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76-506: Under President Saddam Hussein , the ministry performed a wide range of functions, including keeping Iraq free of Hussein's enemies and others deemed "undesirable." When U.S.-led Coalition forces found and captured Hussein during the Iraq War , the ministry was not dissolved, unlike the defense ministry and intelligence agencies. Combined Joint Task Force 7 planned to hand over policing and internal security duties as soon as possible. Instead,

152-870: A counter-insurgency unit answering to the Ministry of the Interior. In June 2004, the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. Under the new Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi , the CPA appointed a new interior minister, Falah al-Naqib . After the poor performance of the police in battles against Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army , Al-Naqib sought to provide the MOI with effective Iraqi constabulary forces. Al-Naqib created “commando units” of former soldiers from elite units such as Saddam's Republican Guard . These units, commanded by al-Naqib's uncle, Adnan Thabit,

228-415: A combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda , Psy-ops , and assassinations . Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military , paramilitary , political , economic , psychological , and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency . To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend

304-463: A counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory , this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals,

380-403: A degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier. According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as

456-501: A former army general, were personally loyal to the minister. The commandos were trained initially without U.S. involvement. They were under MOI control, and were outside the scope of the U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) assistance program. The U.S. military provided arms and logistical support to these units, who proved to be effective under Minister al-Naqib's stewardship in fighting alongside U.S. forces against Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. The existence of

532-531: A prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars . Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time. However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon 's army had no means of effectively combating

608-445: A reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh , second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam , wrote in his Primer for Revolt : The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and

684-524: A reform to consolidate all Facilities Protection Service personnel into a unified organization responsible to the MOI. As of December 2005, the Coalition no longer provided material or logistical support to the FPS. The Iraqi National Security Service (NSS) undertakes the use of intelligence and security means in clear scientific, technical and methodological ways to preserve the state from threats that aim to undermine

760-636: A scattered number of presidential palaces in Baghdad and the rest of the provinces, such as the Sujood Palace and Al-Faw Palace in Baghdad, and the presidential palaces in Mosul, Basra, Tikrit and Babylon. After the revolution of 14 July 1958, elections were scheduled to be held to choose a President of the Republic, but they never took place. Therefore, the position of the president remained suspended, while Najib al-Rubaie

836-510: A state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans , Italians , and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning

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912-588: A successful counterinsurgency: In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen , the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information: This

988-519: Is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes, Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along

1064-401: Is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly,

1140-400: Is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency: Galula contends that: A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of

1216-511: Is tasked with securing and protecting Iraq's international borders from unlawful entry of both personnel and materiel. The DBE mans 405 border structures. As of March 2010, the DBE has approximately 40,000 personnel assigned, organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades and 38 battalions. The DBE was headquartered in Baghdad . In late January 2009, the 1st Region, DBE, controlled the northeastern parts of Iraq which

1292-591: Is the territory of the Federal Kurdistan Region and its where the country shares borders with Turkey and Iran . The 1st Region, considered one of the safest areas of Iraq currently, contains cities like Irbil , Dahuk and Sulyamaniah . Mosul was in the 2nd Region, Diyala was in the 3rd Region, Bashrah is in the 4th Region and the cities of Nyjaf and Nakheb are in the 5th Region." Law Maj. Gen. Fazladin Abdulqader Mohammed of Bamarni, Iraq,

1368-406: Is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value. In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether

1444-820: The ISIS onslaught of the northern summer of 2014, but five brigades based largely on the Syrian border were disbanded. (Knights, Long Haul, 9) In February 2024, the Ministry of Interior announced that a border guard brigade had been dispatched to secure the Iraqi-Turkish border in Duhok Governorate The Facilities Protection Service has more than 150,000 personnel who work for 26 ministries and eight independent directorates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of them are unreliable and responsible for violent crimes. Former Prime Minister Maliki announced

1520-520: The University of Michigan . Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT ), or through signals intelligence ( SIGINT ). Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with

1596-810: The 9th Brigade DBE was responsible for the Iranian border, and the 11th Brigade, responsible for the Saudi border, in Muthanna Governorate . The 15th DBE Brigade in Anbar Province was confirmed operational in January 2010. Both the DBE and the Department of Ports of Entry (POE) were supposed to be equipped with AK-47s, medium machine guns, body armors, medium pick-up trucks, mid-size Sport utility vehicles , generators and radios. Seven DBE brigades in southern Iraq survived

