111-558: T71 may refer to: Military vehicles [ edit ] 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage T71 , an American prototype self-propelled gun HMS Cicala (T71) , a gunboat of the Royal Navy INS ; Kora Divh (T71) , a patrol vessel of the Indian Navy T71 Light Tank , an American American proposed light tank Other uses [ edit ] Cooper T71 ,
222-624: A "security section" of twelve infantrymen. This gave a total of twenty-four 75mm guns, twelve 37mm guns, eighteen anti-aircraft guns, and 108 security troops. The vehicles used were the M3 GMC , with a 75mm gun, and the M6 GMC , a 3/4 ton 4x4 Dodge truck with a 37 mm gun mounted in the rear compartment facing to the rear. The battalions deployed to North Africa used this organization, with both heavy and light anti-tank guns, but as reports from Europe indicated that light anti-tank guns were no longer playing
333-669: A British racing car Cuero Municipal Airport , in Cuero, Texas, United States T71 Dudelange , a Luxembourger basketball club [REDACTED] Topics referred to by the same term This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the same title formed as a letter–number combination. If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=T71&oldid=1157184115 " Category : Letter–number combination disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description
444-500: A German attack and prevented any breakthrough. The battle also highlighted the defensive nature of Tank Destroyer tactics compared to regular armored units. During Team Desobry's initial occupation of Noville, a number of US tanks and tank destroyers were firing into advancing units of the 2nd Panzer Division . However, so many targets were appearing that the M4 tanks from CCB of 10th Armored were staying in place and not moving. By contrast,
555-399: A broad front. But while tanks were effective in this role, the tank destroyers were handicapped by their open turrets and thin armor, making them more vulnerable to enemy fire. Moreover, the speed advantage that some tank destroyers had over tanks did not translate into a tactical advantage since such support operations moved at the speed of foot infantry. Infantry units did, however, appreciate
666-594: A distance. An 814th gunner, Lt Alfred Rose, scored a kill against a Panther at 4,600 yards (4200 meters), the maximum range of the telescopic sight. However, the Panther's 82 to 85mm thick glacis plate could deflect shots at certain angles from the 90 mm gun at just 150 yards (137 meters). Testing done in December 1944 by the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion concluded that the M36's 90mm Gun would theoretically not be able to penetrate
777-408: A fair proportion of combat units were black. Two of the initially converted battalions were black, with another four created in 1942 and four (of a planned six) in 1943. Several would eventually see combat, and the 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion would become the first black unit to receive a Distinguished Unit Citation .{{efn|The two original units were the 795th and the 846th (later deactivated);
888-409: A favorable position, conceal itself thoroughly and ambush the tank" —it was not intended to be used in a frontal offensive, or in assault in combat like a tank. Training problems were also exposed. Mobile Tank Destroyer units had not been trained to work together as a battalion - despite the doctrine being so clearly to the fore, actual training of the units was done at a small unit level. Also at issue
999-521: A high of 220 battalions, now deemed excessive, the 1943 troop basis called for only 114. In April 1943, it was called for that only 106 battalions be activated, the number active or in the process of activation at that time. By October 1943, it was found that the need for tank destroyers overseas was far less than had been expected, and the Tank Destroyer Center began to reduce its training activities. Thirty-five tank destroyer battalions never left
1110-447: A large, open-topped turret mounting a 90 mm gun M3. The gunner aimed the gun using the M76F telescope. The 90 mm gun M3 was the standardized version of the experimental T7, a derivative of the 90 mm gun developed as a vehicle-mounted antitank weapon. The M36 carried 47 rounds of main gun ammunition, 11 of which were stowed in the hollow counterweight, while 36 rounds were stowed in
1221-490: A limited traverse, compared to the vehicular weapon, and their prime-movers were of little assistance in altering their traverse. The vehicular weapon could follow the advance of infantry or armor, or become a part of the forward elements of the assault, all well beyond the capability of the towed gun.. —William F. Jackson (Major) et al. Employment of four tank destroyer battalions in the ETO. May 1950 p 171-172 of 188 By far
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#17328560490501332-692: A mechanized battalion equipped with armored self-propelled guns . The tank destroyer units were formed in response to the German use of massed formations of armored vehicles units early in WWII. The tank destroyer concept envisioned the battalions acting as independent units that would respond at high speed to large enemy tank attacks. In this role, they would be attached in groups or brigades to corps or armies . In practice, they were usually individually attached to infantry divisions. Over one hundred battalions were formed, of which more than half saw combat service. The force
1443-439: A more dispersed deployment of the battalions throughout a force, and recommended that when enemy armor was only expected to be deployed in small groups, tank destroyers were to be distributed among forward units. It became general practice to attach a tank destroyer battalion semi-permanently to a division; this meant that it was locally available for emergencies, and that it would be able to train alongside "its" division when out of
1554-821: A new turret mounting the 90 mm gun M3 . Conceived in 1943, the M36 first served in combat in Europe in October 1944, where it partially replaced the M10 tank destroyer. It also saw use in the Korean War , where it was able to defeat any of the Soviet tanks used in that conflict. Some were supplied to South Korea as part of the Military Assistance Program and served for years, as did re-engined examples found in Yugoslavia , which operated into
