80-655: The Quintinshill rail disaster was a multi-train rail crash which occurred on 22 May 1915 outside the Quintinshill signal box near Gretna Green in Dumfriesshire , Scotland. It resulted in the deaths of over 200 people and remains the worst rail disaster in British history . The Quintinshill signal box controlled two passing loops , one on each side of the double-track Caledonian Main Line linking Glasgow and Carlisle (part of
160-407: A Moffat to Glasgow and Edinburgh commuter service, with which the stopper connected at Beattock . Therefore, in the event of one or both of the sleepers running late, the stopping train would depart at its advertised time of 6.10 am, and then be shunted at one of the intermediate stations or signal boxes to allow the sleeper(s) to overtake it. One of the locations where that could take place
240-426: A token ) was logged. Technological advances including mechanical fixed signals in the 1840s, the electric telegraph and block working in the 1850s, and proper mechanical interlocking from 1856, allowed safer, more expeditious train working, and more complicated track layouts to be controlled single-handedly. The advent of such technological advances gradually led to the provision of an enclosed workspace known as
320-476: A " cornfield meet " in the United States. Train accidents can occur due to a range of factors, including one or more of the following: This rail-transport related article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Signalman (rail) A signalman or signaller is an employee of a railway transport network who operates the points and signals from a signal box in order to control
400-635: A BBC Scotland documentary made to mark the centenary of the disaster, Quintinshill: Britain's Deadliest Rail Disaster . He told the documentary makers: "All those that could be rescued were rescued. Many of them had amputations carried out underneath burning carriages so that they could be rescued. But many, of course, were trapped in such a position that they couldn't be got out or else the fire had taken hold, and they couldn't be got to. And, of course, since then, we've heard stories of some soldiers being shot and some soldiers possibly taking their own lives. It's never been formally documented. My own personal belief
480-604: A physical reminder not to clear his signals for the Up line. Neither man did so, and Signalman Tinsley failed to check for the presence of a lever collar when he took over the working of the box. Meakin and Tinsley admitted in the Coroner's inquest that they did not regularly use the lever collars and this was confirmed by Hutchinson. Another important precaution designed specifically to prevent such signalling errors also failed to be implemented on that day - Rule 55 . Under this rule, if any train
560-565: A result, both signalmen were charged with manslaughter in England, then convicted of culpable homicide after a trial in Scotland; the two terms are broadly equivalent. After they were released from a Scottish jail in 1916, they were re-employed by the railway company, although not as signalmen. The disaster occurred at Quintinshill signal box , which was an intermediate box in a remote location, sited to control two passing loops , one on each side of
640-556: A senior retired army officer who had served with the Royal Scots , saying that he believed that some soldiers were "probably" shot in mercy killings . The BBC said that while no official army records of the alleged shooting existed, "many reports written in the press at the time of the accident suggested that some trapped soldiers, threatened with the prospect of being burnt alive in the raging inferno, took their own lives or were shot by their officers". The colonel's remarks were recorded for
720-449: A shortage of carriages meant that the railway company had to press into service obsolete Great Central Railway stock. These carriages had wooden bodies and frames, with very little crash resistance compared with steel-framed carriages, and were gas-lit using the Pintsch gas system. The gas was stored in reservoirs slung under the underframe, and these ruptured in the collision. Escaping gas
800-633: A signal box, signal cabin or interlocking tower. The principles of British-style railway signalling have changed little since the Victorian era and early 20th century. Modern technology has generally reduced the labour required per train movement. In many cases, a switch, button or computer command is used to alter the lie of points and control signals. Although many classic mechanical signal boxes remain in use, these are gradually being replaced by modern power signalling systems on most railways. The heartlands of British-style railway signalling could be said to be
880-587: A signalman's duty to check each train that passed their signal box, looking for the red tail lamp exhibited on the trailing vehicle, the sighting of which confirmed that the train was still complete, and thus the section was clear. Each train movement was logged, by hand, in a Train Register Book, and it was normal practice to provide a special desk to support this sizeable book. As well as train movements, every communication between signalmen and adjacent signal boxes via bell codes (when accepting trains or dealing with
