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134-636: The Hoover Moratorium was a one-year suspension of Germany's World War I reparations obligations and of the repayment of the war loans that the United States had extended to the Allies in 1917/18. The moratorium was the result of a proposal issued on 20 June 1931 by United States President Herbert Hoover that was intended to ease the effects of the Great Depression and the ongoing international financial crisis and provide time for recovery. The proposal

268-462: A basis, Germany would be required to pay annually, on average, the equivalent of about 12 per cent of its exports, 2.5 per cent of its net national product and 7.3 per cent of all public revenues. The transfer protection of the Dawes Plan was abolished, meaning that in future Germany was responsible for ensuring that the sum raised from tax revenue could be transferred in foreign currency or in kind to

402-564: A conditional ratification would not be recognised by the United States, the reservation did not acquire legal force and only the debt agreement became legally binding. Poincaré resigned a few days later. He was succeeded by Aristide Briand, whose attempt to pass the Young Plan also failed. After he too resigned, André Tardieu of the Democratic Republican Alliance became prime minister. He succeeded on 29 March 1930 in securing

536-512: A criminal offense for any German official to sign a treaty that imposed new reparations obligations. It would also renounce the German acknowledgement of war guilt and the occupation of German territory, both of which were terms of the Treaty of Versailles The Freedom Law proposal was officially presented on 16 October 1929. The committee succeeded in collecting enough signatures to put the proposal before

670-536: A financial operation of such a magnitude had become impossible after the New York Stock Exchange crash. After the adoption of the Young Plan, the French sought closer cooperation with Germany. Tardieu told the German ambassador that "conscious rapprochement with Germany" was the goal of his government. With the seemingly permanent solution to the reparations question and the withdrawal from the occupied Rhineland,

804-450: A great deal to do with the way the German government chose to subsidize industry and to pay the costs of passive resistance to the occupation [of the Ruhr] by extravagant use of the printing press". Bell also writes that hyperinflation was not an inevitable consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, but was among the actual results. According to historian Claude Campbell, John Maynard Keynes "set

938-617: A larger share of the reparations for the British Empire . Wilson opposed these positions and was adamant that no indemnity should be imposed upon Germany. Damages in France and Belgium included the complete demolition of more than 300,000 houses in German-occupied France, the stripping of more than 6,000 factories of their machinery and the smashing of textile industry in Lille and Sedan,

1072-600: A lasting peace between the Allied and Central Powers. Demanding compensation from the defeated party was a common feature of peace treaties, including the Treaty of Versailles that Germany had imposed on France in 1871. However, the financial terms of treaties signed during the peace conference were labelled reparations to distinguish them from punitive settlements usually known as indemnities . Reparations were intended for reconstruction and compensating families who had been bereaved by

1206-546: A majority for the ratification of the Young Plan. Following the wishes of several deputies of the Republican Federation , he had delayed the parliamentary debate until the German Reichstag had given its approval. The speech of the new finance minister Paul Reynaud expressed a highly positive balance: the Young Plan had put reparations on an equal footing with Germany's private debt and thus secured them, it covered

1340-475: A new payment plan, resulting in the Young Plan that established the German reparation requirements at 112 billion marks ( US$ 26.3 billion ) and created a schedule of payments that would see Germany complete payments by 1988. As a result of the severe impact of the Great Depression on the German economy, reparations were suspended for a year in 1931, and after the failure to implement the agreement reached in

1474-464: A new settlement on the various debts they owed each other. During January 1932, Brüning said he would seek the complete cancellation of reparations. His position was supported by the British and Italians, and opposed by the French. Because of the political differences between countries on the subject and impending elections in France and Germany, a conference could not be established until June. On 16 June,

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1608-462: A substantial peace dividend for Weimar's non-revanchist budget politicians." They conclude that, "The fact that [these politicians] did not make sufficient use of this imposed gift supports the hypothesis that the Weimar Republic suffered from home-made political failure". Historians and economists differ on the subject of whether, and to what extent, reparations were a cause of hyper-inflation in

1742-629: A year to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in restitution for destroyed mines. These shipments would not be credited against Bulgaria's reparation sum. Germany, Austria, and Hungary all had commitments to handover timber, ore, and livestock to the Allied Powers. They would, however, be credited for these goods. In January 1921, the Allied Powers grew impatient and established the reparation sum at 226 billion gold marks. The Germans countered with an offer of 30 billion. On 24 April 1921,

1876-412: Is because until now she has not been convinced of her defeat ... We are also certain that Germany, as a nation, resigns herself to keep her pledged word only under the impact of necessity. The occupation proved marginally profitable; the occupying powers received 900 million gold marks, and much of this merely covered the military costs of occupation. However, the real issue behind the occupation

2010-476: Is no doubt that British and French suspicions late in 1922 were sound". Marks also writes that the "astronomic inflation which ensued was a result of German policy", whereby the government paid for passive resistance in the Ruhr "from an empty exchequer" and paid off its domestic and war debts with worthless marks. Bell agrees and writes that "inflation had little direct connection with reparation payments themselves, but

2144-510: The Bank for International Settlements . The bank was established to provide cooperation among central banks and to receive and disburse reparation payments. A further loan of US$ 300 million was to be raised and given to Germany. As a result of the plan, German payments were half the sum required under the Dawes Plan. The implementation of the Young Plan required the Anglo-French withdrawal from

2278-626: The Central Powers agreed to pay war reparations to the Allied Powers . Each defeated power was required to make payments in either cash or kind. Because of the financial situation in Austria , Hungary , and Turkey after the war, few to no reparations were paid and the requirements for reparations were cancelled. Bulgaria , having paid only a fraction of what was required, saw its reparation figure reduced and then cancelled. Historians have recognized

2412-583: The First World War . At the first session of the Hague Conference from 6 to 31 August 1929, the British chancellor of the Exchequer, Labour Party politician Philip Snowden , demanded an increase of annual reparations payments to Britain by the equivalent of 48 million Reichsmarks. Snowden signalled that he was prepared to let the Young Plan fail if necessary. A solution was reached through shifts within

