Shenzhen North Depot
121-477: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Route of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong XRL (Guangshen section in red and Hong Kong section in blue ) Only transfers with rapid transit systems are marked in this diagram The Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link ( XRL ), also known as the Guangshengang XRL , is a high-speed railway line that connects Guangzhou and Hong Kong ( Kowloon ) via Shenzhen . Three types of rolling stock that operate along
242-580: A 22.1% shareholding in Octopus Holdings Limited (OHL), which was first established in 2005 and is owned by the major public transport operators in Hong Kong. OHL is the holding company of Octopus Cards Limited, which is a world leader in smart card payment systems used not only for making public transport journeys within Hong Kong but also for making small purchases in supermarkets and other convenience stores. KCRC also remained responsible for funding
363-647: A consolidated joint report submitted to the Government, it was a preliminary assessment of their ideas, but also required further studies by the Environment, Transport and Works Bureau & KCRC of the Northern Link . In the first and second phases of the study, the planning team had to investigate and compare the traditional wheel-rail and maglev technologies. Operating and maintenance costs were greater with maglev than with wheel-rail technology, The construction period of
484-600: A dependable, long-term source of revenue for the Corporation." In 1994 the government published its Railway Development Strategy, which identified the need for a railway to serve the rapidly expanding new towns in the northwestern New Territories. In October 1998 KCR began work on the construction of an entirely new line of some 30.5 km in length, connecting the new towns of Yuen Long , Tin Shui Wai and Tuen Mun with urban Kowloon . Originally estimated to cost HK$ 64 billion,
605-413: A fare premium. The corporation faced increasing competition from road transport operators, mainly coach operators, following the opening of a number of major crossing points providing convenient road access to Shenzhen and southern China. Profits from this segment of the corporation's transport operations were considered vital to subsidise its domestic services which in general operated at a loss. During
726-796: A formal agreement with the Hong Kong SAR Government, decided by the Ministry of Railways, led the establishment of an expert group to study the construction of the Regional Express high-speed rail line. In February 2002, in the framework of “collaborative meetings” by the Hong Kong SAR Government Environment, Transport and Works Bureau and the Ministry of Railways, the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link Planning Group
847-571: A land developer by utilising its property development rights atop and around railway stations and depots. In December 2007, it ceased railway operations, with its business becoming primarily that of earning revenue from being the holder of railway assets. While it continues to own the rail network, the network is operated by the MTR Corporation under a 50-year service concession, for which the MTR Corporation Limited makes annual payments to
968-627: A light rail and bus terminus in Tuen Mun , was completed in 1988. While profits generated from property and commercial services were useful to fund new railway projects, they were never regarded as essential, being generally treated as a useful windfall. The chairman of the KCRC, K Y Yeung, highlighted this in his statement made in the 2002 annual report, by pointing out that "our main source or revenue has always been and will continue to be fares. The receipts from property developments are one-off in nature and are not
1089-547: A maglev railway between Guangzhou and Hong Kong would benefit visitor numbers. The cost of construction was to be borne in equal proportion by governments of both cities. The Hong Kong government, based on the results of the Second Railway Development Study by the Department of Transportation, issued a new plan, “Railway Development Strategy 2000 – new railway strategy”. On 16 May's Legislative Council meeting,
1210-451: A major business in investment and revenue terms. Corporatisation of public services as a means to permit government-owned public utilities to operate more along the lines of private sector business was an approach that was beginning to gather interest at the time from several governments – the US and UK governments under Reagan and Thatcher being prime movers. The object of corporatisation was to allow
1331-657: A news conference at the APEC Senior Officials' Meeting, Shenzhen and Hong Kong is planning to build maglev railway and to continue to discuss the issue. But also at this time, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway Co. also made a Guangzhou–Kowloon Through Train speed plan. By the end of January 2002, the concept of “Regional Express” gained further development. Tsang in Beijing to attend the “Mainland and Hong Kong SAR major infrastructure coordination meeting”, and with
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#17328475171321452-414: A set of measures to more clearly delineate the work of the chairman and CEO. While the board meeting was being held, 20 of the corporation's senior executives met the media in a room next to where the board meeting was being held. The managing board considered this to be a very serious matter, and that the incident had caused serious damage to the reputation and image of the corporation. A further meeting of
1573-537: A similar maximum passenger capacity of around 238 passengers by having all but 26 passengers standing. These recommendations came at the same time as the government was examining proposals for a mass transit system along the north of Hong Kong Island. As explained by the Secretary for Transport in the Legislative Council on 5 July 1978, the government had asked the then Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) to plan
1694-449: A small number of management staff answerable to its Managing Board, with specialist legal, financial and other support being provided through outsourcing and consultancy arrangements. The Corporation's key responsibilities include overseeing and fulfilling its obligations with respect to its service concession with the MTRCL, raising new financing as needed to service its debts (over HK$ 10 billion
