount Suribachi to the rest of the island was never completed, Kuribayashi organized the southern area of the island in and around the mountain as a semi-independent sector, with his main defensive zone built up in
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#17328440452561092-459: Is conducted within a joint environment—employing joint doctrine, terminology, procedures, command and control—to ensure that forces are ready to join with the other United States armed forces branches under a joint command structure. Commander, Third Fleet is also designated as a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. In that capacity, the commander and their staff may be assigned responsibilities for command of joint U.S. forces deployed in response to
1183-573: The Battle of Iwo Jima in early 1945, the Task Force included eighteen aircraft carriers, eight battleships and two Alaska -class large cruisers , along with numerous cruisers and destroyers. TF 58 alone commanded more firepower than any navy in history. The original TF 38 came into existence in August 1943, built around USS Saratoga , and under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman . TF 58
1274-745: The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea and the Battle off Cape Engaño – that made up the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, encountered the damaging Typhoon Cobra in December 1944, endured Typhoon Connie in June 1945, and took part in the war's final operations in Japanese waters in the summer of 1945, launching air attacks on Tokyo, the naval base at Kure , and the island of Hokkaidō and bombarding several Japanese coastal cities with naval gunfire. The British Pacific Fleet
1365-756: The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force , the Royal Australian Navy , the Royal New Zealand Navy , and the United States. In 2015, Nora Tyson was installed as the new commander of the Third Fleet, making her the first woman to lead a numbered fleet in the U.S. Navy. Third Fleet's primary mission is one of conflict deterrence, but in the event of general war, it would conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea. Such operations would be executed well forward and early in
1456-657: The Japanese home islands , the army garrison on Iwo Jima reached a strength of more than 5,000 men. The loss of the Marianas during the summer of 1944 greatly increased the importance of the Volcano Islands for the Japanese, who were concerned that the loss of those islands would further facilitate American air raids against the Home Islands, disrupt war manufacturing, and severely damage civilian morale. The final Japanese plans for
1547-829: The Mariana Islands and the Carolines. To counter such an offensive, the IJA and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) established an inner line of defenses extending generally northward from the Carolines to the Marianas, from there to Japan via the Volcano Islands ,and westward from the Marianas via the Carolines and the Palau Islands to the Philippines . In March 1944, the Japanese 31st Army , commanded by General Hideyoshi Obata ,
1638-533: The Ryukyu Islands , and the Japanese Home Islands , first with the battleship USS New Jersey and, from May 1945 to the end of the war, the battleship USS Missouri as its flagship . As the Third Fleet, it took part in the Palau Islands campaign of September–November 1944 and the Philippines campaign of 1944–1945, defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy in two of the four major actions –
1729-578: The Southwest Pacific theater was during the double landings at Hollandia and Aitape in April 1944, hundreds of miles behind Japanese enemy lines and far beyond the range of short-ranged P-40 fighters of the Allied Air Forces . TF 58 and escort carriers in Task Force 78 supported the landings. TF 58 only stayed for four days but contributed much crucial air support to one of the greatest successes in
1820-738: The raising of the U.S. flag at the summit of the 169 m (554 ft) Mount Suribachi by six U.S. Marines became a famous image of the battle and the American war effort in the Pacific. After the American capture of the Marshall Islands and the air attacks against the Japanese fortress island of Truk Atoll in the Carolines in January 1944, Japanese military leaders reevaluated their strategic position. All indications pointed to an American drive toward
1911-510: The Fast Carrier Task Force. The force grew to nine CVs and eight CVLs in preparation for the landings on Leyte . Task Force 38 was composed of four task groups: Task Group 38.1 was commanded by Admiral McCain, with its previous commander, Admiral Joseph "Jocko" Clark , remaining on as advisor, Task Group 38.2 was under the command of Admiral Gerald Bogan , Task Group 38.3 was led by Admiral Frederick Sherman , and Task Group 38.4