2546-560: The French countryside and Belgian countryside being heavily scarred in the fighting. Furthermore, in 1918 during the German retreat, German troops devastated France's most industrialized region in the north-east ( Nord-Pas de Calais Mining Basin ) as well as Belgium. Extensive looting took place as German forces removed whatever material they could use and destroyed the rest. Hundreds of mines were destroyed along with railways, bridges, and entire villages. Prime Minister of France Georges Clemenceau

2680-564: The German requirement to pay reparations as the "chief battleground of the post-war era" and "the focus of the power struggle between France and Germany over whether the Versailles Treaty was to be enforced or revised." The Treaty of Versailles (signed in 1919) and the 1921 London Schedule of Payments required the Central Powers to pay 132 billion gold marks ( US$ 33 billion at

2814-703: The Golden Twenties (1924–1929), and in spite of a negative trade balance, there was enough foreign exchange to pay the instalments of the plan. The payments came, however, at the price of a large foreign debt. All sides began to be more uneasy about the plan from 1927 onwards. Wall Street banks and the United States Treasury grew increasingly concerned that Germany would become overindebted. Since 1924, foreign loans worth more than ten billion Reichsmarks had flowed into Germany. The question arose as to whether private loans or reparations should have priority in

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2948-516: The Lausanne Conference in July 1932. The National Socialist government under Adolf Hitler made no payments after it came to power in 1933. However, Germany continued to pay interest on Dawes and Young bonds until 1939. The Treaty of Versailles did not set the total amount or the terms for German reparations. It established an interim 20 billion Reichsmarks to be paid through April 1920 and left

3082-564: The Locarno Treaties . The subsequent "spirit of Locarno" saw an apparent reconciliation between the European Powers. The implementation of the Dawes Plan also saw a positive economic impact in Europe, largely funded by American loans. Under the Dawes Plan, Germany always met her obligations. However, German long-term goals remained the same despite the apparent reconciliation: the revision of

3216-593: The Reichstag , which voted the bill down by a 318–82 margin. In the subsequent Freedom Law referendum , 94.5% of the votes cast were in favour of the proposed law, but voter turnout was just 14.9%, meaning that only 13.8% of eligible voters had voted in favour of the law. The referendum therefore failed, since it needed 50% of all eligible voters to pass. The Young Plan was accepted by the Reichstag on 12 March 1930. The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 had occurred between

3350-572: The Second World War , West Germany took up payments. The 1953 London Agreement on German External Debts resulted in an agreement to pay 50 percent of the remaining balance. The final payment was made on 3 October 2010, settling German loan debts in regard to reparations. In 1914, following the assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist, the First World War broke out, with Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia, and Germany declaring war on and invading France and Belgium. For

3484-474: The Weimar National Assembly that Germany would have to pay reparations for the devastation caused by the war, but would not pay for actual war costs. After the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles on 7 May that year, the German and Allied delegations met and the treaty was handed over to be translated and for a response to be issued. At this meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau stated, "We know the intensity of

3618-561: The "surrender of the coal will destroy German industry" but conceding that without coal shipments as reparations, the French and Italian industries damaged directly by the war or indirectly by damage to coal mines would be affected. He writes that this is "not yet the whole problem". The repercussions would also affect Central and Northern Europe, and neutral states such as Switzerland and Sweden, which made up for their own coal deficiencies by trading with Germany. Likewise, Keynes said Austria would now be consigned to "industrial ruin" as "nearly all

3752-574: The 132 billion gold marks demanded in the 1921 London Schedule of Payments. Germany was not completely satisfied with the Dawes Plan either. In 1928 the full annual payment of 2.5 billion Reichsmarks was due for the first time. It corresponded to 12.4 per cent of total German government expenditure and 3.3 per cent of national income. If the economy continued to develop positively, the plan's prosperity index would have required an even higher sum, which could have threatened to exceed Germany's ability to pay. Following extensive diplomatic consultations during

3886-506: The 1932 Lausanne Conference , no additional reparations payments were made. Between 1919 and 1932, Germany paid less than 21 billion marks in reparations, mostly funded by foreign loans that Adolf Hitler reneged on in 1939. Many Germans saw reparations as a national humiliation; the German Government worked to undermine the validity of the Treaty of Versailles and the requirement to pay. British economist John Maynard Keynes called

4020-571: The American proposal. However, on 13 July, the German Darmstädter Bank collapsed, leading to further bankruptcies and a rise in unemployment further exacerbating Germany's financial crisis. With the Great Depression now exerting its influence, the Bank for International Settlements reported that the Young Plan was unrealistic in light of the economic crisis and urged the world governments to reach

4154-626: The Bank for International Settlements. The institution took over the functions of the Reparation Commission , which was abolished, as was the office of the general agent for reparations payments. The control that the creditor powers had secured in the Dawes Plan over the German National Railway and the Reichsbank were also dropped, as was the prosperity index, which meant that Germany could be sure that it would not have to pay more if

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4288-641: The British ambassador to France. During 1931, a financial crisis began in Germany. In May, Creditanstalt —the largest bank in Austria—collapsed, sparking a banking crisis in Germany and Austria. In response, Brüning announced that Germany was suspending reparation payments. This resulted in a massive withdrawal of domestic and foreign funds from German banks. By mid-July, all German banks had closed. Until this point, France's policy had been to provide Germany with financial support to help Brüning's Government stabilize

4422-516: The British and French then used to "cover their long-term interest obligations and to retire their wartime debts with the United States." Germany's payment of reparations during the 1920s was funded mostly through foreign loans. In 1933, as well as stopping all reparations payments, the new German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in large part repudiated payment of these loans, including a default on all of debt owed in US Dollar bonds. In June 1953, an agreement