SECTION 10
#1732852718186960-411: Is a type of disaster involving two or more trains . Train wrecks often occur as a result of miscommunication , as when a moving train meets another train on the same track, when the wheels of train come off the track or when a boiler explosion occurs. Train accidents have often been widely covered in popular media and in folklore . A head-on collision between two trains is colloquially called
1040-466: Is held. An official inquiry, completed on 17 June 1915 for the Board of Trade , found the cause of the collision to be neglect of the rules by two signalmen . With the northbound loop occupied, the northbound local train had been reversed onto the southbound line to allow passage of two late-running northbound sleepers. Its presence was then overlooked, and the southbound troop train was cleared for passage. As
1120-423: Is that it probably did happen, in a sense of compassion, of mercy killing. It's almost impossible, sitting here, to comprehend what it was like that morning." The BBC said that this section of the interview with Watson would not be broadcast. According to Earnshaw "Many were trapped inside the burning train; injured men with no hope of escape begged their rescuers to shoot them whilst gunfire added an eerie effect to
1200-509: The Board of Trade . Druitt had already spent some time at the accident site and spent the day in Carlisle interviewing witnesses, including both Meakin and Tinsley. Both men were honest about their failures to abide by the rules and their generally lax behaviour. Druitt presented his report to the Board of Trade on 17 June 1915 and laid the blame squarely on Meakin and Tinsley. This disastrous collision
1280-452: The Pintsch gas lighting system of the old wooden carriages of the troop train ignited, starting a fire which soon engulfed all five trains. Only half the soldiers on the troop train survived. Those killed were mainly Territorial soldiers from the 1/7th ( Leith ) Battalion, the Royal Scots heading for Gallipoli . The precise death toll was never established with confidence as some bodies were never recovered, having been wholly consumed by
1360-518: The United Kingdom , New South Wales , Victoria , Queensland , India and South Africa . The signaller's main duty is to ensure trains get from A to B safely and on time. The classic Train Register Book remains in use at most older installations, with train describers and Automatic Train Recording taking its place in more modern power signalling schemes. All trains are listed in a computer system in
1440-545: The West Coast Main Line ). At the time of the accident, both passing loops were occupied with goods trains, and a northbound local passenger train was standing on the southbound main line. The first collision occurred when a southbound troop train travelling from Larbert to Liverpool collided with the stationary local train. A minute later the wreckage was struck by a northbound sleeping car express train travelling from London Euston to Glasgow Central . Gas from
1520-469: The Down passing loop was occupied by the 4.50 am goods train from Carlisle. Two southbound trains were also due to pass through the box's section of track - a special freight train consisting of empty coal wagons and a special troop train. With the Down loop occupied, night shift signalman Meakin decided to shunt the local passenger train onto the Up main line. At this point, the southbound empty coal train
1600-467: The Kirkpatrick signalman would not have been permitted to offer another Up train to Quintinshill until he had received the "obstruction removed" bell from the Quintinshill signalman to confirm that the shunted train was clear of the Up line. However, although the "train out of section" signal was belled to Kirkpatrick, the "blocking back" signal was never sent. Significantly, the "train out of section" signal
1680-467: The Midland, it was at times very difficult for signalmen to keep track of train movements and make optimal traffic regulation decisions whilst operating signalling equipment. Consequently, fast trains could be delayed by slower trains on the line ahead. Moreover, there was no-one with specific responsibilities relating to the efficient, economical use of rolling stock in traffic, which made it difficult to manage
SECTION 20
#17328527181861760-422: The Quintinshill home signal the block regulations prohibited Tinsley from accepting the troop train. However, despite the fact that he had travelled to work on the footplate of the local train minutes earlier and that the train was standing in clear sight directly in front of the signal box, Tinsley forgot about its presence. He, therefore, accepted the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, where it
1840-595: The UK in time order. This system is known as TRUST . Any train can be found on here together with its schedule and route. If a train is late, it is up to the signaller to ascertain in what order the trains should run, known as regulating trains. In busy locations, signalling can be very challenging and stressful, in a manner similar to air traffic control . Signallers are therefore susceptible to stress-related illness. Following protracted industrial action from unions and, much more recently, detailed studies on fatigue and ergonomics in