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#17328440452562002-493: The Home Islands, allowing Japanese air defenses to prepare for the arrival of American bombers. After the U.S. seized bases in the Marshall Islands in the battles of Kwajalein and Eniwetok in February 1944, Japanese reinforcements were sent to Iwo Jima: 500 men from the naval base at Yokosuka and 500 from Chichi Jima reached Iwo Jima during March and April 1944. At the same time, with reinforcements arriving from Chichi Jima and
2093-636: The International Fleet Review (IFR) commemorating the 100th birthday of the Royal Canadian Navy in Victoria, British Columbia . Joining Ronald Reagan for the naval review were the cruiser Chosin , the destroyer Sampson , and the frigate Ford . The naval review took place 9–12 June 2010, and it involved 21 naval ships and more than 8,000 naval personnel from Canada, the French Navy ,
2184-453: The Japanese home islands . Drawing inspiration from Japanese defensive tactics used in the Battle of Peleliu , Kuribayashi designed a defensive strategy that broke with traditional Japanese military doctrine. Rather than establishing his defenses on the beach to contest the landings directly, he instead opted for defenses in depth . Kuribayashi's troops constructed a complex system of mutually-supporting fortifications, often linked together by
2275-487: The Japanese infantrymen, considering them a futile waste of resources. The fighting near the beachhead remained intense, and the American advance was stalled by numerous defensive positions augmented by artillery. Marines were frequently ambushed by Japanese troops who sprang out of previously-unseen tunnels. At night, the Japanese left their defenses in small groups to attack American foxholes under cover of darkness, and U.S. Navy ships began firing star shells to illuminate
2366-428: The Japanese, with a ratio of three American casualties for every two Japanese. Of the 21,000 Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima at the beginning of the battle, only 216 were taken prisoner, some of whom were captured only because they had been knocked unconscious or otherwise disabled. Most of the remainder were killed in action, but it has been estimated that as many as 3,000 continued to resist within various cave systems on
2457-578: The Marine forces, and the Service Squadrons of hundreds of support vessels which resupplied and maintained the fleet. The fleet and task group designation changed when the command of the fleet changed hands. When under the umbrella of Fifth Fleet, the invasion force was called the Fifth Amphibious Force. When Halsey had command of the fleet, Third Amphibious Force was the designation. By the time of
2548-603: The Pacific Fleet AOR ...be it a major humanitarian disaster requiring that level of [joint task force] three-star commander, be it some scenario, maritime security issue in the South China Sea. So we have been working very closely with 7th Fleet, [Aucoin] and his team, and PACFLT to ensure that we have the connective tissue where if something were to happen that 3rd Fleet could very quickly respond, complement [Aucoin] and his team and handle whatever scenario may come to pass in
2639-549: The Pacific War. With command change from Spruance to Halsey on 26 August 1944, all units changed designations again. Mitscher, who was an aviator from early training and had a masterful command of the airgroups, requested that he retain command of the Fast Carrier Task Force until his replacement, Admiral John McCain , could have proper time to become more familiar with the handling of a carrier task force. King and Nimitz concurred. Admiral Halsey, like Spruance before him, sailed with
2730-542: The Pacific theater." In April 2016, Vice Admiral Tyson deployed a three-ship Surface Action Group of warships ( Momsen, Spruance , and USS Decatur (DDG-73) ) ) to the Western Pacific. On Oct. 21, one of them, the destroyer USS Decatur conducted a " Freedom of Navigation " passage near the Paracel Islands , separately claimed by the PRC, Vietnam and Taiwan. All three ships remained under Third Fleet command during
2821-534: The Western Pacific, with the assumption that if something were to happen – and as [Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin , Commander 7th Fleet] said, the number-one probability fight-tonight scenario would be on the Korean Peninsula . "If that were the case, the assumption is that [Aucoin] and his team would be pretty busy up there.. working for General Brooks [ComUSFK/CFC/UNC] and 3rd Fleet would be available to provide that command element to handle whatever else may happen in