1665-471: A new turret was designed with power traverse, and a massive counterweight to balance the gun. The first two M36 prototypes, designated 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage T71 were completed in September 1943. Initially, a request for full production was denied as 90 mm guns were already being studied for use on tanks, but Army Ground Forces approved the project in October 1943, and tests began. The ring mount on
1776-557: A plan was laid out for a program of 220 anti-tank battalions. The first nine units were deployed during the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, equipped with towed 37 mm M3 anti-tank guns (the largest gun that could be towed by a jeep) and surplus 75 mm M1897 guns mounted on half-tracks (the M3 gun motor carriage ), and again in the Carolinas maneuvers that November. Their employment
1887-640: A rear-area reserve and brought into the line to blunt tank-led attacks against infantry positions. A major lesson learned from the Italian campaign was that the conversion to towed guns was not as advantageous as had been previously thought. The mobility and protection of the tank destroyer was found to outweigh the towed anti-tank gun's low profile. At Anzio , a number of British towed anti-tank gun units were overrun and knocked out simply because they were unable to redeploy on short notice, while self-propelled guns were able to fall back and continue fighting. In Italy,
1998-438: A result we lost some ground to tank-led attacks. Then we put all our anti-tank guns right in the front line wherever they could be dug-in to cover the front. We placed the tanks and tank destroyers well back but ready to move up to reinforce the anti-tank guns. After we took this action, we stopped all the tank-led attacks cold. —Executive Officer, 15th Infantry Regiment The second theater of operations for tank destroyer units
2109-466: A result, the number of battalions planned was steadily reduced, and the manpower and equipment assigned to them was reduced. A new table of organization produced in January 1943 reduced the overall manpower by 25%, by eliminating the anti-aircraft units (which had proven unnecessary), reducing the number of supporting units, and combining the tank destroyer platoon's headquarters with its security section. There
2220-474: A significant role in combat, the light platoons were converted to a third "heavy" 75mm gun platoon under a new organization issued in November 1942. As M10 tank destroyers came into use, with a 3-inch gun, these replaced the 75mm gun-equipped M3 GMCs. By 1943, the role of tank destroyer battalions was becoming better understood, and the early ideas of mass employment of tank destroyer units had become obsolete. As
2331-647: A similar fashion to the way separate Tank Battalions had been. Moreover, the loss of lines of communications led to the smaller units being controlled by local commanders rather than being directed by Corps or Army commanders. Northern Sector - Kampfgruppe Peiper Nevertheless, tank destroyers were to be found throughout the fighting in the Battle of the Bulge, fighting at close range in broken terrain much as they had done in Italy, and, despite their shortcomings, were an essential part of
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#17328560490502442-598: A strong defense—knocking out fourteen tanks—but took heavy losses, being mostly overrun and losing eleven guns. This served to reinforce misgivings about the effectiveness of the towed units, and a report delivered to the Pentagon in December recommended they be phased out in favor of self-propelled units. It was in France that the allies first began to face the German Panther tank. The superior frontal armor of this tank, along with
2553-412: A variety of other tasks, most commonly local artillery support. A report in late 1944, reviewing the use of tank destroyer units in combat, found that in practice they were often expected to fulfill the roles of armor support: During the planning stage for an attack it was found that practically without exception the infantry commanders were reasonable in their requirements and expectations of support by
2664-552: A very low-profile target, though a large gun sometimes took a day to fully prepare. Bradley's proposal was not, however, intended to create towed TD battalions. His intent was to put the anti-tank assets in the hands of infantry units. The fact that the British Army had had success with dug-in antitank guns supported his proposal, and an experimental battalion was established in the summer with 3-inch guns . This quickly gained popularity—heavily supported by McNair—and in November 1943 it
2775-521: Is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage T71 The M36 tank destroyer , formally 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage, M36, was an American tank destroyer used during World War II . The M36 combined the hull of the M10 tank destroyer , which used the M4 Sherman's reliable chassis and drivetrain combined with sloped armor , and
2886-646: The 11th Cavalry fought against AMX-13s of the Indian 20 Lancers . Despite winning the battle, the M36s had performed poorly; only two M36s were in fighting condition after the confrontation; most had broken down in the early hours of the battle, with a few (including the CO's M36) being knocked out by Indian fire. The M36s saw more action on the Lahore Front. In the Battle of Phillora ,
2997-525: The 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage M36 . After July 1943, the appliqué armor (add on armor) bosses on the hull side of later M10A1s were omitted as the armor kits were never manufactured. The M36 initially retained the M10A1's "stirrup" gun rest on the rear hull; crews were unhappy about the lack of a travel lock to hold the 90 mm gun in a fixed position when in motion, and many improvised their own from travel locks taken from tanks. A double-baffle muzzle brake
3108-749: The 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B2 beginning in May 1945. A further batch of 52 M36B2s was completed by the Montreal Locomotive Works in May 1945. The first 40 M36s were not shipped overseas until September 1944, and entered combat in October 1944. The US First and Ninth Armies used M36s to re-equip tank destroyer battalions attached to armored divisions. The 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion began re-equipping on 30 September 1944. The Third US Army used them to re-equip towed battalions. The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) began retraining on 25 September 1944. The first tank destroyer battalion to receive