1920-517: The classic Telephone Train Control system has been generally abolished, with a few exceptions. To improve the efficiency of train working, train controllers (also known as controllers, district controllers, line controllers and area controllers) were progressively introduced on many British-style railways in the early years of the 20th century, the first being on the Midland Railway in 1907. Although
2000-408: The coal train. At this point, two crucial failures in the signalling procedure occurred (see Rules breaches ). After being relieved by signalman Tinsley, the night duty signalman Meakin remained in the signal box reading the newspaper that Tinsley had brought. Both guards from the freight trains had also entered the signal box, and war news in the newspaper was discussed. Shortly afterwards, because
2080-625: The contingencies of underutilisation, wastage and allocation of inappropriate locomotive power. In the face of rising costs, operating economies were particularly important to the private British railway companies in the early twentieth century. The Train Controller was intended to manage these and other difficulties. It is important to note that while Train Controllers were responsible for traffic regulation within their areas of control, they generally had no safety-critical responsibilities, which were within
2160-620: The crash, her immediate thought was that the Germans had come. Mrs Dunbar telephoned doctors in Carlisle for assistance. Mr Dunbar spent the day assisting with the rescue efforts. The last known survivor of the accident, Peter Stoddart, was interviewed in Wisbech by Michael Simkins in around 1985. Simkins wrote in The Guardian in 2001: "I asked him about a story I had heard of an officer who went about
2240-599: The dead troops was erected in Rosebank Cemetery in 1916. Of the troops, 83 bodies were identified, 82 were recovered but unrecognisable, and 50 were missing altogether, giving the total of 215, later revised by the army to 214. The soldiers were buried with full military honours . Among the coffins were four bodies which were unidentified and appeared to be remains of children. One coffin was simply labelled as 'little girl, unrecognisable,' and another as 'three trunks, probably children'. As no children were reported missing,
2320-546: The design of signal box lighting, seating and signalling equipment. The signalman is known by various other corporate job titles, including Signaller, Area Controller and Network Controller. In the United States , a signalman is sometimes officially known as such, but is also known under other names, including Leverman and Switchman . At some locations, a Station master or Porter performs signalling duties in addition to other work such as selling tickets and cleaning. Although
2400-591: The double-track main line of the Caledonian Railway . On that section of the main line between Carlisle and Glasgow, in British railway parlance , Up is towards Carlisle and Down is towards Glasgow . The area around the signal box was thinly-populated countryside with scattered farms. The Ordnance Survey 1:2500 map of 1859 (but not modern maps) shows a house named Quintinshill at approximately 55.0133°N 3.0591°W, around one-half mile (800 m) south-south-east of
2480-515: The early-shift signaller at 6.00 am. On the day of the disaster, George Meakin was the night signalman, while James Tinsley was to work the early day shift. At the time of the accident, normal northbound traffic through the section included two overnight sleeping car expresses , from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh , respectively, which were due to depart Carlisle at 5.50 am and 6.05 am. They were followed by an all-stations local passenger service from Carlisle to Beattock , which
Quintinshill rail disaster - Misplaced Pages Continue
2560-404: The empty wagon train was out of the section and clear of the Up main line at Quintinshill, the Quintinshill signalman should have followed this up by sending the "blocking back" bell code to Kirkpatrick. This would have advised the Kirkpatrick signalman that another train (i.e. the Down local) was occupying the Up main line inside the Quintinshill home signal . On receipt of the "blocking back" bell
2640-520: The enlisted men and one officer were declared unfit for service overseas and were returned to Edinburgh. Only Lieutenant Colonel W. Carmichael Peebles and five other officers were fit enough to sail from Liverpool for overseas service. It was reported in the Edinburgh Weekly that on their march from the port to the railway station, the survivors were mistaken for prisoners of war and pelted by some children. There were four steam locomotives hauling
2720-491: The event of a general disruption to train services, during which the train control system simply could not handle the demands placed upon it. In exceptional cases, district control offices were abandoned and train controllers appointed at key signal boxes (as in the London Midland Region of British Railways in the late 1960s), obviating the need for telephonic communication. This practice was followed by what has been