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2912-511: The battleship USS New Mexico which was also hit on 12 May). On 11 May, Mitscher and his chief of staff Commodore Arleigh Burke were merely yards away from getting killed or wounded by kamikazes on his flagship, USS Bunker Hill , which killed three of Mitscher's staff officers and eleven of his enlisted staff members and also destroyed his flag cabin along with all of his uniforms, personal papers, and possessions. Just three days later Mitscher's new flagship, USS Enterprise ,
3003-406: The beach for just over an hour, throughout which they maintained cohesive fire discipline, the Japanese opened fire. Shortly after 10:00 machine guns, mortars, and heavy artillery began to rain down on the crowded beach. At first it came as a ragged rattle of machine-gun bullets, growing gradually lower and fiercer until at last all the pent-up fury of a hundred hurricanes seemed to be breaking upon
3094-445: The beach were heavy, with historian Derrick Wright noting "in virtually every shell hole there lay at least one dead Marine." By 11:30, some Marines had managed to reach the southern tip of Airfield No. 1, the seizure of which had been one of the original American objectives for the first day. The Marines endured a fanatical charge by the over 100 Japanese troops, but were able to keep their toehold on Airfield No. 1 as night fell. In
3185-474: The black ash, made no progress up the slopes dominating the beach; their Marine passengers had to dismount and slog forward on foot. Men of Naval Construction Battalions 31 and 133, braving enemy fire, were eventually able to bulldoze roads off of the beach. This allowed the Marines to finally make some progress inland and get off the beach, which had become overcrowded with both men and materiel as follow-on waves of landing craft continued to unload. Casualties on
3276-481: The carriers to help ward off attacking aircraft. When under attack by torpedo aircraft, the task group would turn toward the oncoming aircraft to limit attack angles. Other than this measure, the carriers in the task group would not take evasive action from their attackers. This was in marked contrast with the Imperial Japanese Navy, but the choice made for more stable platforms for the anti-aircraft fire of all
3367-455: The clock during the first two days of the battle. These six men sent and received over 800 messages, all without error. Connor later stated, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima." Unfortunately for the landing force, the planners at Pearl Harbor severely misjudged the situation that would face Schmidt's Marines. The beaches had been described as "excellent," and
3458-414: The command ship USS Eldorado , Smith saw the lengthy casualty reports and was briefed on the slow progress of the ground forces. To the war correspondents covering the operation, Smith remarked: "I don't know who he is, but the Japanese general running this show is one smart bastard." In the days after the landings, the Marines expected the usual Japanese banzai charge during the night. This had been
3549-404: The construction of foxholes to protect the Marines from hostile fire. However, the ash did help to absorb some of the fragments from Japanese artillery. Marines were trained to move rapidly forward; here they could only plod. The weight and amount of equipment was a terrific hindrance and various items were rapidly discarded. First to go was the gas mask ... The Japanese crews manning
3640-542: The decision was made to invade Iwo Jima, and the operation was codenamed Operation Detachment. In June 1944, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned to command the defense of Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi knew that if the Americans decided to land on Iwo Jima, his garrison could not win the battle, but he hoped to inflict massive casualties on the American forces so that the United States, and its Australian and British allies, might reconsider carrying out an invasion of
3731-871: The defenders, while hampering the attackers' advance. Despite this, many bunkers and caves were destroyed during the bombardment, giving it some limited success. The Japanese had been preparing for this battle since March 1944, which gave them a significant advantage. By the time of the landing, about 450 American ships were located off Iwo Jima, and the battle ultimately involved about 60,000 U.S. Marines and several thousand U.S. Navy Seabees . United States Fifth Fleet Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in heavy cruiser Indianapolis V Amphibious Corps Major General Harry Schmidt , USMC Southern sector (Green and Red beaches): Northern sector (Yellow and Blue beaches): Floating reserve: 21,060 total men under arms Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi , commanding Colonel Tadashi Takaishi, chief of staff During