1815-597: A third extension, the Lok Ma Chau Spur Line came into service. Extending from East Rail at Sheung Shui to a second cross-boundary terminal at Lok Ma Chau, the Spur Line was intended to alleviate congestion for cross-boundary travellers at the existing Lo Wu terminal and to provide a convenient connection to the Shenzhen Metro system. In 2000, the government published its updated Railway Development Strategy. Included
1936-471: Is a list of operators using the line and their respective rolling stock : In Hong Kong, MTR announced their intention to purchase several high-speed EMUs . The tender (contract number: 840) was for 9 trainsets, each with 8 cars and a maximum operating speed of 350 km/h. Chinese manufacturer CSR Qingdao Sifang emerged as the successful bidder, based on the CRH380A "Harmony" model. The purchase contract
2057-739: Is criticized as the infringement on the sovereignty of Hong Kong. In April 2007, the Executive Council assigned the task of planning and design of the fully underground Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) to the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL). Government projections indicate that the XRL will carry about 100,000 passengers daily in 2020 and 120,000 passengers in 2030, generating an economic benefit of HK$ 83 billion over
2178-618: Is estimated to be 1 hour and 18 minutes based on the first trial run, up from the previously announced 47 minutes with a total distance of 142 kilometers. Shenzhen North station was opened on 22 June 2011 and the service was extended to Futian station on 30 December 2015. Trains departing from Hong Kong may have destinations beyond Guangzhou, through the Wuguang High-Speed Railway and the Shiwu High-Speed Railway , or via Shenzhen North to Hangzhou and Shanghai through
2299-519: The Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (sometimes abbreviated "XRL HK section") is a 26 km (16 mi) long stretch of high-speed rail that runs along a dedicated underground rail corridor linking Hong Kong to mainland China . It is one of the most expensive infrastructure undertakings in Hong Kong's history. The line connects Kowloon with the high-speed rail network of China at Futian station in
2420-653: The Hong Kong Legislative Council on 16 January 2010. The XRL HK Section will only serve the West Kowloon Terminus . Trains will run to Guangzhou South Station in the Shibi Township of the Panyu District in southern Guangzhou through three intermediate stations, namely, Futian , Longhua (Shenzhen North) and Humen . The expected travel time between Guangzhou South and West Kowloon stations
2541-664: The KCR East Rail (now the East Rail line on the MTR network) was extended from Hung Hom station to East Tsim Sha Tsui station , enabling KCR services to return to a location close to the original 1910 KCR terminus. In December 2004 Ma On Shan Rail (now the Ma On Shan line on the MTR network) was opened, linking Wu Kai Sha with East Rail at Tai Wai station . Some three years later, in August 2007,
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#17328475171322662-584: The Xiashen Railway and the Huhangyong Railway. The total distance of the Hong Kong section was planned to be 26 kilometres, most of which through tunnels. The dedicated track will enable a top speed of 200 km/h; the expected travel time from Kowloon to Shenzhen's Futian station is 14 minutes. [1] Service between Guangzhou South and Shenzhen North stations started on 26 December 2011. The extension to Futian station, originally scheduled for 2012,
2783-422: The "catch-22" situation faced by the corporation in his statement contained in the 2001 annual report. "While the Corporation has autonomy to decide fares, we face the classic dilemma of most publicly owned transport operators when it comes to raising fares. On the one hand, in the current period of economic deflation, there is considerable pressure on public transport operators not to increase fares so as to share
2904-510: The Acting chief executive officer, Samuel Lai , wrote to the Managing Board to complain about the leadership style of the chairman. Around 80% of the staff signed in support of Lai. In Lai's letter he stated that little had changed since 2001, and that the necessary distinctions between the different but complementary roles of the executive and non-executive functions frequently became blurred, with
3025-541: The British proposal of connecting Hong Kong and China from Kowloon . The RER could be further extended to Hong Kong Island . At the same time, the report recommended that Hung Hom station should continue to play a central role in Hong Kong's mass transit. Since the typical timeframe for rail projects, from conception to completion phase, would take eight or nine years, the Railway Development Study recommended that
3146-499: The CEO) to suit its operational needs and the prevailing corporate practices which change over time. This deliberate lack of clarity arguably sowed the seed for a future controversy. Michael Tien , a businessman, was subsequently appointed as the chairman, with the former chairman and chief executive, K Y Yeung, stepping down to become the CEO. It rapidly became publicly evident, however, that there
3267-593: The Chinese authorities have created checkpoints both on the trains to Hong Kong and at the Hong Kong West Kowloon railway station , in a " Mainland Port Area " where Chinese criminal laws can be legally enforced for the first time in Hong Kong territory, as part of the bill passed in June 2018, which infringes on the sovereignty of Hong Kong. On 29 November 2009, a demonstration of more than 1,000 people protesting against
3388-590: The East Rail or the West Rail line to the border, operating between Hung Hom and the border in an express manner similar to Hong Kong Airport 's Airport Express line. " The decision to build a “Regional Express”, depended on the Lok Ma Chau Spur provided additional transport capacity which would soon be saturated. According to the 1998 price estimates, construction of the RER needed a budget of about HK$ 130 to 170 billion. It