3219-889: The Battle of Barapind . M36s were also exported after World War II to various countries. They were used by the French army during the First Indochina War . The Republic of China Army acquired eight ex-French examples in 1955. They were stationed in Kinmen Island group, and saw combat during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. They were deemed more maneuverable than the bigger M48A3 and later CM11/12 MBTs, while being more powerful than M24 and M41 light tanks. As of April 2001, at least two still remained in service with troops in Lieyu Township . Another recipient
3330-626: The Guides Cavalry was equipped with a squadron of M36B2s, deployed to guard the artillery units. The M36B2 was phased out of the Armoured Corps after the war. Despite being obsolete by the time of the 1971 War , some independent squadrons of the Pakistani Armored Corps received a number of M36B2s. A depleted squadron of M36B2s of "Manto Force" saw action during the Battle of Chumb while 14th Independent Armored Squadron took part in
3441-518: The Kosovo War as decoys for NATO air strikes. American tank destroyer doctrine emphasized speed and gun power over armor. As the M10 and M36 were not purpose-built tank destroyers (they were based on tank chassis) they were not as fast as the Tank Destroyer Force wanted. General Andrew Bruce criticized the M36 due to it being too slow. The armor configuration of the M36 was identical to that of
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3552-518: The Tiger I , Tiger II , and newer Panzerjägers , made the 75mm armed US tanks and tank destroyers less effective. The presence of these German tanks expedited the development and production of US armored vehicles armed with 90mm guns - the first to be introduced being the M36 tank destroyer . In December 1944, and January 1945, the Battle of the Bulge put American ground forces on the operational defensive for
3663-561: The Tunisian Campaign of 1942–1943, the US forces would employ seven tank destroyer battalions. However, contrary to doctrine they were invariably broken up down to the platoon level to support infantry units. On the one occasion where a tank destroyer battalion was employed as an organized unit—the 601st , at the Battle of El Guettar —it defended against an attack by the 10th Panzer Division , destroying 30 of its 57 tanks. This engagement had
3774-552: The U.S. War Office approved Eisenhower's January 1945 request to convert all remaining towed units in the theatre to self-propelled guns. Despite US forces being subjected to a major armored thrust by the Germans in the Ardennes, Tank Destroyer units were not ordered to engage the enemy according to stated doctrine. This was because most units had already been attached to Divisions and had been broken up into smaller infantry support units in
3885-415: The 1,400-vehicle objective for 1944 to 1,342 vehicles. 350 more conversions were scheduled for 1945; this number was increased to 584. A final batch of 200 M10A1s was converted by the Montreal Locomotive Works in May 1945. The supply of M10A1s eventually ran out, so it was decided in January 1945 that M10 hulls would be used for all further conversions. American Locomotive Company converted 672 M10 hulls into
3996-651: The 1,413 M10A1s that had been completed could be requisitioned from training units. Due to the lack of M10A1 hulls, it was decided to finish up the initial production run by mounting M36 turrets onto M4A3 Sherman hulls (which had the same engine as the M10A1) with the necessary internal changes; these were designated M36B1. The production of 187 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1 ran from October to December 1944. From June to December 1944, Massey-Harris converted 500 M10A1s into M36s. From October to December 1944, American Locomotive Company converted 413 M10A1s into M36s. The Army reduced
4107-538: The 1990s. Two remained in service with the Republic of China Army at least until 2001. The vehicle is also known by the nickname General Jackson , or just Jackson , which was originally assigned to the vehicle by the Ordnance Department in November 1944 for publicity purposes, such as in newspapers, but does not appear to have been used by troops in the field during the war. U.S. combined arms doctrine on
4218-492: The 1st Army as a whole, three-quarters of the tank destroyers lost were towed rather than self-propelled. One battalion, the 801st , lost 17 towed guns in just two days, while the M10-equipped 644th , which fought alongside it, found ideal opportunities for close-range ambushes and claimed 17 tanks in the same time period. It was clear that the towed guns had proved ineffective and, once the Ardennes offensive had been dealt with,
4329-399: The 3rd Armored division, the 30th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division . The battle was also the first major engagement of the M36, with its 90 mm gun; the three battalions employed (the 610th , 703rd , and the 740th Tank Destroyer Battalions) proved highly effective. The M36 was beginning to be introduced in number when the offensive began, and was important throughout
4440-473: The 601st had successfully repulsed the attack, it had lost two-thirds of its strength in the process, contributing to Major General George Patton 's declaration that the concept was "unsuccessful in the conditions of the theater". McNair responded by further clarifying the role of the tank destroyer—it was to be a highly mobile force, which sought to find and occupy favorable positions to engage an oncoming enemy attack. A tank destroyer "need only to maneuver for
4551-592: The 76 mm M4A1E6 Shermans used by the Pakistani Armoured Corps. The M36s were called "Tank Busters" in the Pakistan Army , though due to constant mechanical failures probably because of inexperienced maintenance personnel and drivers, they were disliked by soldiers of the Pakistani Armoured Corps . Colonel M. Yahya Effendi who served with the 11th Cavalry in the 1965 war recollects that: It