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3822-403: The defense of the Volcano Islands were hamstrung by several factors: In a postwar study, Japanese staff officers described the strategy used in the defense of Iwo Jima in the following terms: In the light of the above situation, seeing that it was impossible to conduct our air, sea, and ground operations on Iwo Island [Jima] toward ultimate victory, it was decided that to gain time necessary for
3913-515: The defenses of Iwo Jima. Mitscher's fliers did, however, assist the additional surface vessel bombardment that accompanied the launch of the amphibious landing craft toward the island. Unlike many days during the three-day preliminary bombardment, D-Day dawned clear and bright. At 08:59, one minute ahead of schedule, the first wave of Marines landed on the beaches of the southeastern coast of Iwo Jima. Under Major Howard Connor, 5th Marine Division signal officer, six Navajo code talkers worked around
4004-487: The defenses so that every part of Iwo Jima was subject to Japanese defensive fire. He also received a handful of kamikaze pilots to use against the enemy fleet; their attacks during the battle killed 318 American sailors. However, against his wishes, Kuribayashi's superiors on Honshu ordered him to erect some beach defenses. Starting on 15 June 1944, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Air Forces began shore bombardment and air raids against Iwo Jima, which would become
4095-552: The designation Task Force (TF) 58. When led by Admiral Halsey as part of the Third Fleet , the carrier force was commanded by Vice Admiral John S. McCain Sr. and its designation was Task Force (TF) 38. Planning for upcoming operations was completed when each admiral and his staff rotated out of active command. This allowed the Navy to perform at a higher operational tempo, while giving the Japanese
4186-456: The duties of the former First Fleet and Pacific Anti-Submarine Warfare Force located at Ford Island , Hawaii. Third Fleet's new duties were to train naval forces for overseas deployment and evaluate state-of-the-art technology for fleet use. Additionally, Third Fleet could deploy in the event of a major conflict. On 26 November 1986, Commander, Third Fleet shifted his flag from his headquarters ashore to resume status as an afloat commander for
4277-409: The end of April, Admiral Nimitz came out to review the situation. After two months operating off the coast of Okinawa in support of Army forces engaged in battle on the island, the command staff was exhausted from the continuous pressure of fending off kamikaze attacks. On his return to Pearl Harbor, he notified Halsey that he would have to take over command from Spruance in thirty days, whether or not
4368-445: The end of the Pacific war, landing on Okinawa in the spring of 1945.) The commander of the Japanese garrison on Chichi Jima was placed nominally in command of IJA and IJN units in the Volcano Islands. After the American conquest of the Marianas, daily bomber raids from the Marianas began to hit mainland Japan as part of Operation Scavenger . Iwo Jima served as an early warning station that radioed reports of incoming bombers back to
4459-691: The entire operation. As Tyson partially acknowledged during her WEST 2017 conference remarks, "the Chinese know that this administrative (and) operational innovation is directed at them," said Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War College professor in January 2017. U.S. Third Fleet component units include the following: Battle of Iwo Jima Main battle phase: 6,821 dead 19,217 wounded 2 captured 2,648 fatigued 137 tanks destroyed 28,698 total Main battle phase: 17,845–18,375 KIA / MIA 216 prisoners Second Sino-Japanese War The Battle of Iwo Jima (19 February – 26 March 1945)
4550-549: The evening of 18 February, Blessman was hit with a bomb by Japanese aircraft, killing 40 sailors, including 15 members of the UDT. Major General Harry Schmidt , commander of the Marine landing force, requested a 10-day heavy bombardment of the island immediately preceding his planned amphibious assault . However, Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy , commander of the Amphibious Support Force (Task Force 52), believed that such
