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75-398: The Mount Erebus disaster occurred on 28 November 1979 when Air New Zealand Flight 901 (TE901) flew into Mount Erebus on Ross Island , Antarctica , killing all 237 passengers and 20 crew on board. Air New Zealand had been operating scheduled Antarctic sightseeing flights since 1977. This flight left Auckland Airport in the morning and was supposed to spend a few hours flying over

150-451: A Boeing 747-400 chartered from Qantas set off from Auckland for a sightseeing flight over the continent. Controlled flight into terrain Accidents where the aircraft is out of control at the time of impact, because of mechanical failure or pilot error , are classified instead as uncontrolled flight into terrain, or UFIT. Incidents resulting from the deliberate action of the person at

225-405: A GPS terrain database and is now known as an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) . When combined with mandatory pilot simulator training which emphasizes proper responses to any caution or warning event, the system has proved very effective in preventing further CFIT accidents. Smaller aircraft often use a GPS database of terrain to provide terrain warning. The GPS database contains

300-415: A No. 40 Squadron C-130 Hercules aircraft. The job of individual identification took many weeks, and was largely done by teams of pathologists, dentists, and police. The mortuary team was led by Inspector Jim Morgan, who collated and edited a report on the recovery operation. Recordkeeping had to be meticulous because of the number and fragmented state of the human remains that had to be identified to

375-628: A conspiracy to whitewash the inquiry, accusing them of "an orchestrated litany of lies" by covering up evidence and lying to investigators. Mahon found that, in the original report, Chippindale had a poor grasp of the flying involved in jet-airline operation, as he (and the New Zealand CAA in general) was typically involved in investigating simple light aircraft crashes. Chippindale's investigation techniques were revealed as lacking in rigour, which allowed errors and avoidable gaps in knowledge to appear in reports. Consequently, Chippindale entirely missed

450-518: A conspiracy , an accusation which they determined was not supported by the evidence. In its judgment, delivered on 20 October 1983, the Judicial Committee therefore dismissed Mahon's appeal. Aviation researcher John King wrote in his book New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation : They demolished his case (Mahon's case for a cover-up) item by item, including Exhibit 164, which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended for

525-428: A collision with terrain such as hills or mountains or tall artificial obstacles such as radio towers during conditions of reduced visibility while approaching or departing from an airport. A contributing factor can be subtle navigation equipment malfunctions which, if not detected by the crew, may mislead them into improperly guiding the aircraft despite other information received from properly functioning equipment. CFIT

600-477: A combination of factors led the captain to believe the plane was over the sea (the middle of McMurdo Sound and few small low islands), and previous Flight 901 pilots had regularly flown low over the area to give passengers a better view, as evidenced by photographs in Air New Zealand's own travel magazine and by first-hand accounts of personnel based on the ground at NZ's Scott Base. In response to public demand,

675-404: A crew change before completing the journey back to Auckland. Around 50 passengers were also supposed to disembark at Christchurch. Airport staff initially told the waiting families that the flight being slightly late was not unusual, but as time went on, it became clear that something was wrong. At 9:00 pm, about half an hour after the plane would have run out of fuel, Air New Zealand informed

750-683: A crew change, before flying the remaining 464 miles (747 km) to Auckland, arriving at 9:00 pm . Tickets for the November 1979 flights cost NZ$ 359 per person (equivalent to $ 2167 in 2021). Dignitaries including Sir Edmund Hillary had acted as guides on previous flights. Hillary was scheduled to act as the guide for the fatal flight of 28 November 1979, but had to cancel because of other commitments. His long-time friend and climbing companion, Peter Mulgrew , stood in as guide. The aircraft used for Antarctic flights were Air New Zealand's eight McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 trijets . The aircraft on 28 November

825-442: A database of nearby terrain and will present terrain that is near the aircraft in red or yellow depending on its distance from the aircraft. The sterile flight deck rule was implemented to limit pilot distraction by banning any non-essential activities in the cockpit during critical phases of the flight, such as when operating at below 10,000 feet (3,000 m). Flight plan Too Many Requests If you report this error to