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4662-468: The 7th Armored Division would counter-attack. This tactic allowed a gradual retreat of US forces, ceding only a few kilometers a day, and was instrumental in ruining the plans of advancing German forces. While the tank destroyers were broadly used in their intended role in the Ardennes—being used as a reserve to counter a massed armored attack – there were two significant differences between their use and
4773-517: The Battle of the Bulge, German armored capability in the West was seriously weakened, both through combat losses and through logistical limitations. As such, the tank destroyer battalions spent the closing months of the war as mobile support units, broadly distributed into secondary roles. As a result, mobile tank destroyer forces generally operated in the same way as the separate tank battalion - being used as direct fire support for infantry operations across
4884-472: The Greyhound), and an air compressor (MT2) complete with all its various air powered tools. Since neither the pioneer nor reconnaissance units were able to function as originally intended (see below), they were often attached to other units (such as engineering battalions or cavalry reconnaissance squadrons) that operated under the division or corps that the tank destroyer battalion had been assigned to. During
4995-464: The M10A1, save the turret. The thickness of the M36's armor ranged from 0.375 to 5.0 in (9.5 to 127.0 mm). The lower hull had 1 in (25 mm) thick armor on the sides and rear. The rounded, cast transmission cover was 2 in (51 mm) thick. Like the M10, the M36 did not have an extra 0.5 in (13 mm) floor plate under the driver's and assistant driver's stations to provide additional protection against mines. The glacis plate
5106-464: The M18s from the 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion made frequent changes in location after firing. As a result, tank losses were high while Tank Destroyer losses were comparatively low. Central Sector - St. Vith The mobile defense of the Battle of St. Vith involved M36 tank Destroyers from the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion blunting German armored thrusts. Once these thrusts were halted, tank companies from
5217-568: The M3 GMC and M10 tank destroyers—they were not fast enough, and had an overly high silhouette which made them vulnerable to direct enemy fire. Major General Omar Bradley , then commanding the U.S. II Corps in North Africa, suggested that towed anti-tank guns could be reintroduced to infantry units—while it was feared this would lead to a lack of offensive spirit, it was undeniable that a small towed gun could be dug in very quickly and efficiently, giving
5328-418: The M36 in early September, the 776th, was in transit from Italy at the time and did not use them in combat until October 1944. By the end of 1944, seven tank destroyer battalions had converted to the M36; the M36 had mostly replaced the M10 by the end of the war. The M36 was well-liked by its crews, being one of the few armored fighting vehicles available to US forces that could destroy heavy German tanks from
5439-571: The Pakistani 11th Cavalry, which had twelve M36B2s along with its main force of M48s , fought an intense five-day battle against Centurion MBTs of the Indian Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse . At one instance on 11 September, mechanic Daffadar Haq Nawaz took command of an M36B2 whose commander had been injured, and destroyed two Indian Centurions before his M36B2 was fatally hit. At the Chawinda ,
5550-1020: The United States. Twenty-five battalions were broken up in 1943 and 1944 for their manpower, either to reinforce existing battalions, for assignment to special non-divisional infantry regiments for a six-week period of training to be converted to infantry replacements (the bulk of the battalions), or were kept occupied with miscellaneous tasks such as serving as school troops, until their inactivation. Ten battalions (not counting one that did so while overseas) were converted to other types of units, chiefly tank, amphibious tractor, or armored field artillery battalions. In countless operations, mobile guns with armor protection used these characteristics to their decided advantage. They could move in or out of position freely; in combat, towed weapons waited for nightfall (except in extreme emergency) before moving, and once committed had little opportunity for their thin-skinned prime-movers to change them to another position. Towed guns had
5661-459: The actions of mobile Tank Destroyers within Bastogne was similar to stated doctrine - whenever German attacks threatened the front lines, tank destroyer units (along with US tanks) would rush to the area from behind and intercept invading armor. Because of the shortness of the interior lines within the besieged Bastogne, Tank Destroyer units could be directed very quickly to any location in response to
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#17328560490505772-916: The advance to stop any counter-attacking armored force. Towed tank destroyer units had no offensive role in an armored thrust, and were given the task of supporting infantry units or being used as indirect fire units to augment artillery. Mobile tank destroyers were also allowed to support infantry operations, or even function in an indirect fire role, so long as their main mission was not compromised. In terms of vehicle design, mobile tank destroyers were to be heavily armed, but with speed given priority over armor protection. Unlike tanks, mobile tank destroyers were not designed to survive hits from enemy AP rounds, but to mainly resist small arms fire. Crews were also trained to hide their vehicle from enemy fire. Three initial organizations were laid down in December 1941; two were light organisations equipped solely with 37mm guns, and were abandoned as soon as possible to standardise on
5883-473: The advent of heavy German tanks such as the Panther and Tiger , the standard U.S. tank destroyer, the M10 , was rapidly becoming obsolete, because its main armament, the 3-inch gun M7 , had difficulty defeating the thick frontal armor of the newer tanks past several hundred yards. In late summer 1942 American engineers had begun examining the potential of a new tank destroyer armed with a 90mm gun , and produced