4641-401: The first time since World War II, aboard USS Coronado . In August 1991, Third Fleet's commander, his staff and the command ship Coronado shifted homeports to San Diego . In September 2003, Commander, Third Fleet shifted his flag from the command ship Coronado to headquarters ashore at Point Loma, San Diego, California. USS Ronald Reagan and other Third Fleet ships participated in
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#17328440452564732-474: The fleet for major operations, allowing the other admiral and his staff time to plan for subsequent operations. A secondary benefit was confusing the Japanese into thinking that there were actually two separate fleets as the fleet designation flipped back and forth. While under Halsey's command as the Third Fleet, the fleet operated in and around the Solomon Islands , the Philippines , Formosa , Okinawa ,
4823-583: The fleet through the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa , facing sustained attacks from land-based Japanese kamikaze aircraft. As the Okinawa campaign dragged into its second month, the presence of the carriers was still required to provide close air support to the soldiers on the island as the Army and its Air Corps were not as adept as the Marine Corps at quickly establishing airfields over newly occupied territory. At
4914-466: The general impression of naval assets greater than what were actually available. The Fast Carrier Task Force took part in all the US Navy's battles in the Pacific during the last two years of the war. The task groups could operate independently or combine with the others as needs dictated. Raids against island strong points such as Iwo Jima or Chichi Jima might be undertaken by one or two task groups, but when
5005-486: The heads of the Americans. Shells screeched and crashed, every hummock spat automatic fire and the very soft soil underfoot erupted underfoot with hundreds of exploding land mines ... Marines walking erect crumpled and fell. Concussion lifted them and slammed them down, or tore them apart ... Furthermore, after crossing the beach, the Marines were faced with 15 ft-high (4.6 m) slopes of soft black volcanic ash. This ash allowed for neither secure footing nor
5096-495: The heavy artillery in Mount Suribachi opened reinforced steel doors shielding their positions in order to fire, and then closed them immediately afterward to prevent counterfire from the Marines and U.S. Navy gunners. This made it exceedingly difficult for American units to destroy a Japanese artillery piece. To make matters worse for the Americans, most bunkers were connected to the elaborate tunnel system that ran through most of
5187-595: The invasion of Kyushu in the Japanese Home Islands, scheduled to begin on 1 November 1945, during which it would have operated simultaneously with the Fifth Fleet for the first time. The end of the war made this operation unnecessary. Embarked aboard Missouri , Admiral Halsey led the Third Fleet into Tokyo Bay on 29 August 1945. On 2 September 1945, the documents of surrender of the Japanese Empire ending
5278-427: The island after most major fighting ended, until they eventually succumbed to their injuries or surrendered weeks later. The invasion of Iwo Jima was controversial, with retired Chief of Naval Operations William V. Pratt stating that the island was useless to the Army as a staging base and useless to the Navy as a fleet base. The Japanese continued to maintain early-warning radar capabilities on Rota island, which
5369-498: The island were heavily fortified , with a dense network of bunkers , hidden artillery positions, and 18 km (11 mi) of tunnels. The American ground forces were supported by extensive naval artillery and had complete air supremacy provided by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviators throughout the battle. The five-week battle saw some of the fiercest and bloodiest fighting of the Pacific War . Unique among Pacific War Marine battles, total American casualties exceeded those of
5460-464: The island, and many areas were extensively mined . Among the Japanese weapons were 320 mm spigot mortars and a variety of explosive rockets. Nonetheless, the Japanese supply situation was inadequate. Troops were supplied 60% of the ammunition normally considered sufficient for single engagement by one division, and food for no more than four months. Numerous Japanese sniper nests and camouflaged machine gun positions were set up. Kuribayashi engineered
5551-453: The island, such that bunkers that were cleared with flamethrowers and grenades were often reoccupied shortly afterwards by Japanese troops moving underground. This tactic caused many casualties among the Marines, as they walked past reoccupied bunkers without expecting to suddenly take fresh fire from them. Time-Life correspondent Robert Sherrod described the landing simply as "a nightmare in hell." Amtracs , unable to gain traction in