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900-638: A position of 77°25′30″S 167°27′30″E  /  77.42500°S 167.45833°E  / -77.42500; 167.45833  ( accident site ) and an elevation of 1,467 feet (447 m) above mean sea level . McMurdo Station attempted to contact the flight after the crash, and informed Air New Zealand headquarters in Auckland that communication with the aircraft had been lost. United States search-and-rescue personnel were placed on standby. Air New Zealand had not lost any passengers to an accident or incident until this event took place. The nationalities of

975-452: A rare meteorological phenomenon called sector whiteout , which creates the visual illusion of a flat horizon far in the distance. A very broad gap between cloud layers appeared to allow a view of the distant Ross Ice Shelf and beyond. Mahon noted that the flight crew, with many thousands of hours of flight time between them, had considerable experience with the extreme accuracy of the aircraft's inertial navigation system . Mahon also found that

1050-502: A smooth take-off, the flight was 42 miles (68 km) away from McMurdo Station. The radio communications centre there allowed the pilots to descend to 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and to continue "visually". Air-safety regulations at the time did not allow flights to descend to lower than 6,000 ft (1,800 m), even in good weather, although Air New Zealand's own travel magazine showed photographs of previous flights clearly operating below 6,000 ft (1,800 m). Collins believed

1125-505: A total of 6,468 flight hours, including 1,700 in the DC-10. Captain Collins and co-pilot Cassin had never flown to Antarctica before (while flight engineer Brooks had flown to Antarctica only once previously), but they were experienced pilots and were considered qualified for the flight. On 9 November 1979, 19 days before departure, the two pilots attended a briefing in which they were given a copy of

1200-527: Is a constant hazard during aerial application and aerial firefighting operations, which involve routine low-altitude flight along varying routes over terrain that may be unfamiliar to the pilots. Before the installation of the first electronic terrain warning systems, the only defenses against CFIT were conventional see-and-avoid aviation practices, pilot simulator training, crew resource management (CRM) and radar surveillance by air traffic services . While refinements applied to those practices helped reduced

1275-461: Is the most common factor found in CFIT accidents. Behind such events there is often a loss of situational awareness by the pilot, who becomes unaware of their actual position and altitude in relation to the terrain below and immediately ahead of them. Fatigue can cause even highly experienced professionals to make significant errors, which culminate in a CFIT accident. CFIT accidents frequently involve

1350-483: The International Air Transport Association (IATA) between 2008 and 2017, CFITs accounted for six percent of all commercial aircraft accidents, and was categorized as "the second-highest fatal accident category after Loss of Control Inflight (LOC-I) ". While there are many reasons why an aircraft might crash into terrain, including poor weather and navigational equipment failure, pilot error

1425-458: The New Zealand government announced a further one-man Royal Commission of Inquiry into the accident, to be performed by Justice Peter Mahon. This Royal Commission was initially handicapped in that the deadline was extremely short; originally set for 31 October 1980, it was subsequently extended four times. The report was released on 27 April 1981, and cleared the crew of blame. Mahon concluded that

1500-468: The ground proximity warning system  (GPWS) began sounding a series of "whoop, whoop, pull up" alarms, warning that the plane was dangerously close to terrain. The CVR recorded the following: The pilots had begun a terrain escape manoeuvre by applying full ( go-around ) power, but it was too late. Six seconds later, the plane crashed into the side of Mount Erebus and exploded, instantly killing everyone on board. The accident occurred at 12:50 pm at

1575-453: The Antarctic continent, before returning to Auckland in the evening via Christchurch . The initial investigation concluded the accident was caused primarily by pilot error , but public outcry led to the establishment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the crash. The commission, presided over by Justice Peter Mahon , concluded that the accident was primarily caused by a correction made to

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1650-535: The DC-10. First Officer Gregory Mark "Greg" Cassin (37) had accumulated 7,934 flight hours, including 1,361 in the DC-10. Flight Engineer Gordon Barrett Brooks (43) had 10,886 flight hours, including 3,000 in the DC-10 (Brooks had also been Flight Engineer on the Air New Zealand flight involved in the Cessna 188 Pacific rescue in 1978). Also on board were First Officer Graham Neville Lucas (39) and Flight Engineer Nicholas John "Nick" Moloney (44). Flight Engineer Moloney had