4556-453: The Bulgarian reparation sum was revised downwards to 550 million gold francs, "plus a lump sum payment of 25 million francs for occupation costs". Towards this figure, Bulgaria paid 41 million gold francs between 1925 and 1929. In 1932, the Bulgarian reparation obligation was abandoned following the Lausanne Conference . Because Austria was "so impoverished" after the war, and because of

4690-594: The French ambassador in London: Judging others by themselves, the English, who are blinded by their loyalty, have always thought that the Germans did not abide by their pledges inscribed in the Versailles Treaty because they had not frankly agreed to them ... We, on the contrary, believe that if Germany, far from making the slightest effort to carry out the treaty of peace, has always tried to escape her obligations, it

4824-558: The German government of Constantin Fehrenbach , finding itself unable to reach agreement on the issue, had resigned on 4 May. The government of the new chancellor, Joseph Wirth , accepted the ultimatum on 11 May and began the "policy of fulfillment" – by attempting to meet the demands, it tried to show the impossibility of complying with the scheduled payments. Between the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and April 1922, Bulgaria paid 173 million gold francs in reparations. In 1923,

4958-430: The German Government with an opportunity to be heard on the subject, and decide on the final reparation figure that Germany would be required to pay. In the interim, Germany was required to pay an equivalent of 20 billion gold marks ( US$ 5 billion ) in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or other forms. The money would be used to pay Allied occupation costs and to buy food and raw materials for Germany. Article 121 of

5092-512: The German Government wrote to the American Government expressing "her readiness to acknowledge for reparation purposes a total liability of 50 billion gold marks", but was also prepared "to pay the equivalent of this sum in annuities adapted to her economic capacity totalling 200 billion gold marks". In addition, the German Government stated that "to accelerate the redemption of the balance" and "to combat misery and hatred created by

5226-522: The German defaults on payments had grown so serious and regular that a crisis engulfed the Reparations Commission. French and Belgian delegates urged the seizure of the Ruhr to encourage the Germans to make more effort to pay, while the British supported postponing payments to facilitate the financial reconstruction of Germany. On 26 December 1922, Germany defaulted on timber deliveries. The timber quota

5360-784: The German fleet at Scapa Flow , state property lost in lands ceded to other countries, and the loss of colonial territories. The Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements state that 20.598 billion gold marks was paid by Germany in reparations, of which 7.595 billion was paid before the implementation of the London Schedule of Payments. Niall Ferguson provides a slightly lower figure. He estimates that Germany paid no more than 19 billion gold marks. Ferguson further estimates that this sum amounted to 2.4 per cent of Germany's national income between 1919 and 1932. Stephen Schuker, in his comprehensive econometric study, concedes that Germany transferred 16.8 billion marks over

5494-554: The German military was decisively defeated on the Western Front , and the German navy mutinied , all of which prompted domestic uprisings that became known as the German Revolution . Germany signed an armistice with the allies on 11 November 1918. The armistice agreement included an agreement to pay "reparation for damage done" to the Allied countries. Most of the war's major battles occurred in France and Belgium, with both

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5628-515: The Germans being informed that they would not be expected to pay them under realistic conditions. They were "a political bargaining chip" that served the domestic policies of France and the United Kingdom. The figure was completely unreal; its primary function was to mislead public opinion "into believing that the 132-billion-mark figure was being maintained". Furthermore, "Allied experts knew that Germany could not pay 132 billion marks and that

5762-544: The Lausanne Conference opened. However, discussions were complicated by the ongoing World Disarmament Conference . At the latter conference, the US informed the British and French that they would not be allowed to default on their war debts. In turn, they recommended that war debts be tied into German reparation payments, to which the Germans objected. On 9 July, an agreement was reached and signed. The Lausanne Conference annulled

5896-804: The London Stock Exchange until the end of World War II , with Germany only stopping interest payments at the outbreak of war in 1939. In November 1934, Britain and Germany made what is known as the Anglo-German Payments Agreement , wherein among other terms, Germany agreed to continue paying interest on both Dawes and Young bonds in sterling . It is estimated that Germany's total reparations payments up to 1931 came to about 36.1 billion marks. After Germany's defeat in World War II, an international conference ( London Agreement on German External Debts , 1953) decided that Germany would pay

6030-608: The Netherlands. In January 1923, despite quota reductions, the German Government defaulted on coal deliveries for the 34th time in three years. On 9 January 1923, the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default of her coal deliveries and voted to occupy the Ruhr to enforce the country's reparation commitments. Britain was the lone dissenting voice to both measures. On 11 January, French and Belgian soldiers—supported by engineers including an Italian contingent—entered

6164-463: The Reich's budget". They say, "though politically a humiliation", the limitation on the military "was beneficial in fiscal terms" and that their economic models show that "the restriction of the size of the army was clearly beneficial for the Reich budget". Additionally, their economic scenarios indicate that while the Treaty of Versailles was "overall clearly a burden on the German economy", it "also offered

6298-422: The Reparation Commission was a tool that could "be employed to destroy Germany's commercial and economic organization as well as to exact payment". Writing of his proposed US$ 10 billion figure, fixing reparations "well within Germany's capacity to pay" would "make possible the renewal of hope and enterprise within her territory" and "avoid the perpetual friction and opportunity of improper pressure arising out of

6432-614: The Rhineland within months. Despite the reduction, there was increasing German hostility to the plan. For example, the Law against the Enslavement of the German People, or Freedom Law, was proposed by the nationalist politician Alfred Hugenberg . Hugenberg's proposed law called for the end of the Ruhr occupation, the official renouncement of Article 231 (the "war guilt" clause) and the rejection of

6566-449: The Rhineland. The French, aware of their weakening political and financial position, acquiesced. On 16 September 1928, a joint Entente-German statement acknowledging the need for a new reparation plan was issued. In February 1929, a new committee was formed to re-examine reparations. It was chaired by the American banker Owen D. Young and presented its findings in June 1929. The " Young Plan "