5994-488: The battalion remained – three companies of three platoons of four guns – but the reconnaissance company was downgraded to two platoons in the headquarters company. However, the need for larger gun crews and more security troops meant that the manpower of the unit increased again. These units were equipped with 3-inch M5 guns towed by trucks or M3 Halftracks . However, combat experience in Normandy and in Italy – coupled with
6105-534: The bow machine gun of the M4A3 Sherman tank, and had 2,000 rounds of ammunition for it. The crew had their personal weapons for self-defense. Tank destroyer battalion (United States) The tank destroyer battalion was a type of military unit used by the United States Army during World War II . The unit was organized in one of two different forms—a towed battalion equipped with anti-tank guns , or
6216-409: The destruction of hostile tanks" —and repeatedly emphasized an offensive, vigorous spirit. Tank destroyer units were expected to be employed as complete battalions, held in reserve and committed at critical points, rather than parceled out as small defensive strongpoints. The emphasis was heavy on mobility, and the ability to outmaneuver the attacking armor; this would feed into vehicle design, and cause
6327-404: The distinction of being the only time a battalion would fight in the way envisaged by the original "tank destroyer" concept, as an organized independent unit opposing an armored force in open terrain. The 601st lost 24 of its 36 M3 GMC tank destroyers. Seven M10 tank destroyers from the 899th tank destroyer battalion were also lost in the battle. Critical analysis of the new force was mixed; while
6438-413: The enemy-occupied highlands. In the Battle of Betty Hill on 15–16 July 1953, the 57th Tank Company of the 3rd Tank Battalion provided direct fire support for a platoon defending the highlands overnight, which claimed the lives of 300 communist soldiers. However, the M36 had limitations for large-scale operations due to the equipment already being retired from the U.S. military: spare parts were scarce, and it
6549-459: The entire Ardennes offensive. Southern Sector - Bastogne The 705th , equipped with M18s, fought alongside the 101st Airborne at the siege of Bastogne , and played a key role in the defense of the town. Four M-18s, along with some M4 medium tanks and infantry from the 10th Armored division, occupied Noville, just north of Bastogne, and stopped a German armored attack with flank fires, killing 30 heavy tanks (Panthers and Tigers). Once surrounded,
6660-412: The eve of World War II held that tanks should be designed to fulfill the role of forcing a breakthrough into enemy rear areas. Separate GHQ tank battalions would support infantry in destroying fixed enemy defenses, and armored divisions would then exploit the breakthrough to rush into the enemy's vulnerable rear areas. U.S. tanks were expected to fight any hostile tanks they encountered in their attack, but
6771-449: The fact that purpose-built M18 Hellcat and M36 tank destroyers were becoming available – showed that the towed units were underperforming compared with self-propelled ones. After the Ardennes campaign , where 85% of all tank destroyer losses were towed guns, it was decided to convert all towed units back to self-propelled guns. The Reconnaissance company of the tank destroyer battalion
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#17328560490506882-491: The first six M36s for training in late October 1950. During the war, the South Korean Army had about 200 M36s and operated 9 tank companies. Each company was assigned to the frontline infantry division, and each tank platoon, consisting of five M36s, was attached to an infantry regiment for fire support missions. The M36 played a powerful role by direct firing at the enemy's position during the battle for high ground. Since it
6993-401: The first time in Europe, as a German army group of 24 divisions (including ten panzer divisions with 1,500 armored vehicles) launched a major offensive in the Ardennes forest. The main thrust fell on the 99th and 2nd Infantry divisions which jammed the northern shoulder. A secondary attack hit two overstretched infantry divisions, both with attached towed tank destroyer battalions. Once contact
7104-462: The front fenders, by maintenance units. The hull roof plate ranged from 0.75 in (19 mm) thick over the driver's and assistant driver's stations and turret ring, to 0.5 in (13 mm) thick over the engine compartment. The M36B1 had the hull armor configuration of the late production M4A3 Sherman tank. The sides of the M36's rounded turret were made of rolled armor plate 1.25 in (32 mm) thick. A massive hollow cast counterweight
7215-492: The frontal armor of a Tiger II at any range with the ammunition that was available to them. and that it was tactically viable to engage Panther tanks from the side. The M36 was used by the US Army in the Korean War . It could destroy any Soviet-made AFV deployed in that theater of operations. One postwar modification was the addition of a ball-mounted machine gun on the co-driver's side, as in many other armored fighting vehicles of
7326-490: The gun companies". Other missions included zone reconnaissance, battle reconnaissance, security missions and counter-reconnaissance. Each platoon had two M8 Greyhound armored cars and five 1/4 ton trucks (jeeps). In the context of Tank Destroyer doctrine - that the battalion be placed in the path of an enemy armored thrust - the reconnaissance platoons served to seek and locate areas for tank destroyer units to set up. The pioneer platoon had two general missions: to prevent
7437-415: The honored unit was 3rd Platoon, Company C, 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion US tank destroyer doctrine was essentially a defensive and reactive measure. Their role was to slow down, or even stop, a Blitzkrieg style armored thrust and prevent it from penetrating too deeply or from encircling friendly forces in a pincer movement. The idea was that, once an enemy armored thrust was expected to break through,
7548-487: The independent operation of tank-destroyer platoons, and crews began to have specialized training in their secondary roles, such as indirect gunnery or anti-fortification work. Changes in training were made to ensure that tank destroyer units acted according to operating procedure. This was necessary because too many tank destroyer units in North Africa were "behaving like tanks" and attacking German tanks "head-on", despite their lack of armor. Further training changes involved