3509-885: The Express Rail Link under the Railways Ordinance to collect public views. In early 2009, the government of Hong Kong signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Ministry of Railways that would permit the construction of the Shenzhen–Hong Kong section of the railway. On 20 October 2009, the Chief Executive in Council authorised the scheme and the Amendments of the Scheme of the Express Rail Link. On 16 January 2010,
3630-539: The Finance Committee of the Legislative Council approved the funding application for the construction of the Express Rail Link. The construction commenced in late January 2010 and was completed in September 2018. In October 2014, an MTR report warned that the revised budget of HK$ 71.5 billion might be at risk. This section had been expected to open in 2015, but severe storms flooded the tunnels and caused immense damage to
3751-695: The Governor of Guangdong Province, Lu Ruihua , acting mayor of Guangzhou, Lin Shusen and Shenzhen Mayor Yu Youjun for talks about the “Regional Express line concept”. Tung attended the Shanghai APEC Summit in October 2001, formally proposing the construction of a maglev railway between Canton/Guangzhou and Hong Kong Express Line plans to the State Planning Commission. The Mayor of Shenzhen Yu Youjun said at
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link - Misplaced Pages Continue
3872-545: The Guangdong Provincial Government and PRC's Ministry of Railways ). Hoping to be able to start construction of the Hong Kong section of the Express Rail Link (XRL) project before the end of 2009, the Executive Council approved the implementation on 20 October, paving the way for funding approval from the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council. Appropriations for the project secured approval of
3993-634: The Guangzhou–Shenzhen starts at Guangzhou South railway station and ends at Shenzhen Futian station , it is 116 km (72 mi) line length, with a design speed of 350 km/h (220 mph). From there it travels south to Qingsheng before tunnelling eastwards underneath the Pearl River to Humen in Dongguan . It then moves south to Guangmingcheng, Shenzhen North and Futian(u/c) in Shenzhen. Originally
4114-660: The Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link correspondingly accelerated planning until July 2004, deciding to adopt the “Panyu – Nansha – Shekou – Hong Kong” route. The station located in Guangzhou's Panyu district would also connect with the Wuhan–Guangzhou Passenger Line. The 143 km (89 mi) route starts with a connection to the Wuguang High-Speed Railway at Guangzhou South railway station in Shibi , southern Guangzhou (Canton). From there it travels south to
4235-482: The Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link project, the relevant regional passenger transport demand analysis and forecasting, as well as railway lines and public transit locations. The first phase of the study completed in September 2002 and reported on the September 20th 2002 at the Second “Mainland and Hong Kong's major infrastructure cooperation held meeting”. At the meeting, the high-speed rail planning team reported
4356-501: The Hong Kong (SAR) Government should commence as soon as possible, so that the new express railway could be constructed in time to meet capacity demands. In September 1999, the then mayor of Guangzhou, Lin Shusen , announced his “Suigang maglev rail project” at the "Fortune Global Forum" in Shanghai. Lin was already working with then-Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa , on the development of Hong Kong Disneyland. Lin proposed that
4477-483: The KCR Ordinance in 1998. The purpose of the amendment was to enable the corporation to build new railway projects (other than East Rail and Light Rail) and to raise commercial loans. Also included in the amendment was the removal of the requirement on the corporation to make a return on its fixed assets. This was particularly important as it was recognised that the heavy capital investment in new railways would not enable
4598-527: The KCRC Ordinance to provide for the separation of the functions and duties of the chairman from those of the chief executive by creating the office of chief executive officer (CEO), who also became a member of the managing board. The government argued that, with the then planned expansion of the railway network, there was a growing need to separate the strategic planning functions and day-to-day management responsibilities of KCRC. Enacting legislation to separate
4719-667: The KCRC. From 1910 to 1982, the KCR network was operated as a department of the Hong Kong Government . The Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation was created in December 1982 after the government decided to corporatise its railway department. Until 2007, the KCRC owned and operated a network of heavy rail, light rail and feeder bus routes within Kowloon and the New Territories . It was also
4840-482: The KCRC. During the electrification of the KCR in the 1970s and early 1980s, thought had been given by the government as to the future management of the railway. Before 1982, the Kowloon–Canton Railway had been run as a department of the government, and was subject to the normal civil service rules and requirements. This made it difficult to take a commercial approach to operating what was increasingly becoming
4961-518: The KSL and the new light rail vehicles under the service concession. Although the corporation's annual revenues saw a sharp decline from over HK$ 5.5 billion before the merger to less than HK$ 1 billion immediately after the merger, its operating costs similarly declined. The corporation was also fortunate in being able to refinance a substantial portion of its large debt portfolio during the low interest environment that prevailed during 2009 and 2010. This reduced
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link - Misplaced Pages Continue
5082-627: The Kowloon Wharf and Godown Company (the owner of the Hong Kong Tramways). The main sticking points in the negotiations appear to have been the amount of profit that the company would have been allowed to earn from the Tuen Mun light rail network and the granting of property development rights. Also during this time, the decision had been taken to construct the MTR Island line underground as had been