2800-416: The express train stood in a siding with all their paint burnt off. The overwhelming majority of fatalities were among the men of the Royal Scots . The precise number was not established as the roll list of the regiment was destroyed by the fire. Lt.-Col. Druitt's official report gives an estimated total of 215 deaths and a further 191 injured. Of the 500 soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Royal Scots on
2880-558: The fire, and the roll list of the regiment was also destroyed in the fire. The official death toll was 227 (215 soldiers, nine other passengers and three railway employees), but the Army later reduced their 215 figure by one. Not counted in the 227 were four victims thought to be children, but whose remains were never claimed or identified. The soldiers were buried together in a mass grave in Edinburgh 's Rosebank Cemetery , where an annual remembrance
2960-409: The goods train in the down loop and the trucks of the empty coal train in the up loop. At 6.53 am Tinsley sent the "Obstruction Danger" bell signal to both Gretna and Kirkpatrick, stopping all traffic and alerting others to the disaster. Many men on the troop train were killed as a result of the two collisions, but the disaster was made much worse by a subsequent fire. The great wartime traffic and
3040-483: The goods train in the down loop caught fire. He also concluded that had Quintinshill been equipped with track circuiting , then the accident would have been avoided as the electrical interlocking of the signals would have prevented Tinsley from pulling the relevant signal levers, but that with its simple layout and good visibility from the signal box Quintinshill was a low priority for track circuits to be installed. Rail crash A train accident or train wreck
3120-498: The inquiry into the accident. The King sent a telegram to Caledonian Railway general manager Donald Mathieson expressing sympathy and asking to be kept informed of the recovery of those injured. On 23 May, a recruitment meeting was held at the Usher Hall , Edinburgh, to raise a new battalion. The railway was reopened through Quintinshill on the morning of 25 May, although not all the wreckage had been removed. The two locomotives of
3200-446: The local train had been stopped for longer than three minutes, its fireman , George Hutchinson, was dispatched to the box. Contrary to the rule, Hutchinson merely signed the train register, using a pen that Tinsley (who was intent on filling in the missing entries in the train register) handed over his shoulder without looking up. Hutchinson then returned to his engine without reminding the signaller of his train's position or checking that
3280-474: The local train had stood on the main line for over three minutes, pursuant to Rule 55 its driver sent fireman George Hutchinson to the box, although he left at 6.46 am, having failed to fully perform the required duties (see Rules breaches ). At 6.38 am the first of the northbound expresses from Carlisle passed Quintinshill safely. At 6.42 am Kirkpatrick " offered " the southbound troop train to Quintinshill. Signalman Tinsley immediately accepted
Quintinshill rail disaster - Misplaced Pages Continue
3360-438: The local train was standing on the Up main line. Once the local train had crossed onto the Up main line, Meakin allowed the empty coal wagon train to proceed into the Up loop. Arriving late aboard the local train, the early day shift signalman Tinsley reached Quintinshill signal box shortly after 6.30 am. At 6.34 am one of the signalmen (it was never established which) gave the "train out of section" bell to Kirkpatrick for
3440-515: The local train, two passengers died, with none seriously injured; on the express, seven passengers died, with a further 51 and 3 members of railway staff seriously injured. Some bodies were never recovered, having been wholly consumed by the fire, and when the bodies of the men of the Royal Scots were returned to Leith on 24 May, they were buried together in a mass grave in Edinburgh 's Rosebank Cemetery . The coffins were laid three deep, with each on
3520-495: The missing train register entries as soon as he took over the signal box may have distracted him from his duties in relation to the handover of the box and seems likely to have been a factor in his subsequent acceptance of the troop train. Immediately after the empty coal train had stopped in the Up loop, two crucial failures in block signalling procedure occurred. Firstly, as soon as the "train out of section" bell code had been telegraphed to Kirkpatrick signal box to advise that
3600-422: The movement of trains. The first signalmen, originally called Railway Policemen (leading to the nickname of 'Bobby'), were employed in the early 19th century and used flags to communicate with each other and train drivers. The railways were already in existence by then and The British Transport police say that,"early railway policemen were probably sworn in as special constables under a statute passed in 1673 during