6700-492: The Ruhr fuelled the hyperinflation that nearly wrecked the economy. The Dawes Plan of 1924 was drafted to replace the London Schedule. The Dawes Plan came into effect on 1 September 1924. It reopened the American capital market to Germany, and billions in long-term bonds and short-term loans flowed to the German private and public sectors in roughly equal parts. The economy of the Weimar Republic grew significantly during

6834-405: The Ruhr occupation, the Germans had wrecked their economy by funding passive resistance and brought about hyperinflation . Under Anglo-American pressure and simultaneous decline in the value of the franc, France was increasingly isolated and her diplomatic position was weakened. In October 1923, a committee consisting of American, Belgian, British, French, German, and Italian experts and chaired by

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6968-410: The Ruhr, and a bank independent of the German Government, with a ruling body at least 50 per cent non-German , was to be established and the German currency was to be stabilized. The payment of reparations was also reorganized. In the first year following the implementation of the plan, Germany would have to pay 1 billion marks. This figure would rise to 2.5 billion marks per year by the fifth year of

7102-551: The Treaty clauses". Keynes identified reparations as the "main excursion into the economic field" by the Treaty of Versailles, but said that the treaty excluded provisions for rehabilitating Europe's economies, for improving relations between the Allies and the defeated Central Powers, for stabilizing Europe's new nations, for "reclaim[ing] Russia", or for promoting economic solidarity between the Allies. Coal provides an example of these destabilizing effects in Germany and beyond. Keynes said

7236-419: The Treaty of Neuilly acknowledged that "the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation". Therefore, the treaty required Bulgaria to pay a sum equivalent of 2.250 billion Gold francs in reparations. The treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Trianon, and Sèvres acknowledged that Austria , Hungary , and Turkey did not have the resources to pay reparations, and delayed

7370-471: The Treaty of Versailles to end reparations. The Dawes Plan was seen only a temporary measure, with expected future revisions. In late 1927, the Agent-General for Reparations "called for a more permanent scheme" for payments and in 1928 the Germans followed suit. German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann called for a final reparation plan to be established alongside an early withdrawal of Allied troops from

7504-445: The U.S. furnished to West Germany under the post-1948 Marshall Plan. According to Gerhard Weinberg , reparations were paid, towns were rebuilt, orchards replanted, mines reopened and pensions paid. However, the burden of repairs was shifted away from the German economy and onto the damaged economies of the war's victors. Hans Mommsen wrote "Germany financed its reparation payments to Western creditor nations with American loans", which

7638-446: The US. The objective of both the politicians and historians was to prove that Germany was not solely guilty for causing the war; this was with the idea that, if that guilt could be disproved, the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear. The Treaty of Versailles stated that a Reparation Commission would be established in 1921. This commission would consider the resources available to Germany and her capacity to pay, provide

7772-560: The United States concerning their own outstanding war debts. Although the United States Congress voted against the proposal to relieve France and the United Kingdom of their debt, they never restarted payments, since previously German reparations had been used for the purpose, and the economic conditions militated against Germany being able to do so in the future. World War I reparations Following their defeat in World War I ,

7906-535: The Weimar Republic's eventual ability to pay, as was to be assessed at some future point by an Allied committee. Due to the lack of reparation payments by Germany, France occupied the Ruhr in 1923 to enforce payments, causing an international crisis that resulted in the implementation of the Dawes Plan in 1924. This plan outlined a new payment method and raised international loans to help Germany to meet its reparation commitments. Despite this, by 1928 Germany called for

8040-473: The Weimar republic. Amongst those stating that it was a cause, Erik Goldstein wrote that in 1921, the payment of reparations caused a crisis and that the occupation of the Ruhr had a disastrous effect on the German economy, resulting in the German Government printing more money as the currency collapsed. Hyperinflation began and printing presses worked overtime to print Reichsbank notes; by November 1923 one US dollar

8174-457: The Young Plan and required Germany to pay a final, single installment of 3 billion marks. The Lausanne Treaty was to become effective as soon as a corresponding agreement had been reached with the United States on the repayment of the loans it had made to the Allied powers during World War I. Due to the failure to come to such an agreement, the Lausanne Treaty was not ratified by any of

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8308-568: The Young Plan. While politicians rejected it, it attracted enough support from voters in order to be put up for a referendum. The plebiscite was held in December 1929, resulting in 5.8 million people out of 6.3 million voters voting in favor of the law. This fell below the required 21 million votes (50% of eligible voters) in order for it to take effect. While this was a political defeat for Hugenberg, it did result in significant national attention for Adolf Hitler , who had worked with Hugenberg to promote

8442-504: The autumn meeting of the League of Nations , the six interested powers – Germany France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and Japan – agreed on 16 September 1928 to set up an international commission of experts under the leadership of American economist Owen D. Young to settle the reparations question and at the same time to begin negotiations on the evacuation of the occupied Rhineland . The fourteen international financial experts chosen to draw up

8576-476: The coalfields of the former Empire lie outside of what is now German-Austria ". Young Plan In a parallel agreement, France agreed to withdraw its troops from the occupied Rhineland in 1930, five years earlier than called for in the Treaty of Versailles. Due to the effects of the Great Depression , the Young Plan was suspended by the Hoover Moratorium in June 1931 and payments reduced by 90% at

8710-459: The collapse of the Bank of Vienna, the country paid no reparations "beyond credits for transferred property". Likewise, Hungary paid no reparations beyond coal deliveries because of the collapse of the Hungarian economy. Turkish reparations had been "sharply limited in view of the magnitude of Turkish territorial losses". However, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified. When the Treaty of Lausanne

8844-458: The country. Brüning, now under considerable political pressure from the far-right and President Paul von Hindenburg , was unable to make any concessions or reverse policy. As a result, Brüning was unable to borrow money from foreign or domestic sources. Further attempts to enlist British support to end reparations failed; the British said it was a joint issue with France and the United States. In early July, Brüning announced "his intention to seek