1725-650: The McMurdo Sound route, unaware that the route flown did not correspond with the approved route. Captain Leslie Simpson, the pilot of a flight on 14 November and also present at the 9 November briefing, compared the coordinates of the McMurdo TACAN navigation beacon (about 5 km or 3 mi east of McMurdo NDB), and the McMurdo waypoint that his flight crew had entered into the inertial navigation system (INS), and

1800-641: The Privy Council in London against the Court of Appeal's decision. His findings as to the cause of the accident, namely reprogramming of the aircraft's flight plan by the ground crew, who then failed to inform the flight crew, had not been challenged before the Court of Appeal, so were not challenged before the Privy Council. His conclusion that the crash was the result of the aircrew being misdirected as to their flight path, not due to pilot error, therefore remained. Regarding

1875-703: The United States of America and other countries, who were involved in the body recovery, identification, and crash investigation phases of Operation Overdue. On 5 June 2009, the New Zealand government recognised some of the Americans who assisted in Operation Overdue during a ceremony in Washington, DC. A total of 40 Americans, mostly Navy personnel, are eligible to receive the medal. Despite Flight 901 crashing in one of

1950-545: The accident of replacing the aircraft; DC-10s were replaced by Boeing 747s from mid-1981, and the last Air New Zealand DC-10 flew in December 1982. The occurrence also spelled the end of commercially operated Antarctic sightseeing flights – Air New Zealand cancelled all its Antarctic flights after Flight 901, and Qantas suspended its Antarctic flights in February 1980, only returning on a limited basis again in 1994. Almost all of

2025-439: The aircraft's public-address system, while passengers enjoyed a low-flying sweep of McMurdo Sound. The flights left and returned to New Zealand the same day. The plane left Auckland International Airport at 8:00 am for Antarctica, and was scheduled to arrive back at Christchurch International Airport at 7:00 pm after flying 5,360 miles (8,630 km). The aircraft would make a 45-minute stop at Christchurch for refuelling and

2100-456: The aircraft's wreckage still lies where it came to rest on the slopes of Mount Erebus, as both its remote location and its weather conditions can hamper any further recovery operations. During the cold periods, the wreckage is buried under a layer of snow and ice. During warm periods, when snow recedes, it is visible from the air. Following the incident, all charter flights to Antarctica from New Zealand ceased, and were not resumed until 2013, when

2175-502: The aircraft, however, and the crew also experienced difficulty establishing VHF communications. The distance measuring equipment did not lock onto the McMurdo Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) for any useful period. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts from the last minutes of the flight before impact with Mount Erebus indicated that the flight crew believed they were flying over McMurdo Sound, well to

2250-564: The airline. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council later ruled that the finding of a conspiracy was a breach of natural justice and not supported by the evidence. The accident is the deadliest in the history of Air New Zealand, the deadliest aviation accident in Antarctica and one of New Zealand's deadliest peacetime disasters . Flight 901 was designed and marketed as a unique sightseeing experience, carrying an experienced Antarctic guide, who pointed out scenic features and landmarks using

2325-498: The approved route. The Air New Zealand navigation section changed the McMurdo waypoint co-ordinate stored in the ground computer system around 1:40 am on the morning of the flight from 77°53′S 164°48′E  /  77.883°S 164.800°E  / -77.883; 164.800  ( False McMurdo waypoint ) to 77°52′0″S 167°03′0″E  /  77.86667°S 167.05000°E  / -77.86667; 167.05000  ( McMurdo field waypoint ) . Crucially,

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2400-447: The briefing corresponded to a track down McMurdo Sound, giving Mount Erebus a wide berth to the east, whereas the flight plan printed on the morning of the flight corresponded to a track that coincided with Mount Erebus, which would result in a collision with Mount Erebus if this leg were flown at an altitude less than 13,000 feet (4,000 m), 12,448 feet (3,794 m) being the top peak of Mount Erebus. The Air New Zealand computer program