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1672-643: The ADE 651 device purchase. He was subsequently convicted of taking millions of dollars of bribes from McCormick and was imprisoned along with two other Iraqi officials. Up to 15 Iraqis are said to have been on McCormick's payroll, receiving money through a bank in Beirut . In 2014, the ADE 651 was still in use at Iraqi checkpoints, with the Iraqi Police defending their use: "Don't listen to what people say about them or what reports media have on them. We would know best because we are

1748-577: The Federal Police. On April 1, 2009, the Ministry of Interior was awarded the annual Pigasus Award by James Randi "For the funding organization that wasted the most money on pseudo-science... Iraq's Interior Ministry had, by the end of 2009, spent US$ 85,000,000 on a dowsing rod called the ADE 651 . (Each individual unit cost up to $ 60,000.) Despite an international uproar and continual car bomb detonations in Iraq,

1824-727: The Iraqi government took over it, restored it and changed its name to the Government Palace. In 2012, the Arab summit postponed from the previous year was held in this palace. The current presidential palace in which the Iraqi president resides is the Peace Palace, which was built during the era of Saddam Hussein. Another complex used as a presidential palace during Saddam Hussein's rule was the Radwaniyah presidential palace complex. In addition, there are

1900-642: The Iraqi parliament voted Abdul Latif Rashid as the new president of Iraq. According to Article 73 of the Iraqi Constitution, the powers of the president are: The Iraqi constitution, in Article 68, specifies a number of conditions that a candidate for the presidential office must: In the early days of the Iraqi Republic in 1958, neither the head of the Sovereign Council, Muhammad Najib al-Rubaie, nor

1976-577: The Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over

2052-494: The Prime Minister, Abdul Karim Qassem, took any palace to be an official republican palace for the state. Al-Rubaie stayed in his personal home before 14 July 1958. Qassem also remained in his home before the revolution, while his office at the Ministry of Defense was taken as his official office in his capacity as prime minister. Sometimes he slept there. With Abd al-Salam's accession to power in 1963, he focused his attention on

2128-638: The Turkish forces off. In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War . The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such

2204-456: The activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary . Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history . However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization . During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win

2280-408: The child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary. Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone

2356-487: The city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey

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2432-428: The civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice". Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being

2508-527: The decades have tried a range of tactics. Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University , and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at

2584-452: The dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago , John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of

2660-444: The enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics … and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from

2736-498: The fall of 2006 the Iraqi government decided to reform and retrain all FP units. The FP transformation yielded a police organization capable of performing criminal investigations as well as tactical operations, and included a reorganization that resulted in the replacement of two division headquarters with a federal police headquarters. FP units are equipped with small arms, machine guns, pick-up trucks, and SUVs. The mechanized battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles. The DBE

2812-488: The fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach , a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as

2888-612: The few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood , he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods. The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know

2964-412: The fight against terrorism and organized crime. The FIIA seeks to contribute to internal security by identifying risks and their levels, and providing advice to decision makers at all times. It has 3 working directorates: Directorate of Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, Directorate for Combating Organized Crime, and Directorate of Technologies and Information Technology. The Special Police Commandos were

3040-642: The golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency. The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares , published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without

3116-406: The government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward." Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for

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3192-441: The grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area 1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel

3268-403: The hearts and minds of populations supporting the insurgency. Alternatively, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence. The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea. –Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as

3344-460: The individual responsible for equipping the Ministry of Interior with the ADE 651 had been sentenced to 7 years in prison for his involvement in the corruption scandal. President of Iraq [REDACTED] Member State of the Arab League The president of the Republic of Iraq is the head of state of Iraq . Since the mid-2000s, the presidency is primarily a symbolic office, as

3420-443: The information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for

3496-453: The institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield. According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism

3572-479: The insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War . His theory of counterinsurgency

3648-456: The insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at

3724-471: The insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return

3800-451: The line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally,

3876-531: The main body of armed insurgents. 2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. 4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace

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3952-445: The margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria , Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain

4028-418: The military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from

4104-590: The military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested. Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army 's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that