8978-408: The creditor instalments, above all at German expense, and compromise solutions were found on the question of deliveries in kind. Briand was then prepared to give in on the evacuation of the Rhineland and agreed to 30 June 1930 as the final date for the occupation. The second session of the conference took place from 3 to 20 January 1930. Issues of a mostly technical nature were clarified, specifically

9112-422: The currency stabilized, and the German economy fixed to ease reparation payments. Max Winkler wrote that from 1924 onward, German officials were "virtually flooded with loan offers by foreigners". Overall, the German economy performed reasonably well until the foreign investments funding the economy and the loans funding reparations payments were suddenly withdrawn after the 1929 Stock Market Crash . This collapse

9246-614: The destruction of nearly 2,000 breweries, the blowing up of 112 mineshafts in Roubaix and Tourcoing , the flooding or blocking-off of more 1,000 miles of mine galleries, the ripping up of more than 1,000 miles of railway, the dropping of more than 1,000 bridges, as well as the looting of churches. German wartime requisitions of farm animals imposed on the civilian population within occupied France and Belgium included roughly 500,000 head of cattle, approximately 500,000 head of sheep, and more than 300,000 head of horses and donkeys. In cleaning up after

9380-600: The draft Terms of Peace" due to the "policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of Europe". In 1919, Keynes wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace based on his objections to the Versailles treaty. He wrote that he believed "that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible", and called

9514-472: The economic downturn in Europe. Germany was caught in a major banking crisis, Britain left the gold standard – the US would follow suit in 1933 as part of President Franklin Roosevelt 's New Deal – and France intended to address the issues again once the one-year suspension had ended. A few of the former Allies continued to make payments to the United States after the moratorium expired, but only Finland

9648-440: The economic situation was favourable. The deliveries in kind (as, for example, coal), which had often competed with companies in the creditor countries, were to expire after ten years. The remaining payment obligation in foreign currency was divided into an unprotected instalment, which had to be transferred in foreign currency under all circumstances and amounted to a constant 600 million Reichsmarks. The protected instalment, which

9782-465: The establishment of a final figure until the Reparation Commission was established. In addition, Bulgaria was required to hand over thousands of livestock to Greece , Romania , and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State "in restitution for animals taken away by Bulgaria during the war". This would not be credited towards the reparation figure. Likewise, Bulgaria had to dispatch 50,000 tons of coal

9916-465: The establishment of the Bank for International Settlements to handle the transfer of reparations payments and the question of whether, as provided for in the Treaty of Versailles, creditors could continue to impose sanctions in the event of a German default. It was agreed that the creditor nations would regain their "full freedom of action" if the International Court of Justice found that Germany

10050-412: The event of a payment crisis. The French government also became increasingly concerned. Since 1919 the United States had been calling for the repayment of the inter-allied war debts incurred by France in 1917 and 1918. France urgently needed loans to stabilise the franc after the inflation of 1924 and 1925, but the American capital market was closed to it as long as the war debt remained unpaid. The matter

10184-462: The fashion for critics of the economic aspects of the treaty" and "made probably the severest and most sweeping indictment of its economic provisions". Keynes was temporarily attached to the British Treasury during the war and was their official representative at the peace conference. He later resigned "when it became evident that hope could no longer be entertained of substantial modifications in

10318-465: The foreseeable future the American capital market would be unable to pre-finance the entire value of the German reparations debt for the European creditor powers. They had wanted to use mobilisation bonds to be able to repay the inter-Allied war debt to the US in a lump sum. The "New Plan", as the Young Plan was officially called, and the agreement on the evacuation of the Rhineland were nevertheless signed by

10452-616: The former Director of the US Bureau of the Budget Charles G. Dawes was formed, to consider "from a purely technical standpoint", how to balance the German budget, stabilize the economy and set an achievable level of reparations. In April 1924, the Dawes Plan was accepted and it replaced the London schedule of payment. While the "C" Bonds were omitted from the plan's framework, they were not formally rescinded. French troops were to withdraw from

10586-590: The full details to be determined by the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission . The Commission drew up the May 1921 London Schedule of Payments that fixed the total sum at 132 billion Reichsmarks . After Germany was declared in default in January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr . Germany responded with passive resistance to the occupation, and the government's payments to the idled workers of

10720-414: The hatred which meets us, and we have heard the victors' passionate demand that as the vanquished we shall be made to pay, and as the guilty we shall be punished". However, he proceeded to deny that Germany was solely responsible for the war. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was not correctly translated. Instead of stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all

10854-404: The heads of government of the six powers on 20 January 1930. The Young Plan provided for a German reparation debt of the equivalent of 36 billion Reichsmarks. It was to be repaid with interest through 1988, resulting in a total sum of 112 billion Reichsmarks. The annual instalments were to rise rapidly from 1.7 billion to 2.1 billion Reichsmarks, falling to 1.65 billion after 1966. Taking 1930 as

10988-401: The inflation long predated reparations" and the way "inflation mushroomed" between mid-1921 and the end of 1922 "when Germany was actually paying very little in reparations" and have failed to explain why "the period of least inflation coincided with the period of largest reparation payments ... or why Germans claimed after 1930 that reparations were causing deflation". She writes "there

11122-545: The initial agreement and the adoption of the Young Plan. With the severe world-wide economic downturn that heralded the Great Depression , United States President Herbert Hoover won support for a one-year moratorium on reparations payments from 15 nations by July 1931. A final effort to resolve the reparations issue was made at the Lausanne Conference of 1932 . It essentially ended Germany's reparations payments. However, Germany continued to pay interest on both Dawes and Young bonds, issued in 1924 and 1930. These were traded on

11256-407: The inter-allied war debts and generated a surplus for the reconstruction of French territories destroyed in the war. Although Versailles' original sum of 132 billion gold marks plus interest had had to be dropped, "the sacrifice is the price of the permanent solution". He did not mention the original goal of mobilising reparations on a large scale and repaying the inter-allied debt as a lump sum because