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#17328440452565642-561: The left-most sector of the landings, the Americans did manage to achieve one of their objectives for the battle that day. Led by Colonel Harry B. "Harry the Horse" Liversedge , the 28th Marines drove across the island at its narrowest width, around 800 m (870 yd), thereby isolating the Japanese dug in on Mount Suribachi. The rightmost landing area was dominated by Japanese fortifications located at "the Quarry". The 25th Marine Regiment conducted
5733-665: The longest and most intense preliminary bombardments in the Pacific Theater. They consisted of a combination of naval artillery attacks and aerial bombings , which would last for nine months. Unaware of Kuribayashi's tunnel defense system, some American planners assumed that most of the Japanese garrison had been killed by the constant bombing raids. On 17 February 1945 the destroyer escort USS Blessman deployed Underwater Demolition Team 15 (UDT-15) onto Iwo Jima's Blue Beach for reconnaissance. They were spotted by Japanese infantry and fired upon, killing one American diver. On
5824-406: The mission was completed. Nimitz' assessment of the exhaustion and psychological toll on Spruance and Mitscher and their staff due to the kamikazes proved to be justified. The kamikazes were so relentless at Okinawa that Spruance's flagships were struck two separate times (the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis was hit on 31 March and had to retire for repairs which forced him to transfer to
5915-655: The newly built fast battleships . With the arrival of the fleet carriers the primary striking power of the navy was no longer in its battleship force, but with the aircraft that could be brought to battle by the carriers. The means by which the US Navy operated these carriers was developed principally by Admiral Marc Mitscher . Mitscher determined that the best defense for a carrier was its own air groups, and that carriers were more easily defended if they operated together in groups, with supporting ships along with them to aid in air defense, anti-submarine defense, and rescue of downed airmen. Said Mitscher: "The ideal composition of
6006-423: The next shell would land. He was soon to find out as a shell burst almost on top of him, wounding him for the third time in the shoulder. Almost at once another explosion bounced him several feet into the air and hot shards ripped into both thighs ... as he lifted his arm to look at his watch a mortar shell exploded only feet away and blasted the watch from his wrist and tore a large jagged hole in his forearm: "I
6097-403: The night of 18 February 1945, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher 's large carrier force, Task Force 58 , arrived off Iwo Jima. Also in this flotilla was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance , the overall commander for the invasion, in his flagship USS Indianapolis . Smith was once again deeply frustrated that Mitscher's powerful carrier group had been bombing the Japanese home islands instead of softening
6188-481: The north. The expected American naval and air bombardment prompted the creation of an extensive network of tunnels connecting otherwise disparate fighting positions, so that a pillbox that had been cleared could be reoccupied later. This network of bunkers and pillboxes strongly favored the defense, and was designed for protracted resistance. For instance, the Nanpo Bunker (Southern Area Islands Naval Air HQ), which
6279-451: The preparation of the Homeland defense, our forces should rely solely upon the established defensive equipment in that area, checking the enemy by delaying tactics. Even the suicidal attacks by small groups of our Army and Navy airplanes, the surprise attacks by our submarines , and the actions of parachute units, although effective, could be regarded only as a strategical ruse on our part. It
6370-437: The ships in the task group and allowed the ships in the group to sail more closely together. The primary defense of the group against air attack was the group's own fighter cover. The individual primarily responsible for the development and operations of the task force was Admiral Mitscher. The overall command of the task force alternated between two very different admirals: Raymond Spruance and William "Bull" Halsey . Spruance
6461-446: The standard Japanese defense strategy in previous island battles against enemy ground forces in the Pacific, such as during the Battle of Saipan in June 1944. In those attacks, for which the Marines had usually been at least somewhat prepared, the majority of Japanese attackers had been killed and the overall Japanese fighting strength significantly degraded. However, General Kuribayashi had strictly forbidden these "human wave" attacks by