2475-441: The chances of identifying the corpses. We tried to shoo them away, but to no avail; we then threw flares, also to no avail. Because of this, we had to pick up all the bodies/parts that had been bagged and create 11 large piles of human remains around the crash site in order to bury them under snow to keep the birds off. To do this we had to scoop up the top layer of snow over the crash site and bury them, only later to uncover them when

2550-442: The controls, such as a forced landing , an act of terrorism , or suicide by pilot , are also excluded from the definition of CFIT. According to Boeing in 1997, CFIT was a leading cause of airplane accidents involving the loss of life, causing over 9,000 deaths since the beginning of the commercial jet aircraft . CFIT was identified as a cause of 25% of USAF Class A mishaps between 1993 and 2002. According to data collected by

2625-454: The coordinates had been modified earlier that morning to correct the error introduced previously and undetected until then. The crew evidently did not check the destination waypoint against a topographical map (as did Captain Simpson on the flight of 14 November) or they would have noticed the change. Charts for the Antarctic were not available to the pilot for planning purposes, being withheld until

2700-457: The coordinates of the flight path the night before the disaster, coupled with a failure to inform the flight crew of the change, with the result that the aircraft, instead of being directed by computer down McMurdo Sound (as the crew had been led to believe), was instead rerouted to a path toward Mount Erebus. Justice Mahon's report accused Air New Zealand of presenting "an orchestrated litany of lies", and this led to changes in senior management at

2775-564: The crash site was whipped up by the helo rotors. Risks were taken by all those involved in this work. The civilians from McDonnell Douglas , MOT, and U.S. Navy personnel were first to leave and then the Police and DSIR followed. I am proud of my service and those of my colleagues on Mount Erebus. In 2006, the New Zealand Special Service Medal (Erebus) was instituted to recognise the service of New Zealanders, and citizens of

2850-438: The details of what we saw and assigning body and grid numbers to all body parts and labelling them. All bodies and body parts were photographed in situ by U.S. Navy photographers who worked with us. Also, U.S. Navy personnel helped us to lift and pack bodies into body bags, which was very exhausting work. Later, the skua gulls were eating the bodies in front of us, causing us much mental anguish, as well as destroying

2925-419: The flight crew of Flight 901 was not notified of the change. The flight plan printout given to the crew on the morning of the flight, which was subsequently entered by them into the aircraft's INS, differed from the flight plan presented at the 9 November briefing and from Captain Collins' map mark-ups, which he had prepared the night before the fatal flight. The key difference was that the flight plan presented at

3000-450: The flight plan had been changed, probably because it was known that US Air Traffic Control would lodge an objection to the new flight path. The flight had earlier paused during the approach to McMurdo Sound to carry out a descent, via a figure-eight manoeuvre, through a gap in the low cloud base (later estimated to be at around 2,000 to 3,000 feet (610 to 910 m)) while over water to establish visual contact with surface landmarks and give

3075-456: The flight was about to depart. The charts eventually provided, which were carried on the aircraft, were neither comprehensive enough nor large enough in scale to support detailed plotting. These new coordinates changed the flight plan to track 27 miles (43 km) east of their understanding. The coordinates programmed the plane to overfly Mount Erebus, a 12,448-foot-high (3,794 m) volcano, instead of down McMurdo Sound. About four hours after

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3150-414: The human remains at the site. Many bodies were trapped under tons of fuselage and wings and much physical effort was required to dig them out and extract them. Initially, there was very little water at the site and we had only one bowl between all of us to wash our hands in before eating. The water was black. In the first days on site, we did not wash plates and utensils after eating, but handed them on to

3225-563: The importance of the flight-plan change and the rare meteorological conditions of Antarctica. Had the pilots been informed of the flight plan change, the crash would have been avoided. On 20 May 1981, Air New Zealand applied to the High Court of New Zealand for judicial review of Mahon's order that it pay more than half the costs of the Mahon inquiry, and for judicial review of some of the findings of fact Mahon had made in his report. The application