5203-535: The Legco Panel on Transport Railway Development Strategy tabled the strategy for use by the Hong Kong (SAR) Government. The Executive Council (upper house) recommended that, under the Chief Executive's advice, Hong Kong should adopt the "Railway Development Strategy 2000" until a further review in 2016. “Railway Development Strategy 2000” recommended new six new rail corridors, through the New Territories, connecting
5324-442: The Legislative Council in March 2008, the cost of building the SCL will be borne by the government, with MTRCL given responsibility for managing the design and construction of the line. The government has indicated that it may vest the completed line in, or lease the line to, KCRC, which would then grant an additional service concession to the MTRCL to operate the line. KCRC has indicated that such an arrangement would enable recovery of
5445-465: The Legislative Council, the KCRC ceased to be a public transport operator on 2 December 2007, becoming thereafter primarily simply the holder of railway assets. Instead of being the operator of those assets, KCRC granted MTRCL the right to operate KCRC's rail and feeder bus network under a service concession agreement for an initial period of 50 years, which may be extended. In return MTRCL was required to make an upfront payment to KCRC of HK$ 4.25 billion for
5566-404: The MTRCL making annual payments to KCRC for the right to operate the network. The KCRC's activities are governed by the KCRC Ordinance as amended in 2007 by the Rail Merger Ordinance to enable the service concession agreement to be entered into with the MTR Corporation Limited. The XRL Hong Kong Section and the Sha Tin to Central Link have since been injected by the Hong Kong Government into
5687-414: The Ministry of Railways had to consider the feasibility of the PRD Intercity Rapid Rail network together with the Guangzhou–Shenzhen section of GZ–SZ–HK XRL. In Hong Kong, the government began to consider the use of the proposed North West Rail Link, Northern Link and the feasibility GZ–SZ–HK XRL Hong Kong section. Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation and the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Corporation produced
5808-413: The National People's Congress, submitted a bill that called for the construction of a Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link Passenger Line as soon as possible. The Guangzhou–Shenzhen Railway utilization has exceeded 90% and was saturated. According to the existing passenger growth rate, to 2005, the Guangzhou East to Shenzhen route would require 96-151 train pairs daily, which will greatly exceed
5929-426: The Ordinance required the government to acquire Hong Kong Tramways' land and assets at their full market value. In exchange for the surrender of the Hong Kong Tramways' Hong Kong Island operations, the government indicated its willingness to offer the right to operate the future Tuen Mun light rail system to the company. However, in January 1983 the government announced that it had not been able to reach an agreement with
6050-410: The Railway Development Strategy 2000 proposed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSAR Government), has now become the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL). In April 2008, the HKSAR Government asked the MTR Corporation to carry out further planning and design of the Express Rail Link. Subsequently, the HKSAR Government gazetted the Scheme for
6171-449: The State Development Planning Commission and the relevant ministry officials, the talks were initially on Regional Express railway line connecting Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong, focussing on the design and coordination of consensus between the parties. The central government officially approved research and co-ordination by the Ministry of Railways, and officially named this railway the "Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link". With
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#17328475171326292-501: The Tunnel Boring Machines in March 2014. The railway has been expected to be completed in third quarter of 2018. According to the Rail Merger Bill, MTR Corporation will lease the rights to conduct operations on this line, until 1 December 2057. With the completion of the section, the journey time through the Rail Link have been reduced to 14 minutes between WKT and Futian stations, 23 minutes between Hong Kong and Shenzhen North and 48 minutes between Hong Kong and Guangzhou South. As of 2015,
6413-425: The West Rail Line, now the Tuen Ma line on the MTR network) was finally opened on 20 December 2003. As a result of extensive value engineering exercises, the final cost of the project came in much lower than originally forecast at HK$ 46.6 billion. The following year two extensions to the East Rail network were commissioned, both lines also forming part of the government's Railway Development Strategy. In October 2004
6534-400: The West Rail Project. Hyde forged new and productive working relationships with the KCRC's Mainland counterparts and Ministry Officials leading to a number of co-operative projects on both sides of the border. He also introduced a 'post-colonial' ethos within the business, actively developing and promoting local executives and expertise. Hyde left in 1996 having decided that it was important that
6655-501: The XRL: Hexie (Harmony) and Fuxing (Rejuvenation) operated by China Railway , and Vibrant Express by MTR Corporation . The first phase, Shenzhen North – Guangzhou South , commenced revenue operation in December 2011. Services were extended to the city centre of Shenzhen at Futian in December 2015. The final phase, which connects Shenzhen-Futian to Hong Kong (West Kowloon) was inaugurated on 22 September 2018. It opened for public on Sunday 23 September 2018. The railway connecting
6776-417: The amendments did not spell out in detail the duties and functions of the chairman and the CEO, or at least their responsibilities. The government argued that this would not be appropriate as it was important for KCRC, which operated along prudent commercial principles, to retain the flexibility to determine and fine-tune the relationship between the managing board (led by the chairman) and the executives (led by