6552-435: The thrust inland was expected to be "easy." The apparent lack of a vigorous Japanese response to the landings led the Navy to conclude that its bombardment had effectively suppressed the Japanese defenses. The Marines initially began deployment on the beach in good order, but the landings swiftly became congested due to the loose volcanic ash that covered the island. After allowing the Americans to concentrate men and materiel on
6643-406: The time and care that the Japanese had taken in preparing their artillery positions became clear. When heavy cruiser USS Pensacola got within range of Japanese shore batteries, the ship was quickly hit 6 times and suffered 17 dead. Later, 12 small craft attempting to land a UDT were all struck by Japanese fire and quickly retired. While aiding these vessels, the destroyer USS Leutze
6734-405: The time the Americans invaded on 19 February 1945, 18 km (11 mi) of a planned 27 km (17 mi) of tunnels had been dug. Besides the Nanpo Bunker, there were numerous other command centers and barracks that were 75 feet below ground. Tunnels allowed for troops to move undetected between various defensive positions. Hundreds of hidden artillery and mortar positions were placed all over
6825-687: The war on 2 September 1945. United States Third Fleet First established in 1943, the Third Fleet conducted extensive operations against Japanese forces in the Central Pacific during World War II . Deactivated in 1945, the fleet remained inactive until 1973, when it was reactivated and assumed its current responsibilities. The Third Fleet plans and executes naval operations in the Pacific Ocean. The fleet provides maritime homeland defense, regional security, and humanitarian operations support through integrated naval and coastguard forces acting as
6916-558: The war were signed on Missouri ' s deck. The Third Fleet remained in Japanese waters until late September 1945, when its ships were directed to proceed to the United States West Coast . On 7 October 1945, the Third Fleet was designated a reserve fleet and decommissioned from active status. On 1 February 1973, following a reorganization of the Pacific Fleet , the Third Fleet was recommissioned as an active fleet and assumed
7007-539: Was a major battle in which the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Navy (USN) landed on and eventually captured the island of Iwo Jima from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during World War II . The American invasion, designated Operation Detachment , had the goal of capturing the island with its two airfields: South Field and Central Field . The Japanese Army positions on
7098-669: Was a most depressing thought that we had no available means left for the exploitation of the strategical opportunities which might from time to time occur in the course of these operations. After the Battle of Leyte in the Philippines , the Allies were left with a two-month lull in their offensive operations before the planned invasion of Okinawa . Iwo Jima was considered strategically important since it provided an air base for Japanese fighter planes to intercept long-range B-29 Superfortress bombers flying to strike targets in Japan. In addition, it
7189-522: Was activated to garrison this inner line. (Note that an army-sized unit in Imperial Japanese military doctrine was about the size of an American, British Army , or Canadian Army corps . The Japanese Army had many armies , but the U.S. Army had only ten at its peak, with the 4th Army, the 6th Army, the 8th Army, and the 10th Army being in the Pacific Theater . The 10th Army only saw action at
7280-439: Was also hit and suffered 7 dead. On D-1, Blandy's gunners were once again hampered by rain and clouds. Schmidt summed up his feelings by stating, "We only got about 13 hours worth of fire support during the 34 hours of available daylight." The limited bombardment had a questionable impact on the enemy since the Japanese were heavily dug-in and well fortified. The craters left behind by the barrage also provided additional cover for
7371-427: Was also struck by a kamikaze , forcing him to have to change his flagship yet again. On 28 May 1945, Halsey arrived aboard USS Missouri , his new flagship, whereupon he relieved Spruance, while McCain relieved Mitscher. Spruance and Mitscher returned to Pearl Harbor. Fifth Fleet once again became Third Fleet, and Task Force 58 became Task Force 38. Halsey remained in command until the Japanese surrender ended