3300-412: The incidence of CFIT accidents, they did not eliminate them. To further assist in preventing CFIT accidents, manufacturers developed terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS). The first generation of those systems was known as a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), which used a radar altimeter to assist in calculating terrain closure rates. That system was further improved with the addition of

3375-647: The issue of Air New Zealand stating a minimum altitude of 6,000 feet for pilots in the vicinity of McMurdo Base, the Judicial Committee stated, Their Lordships accept unreservedly that ... the evidence given by several of the executive pilots at the inquiry was false. But, even though false ... it cannot have formed part of a predetermined plan of deception. Those witnesses whom the Judge disbelieved on this issue were, as their Lordships must accept, being untruthful ... they were also being singularly naive. [Q]uite apart from

3450-495: The lower slopes of the 12,448-ft-tall (3,794 m) mountain. Passenger photographs taken seconds before the collision removed all plausibility of a "flying in cloud" theory, showing perfectly clear visibility well beneath the cloud base, with landmarks 13 miles (21 km) to the left and 10 miles (16 km) to the right of the aircraft visible. The crew put the coordinates into the plane's computer before they departed at 7:21 am from Auckland International Airport . Unknown to them,

3525-593: The mass of evidence of flights at low altitudes and the publicity given to them ... it is not conceivable that individual witnesses falsely disclaimed knowledge of low flying on previous Antarctic flights in a concerted attempt to deceive anybody. However, the Law Lords of the Judicial Committee under the chair of Lord Diplock effectively agreed with some of the views of the minority in the Court of Appeal in concluding that Mahon had acted in breach of natural justice by finding that Air New Zealand management had been engaged in

3600-517: The most isolated parts of the world, evidence from the crash site was extensive. Both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder were in working order and able to be deciphered. Extensive photographic footage, including video, from the moments before the crash was available; being a sightseeing flight, most passengers were carrying cameras, from which the majority of the film could be developed. The accident report compiled by New Zealand's chief inspector of air accidents, Ron Chippindale ,

3675-420: The next shift because we were unable to wash them. I could not eat my first meal on site because it was a meat stew. Our polar clothing became covered in black human grease (a result of burns on the bodies). We felt relieved when the first resupply of woollen gloves arrived because ours had become saturated in human grease, however, we needed the finger movement that wool gloves afforded, i.e., writing down

3750-459: The passengers a better view. The flight crew either was unaware of or ignored the approved route's minimum safe altitude (MSA) of 16,000 feet (4,900 m) for the approach to Mount Erebus, and 6,000 feet (1,800 m) in the sector south of Mount Erebus (and then only when the cloud base was at 7,000 feet (2,100 m) or better). Photographs and news stories from previous flights showed that many of these had been flown at levels substantially below

3825-464: The passengers and crew included: At 2:00 pm, the United States Navy released a situation report stating: Data gathered at 3:43 pm were added to the situation report , stating that the visibility was 40 miles (64 km). Also, six aircraft had been launched to find the flight. Flight 901 was due to arrive back at Christchurch at 6:05 pm for a stopover including refuelling and

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3900-424: The plane was over open water. Collins told McMurdo Station that he would be dropping to 2,000 feet (610 m), at which point he switched control of the aircraft to the autopilot . Outside, a layer of clouds blended with the white snow-covered volcano, forming a sector whiteout – no contrast between ground and sky was visible to the pilots. The effect deceived everyone on the flight deck, making them believe that

3975-451: The preflight briefings for previous flights had approved descents to any altitude authorised by the US ATC at McMurdo Station, and that the radio communications centre at McMurdo Station had indeed authorised Collins to descend to 2,000 feet (610 m), below the minimum safe level of 6,000 feet (1,800 m). In his report, Mahon found that airline executives and senior pilots had engaged in

4050-418: The press that it believed the aircraft to be lost. Rescue teams searched along the assumed flight path, but found nothing. At 12:55 am, the crew of a United States Navy aircraft discovered unidentified debris along the side of Mount Erebus. No survivors could be seen. Around 9:00 am, 20 hours after the crash, helicopters with search parties managed to land on the side of the mountain. They confirmed that