6897-417: The board was held the next day on 15 March 2006. The board decided to terminate the employment contract of one of the 20 senior executives and to issue warning letters to the remaining 19. At the meeting Lai resigned. The reason given in the government's paper to the Legislative Council's Panel on Transport was because Lai, being the CEO, felt that he should be held responsible for the acts of his staff. Lai, in
7018-495: The burden of the community. On the other hand, when inflation returns, there will be equal pressure on operators to keep any fare increases below the rate of inflation so as not to fuel inflation. The longer term implications of this dilemma for the Corporation are obvious. A way has to be found out of this situation if we are to fund new projects. We must try to devise a consistent policy in respect of fare increases which will allow us to demonstrate to investors that we can generate
7139-421: The business entered the 1997 handover with a local person in the position of chairman and chief executive. He was replaced by K Y Yeung, a former senior civil servant with the Hong Kong government. While the KCRC continued to prosper financially, K Y Yeung's style of management, founded as it was in his civil service background, did not sit well with some. In December 2001, the government enacted an amendment to
7260-425: The capacity of the line. It is difficult to meet the transportation needs of the future with the new high-speed rail showing greater potential in the pipeline. On 7 January 2004, China's State Council considered the “long-term railway network plan”, deciding to build more than 12,000 kilometers of “four vertical and four horizontal” Passenger Lines, including Hong Kong in the planning. The Guangzhou–Shenzhen section of
7381-405: The case with the MTRC's earlier Kwun Tong line. Subsequent discussions with other possible interested parties also failed and in 1984 the government turned to the KCRC to invite it to take on the construction and operation of the light rail network. The Light Rail Transit (LRT, known later as the KCR Light Rail and currently simply as the Light Rail) came into service in September 1988. Although
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#17328475171327502-413: The chairman interfering in how day-today matters should be handled. On the following day, Michael Tien met the Chief Executive of Hong Kong , Donald Tsang . In the afternoon of 12 March 2006, Tien announced his resignation, with the effective date to be determined by Tsang. After further negotiation, Tien withdrew his resignation. The KCRC managing board convened a meeting on 14 March 2006 and decided on
7623-467: The construction of a light rail system. The consultants argued that a light rail system offered "the best technical and economic solution to the future travel needs of Tuen Mun. Such a system would, moreover, help to promote and develop the image of the new town." Light rail vehicles would offer greater passenger carrying capacity than buses, and, although initially more expensive to purchase than diesel or trolley buses, their economic life of around 50 years
7744-420: The construction of a mass transit light rail system on HK Island more or less along the alignment of Hong Kong Tramways' existing line, which had been in operation since 1904 and lacked the capacity to handle anticipated future public transport demands. If MTRC's plan was viable, the government would exercise its option under Section 30 of Tramways Ordinance to buy out the existing tramway operation. Section 30 of
7865-440: The construction of the Express Rail link gained the attention of the local media when a group of 100 people engaged in a sit-in protest in front of the government headquarters in Central. On 18 December 2009, when the funding application was debated in the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council, a demonstration of an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 people was staged around the Legislative Council Building . The debate did not end at
7986-430: The construction of the KSL, KCRC ceased to be a public transport operator. The government's Railway Development Strategy 2000 proposed the construction of a new line to link up the northeastern New Territories and the central business area of Hong Kong Island, to be called the Sha Tin to Central Link (SCL). Competitive proposals were invited from both KCRC and the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) to design, build and operate
8107-525: The corporation continued to show a cash operating profit. Of interest also is that the last fare increase made by the corporation was in 1997. Although proposals were put forward to increase fares over the subsequent 10 years to provide comfort that the corporation would be able to service its increasing debt portfolio created by the need to fund the expansion of the KCR network, these came to naught in light of economic and political pressures. The chairman and chief executive, K.Y. Yeung, most eloquently explained
8228-440: The corporation proceeded with detailed planning for the project. In 2005, however, work was suspended pending an announcement by the Government of its decision on how and by whom the SCL would in fact be constructed. By this time KCRC had incurred some HK$ 1.188 billion in costs on the project. Following the rail merger, the government took over responsibility for the project. According to the government's latest plan as explained to
8349-436: The corporation remained 100% government owned, it faced at the same time strong public and political pressure not to increase fares. These difficulties were further complicated by corporate governance issues involving senior management and members of the corporation's managing board. At corporatisation the positions of (non-executive) chairman of the managing board and that of the (executive) managing director were separate, with
8470-433: The corporation to make a commercial return for a good number of years on what would become a far larger asset holding. The basic requirement now placed on the corporation was that. "The Corporation shall conduct its business according to prudent commercial principles and shall ensure as far as possible that, taking one year with another, its revenue is at least sufficient to meet its expenditure." The KCR West Rail (later