3680-637: The norm since the introduction of modern power signalling schemes, viz. the traditional train controller's substitution by a senior signalman, signal box supervisor or traffic regulator, situated in the signal box. In the UK, the beginning of the end for classic "Control" came with the commissioning of large power signal boxes from the 1950s. A power signal box (PSB) often has a number of signalmen operating multiple electric or computerized signalling panels and large illuminated track diagrams showing wide areas of operation. This makes traffic regulation much easier for signalmen to handle among themselves. In some cases,
3760-408: The omnibus circuit, making the role of the train controller somewhat self-defeating. Secondly, signalmen were often in a better position to make train working decisions by virtue of their experience and by being on the spot, but were prevented from doing so by bureaucratic procedures. In silent admission of the deficiencies of this system, signalmen were generally left to their own devices, especially in
3840-400: The paper into the train register in his own handwriting, making it appear that the shift change had occurred at the correct time. The changing of shifts was a safety-critical moment where it was essential that the signalman taking over the box was fully aware of the position of trains and for all block signalling requirements to be properly completed and recorded. The need for Tinsley to copy out
3920-452: The part of signalmen. Druitt was also critical of Hutchinson for his failure to comply properly with Rule 55 , and also of Gretna stationmaster Alexander Thorburn, who, in Druitt's opinion, cannot have been unaware of the irregular shift changes operated by Meakin and Tinsley. Druitt concluded that even had all the trains been lit by electricity, a fire would still have occurred as the wagons of
4000-481: The positions of Train Controller and Signalman were always distinct from the inception of the former in 1907, Train Controllers perform work previously executed by Signalmen in some cases. In many railways, modern technology has seen the positions of Signalman and Train Controller united (or reunited, in the sense that traffic regulation and train path allocation were originally duties of the Signalman anyway). Irrespective,
4080-414: The proper precautions were taken. In the six months before the accident, the 6.17 am local train had been shunted at Quintinshill 21 times, and on four of those occasions it had been shunted onto the Up line. The disaster occurred on the morning of 22 May. On this morning, both of the northbound night expresses were running late, and the northbound local train required to be shunted at Quintinshill, but
SECTION 50
#17328527181864160-425: The rail industry, prudent operators implemented strict guidelines relating to the length and number of consecutive shifts permissible for safety-critical workers, including signallers. These guidelines are ideally aimed at improving safety and reducing fatigue at work, but also the overall lifestyle of employees. In some cases, physical changes in the work environment also followed these studies, including changes in
4240-562: The railway company moved the bodies to Glasgow for possible identification, but no one came forward to claim the bodies; which were buried in Glasgow's Western Necropolis on 26 May. The engine crew of the troop train were both from Carlisle, and they were also buried on 26 May at Stanwix Cemetery. The surviving officers and men of the Royal Scots were taken to Carlisle on the evening of 22 May. The next morning, they went on by train to Liverpool, but on arrival there, they were medically examined: all
4320-473: The realm of the signalmen and station masters . Typically, train controllers were stationed at district or "divisional" control offices which were linked by omnibus circuit telephone systems with selective code rings, to all signal boxes in the area. This method of operating was sometimes known as the Telephone Train Control System. If the signalman required directions, he simply lifted
4400-448: The rear six, which had broken away during the impact and rolled back along the line a short distance. The fire also affected four coaches from the express train and some goods wagons. Such was the intensity of the fire that all the coal in the locomotive tenders was consumed. Amongst the first rescuers to arrive at the scene were Mr and Mrs Dunbar, caretakers at The Old Blacksmith's Shop, Gretna Green. Mrs Dunbar stated that when she heard
4480-500: The receiver and spoke to the train controller on the omnibus circuit. If the train controller wanted to issue instructions or receive train arrival and departure times, he selected the relevant signal box on his telephone, which rang the control phone therein. There were two main problems with this system. Firstly, the train controllers could become overloaded with path requests from signalmen, train recording and other duties. This led to delays for signalmen waiting for their turn to speak on
4560-402: The reign of Charles II. They were appointed to preserve law and order on the construction site of the railway patrol and protect the line control of the movement of railway traffic. ) and hourglasses for the purpose of Time Interval Working between stations.) In South Africa, a local rail signaller named Jack achieved some fame for the unique distinction of being a chacma baboon . It was