4125-544: The previous flight's flight plan . The flight plan had been approved in 1977 by the Civil Aviation Division of the New Zealand Department of Transport and was along a track directly from Cape Hallett to the McMurdo non-directional beacon (NDB), which, coincidentally, entailed flying almost directly over the 12,448-foot (3,794 m) peak of Mount Erebus . Due to a typing error in the coordinates when

4200-467: The purposes of navigation" and went even further, saying there was no clear proof on which to base a finding that a plan of deception, led by the company's chief executive, had ever existed. "Exhibit 164" was a photocopied diagram of McMurdo Sound showing a southbound flight path passing west of Ross Island and a northbound path passing the island on the east. The diagram did not extend sufficiently far south to show where, how, or even if they joined, and left

4275-566: The reputation of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. Following the Chicago crash, the FAA withdrew the DC-10's type certificate on 6 June, which grounded all U.S.-registered DC-10s and forbade any foreign government that had a bilateral agreement with the United States regarding aircraft certifications from flying their DC-10s, which included Air New Zealand's seven DC-10s. The Air New Zealand DC-10 fleet

4350-451: The route was computerised, however, the printout from Air New Zealand's ground computer system that was presented at the 9 November briefing corresponded to a southerly flight path down the middle of the wide McMurdo Sound, about 27 nautical miles (50 km; 31 mi) to the west of Mount Erebus. The majority of the previous 13 flights had also entered this flight plan's coordinates into their aircraft inertial navigational system and flown

4425-524: The route's MSA. In addition, preflight briefings for previous flights had approved descents to any altitude authorised by the US ATC at McMurdo Station. As the US ATC expected Flight 901 to follow the same route as previous flights down McMurdo Sound, and in accordance with the route waypoints previously advised by Air New Zealand to them, the ATC advised Flight 901 that it had a radar that could let them down to 1,500 feet (460 m). The radar equipment did not pick up

4500-467: The satisfaction of the coroner . The exercise resulted in 83% of the deceased passengers and crew eventually being identified, sometimes from evidence such as a finger capable of yielding a print, or keys in a pocket. The fact that we all spent about a week camped in polar tents amid the wreckage and dead bodies, maintaining a 24-hour work schedule says it all. We split the men into two shifts (12 hours on and 12 off), and recovered with great effort all

4575-465: The single, dominant and effective cause of the crash was Air New Zealand's alteration of the flight plan waypoint coordinates in the ground navigation computer without advising the crew. The new flight plan took the aircraft directly over the mountain, rather than along its flank. Due to whiteout conditions, "a malevolent trick of the polar light", the crew were unable to visually identify the mountain in front of them. Furthermore, they may have experienced

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4650-443: The supply we had. As the weather cleared, the helos were able to get back and we then were able to hook the piles of bodies in cargo nets under the helicopters and they were taken to McMurdo. This was doubly exhausting because we also had to wind down the personnel numbers with each helo load and that left the remaining people with more work to do. It was exhausting uncovering the bodies and loading them and dangerous, too, as debris from

4725-408: The two paths disconnected. Evidence had been given to the effect that the diagram had been included in the flight crew's briefing documentation. The crash of Flight 901 is one of New Zealand's three deadliest disasters – the others being the 1874 Cospatrick sailing ship disaster in which 470 people died, and the 1931 Hawke's Bay earthquake , which killed 256 people. At the time of the disaster, it

4800-523: The weather cleared and the helos were able to get back on the site. It was immensely exhausting work. After we had almost completed the mission, we were trapped by bad weather and isolated. At that point, NZPO2 and I allowed the liquor that had survived the crash to be given out and we had a party (macabre, but we had to let off steam). We ran out of cigarettes, a catastrophe that caused all persons, civilians and police on site, to hand in their personal supplies so we could dish them out equally and spin out