8591-401: The corporation's earlier costs on the project. The following table lists year with chairmen, managing directors, CEOs and chief officers since corporatisation. From corporatisation in December 1982 until the rail merger 25 years later, corporate governance issues periodically troubled the corporation. Reflecting this were the changes that took place in the relationship between the chairman of
8712-431: The corporation's interest costs by more than half because the effective interest rate on its debt fell from above 7% to around 3%. Excluding non-cash depreciation charges, the corporation enjoys a cash operating profit, which should continue to increase over time as reflected in MTRCL's variable annual payments. The variable annual payment for 2010 was HK$ 45 million, covering the period from 2 to 31 December 2010 only. For
8833-455: The cost of the project has risen substantially to HK$ 85.3 billion. At present, Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail operates around 104 northbound trains and 101 southbound trains a day, three pairs of separate lines on weekends, a separate peak line 20 pairs and 7 high-speed sleeper train pairs, including: In December 2014, overnight high-speed sleeper trains were added to several long-distance destinations, such as Beijing. The following
8954-550: The country's extensive high-speed railway network. Construction began in 2011 and was hampered by construction delays and political controversy. It opened for commercial service on 23 September 2018. Unlike the rest of Hong Kong, the passenger compartments of trains operating on the Hong Kong Express Rail Link are legally defined as part of the Mainland Port Area and subject to the laws of mainland China, which
9075-450: The end of 1990, with the appointment of Kevin Hyde, a Lawyer and the former chief executive of New Zealand Railways Corporation , the two formerly separate positions were combined into the single position of chairman and chief executive. During his tenure, Hyde oversaw unprecedented growth in the business as well as spearheading a number of significant commercial and engineering projects, including
9196-432: The evaluation of the respective merits and demerits of various modes of public transport to determine which would best meet the needs of the area. The final selection came down to a choice of one of three systems – double-deck diesel powered buses, electrically powered trolley buses , and electrically powered light rail vehicles supported by diesel buses serving less densely populated areas or where steeper gradients limited
9317-557: The first full year of 2011 the variable annual payment was HK$ 647 million. By 2013 the annual variable payment had increased to HK$ 1,247 million. With the HK$ 750 million fixed annual payment, the total cash payment made by MTRCL under the Service Concession for 2013 was HK$ 1.997 billion. After the announcement in June 2002 that KCRC had won the bid to design, build and operate the SCL,
9438-580: The first phase of on the planning for the GZ-SZ-HK XRL. Including the necessities of GZ-SZ-HK XRL construction, function and regional transportation needs, forecasting and route traffic in order to determine the strategic value of the railway. Experts in Hong Kong and mainland China reached a consensus after comparing different alignments, shortlisting two options, “Guangzhou East – Dongguan – Lin Tong – Hong Kong” and “Panyu – Nansha – Shekou – Hong Kong”. A planning goal
9559-471: The focus had been on Tuen Mun, with the new town being planned from the outset with an 'exclusive public transport right of way' segregated from the ordinary road network. In 1977 the government commissioned Swiss Electrowatt Engineering and Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick & Partners, both as the engineering consultants for the Tuen Mun new town, to undertake the Tuen Mun Transport Study. This involved
9680-409: The full construction costs of the KSL, which was under construction at the time of the merger, with the MTRCL paid a fee for project managing the works. KCRC also funded the purchase of 22 additional light rail vehicles needed to accommodate the increase in patronage expected on light rail feeder routes to West Rail stations as a result of the opening of the KSL. MTRCL assumed responsibility for operating
9801-431: The functions and duties of the chairman and the CEO was intended to put in place an effective governance structure to ensure transparency, accountability and responsibility. By strengthening the independence of the KCRC board and providing clear lines of reporting, there would be improved checks and balances over senior management. Unfortunately, as set out in a paper by the legal adviser to Hong Kong's Legislative Council,
9922-447: The government agreed to make an equity injection of HK$ 29 billion to assist the corporation, with the remaining funds coming either from the corporation's own reserves or through borrowings in the open market. In return the corporation agreed to undertake property development along the line, the profits from which (then estimated to be in excess of HK$ 20 billion) being returned to the government. The government also enacted an amendment to
10043-400: The government to build and operate a light rail network in the north western New Territories serving the local public transport needs of the future residents of the Tuen Mun and Yuen Long new towns. The first choice of operator for this network had not in fact been KCR, nor had the construction of a light rail network been decided when the plans for the new towns were first drawn up. Originally
10164-469: The governor (Chairman, managing director and not less than 4 nor more than 8 other members), became responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Corporation. The Corporation was required to "perform its functions with a view to achieving a rate of return on the assets employed in its undertaking, and in accordance with ordinary commercial criteria, is satisfactory." The KCR expanded its operations starting in 1984. It accepted an invitation from
10285-455: The gradually increasing profitability of the corporation. However, as a result of public controversy in late 1988 over claimed "golden handshakes" paid to two senior executives as a result of termination of their services, and in 1989 a fare increase with the corporation already enjoying a significant profit, the government took the decision that both the chairman and the managing director should leave upon expiry of their period of office. At