4180-559: The ministry was merely restructured. The Federal Police (FP), sometimes called the National Police, is a gendarmerie -type paramilitary force designed to bridge the gap between the local police and the army. This allows the MOI to project power across provinces and maintain law and order, while an effective community police is developed. Although called police, the force has been trained primarily for military operations. Amid frequent allegations of abuse and other illegal activities, in

4256-428: The natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying

4332-401: The objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing

4408-534: The ones that are using them." Investigations by the BBC, U.S. Naval EOD Technology Division and other organizations have reported that these and similar devices are fraudulent and little more than "glorified dowsing rods " with no ability to perform claimed functions. In July 2016, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the police to stop using the devices. In 2020, the Iraqi Commission of Integrity announced that

4484-503: The ones that are using them." Investigations by the BBC, U.S. Naval EOD Technology Division and other organizations have reported that these and similar devices are fraudulent and little more than "glorified dowsing rods " with no ability to perform claimed functions. In September 2014, the ADE 651 was still in use at Iraqi checkpoints, with the Iraqi Police defending their use: "Don't listen to what people say about them or what reports media have on them. We would know best because we are

4560-472: The overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions." Military historian Martin van Creveld , noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises: The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do

4636-510: The palace that was being built during the reign of King Faisal II and in which he was to marry later. Abd al-Salam took care of the palace and completed it in 1965, the first republican palace of Iraq. And it continued as a republican palace until 2003, at the beginning of the American occupation of Iraq. The American forces used it as a headquarters in the first days of the occupation, then made it into an American embassy until 1 January 2009, when

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4712-581: The position does not possess significant power within the country according to the constitution adopted in October 2005. Due to the Muhasasah political system informally adopted since the creation of the new Iraqi federal state, the office is expected to be held by a Kurd (all were from the PUK party). Although, it is not an official legal requirement. On the 2022 Iraqi presidential election held on 13 October 2022,

4788-612: The president until one successive term after the Constitution was ratified and a government was seated. The presidency council had the additional power to send legislation back to the Council of Representatives for revision. Counter-insurgency Counterinsurgency ( COIN , or NATO spelling counter-insurgency ) is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces ". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against

4864-613: The rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation. Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War , the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been

4940-593: The regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war . Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli : In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice,

5016-531: The second method exemplified by the Hama massacre . In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood . Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama , known to be the center of the resistance. Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish

5092-620: The sites of failed insurgencies. Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs ' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish

5168-408: The softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by

5244-442: The state’s entity, the security and stability of society, and the development of its other basic interests, in cooperation with other concerned state agencies. The Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency (FIIA) was founded in 2003, specializing in collecting intelligence information pertinent to national security through confidential and public sources, as well as auditing, analysing, and producing intelligence reports regarding

5320-665: The struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use

5396-401: The things are still being used, and the Ministry is still defending its decision to buy them [as of 2009]." A New York Times report from October 2009 asserted "pervasive" corruption within the Ministry. In 2010, the British businessman who exported the device was arrested by the British police for fraud. In February 2011, General al-Jabiri was arrested on corruption charges, centering on

5472-462: The third objective. Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support. Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at

5548-461: The time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized. General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures,

5624-549: The unit was officially announced in September 2004 and numbered about 5,000 officers. Its principal U.S. adviser (Counselor) was Colonel James Steele , who also commanded the U.S. Military Advisory Group in El Salvador from 1984 through 1986. The Special Police Commando Division, Public Order Division, and Mechanized Police Brigade were merged in 2006 to form the National Police. The National Police has since expanded and been renamed

5700-526: Was assigned to head the Sovereignty Council, which was considered as the president of the republic. Thus, Abd al-Salam Aref became the first to bear the title of President of the Iraqi Republic. The presidency council was an entity that operated under the auspices of the "transitional provisions" of the Constitution. According to the Constitution, the Presidency Council functioned in the role of

5776-688: Was the commander, 1st Region, DBE. The 1st DBE Region "[had] the longest border of all the regions in Iraq," said Fazladin. "Our border covers from Fairozkan to Al Khabour, where the Tigris River Border Fort is located. It is 1,083 kilometers and we have three brigades for this region, the 1st Brigade, DBE, in Dahuk, 2nd Brigade, DBE, in Diyana and 3rd Brigade, DBE, in Sulyamaniah." All three of these brigades were made up of Kurdish Peshmerga . In October 2009

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