4640-568: The scene as small arms and rifle shells in the luggage vans began to explode in the intense heat." By 24 May, newspapers were already reporting the accident as the deadliest in the United Kingdom. The initial estimate was 158 dead, with over 200 injured. The bodies of the victims were initially laid in a field by the line and covered in white sheets. They were later taken to a nearby farm or to Gretna Green Village Hall. The Board of Trade appointed Lieutenant Colonel Edward Druitt , R.E. to head
4720-470: The scene shooting men trapped in the burning wreckage. 'That was true. I saw that. He was a Scottish gentleman, eventually a millionaire. But he had to.' There was a suspicion of a chuckle in his voice as he added: 'And there were one or two other survivors who made themselves scarce. They took their opportunity.'" Stoddart died on 4 July 1988 following a stroke. On 16 May 2015, the BBC reported Colonel Robert Watson,
4800-546: The signal box. The nearest settlement was Gretna , 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to the south of the box, on the Scottish side of the Anglo-Scottish border . Responsibility for Quintinshill signal box rested with the stationmaster at Gretna railway station who, on the day of the accident, was Alexander Thorburn. The box was staffed by one signalman , on a shift system. In the mornings, a night-shift signaller would be relieved by
4880-400: The signalman had placed a lever collar on the signal lever. Various railwaymen were required to visit the signal box as part of their duties, but it was expressly forbidden for such visitors to stay any longer than necessary due to the potential for the distraction of the signalman. However, signal boxes were relatively comfortable places to spend time (having a stove, kettle and the company of
SECTION 60
#17328527181864960-424: The signalman), so there was a temptation for such visitors to linger. When Tinsley arrived at Quintinshill signal box on the morning of the accident, the guard of the down goods train was leaving the box having been there for around ten minutes, while the guard of the up empty wagon train arrived at the same time and was still in the box when the first collision occurred 15 minutes later. Furthermore, after handing over
5040-450: The signalmen were identified. For the 6.00 am shift change, the signalmen had developed an informal arrangement allowing whoever was working the early day shift to arrive for work at around 6.30 am. This allowed the day shift signalman to get up slightly later, and in the case of Signalman Tinsley (who lived in Gretna) it enabled him to travel to work on the local train on days when it
5120-605: The specifics of their duties varied between railways, train controllers were responsible for tracking train movements (especially freight), ensuring freight trains were loaded economically and provided with suitable locomotive power, liaising with train crew rostering personnel, ordering additional trains to run for the carriage of extra freight tonnage or passengers as required, allocating paths for unscheduled services and making alterations to scheduled working in order to maximize efficiency and deal with any irregularity in traffic which may affect smooth operation. On busy railways such as
5200-488: The three passenger trains directly involved in the collisions, the express train having been double headed . All were designs built for the Caledonian Railway. The two locomotives that collided head-on in the first impact (when the troop train hit the local train) were both written off and scrapped. The local train's locomotive had been No. 907 of the 903 Class ( 4-6-0 wheel arrangement). The troop train's locomotive
5280-695: The top row covered in the Union Flag . The public were excluded from the cemetery, although 50 wounded servicemen who were convalescing at a nearby military hospital were allowed to attend. The ceremony lasted three hours, at the end of which a volley of three shots was fired, and the Last Post was sounded. The bodies were escorted by the 15th and 16th Battalions of Royal Scots, the Edinburgh Pals battalions recently assembled and still undergoing training. The cortege took four hours to complete its task. A memorial to
5360-414: The troop train, and four minutes later, he was offered and accepted the second northbound express from Gretna Junction. At 6.47 am, Tinsley received the "train entering section" signal from Kirkpatrick for the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, having forgotten about the local passenger train (aboard which he had arrived that morning), which was occupying the Up line. The troop special
5440-483: The troop train, only 58 men were present for roll call at 4.00 pm that afternoon, along with seven officers. In total, around 226 people died, and 246 were injured. The engine crew of the troop train also died in the first collision. Both driver Scott and fireman Hannah had driven the Royal Train . Considering the double collision and the fire, casualties in the other trains were lighter than might have been expected. On