10406-408: The interaction between the managing board and the executive management team.) The situation did not improve with K Y Yeung's departure at the end of 2003, following the opening of West Rail. At the heart of the problem was the lack of clarity in the respective roles and responsibilities of the chairman and the CEO. On 9 March 2006, with the signed support of all 5 operations directors and 19 managers,
10527-458: The main technical standards, passenger flow forecasting, financial benefits. During the study, in response to the latest developments of both the overall urban planning and transportation network planning, the Ministries of Railways, Environment, Transport and Works respectively needed to consider some new ideas and make adjustments for the Hong Kong section of GZ–SZ–HK XRL project. In mainland China,
10648-460: The mainland China has been important for Hong Kong since the 20th century. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, three railway lines from the mainland, also known as “santang kuaiche” (three cargo express trains), were arranged to transport fresh food every day to maintain the daily needs of the Hong Kong people. A high-speed railway connecting Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong, railway
10769-565: The mainland. The second program for a new line from the West Rail line at Kam Sheung Road station , northwards to Lo Wu or Lok Ma Chau station. Since 2001, the Hong Kong government began working on the “Regional Express” with mainland China, and discussing the feasibility of cooperation on “Suigang maglev rail project”. In 2001, the Hong Kong DoT, with the Shenzhen Municipal Government and Chinese railway authorities to explore
10890-404: The managing board and the head of the executive management team. Initially the root causes of this were the commercial and political tensions arising from the change from a government department to an organisation expected to operate in a prudent commercial manner so as to make a return on its fixed assets. While expected to make a profit to comply with its mandate under the KCRC Ordinance, because
11011-437: The managing director answerable to the board for the day-to-day business of the corporation. D M (Bobby) Howes, the previous general manager of KCR remained for a few months until his successor, Peter Quick, took up the post. Unlike Howes, who was a traditional railway man, Quick came from a commercial background, and from the outset, adopted a strong commercial approach to the operation of the railway. His efforts were reflected in
11132-408: The necessary stable revenue stream in the medium to long term and which, at the same time, will also allow us to demonstrate to our passengers that our fares will remain competitive with those of alternative modes of public transport." Of critical concern to the corporation was the gradual erosion of its cross-boundary market, where for many years it had enjoyed the majority share and was able charge
11253-547: The new line. On 25 June 2002 the government announced that KCRC had won the bid. In the same announcement the government said that, as a separate issue, the chief executive in Council had also instructed the Administration to consider the feasibility of merging the MTRCL and the KCRC into a single rail company. Following five years of negotiations and the enactment of the Rail Merger Ordinance after its passage through
11374-454: The next 50 years in terms of travelling time saved. Construction costs were estimated at HK$ 39.5 billion (US$ 5 billion), giving an economic internal rate of return of about 9%. The government stated the objectives were to "reinforce Hong Kong's position as the transport hub in southern China and integrate Hong Kong into Mainland China's rapidly growing express rail network", and promoting cultural tourism. It also argued that shortening
11495-463: The project was expected to be longer for maglev than the wheel-rail technology solutions. Maglev was not conducive to the existing rail network and compatibility. Also with current high-speed railway operating speeds of up to 350 km/h (220 mph), the less than an hour goal was able to be achieved. Thus to reach the GZ–SZ–HK XRL's three goals, there was no need to adopt a relatively high cost and
11616-500: The public service providers to make a commercial return on their assets, thus reducing the need for investment of public funds raised predominantly from taxes, while still remaining under government control. On 24 December 1982, the KCRC Ordinance (Cap 372) was enacted and the KCR ceased to be a government department, although it remained wholly owned by the government. Under the Ordinance a managing board, comprising 10 members appointed by
11737-464: The purposes of operating the Kowloon–Canton Railway (KCR), and to construct and operate other new railways. On 2 December 2007, the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) , another railway operator in Hong Kong, took over the operations of the KCR network under a 50-year service concession agreement, which can be extended. Under the service concession, KCRC retains ownership of the KCR network with
11858-505: The route, but also allowing for Hong Kong and China Intercity trains to run, reducing the load on the existing East Rail line. At that time the initial alignment program has two starting points located around Hung Hom station. The first one was the Eastern scheme, a new line following the East Rail line of pink Lingnan station, connecting to Lo Wu station or a new rail crossings in the east of Luohu. However, this proposal needed to co-operation with
11979-604: The same district before tunnelling eastwards underneath the Pearl River to Humen in Dongguan . It then moves south through three stations within Shenzhen and then across into Hong Kong where it arrives at West Kowloon Terminus in Kowloon . This project has been divided into two sections, the Guangshen section with six stations, and the Hong Kong section, with one station. Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link section of