11390-476: The international public. The Young Plan was mostly welcomed in France. The left-wing and liberal press judged it positively; only on the political right was criticism levelled that the plan and its accompanying withdrawal from the Rhineland affected both the financial and military security of the French Republic. Since all the governments from 1926 to 1932 were based on the political centre in coalition with

11524-407: The last points of contention stemming from the Treaty of Versailles appeared to have been resolved and the way cleared for a secure and peaceful future. Although the Young Plan had effectively reduced Germany's obligations, it was opposed by parts of the political spectrum in Germany. Nationalist parties had been most outspoken against reparations and seized on the Young Plan as an issue. A committee

11658-472: The loss and damage ...", the German Government's edition reads, "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...". This resulted in a prevailing belief of humiliation among Germans; the article was seen as an injustice and there was a view that Germany had signed "away her honor". Despite the public outrage, German government officials were aware "that Germany's position on this matter

11792-474: The lower figure the British supported—that "represented an assessment of the lowest amount that public opinion ... would tolerate". This figure was divided into three series of bonds : "A" and "B" Bonds together had a nominal value of 50 billion gold marks ( US$ 12.5 billion) —less than the sum Germany had previously offered to pay. "C" Bonds, comprising the remainder of the reparation figure, "were deliberately designed to be chimerical ", with

11926-399: The mark, particular on the grounds that reparations payments, and particularly hard-cash payments, were in large part not made during the period of hyper-inflation and so could not be the cause of it. Gerhard Weinberg writes that Germany refused to pay by, and that doing so destroyed their own currency. Anthony Lentin agrees and writes that inflation was "a consequence of the war rather than of

12060-411: The mid-to-late 1920s, trade between France and Germany grew rapidly. French imports of German goods "increased by 60 per cent", highlighting the close links between French industrial growth and German production, and the increase in cooperation between the countries. Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer provide a different perspective on the effect of reparations on the German economy. They wrote that focusing on

12194-471: The nationalists and right-wing Catholics, difficulties arose in the French parliament. It had not been possible to complete the Young Plan by July 1929, the deadline for ratification of the agreement on inter-allied war debts. Poincaré therefore had to ask the parliament to ratify the Mellon–Berenger Agreement on French debt owed to the United States before Germany had agreed to the Young Plan. Both

12328-421: The need to pay war debts and the demands of voters for more social services. Ferguson argued that these problems were aggravated by a trade deficit and a weak exchange rate for the mark during 1920. Afterwards, as the value of the mark rose, inflation became a problem. None of these were the result of reparations. According to Ferguson, even without reparations total public spending in Germany between 1920 and 1923

12462-419: The new reparations plan were to be independent and guided only by their economic expertise. The governments of the six powers that had commissioned the drafting of the Young Plan agreed to it in principle in June 1929. The foreign ministers of France and Germany, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann , then called for a conference to be held to decide on the final settlement of all questions still arising from

12596-692: The next four years fighting raged across Europe , the Middle East , Africa , and Asia . On 8 January 1918, United States President Woodrow Wilson issued a statement that became known as the Fourteen Points . In part, this speech called for Germany to withdraw from the territory it had occupied and for the formation of a League of Nations . During the fourth quarter of 1918, the Central Powers began to collapse. In particular, Austria-Hungary collapsed putting southern Germany at risk of invasion, Turkey surrendered freeing up Allied troops for action elsewhere,

12730-571: The other Central Powers could pay little. Thus, the A and B Bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of German capacity to pay." Taking into account the sum already paid between 1919 and 1921, Germany's immediate obligation was 41 billion gold marks. To pay towards this sum, Germany could pay in kind or in cash. Commodities paid in kind included coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceuticals, livestock, agricultural machines, construction materials, and factory machinery. The gold value of these would be deducted from what Germany

12864-465: The outright revision of the Young Plan". In light of the crisis and with the prospect of Germany being unable to repay her debts, United States President Herbert Hoover intervened. In June, Hoover publicly proposed a one-year moratorium to reparation and war debts. By July, the " Hoover Moratorium " had been accepted. The moratorium was widely supported in both Germany and the United Kingdom. The French, initially hesitant, eventually agreed to support

12998-525: The peace" and that hyperinflation was a result of the "German government's reckless issue of paper money" during the Allied occupation of the Ruhr. Contemporary British and French experts believed that the Mark was being sabotaged to avoid budgetary and currency reform and to evade reparations, a view supported by Reich Chancellery records. Historian Sally Marks endorsed that view, writing that historians who say reparations caused hyperinflation have overlooked "that

13132-411: The period of reparations, Germany received between 27 and 38 billion marks in loans. By 1931, German foreign debt stood at 21.514 billion marks; the main sources of aid were the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Detlev Peukert argued the financial problems that arose in the early 1920s, were a result of post-war loans and the way Germany funded her war effort, and not

13266-407: The plan. A Reparations Agency was established with Allied representatives to organize the payment of reparations. Furthermore, a loan of 800 million marks was to be raised—over 50 per cent coming from the United States, 25 per cent from Britain, and the balance from other European nations—to back the German currency and to aid in the payment of reparations. The adoption of the plan was followed by

13400-529: The political right and the opposition Socialists , who otherwise supported Briand's foreign policy, insisted on linking the two debts, a position that the United States strongly opposed. By a narrow majority, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Mellon–Bérenger Agreement on 12 July 1929 with the reservation that it would only be serviced as long as sufficient reparations were collected from Germany. Since

13534-595: The primarily-German U-boat campaign had also been severe, particularly for Britain. Nearly 8 million tons of British civilian shipping had been sunk by German U-boats, with many civilian crew killed. France, Italy, and the United States of America had lost another 2 million tons of merchant shipping, again with heavy losses amongst crew. Another 1.2 million tons of neutral Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish shipping had also been sunk. The sinking of five British hospital ships also caused considerable bitterness. The Paris Peace Conference opened on 18 January 1919, aiming to establish