7462-484: Was announced by U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Scott Swift in 2015, but 3rd Fleet commander Vice Adm. Nora Tyson said at the "WEST 2017" conference that the North Korean threat was a main driver behind this effort: "What we have done in the past really 18 months is we, 3rd Fleet, have worked very closely with 7th Fleet and PACFLT in developing our, 3rd fleet's, capability to command and control forces forward in
7553-418: Was beginning to know what it must be like to be crucified," he was later to say. The 25th Marines' 3rd Battalion had landed approximately 900 men on the island that morning. Japanese resistance at the Quarry was so fierce that by nightfall, only 150 Marines were left in fighting condition, an 83.3% casualty rate. By the evening of 19 February, 30,000 Marines had landed. About 40,000 more would follow. Aboard
7644-425: Was calculating and cautious, while Halsey was more aggressive and known for taking risks. Most higher-ranking officers preferred to serve under Spruance; most common sailors were proud to serve under Halsey. Their commander was Admiral Chester Nimitz , who was responsible for all Pacific Ocean assets. When the force was part of Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet , the carrier task force was commanded by Mitscher and bore
7735-625: Was created on 6 January 1944 with Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher commanding, serving under the fleet command of Admiral Spruance in the Fifth Fleet. TF 38 continued to exist, but as a command structure only. TF 58 proved the success of the Fast Carrier TF concept with Operation Hailstone , a massive naval air squadrons and surface vessels attack on the Japanese ships and airfield at Truk Lagoon on 17–18 February 1944. The only time that any aircraft carriers were used to support operations in New Guinea in
7826-425: Was east of Airfield Number 2, had enough food, water, and ammunition for the Japanese to hold out for three months. The bunker was 90 feet underground, and had tunnels running in various directions. Approximately five hundred 55-gallon drums filled with water, kerosene, and fuel oil for generators were stored inside the complex. Gasoline-powered generators allowed for radios and lighting to be operated underground. By
7917-409: Was never invaded by American forces. Experiences with previous Pacific island battles suggested that the island would be well-defended and result in significant casualties. The lessons learned on Iwo Jima served as guidelines for American forces in the Battle of Okinawa two months later, as well as for the planned invasion of the Japanese homeland. Joe Rosenthal 's Associated Press photograph of
8008-571: Was operating as Task Force 57 of the Fifth Fleet when Halsey relieved Spruance of command in May 1945. Like the rest of the Fifth Fleet's ships, the British ships were resubordinated from Spruance's Fifth Fleet to Halsey's Third Fleet. The British Pacific Fleet then constituted Task Force 37 under the Third Fleet's operational command through the end of World War II on 15 August 1945. The Third Fleet's next major combat operation would have been Operation Olympic ,
8099-496: Was originally formed during World War II on 15 March 1943 under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey . Its on-shore headquarters at Pearl Harbor , Hawaii was established on 15 June 1944. The ships of the Third Fleet also formed the basis of the Fifth Fleet , formed on 26 April 1944, which was the designation of the "Big Blue Fleet" when under the command of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance . Spruance and Halsey alternated command of
8190-618: Was under the command of Admiral Ralph Davison . Following the Battle of Leyte Gulf , Mitscher went on shore leave and planning duty, and Vice Admiral McCain took over as commanding officer of TF 38, which continued under Halsey and the Third Fleet. In January 1945 TF 38 raided the South China Sea and attacked Japanese positions in Formosa and Luzon. On 26 January 1945, Halsey and McCain went on shore leave and planning duty, while Spruance and Mitscher returned to their previous commands. Third Fleet became Fifth Fleet, and TF 38 became TF 58. They led
8281-488: Was used by the Japanese to stage intermittent air attacks on the Mariana Islands from November 1944 to January 1945. The capture of Iwo Jima would eliminate those problems. The island's airfield would also support P-51 Mustang fighters, which could escort and protect bombers en route to Japan. American intelligence sources were confident that Iwo Jima would fall in one week. In light of optimistic intelligence reports,
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