4875-510: The west of Mount Erebus and with the Ross Ice Shelf visible on the horizon, when in reality they were flying directly toward the mountain. Despite most of the crew being engaged in identifying visual landmarks at the time, they never perceived the mountain directly in front of them. About 6 minutes after completing a descent in visual meteorological conditions, Flight 901 collided with the mountain at an altitude around 1,500 feet (460 m), on

4950-548: The white mountainside was the Ross Ice Shelf, a huge expanse of floating ice derived from the great ice sheets of Antarctica, which was in fact now behind the mountain. As it was little understood, even by experienced polar pilots, Air New Zealand had provided no training for the flight crew on the sector whiteout phenomenon. Consequently, the crew thought they were flying along McMurdo Sound, when they were actually flying over Lewis Bay in front of Mount Erebus. At 12:49 pm,

5025-452: The wreckage was that of Flight 901 and that all 237 passengers and 20 crew members had been killed. The DC-10's altitude at the time of the collision was 1,465 feet (447 m). The vertical stabiliser section of the plane, with the koru logo clearly visible, was found in the snow. Bodies and fragments of the aircraft were flown back to Auckland for identification. The remains of 44 of the victims were not individually identified. A funeral

5100-461: Was registered ZK-NZP. The 182nd DC-10 to be built, and the fourth DC-10 to be introduced by Air New Zealand, ZK-NZP was handed over to the airline on 12 December 1974 at McDonnell Douglas's Long Beach plant. It had logged more than 20,700 flight hours prior to the crash. Captain Thomas James "Jim" Collins (45) was an experienced pilot who had accumulated 11,151 flight hours, including 2,872 hours in

5175-474: Was altered so that the standard telex forwarded to US air traffic controllers (ATCs) at the United States Antarctic science facility at McMurdo Station displayed the word "McMurdo", rather than the coordinates of latitude and longitude, for the final waypoint. During the subsequent inquiry , Justice Mahon concluded that this was a deliberate attempt to conceal from the United States authorities that

5250-523: Was grounded until the FAA measures were rescinded five weeks later, on 13 July, after all carriers had completed modifications that responded to issues discovered from the American Airlines Flight 191 incident. Flight 901 was the third-deadliest accident involving a DC-10, following Turkish Airlines Flight 981 and American Airlines Flight 191. The event marked the beginning of the end for Air New Zealand's DC-10 fleet, although talk existed before

5325-414: Was held for them on 22 February 1980. The recovery effort of Flight 901 was called "Operation Overdue." Efforts for recovery were extensive, owing in part to the pressure from Japan, as 24 passengers had been Japanese. The operation lasted until 9 December 1979, with up to 60 recovery workers on site at a time. A team of New Zealand Police officers and a mountain-face rescue team were dispatched on

5400-516: Was referred to the Court of Appeal , which unanimously set aside the costs order. The Court of Appeal, by majority, though, declined to go any further, and in particular, declined to set aside Mahon's finding that members of the management of Air New Zealand had conspired to commit perjury before the inquiry to cover up the errors of the ground staff. Mahon then appealed to the Judicial Committee of

5475-401: Was released on 12 June 1980. It cited pilot error as the principal cause of the accident and attributed blame to the decision of Collins to descend below the customary minimum altitude level, and to continue at that altitude when the crew was unsure of the plane's position. The customary minimum altitude prohibited descent below 6,000 feet (1,800 m) even under good weather conditions, but

5550-484: Was surprised to find a large distance between the two. After his flight, Captain Simpson advised Air New Zealand's navigation section of the difference in positions. For reasons that were disputed, this triggered Air New Zealand's navigation section to update the McMurdo waypoint coordinates stored in the ground computer to correspond with the coordinates of the McMurdo TACAN beacon, despite this also not corresponding with

5625-556: Was the fourth-deadliest air crash of all time. As of January 2020  ( 2020-01 ) , the crash remains Air New Zealand's deadliest accident, as well as New Zealand's deadliest peacetime disaster (excluding the Cospatrick sailing ship disaster, which happened south of the Cape of Good Hope , en route to Auckland). Flight 901, in conjunction with the crash of American Airlines Flight 191 in Chicago six months earlier (25 May), severely hurt

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