5520-399: The working of the signal box to Tinsley, Meakin remained in the box reading the newspaper. The unnecessary presence of these other railwaymen may have further distracted Tinsley from his duties. The failure to carry out the "blocking back" procedure enabled the Kirkpatrick signalman to offer the up troop train to Quintinshill, but as the down local train was standing on the Up main line inside
5600-539: Was No. 121 of the 113 Class ( 4-4-0 ). The two locomotives of the express train which hit the wreckage a minute later, were subsequently repaired and returned to traffic - No. 140 of the Dunalastair IV Class and No. 48 of the 43 Class (both 4-4-0). The sequence of events leading up to the collisions featured multiple breaches of the railway's regulations, which formed the basis of the later prosecution of both signallers. In total, eight separate rule breaches by
5680-403: Was Quintinshill, where there were passing loops for both Up and Down lines. If the Down (northbound) loop was occupied, as it was on the morning of the accident, then the northbound local train would be shunted, via a trailing crossover, to the Up (southbound) main line. Although not a preferred method of operation, it was allowed by the rules and was not considered a dangerous manoeuvre, provided
5760-524: Was accepted. In the absence of a lever collar on the Up Home signal lever to remind him the line was blocked, he pulled off the Up line signals to allow the troop train to run through Quintinshill. The first official investigation into the disaster commenced in Carlisle on 25 May at County Hall, Carlisle. It was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Edward Druitt RE of the Railway Inspectorate on behalf of
5840-439: Was advertised in the public timetable as departing Carlisle at 6.10 am but which normally departed at 6.17 am. If the sleepers ran late, the local service could not be held back to depart from Carlisle after them because precedence would then need to be given to the scheduled departure of rival companies' express trains at 6.30 am and 6.35 am. Also, any late running of the local train would cause knock-on delays to
5920-406: Was ignited by the coal-burning fires of the engines. The gas reservoirs had been filled before leaving Larbert , and this, combined with the lack of available water, meant that the fire was not extinguished until the morning of the next day, despite the best efforts of railway staff and the Carlisle fire brigade. The troop train had consisted of 21 vehicles; all were consumed in the fire, apart from
6000-497: Was immediately accepted by Gretna Junction, so Tinsley pulled "off" his Up home signal to allow the troop train to run forward. The troop train collided head-on with the stationary local train on the up line at 6.49 am. Just over a minute later, the second northbound express train ran into the wreckage, having passed the Quintinshill Down Distant signal before it could be returned to danger. The wreckage also included
6080-434: Was sent at 6.34 am immediately after Tinsley arrived in the signal box and at the moment when responsibility for working the box was being handed over. Both of the Quintinshill signalmen subsequently claimed that the other man had been the one to send the "train out of section" signal. Secondly, the signalman at Quintinshill should have placed a signal lever collar over the relevant signal lever, which would have served as
6160-466: Was standing at the Up Home signal to the north of Quintinshill, and accordingly, it was still occupying the section from Kirkpatrick (the next signalbox to the north). This meant that signalman Meakin had not yet telegraphed Kirkpatrick the " train out of section " signal for the empty coal train, which in turn meant that he could not send the "blocking back" signal to advise the Kirkpatrick signalman that
6240-446: Was stopped on the main line for longer than three minutes, the driver was required to send one of the crew to the signal box in order to remind the signalman of the presence of the train and to ensure that the necessary safeguards to protect the train (e.g. lever collars on the signal levers) were in place. The crewman was required to sign the train register to confirm that he had visited the signal box and carried out these actions. Since
6320-499: Was thus due to want of discipline on the part of the signalmen, first by changing duty at an unauthorised hour, which caused Tinsley to be occupied in writing up the Train Register Book, and so diverted his attention from his proper work, secondly by Meakin handing over the duty in a very lax manner; and, thirdly by both signalmen neglecting to carry out various rules specially framed for preventing accidents due to forgetfulness on
6400-413: Was to be shunted at Quintinshill. The signalmen at Gretna Junction would let Tinsley know when this was to occur. To avoid this malpractice being detected by company management, whichever signalman was working the night shift would record all train register entries after 6.00 am on a piece of paper rather than in the register book itself. When the day shift man arrived, he would copy the entries from
#185814