13668-492: The referendum, and subsequently in valuable right-wing financing. In March 1930, the German Government collapsed and was replaced by a new coalition led by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning . In June, Allied troops withdrew from near Mainz —the last occupation zone in the Rhineland—and Brüning's Government broached the subject of demanding further refinement to reparations, but this demand was refused by William Tyrrell ,

13802-502: The region, initiating the Occupation of the Ruhr . The French Premier Raymond Poincaré was deeply reluctant to order the occupation and had only taken this step after the British had rejected his proposals for more moderate sanctions against Germany. By December 1922, Poincaré was faced with Anglo-American-German hostility; coal supplies for French steel production were running low. Exasperated with Britain's failure to act, he wrote to

13936-506: The remaining debt only after the country was reunified. West Germany nevertheless paid off the principal by 1980; then in 1995, after reunification , the new German government announced it would resume payments of the interest, including on the Young bonds. Germany was due to pay off the interest to the United States in 2010, and to other countries in 2020. In 2010, Time magazine reported that Germany made "final reparations-related payment for

14070-402: The reparations and inflation ignores "the fact that the restriction of the German military to 115,000 men relieved the German central budget considerably". Hantke and Spoerer argue that their findings show "that even under quite rigorous assumptions the net economic burden of the Treaty of Versailles was much less heavy than has been hitherto thought, in particular if we confine our perspective to

14204-678: The result of reparations. During the First World War, Germany did not raise taxes or create new ones to pay for war-time expenses. Rather, loans were taken out, placing Germany in an economically precarious position as more money entered circulation, destroying the link between paper money and the gold reserve that had been maintained before the war. With its defeat, Germany could not impose reparations and pay off her war debts now, which were now colossal. Historian Niall Ferguson partially supports this analysis: had reparations not been imposed, Germany would still have had significant problems caused by

14338-455: The same time, the Young bond was put on the market. Germany borrowed 1.47 billion Reichsmarks (300 million gold marks) at 5.5 percent interest for 35 years. Two-thirds of the sum went to the reparation creditors and to support the German economy and one-third to the postal service and the national railway. In spite of the poor capital market after the Wall Street crash, the bond was a success with

14472-501: The states involved and therefore never became legally valid. Germany still paid interest on bonds created under the Dawes and Young plans until 1939, but did not resume paying reparations until after 1945. The precise figure Germany paid is a matter of dispute. The German Government estimated it had paid the equivalent of 67.8 billion gold marks in reparations. The German figure included—other than gold or goods in kind—the scuttling of

14606-441: The time which is US$ 1052 billion in 2024 ) in reparations to cover civilian damage caused during the war. This figure was divided into three categories of bonds : A, B, and C. Of these, Germany was required to pay towards 'A' and 'B' bonds totaling 50 billion marks ( US$ 12.5 billion ) unconditionally. The payment of the remaining 'C' bonds was interest-free and without any specific schedule for payment, instead being contingent on

14740-643: The treaty a Carthaginian peace that would economically destroy Germany. His arguments had a profound effect on historians, politicians, and the public at large. The consensus of contemporary historians is that reparations were not as intolerable as the Germans or Keynes had suggested and were within Germany's capacity to pay had there been the political will to do so. Reparations played a significant role in Nazi propaganda, and after coming to power in 1933, Hitler ceased payment of reparations, although Germany still paid interest to holders of reparation bonds until 1939. Following

14874-451: The treaty a " Carthaginian peace " that would economically affect all of Europe. Keynes said that the figures being bandied about by politicians at the time of the signing of the treaty, such as US$ 25 billion or even US$ 50 billion , as "not within the limits of reasonable possibility". He instead calculated that US$ 10 billion was the "safe maximum figure", but though he also "not believe that [Germany could] pay as much". He predicted that

15008-423: The war", Germany was willing to provide the resources needed and "to undertake herself the rebuilding of townships, villages, and hamlets". The London Schedule of Payments of 5 May 1921 established "the full liability of all the Central Powers combined, not just Germany alone," at 132 billion gold marks. This sum was a compromise promoted by Belgium—against higher figures demanded by the French and Italians and

15142-421: The war, the French authorities had to remove over 3 hundred million metres of barbed wire and fill in more than a quarter of a billion cubic metres of trenches, with much farmland rendered essentially useless for years after the war due to unexploded ordinance and contamination by poison gas that continued to leak from buried gas-cylinders which had to be removed. Allied losses of civilian shipping at sea due to

15276-451: The war. Despite domestic pressure for a harsh settlement, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George opposed overbearing reparations. He argued for a smaller sum, which would be less damaging to the German economy with a long-term goal of ensuring Germany would remain a viable economic power and trading partner. He also argued that reparations should include war pensions for disabled veterans and allowances for war widows, which would reserve

15410-453: The war. The opening article of the reparation section of the Treaty of Versailles , Article 231 , served as a legal basis for the following articles, which obliged Germany to pay compensation and limited German responsibility to civilian damages. The same article, with the signatory's name changed, was also included in the treaties signed by Germany's allies. In February 1919, Foreign Minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau informed

15544-413: The whole period, but points out that this sum was vastly offset by the devaluation of Allied paper-mark deposits up to 1923, and by loans that Germany subsequently repudiated after 1924. The net capital transfer into Germany amounted to 17.75 billion marks, or 2.1% of Germany's entire national income over the period 1919–1931. In effect, America paid Germany four times more, in price-adjusted terms, than

15678-411: Was 33 per cent of total net national product. A.J.P. Taylor wrote "Germany was a net gainer by the financial transactions of the nineteen-twenties: she borrowed far more from private American investors ... than she paid in reparations". P.M.H. Bell stated the creation of a multi-national committee, which resulted in the Dawes Plan, was done to consider ways the German budget could be balanced,