7659-550: The issue as sufficiently important to be dealt with as a combined-arms organization, forming an Anti-Tank Planning Board headed by Lt. Col. Andrew D. Bruce , and appointing Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair to take immediate action on organizing anti-tank forces. Three anti-tank "groups" were quickly organized, with each of three anti-tank battalions drawn from infantry divisions and various support units, and tasked with "speedy and aggressive action to search out and attack opposing tanks before they had assumed formation". In August,
7770-455: The issue of which branch of the Army should control it—the infantry (as a defensive role), the cavalry (as a mobile response force), or the artillery (as heavy guns). The Armor Branch did not press for control of the anti-tank units, feeling that it would be at odds with their general principles of maintaining the offensive. In May, General George C. Marshall "cut through the knot" by declaring
7881-515: The largest employment of tank destroyer units was in the north-western Europe campaign through France, the Low Countries and Germany. They were employed from the very beginning of the campaign, with one battalion being landed on Utah Beach in a follow-up wave on D-Day . A revised version of Field Manual 18–5, introduced in June 1944, broadened the doctrine of tank destroyer operations. It allowed for
7992-401: The last few M3 GMC were replaced by the M10. Although the M10 was incapable of dealing with the frontal arc of the rarely-encountered Panther tanks and Tiger tanks , it was sufficient against most enemy armor encountered in Italy, and against heavy tanks from the flank. The M18 was first deployed in the summer of 1944, and was not seen as a great success in the Italian theater; its high speed
8103-438: The left side of the turret for the .50 caliber Browning M2HB antiaircraft machine gun was changed to a pintle mount at the rear. It was decided that production vehicles would use the chassis of the M10A1 tank destroyer, as the M10A1 had superior automotive characteristics, and significant numbers were available. After testing, an initial order for 300 vehicles was issued. The T71 was designated upon standardization on 1 June 1944 as
8214-438: The line. The most significant employment of tank destroyers in Normandy was in early August, at the Battle of Mortain , where the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed 3-inch guns) was on the defensive alongside the 30th Infantry Division . The division, which was in temporary positions and not prepared for a defensive engagement, was attacked by elements of four panzer divisions on 6 August, under heavy fog. The 823rd put up
8325-475: The mission of defeating massed enemy armored counterattacks was assigned to a new branch, the Tank Destroyer Force . Tank destroyer units were meant to counter German blitzkrieg tactics. They were to be held as a reserve at the corps or army level, and were to move quickly to the site of any massed enemy tank breakthrough, maneuvering aggressively and using ambush tactics (charging or chasing enemy tanks
8436-441: The movement of the battalion from being delayed by natural or artificial obstacles, and to impede or canalize the movement of the enemy by the creation of obstacles. The pioneer platoon consisted of a platoon headquarters and two sections, each section included ten men and two 1 + 1 ⁄ 2 -ton trucks equipped with pioneer tools and equipment; the platoon headquarters consisted of six men, an M20 armored utility car (a variant of
8547-440: The original doctrine. Firstly, there was no central strategic reserve—most tank destroyer battalions were assigned to divisions and kept near the front line, rather than massed in the rear. Secondly, the battalions were rarely committed as a whole; as had become common, they were effectively used as local anti-tank assets, with a platoon or a company assigned to an infantry battalion to bolster its defensive strength. After losses in
8658-446: The prototype 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage T53 , which placed the 90 mm gun in an open mounting at the rear of an M4 Sherman chassis. In August 1942, it was agreed to immediately produce 500 vehicles, with 3,500 more later. The Tank Destroyer Force objected, arguing that the design of the T53 was too rushed. The 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage T53E1 proved to be even worse, and the contract
8769-613: The role of the organic reconnaissance companies, which were not adequately performing their assigned tasks: route and area reconnaissance with the specific aim of finding locations for tank destroyers to ambush approaching enemy tanks. There were not enough anti-tank guns to cover the frontage and still have depth. That left gaps in the AT defenses that were filled by bringing tanks and tank destroyers way forward. These were such big targets, since they could not be dug- in, that many of them were knocked out by German 88mm guns and Mark VI tanks . As
8880-528: The speed of a vehicle to be prioritized over survivability. One side-effect of the new status of the tank destroyer force was that, as a fully-fledged independent branch, it was required by War Department policy to establish units manned by African Americans – the United States Army remained racially segregated until the Korean War , but the War Department placed pressure on the Army to ensure that
8991-494: The sponsons. For combat use, the 90mm gun M3 could fire five types of ammunition: The M82 armor-piercing capped shot was the main round used for engaging enemy tanks. It had a large explosive filler to increase damage after penetration. It was capable of penetrating 129 mm (5.1 in) of armor angled at 30 degrees from the vertical at 500 yd (0.28 mi; 0.46 km) and 122 mm (4.8 in) of armor at 1,000 yd (0.57 mi; 0.91 km). The T30E16 HVAP shot
9102-527: The successful defense. They were widely used during the Ardennes fighting, especially in the northern sector around Malmedy , Spa , Stoumont. Large numbers were involved in several actions against the tanks of Kampfgruppe Peiper , the spearhead of the German 6. Panzer Army , around La Gleize . Elements of the 740th Tank Battalion and 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion closed from Remouchamps were deployed into defensive positions in front of Stoumont alongside elements of