15812-513: Was able and willing to meet all obligations. A committee formed under the terms of Young Plan – a previous reduction in Germany's reparations schedule – concluded that Germany would not be able to meet its obligations and recommended that they be permanently cancelled. At the Lausanne Conference of 1932 , the United Kingdom and France relieved Germany of its reparation obligations, subject to their being able to reach an agreement with

15946-497: Was accepted and was ratified by the German Government on 12 March 1930. The plan established a theoretical final reparation figure at 112 billion gold marks ( US$ 26.35 billion ) , with a new payment schedule that would see reparations completed by 1988—the first time a final date had been set. In addition, foreign oversight of German finances was to end with the withdrawal of the Reparations Agency, which would be replaced by

16080-568: Was based upon a German proposal and the default was massive. The Allies were unanimous that the default was in bad faith. Whilst Germany had lost important coal-fields in Silesia when these were transferred to Poland under the Versailles treaty, the required coal-quota had also been reduced. Exporting of German coal to Austria and Switzerland continued until December 1921 when the Reparations Committee banned all exports of German coal except to

16214-416: Was determined, for these reasons, that any just peace required Germany to pay reparations for the damage it had caused. Clemenceau viewed reparations as a way of weakening Germany to ensure it could never threaten France again. His position was shared by the French electorate. Reparations would also go towards the reconstruction costs in other countries, including Belgium, which were also directly affected by

16348-545: Was formed of various nationalist groups under the leadership of Alfred Hugenberg , a media baron and head of the German National People's Party . One of the groups that joined was the Nazi Party led by Adolf Hitler . The committee's goal was the enactment of what it called the "Law Against the Enslavement of the German People", or in its shortened form, the "Freedom Law". It would renounce all reparations and make it

16482-508: Was in the process of "tearing up" the Young Plan. The French saw in the statement the chance to fall back on the robust sanctions possibilities of the Versailles Treaty, while the Germans recognised in it merely the freedom of action to which every sovereign state was entitled under international law. Due to the New York stock market crash of 24 October 1929, which had occurred between the two sessions at The Hague, it had become apparent that for

16616-417: Was magnified by the volume of loans provided to German companies by US lenders. Even the reduced payments of the Dawes Plan were mainly financed through a large volume of international loans. While Germany initially had a trade deficit, British policy during the early 1920s was to reintegrate Germany into European trade as soon as possible. Likewise, France attempted to secure trade deals with Germany. During

16750-466: Was met with mixed reactions. Germany welcomed the relief, but other nations resisted, particularly France, which was heavily reliant on German reparations to service its own war debts, and many American citizens. After much telephone lobbying by Hoover, it had gained support from 15 nations by 6 July. It was approved by the United States Congress in December. The moratorium did little to slow

16884-551: Was more than twice as large, could initially be transferred in Reichsmarks in the event of a "relatively short depression", but the foreign currency had to be delivered within two years. The protected instalment was closely linked to inter-allied war debts through the Concurrent Memorandum that the creditor powers attached to the Young Plan. On 17 May 1930, the Young Plan came into force retroactively to 1 September 1929. At

17018-496: Was not German defaults on coal and timber deliveries, but the forcing of Germany "to acknowledge her defeat in World War I and to accept the Versailles Treaty". Poincaré recognized that if Germany could get away with defying Versailles in regard to the reparations, a precedent would be created and inevitably the Germans would proceed to dismantle the rest of the Versailles treaty. Although the French succeeded in their objective during

17152-456: Was not nearly so favorable as the imperial government had led the German public to believe during the war". Politicians seeking international sympathy would continue to use the article for its propaganda value, persuading many who had not read the treaties that the article implied full war guilt. German revisionist historians who later tried to ignore the validity of the clause found a ready audience among revisionist writers in France, Britain, and

17286-450: Was reached on this existing debt with West Germany. Germany agreed to repay 50 per cent of the loan amounts that had been defaulted on in the 1920s, but deferred some of the debt until West and East Germany were unified . In 1995, following reunification, Germany began making the final payments towards the loans. A final installment of US$ 94 million was made on 3 October 2010, settling German loan debts in regard to reparations. During

17420-446: Was required to pay. Germany's assistance with the restoration of the university library of Louvain , which was destroyed by the Germans on 25 August 1914, was also credited towards the sum, as were some of the territorial changes the treaty imposed upon Germany. The payment schedule required US$ 250 million within twenty-five days and then US$ 500 million annually, plus 26 per cent of the value of German exports. The German Government

17554-539: Was settled with the Mellon–Berenger Agreement in April 1926 that established a schedule for French repayment to the United States. The French Chamber of Deputies , however, refused to ratify it until the German reparations issue was settled. Since the money from Germany was to be used for French payments to the United States, France became more willing to agree to a new reparations plan, even to settle for less than

17688-529: Was signed in 1923, Turkish reparations were "eliminated altogether". From the initiation of reparations, German coal deliveries were below the level agreed. In an attempt to rectify this situation, the Spa Conference was held in July 1920. At this conference it was decided that Germany would be paid five marks per coal ton delivered to facilitate coal shipments and help feed the miners. Despite this, Germany continued to default on her obligations. By late 1922,

17822-494: Was to issue bonds at five per cent interest and set up a sinking fund of one per cent to support the payment of reparations. In the London ultimatum of 5 May, Germany was given six days to recognize the Schedule of Payments and to comply with the Treaty of Versailles' demands for disarmament and the extradition of German "war criminals". If it did not, the Allies threatened to occupy the Ruhr . In anticipation of such an ultimatum,

17956-487: Was worth 4,200,000,000,000 marks. Ferguson writes that the policy of the Economics Minister Robert Schmidt led Germany to avoid economic collapse from 1919 to 1920, but that reparations accounted for most of Germany's budget deficit in 1921 and 1922 and that reparations were the cause of the hyperinflation. Several historians counter the argument that reparations caused the inflation and collapse of

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