9213-516: The tank destroyer battalion (as a single unit and operating behind the front lines), would position itself to intercept the enemy while a more complete defense is organized at corps or higher level. This was to be the case for both towed and mobile tank destroyer battalions. As the enemy armored thrust approached, organic reconnaissance units would communicate to battalion commanders the best locations for tank destroyer units to place themselves in, while organic pioneer units would create blockades or help
9324-402: The tank destroyers dig into their positions. As the enemy armored thrust came within range, the hidden tank destroyer units would fire upon enemy tanks and then retreat to another position once they began to draw fire. In the offense, mobile tank destroyers were not given the duty to hunt down enemy tanks, as this would be the role of their own tanks. Instead, they were to be positioned close to
9435-414: The tank destroyers. But once the battle was joined, the original plans with few exceptions were often discarded and the destroyers were ordered to go forward as tanks ahead of the infantry... When operating with armored forces, it was common to attach a company or a platoon to a tank battalion or company, and use them in an overwatch role. When operating in defense, tanks and tank destroyers were pooled as
9546-503: The third type, modeled after the 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion , and officially declared the standard organization with the publication of FM 18–5 in June 1942. This was designated the "tank destroyer battalion, heavy, self-propelled", and consisted of: The three tank destroyer companies each had one platoon of four 37mm self-propelled guns and two platoons of 75mm self-propelled guns. Each platoon had two sections of two guns each, an anti-aircraft section of two self-propelled 37mm guns, and
9657-412: The time. Due to the shortage of M26 and M46 tanks, the M36 became one of the preferred armored vehicles for MAP (Military Assistance Program) transfers. The M36 was treated as a tank by the Republic of Korea Army despite technically being considered a self-propelled gun. The South Korean military , which faced the war without having a single tank, pushed for the creation of an armored unit and acquired
9768-475: The vehicle's pioneer tools; an axe, a crowbar, a mattock handle and head, a double-sided 10 lb (4.5 kg) sledgehammer, and a track tensioning wrench, so no appliqué armor bosses could be fitted there. The sides and rear of the upper hull had angled extensions or covers over the upper run of track. These extensions often got in the way of fitting duckbill extended end connectors, used to reduce ground pressure on soft ground, and were often removed, along with
9879-671: Was Yugoslavia , which received 399. The engine was later replaced by the 500 hp Soviet-made diesel engine used in T-55 main battle tanks. Yugoslavian M36s participated in the Slovenian War of Independence (1991) and Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995), but they were withdrawn immediately from service with the Croatian Armed Forces after the war. M36s were also used by Serbian forces in Bosnia and Croatia, and they were used during
9990-404: Was 1.5 in (38 mm) thick, sloped at 55 degrees from the vertical, and had eight large bosses on it to attach appliqué armor plates. The sides and rear of the upper hull were 0.75 in (19 mm) thick, sloped at 38 degrees from the vertical. Earlier M10s converted to M36s had 12 appliqué armor bosses on each side of the M36's upper hull. The rear upper hull plate was used for storage of
10101-436: Was a normal substitute standard M77 armor piercing shot that was heat-treated to improve its hardness and fitted with a ballistic windshield to improve its drag characteristics. The T33 and T30E16 were only issued in very small numbers towards the end of World War II. The M71 high explosive shell was used for indirect fire, or engaging enemy infantry, antitank guns, light vehicles, or other soft targets. The M36 tank destroyer
10212-486: Was an awkward fighting vehicle in every sense. The synchronization of the engines was a nuisance for the mechanics, and while driving, an inexperienced or flappy driver could smash the single plate clutch by sudden release, thus immobilizing the vehicle. Their first combat use by the Pakistan Army was in early September 1965 during Operation Grand Slam at Chumb when 11 M36B2s under the command of Major Mian Raza Shah of
10323-474: Was canceled. In October 1942, the Ordnance Department tested mounting the experimental 90 mm gun T7 into the turret of an M10 tank destroyer . General Andrew Bruce , head of the Tank Destroyer Force, objected to the project, favoring the lighter Gun Motor Carriage M18 'Hellcat' , but was ignored. Mounting the 90 mm gun was straightforward, but the gun proved too heavy for the M10's turret, and
10434-510: Was capable of penetrating 221 mm (8.7 in) of armor angled at 30 degrees from the vertical at 500 yd (0.28 mi; 0.46 km), and 199 mm (7.8 in) of armor at 1,000 yd (0.57 mi; 0.91 km). The T30E16 HVAP round had difficulty with the highly sloped glacis plate of the German Panther tank , so the T33 AP shot was developed to solve this problem. The T33 shot
10545-463: Was difficult to obtain further fully functional vehicles. Servicing became even harder because units were scattered around infantry units. Therefore, the Korean Army began operating in large numbers, forming three armored battalions in early 1953. Pakistan procured between 25 and 75 M36B2s in 1956, which were refurbished second-hand units from US stocks. Its 90 mm gun had better performance than
10656-528: Was disbanded shortly after the end of the war when the concept had been shown to be militarily unsound. In April 1941, a conference focused on the future of antitank operations. The immediate effect was to create an anti-tank battalion in infantry divisions, but this organic anti-tank capacity was not deemed sufficient. The conference gave broad support to the idea of creating mobile anti-tank defensive units (commanded by corps or army formations) which could be deployed to meet an armored attack. The effort stalled on
10767-401: Was equipped with a single .50 caliber (12.7 mm) Browning M2HB machine gun for anti-aircraft or anti-personnel use, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition. Due to the difficulty in firing the .50 caliber machine gun directly to the front, the pintle was often repositioned to the front of the turret, or a .30 caliber (7.62 mm) Browning M1919A4 machine gun mounted there. The M36B1 retained
10878-452: Was explicitly prohibited) to destroy enemy tanks. This led to a requirement for fast, well-armed vehicles. Though equipped with turrets (unlike most self-propelled anti-tank guns of the day), the typical American design was more heavily gunned, but more lightly armored, and thus more maneuverable, than a contemporary tank. The idea was to use speed and agility to bring a powerful self-propelled anti-tank gun into action against enemy tanks. With
10989-538: Was fitted to all vehicles after the first 600, beginning in early November 1944. A folding travel lock better-suited to the 90 mm gun was added to the rear hull at about this time. The gun itself was also modified with a better equilibrator and more powerful elevating mechanism. As the initial contract was for 300 vehicles, General Motors' Fisher Tank Arsenal produced the last 300 M10A1 tank destroyers in January 1944 without turrets for immediate conversion to M36s, which took place from April to July 1944. The contract
11100-487: Was judged a success—though not without some disgruntled voices in the Armored Branch arguing that the umpires had rigged the results — and on 27 November, Marshall ordered the establishment of a tank destroyer Tactical and Firing Center at Fort Hood , Texas , under Bruce, and the activation of 53 new anti-tank battalions under the command of General Headquarters. The term "tank destroyer" was used from this point on, as it
11211-484: Was later increased to 500 vehicles, as it was decided that existing M10A1s were also to be converted to M36s. The requirement was later increased to 600 vehicles on 15 May 1944. As it was found that the M10 tank destroyer had struggled against German tanks like the Panther and especially the Tiger during the Normandy campaign , the contract was increased to 1,400 vehicles on 29 July 1944. This caused problems, as only 913 of
11322-406: Was made up of three reconnaissance platoons and one pioneer platoon, along with supporting units. The reconnaissance platoons had two main missions for the battalion's tank destroyer units: "Route reconnaissance, particularly of those routes over which the gun companies will move to reach combat areas", and "Area reconnaissance, particularly to locate general areas suitable for use as combat areas by
11433-478: Was made, the towed guns were unable to reposition themselves or withdraw, and were often overrun by the enemy advance, or simply outflanked by infantry. The gun crews, unlike their self-propelled counterparts, had no protection against small-arms fire, and could easily be driven back by a squad of infantry. This lack of mobility was aggravated by the cold wet weather, and the rough conditions, which tended to bog down wheeled vehicles and immobilize fixed guns. Throughout
11544-413: Was no reduction in actual combat strength. In early 1943, stemming from problems found in North Africa, the Army began to consider a more defensive role for tank destroyer units. After trials in January, fifteen battalions were ordered to convert to towed guns on 31 March, and shortly thereafter it was decided that half of all tank destroyer units would convert to a towed organization. The broad outline of
11655-516: Was only of limited use in the restricted terrain, and as a result it was effectively a slightly up-gunned M10. In August 1942, the Tank Destroyer Command was redesignated the "Tank Destroyer Center," representing a "sharp restriction of authority" to purely a training establishment, with tank destroyer battalions leaving the custody of the Center entirely after their training was finished. From
11766-401: Was operated by Koreans, command and communication between infantry and armored units were smooth, and it had a significant effect on boosting morale. During the Battle of White Horse during 6–15 October 1952, the 53rd Tank Company, assigned to the 9th Infantry Division , contributed to the victory by bombarding the side of the enemy's offensive force and suppressing heavy weapons deployed on
11877-430: Was ordered that half of all tank destroyer battalions were to be equipped with towed guns; this was a major distortion of Bradley's suggestion. The expected employment of the battalions shifted. While the formal doctrine still called for the employment of complete battalions, the Tank Destroyer Center began to emphasize a new focus on combined arms training and small-unit actions. New field manuals were prepared to discuss
11988-455: Was seen as a more psychologically powerful term. On 3 December, all existing anti-tank battalions were reassigned to General Headquarters and converted to tank destroyer battalions. The new tank destroyer doctrine was formally stated in Field Manual 18–5, Tactical Employment, Tank Destroyer Unit , in June 1942. It laid down a focused doctrine— "There is but one objective of tank destroyer units…
12099-582: Was the Italian campaign , beginning with the landings in Sicily in July 1943, and continuing into mainland Italy that September. While German armor was present in the theater, it was rarely committed to battle in large groups; this was partly a result of the broken, heavily cultivated, terrain, but also due to a growing conservatism and defensive ethos on the German side. As a result, the tank destroyers found themselves used for
12210-500: Was the performance of the organic reconnaissance units, who had never experienced such extended distances in training as they were forced to operate in North Africa. With an inability to work together as a battalion, along with the poor performance of the organic reconnaissance units, many vehicles were lost in the Battle of El Guettar. Major changes to the overall doctrine emerged from the North African campaign. Flaws had emerged in
12321-523: Was welded to the rear of the turret to balance the heavy gun. The top was 0.38 to 1 in (9.7 to 25.4 mm) thick, the sides were 1.25 in (32 mm) thick, and the rear was 1.75 to 5 in (44 to 127 mm) thick. The rounded cast gun shield was 3 in (76 mm) thick. The M36 tank destroyer used an M10A1 chassis (the M36B1 used an M4A3 Sherman chassis, while the M36B2 used an M10 chassis) mounting
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