12100-526: The service concession and certain short-lived railway assets of KCRC such as stores and spares, and thereafter a fixed annual payment of HK$ 750 million and, commencing 36 months after the date of the merger (i.e. 2 December 2010), an additional variable annual payment calculated according to a pre-agreed set of sharing ratios as follows – MTRCL also paid KCRC HK$ 7.79 billion on the merger for the acquisition of property and other related commercial interests. KCRC and MTRCL remain as separate entities. KCRC employs
12221-765: The station in Humen was to be named Dongguan but this was changed to Humen to avoid confusion with an existing Dongguan railway station on the Guangzhou–Shenzhen Railway in the town of Changping. The Hong Kong section is in total 26 km (16 mi) of dedicated underground track, emergency rescue sidings and the stabling sidings in Shek Kong , ventilation facilities at Mai Po , Ngau Tam Mei and Pat Heung , along with an emergency access point at Tai Kong Po and eventually terminating at Hong Kong West Kowloon station . The Regional Express Line originally envisaged in
12342-409: The system was generally successful in meeting passenger demand, it was never a commercial success. According to the corporation's annual reports, the system showed an annual cash-operating loss up to 2003. The KCRC started to participate in property development and management at around the same time as constructing Light Rail. The first joint-venture property development, Pierhead Garden, located above
12463-494: The technical difficulty of maglev technology. Thus, despite the advantages that high-speed maglev technology has, until August 2003, both sides tended to choose more mature high-speed wheel-rail plans. In other words, the "Regional Express" that was originally intended to have been conceived as a maglev train was cancelled. In March 2003, the Guangzhou Railway Group Corporation general manager, Wú Jùnguāng, at
12584-403: The technology hub of Shenzhen , then running north towards the commercial/ political hub of Guangzhou . As of August 2023 the line has an average ridership of 79,000 passengers a day. The railway is the first high-speed rail link between mainland China and Hong Kong; it roughly halved travel time between Hong Kong and Guangzhou and connected Hong Kong to most major mainland Chinese cities via
12705-570: The time when the meeting was scheduled to be ended, and the funding application was not yet voted on. A major protest followed in January 2010. Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation The Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation ( KCRC ; Chinese : 九廣鐵路公司 ) is a Hong Kong wholly government-owned railway and land asset manager . It was established in 1982 under the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation Ordinance for
12826-475: The travelling time between Hong Kong and Guangzhou to just under 50 minutes—half the current journey time— would save "HK$ 83 billion over the next 50 years in terms of travelling time", and the creation of 5,000 jobs during construction, and 10,000 operational jobs. The construction cost in Hong Kong was covered by the Hong Kong taxpayer (whereas the construction cost in the Mainland section will be covered by
12947-402: The use of light rail vehicles. Diesel buses, although unquestionably more flexible in operation and requiring far lower initial capital costs, because they did not rely on fixed overhead power lines and tracks like trolley buses and light rail vehicles, were ruled out on grounds of air pollution. Trolley buses were ruled out on grounds of capital costs, in that the purchase price of a trolley bus
13068-500: The use of “RER” and maglev technology, project feasibility and actively using magnetic levitation technology to build a line from Hong Kong to Canton/Guangzhou. The study pointed out that the use of a maglev train would reduce the Hong Kong to Shenzhen running time of 40 minutes to 15 minutes. September 2001, when he was the Hong Kong SAR Chief Secretary Donald Tsang, visited Canton/Guangzhou, where he met with
13189-510: Was a proposal by KCR to construct a 3.8 km extension to the West Rail line from Nam Cheong station to East Tsim Sha Tsui station, with the existing section of East Rail line from Hung Hom station to East Tsim Sha Tsui station being modified to become part of the extended West Rail line. Known as the Kowloon Southern Link (KSL), the extension, with a new intermediate station at Austin Road,
13310-530: Was brought up in the late 1990s by the Government of Hong Kong . This Regional Express Railway (RER) proposal was developed in the 1994 “Railway Development Study” (RDS); it foresaw a continual growth of Hong Kong's population over the next two decades and strong demand for cross-border passenger traffic. The Hong Kong (SAR) Government commissioned a second Railway Development Study in March 1998. The Study went further on
13431-491: Was completed and opened for passenger services on 16 August 2009. The financial impact of all these new projects can be seen in the declining net profits of the corporation from 2001. Despite increasing passengers, heavy interest expenses on borrowings and depreciation charges on the new assets pushed net profits down to close to zero by the end of 2007. However, if non-cash depreciation charges are excluded, which rose from about HK$ 700 million in 2001 to HK$ 2,400 million by 2007,
13552-520: Was delayed until on 30 December 2015 for Futian and the 3rd quarter of 2018 during the planning process for West Kowloon Terminus . The completion of the XRL HK section had been delayed on multiple occasions and continuously ran over budget, attracting criticisms from many Hong Kong protestors. Being part of the Chinese Rail Link network, with the start of commercial operations in the Hong Kong section,
13673-435: Was established, which meant the “Railway Development Strategy 2000” planned “Regional Express” was set aside for the “Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link - Hong Kong section”. The planning Group conducted preliminary studies on the main railway necessity, function, alignment, location transit, rail technology and economic benefits. The first phase of the study topics included the functional and strategic importance of
13794-603: Was far longer than that for diesel and trolley buses of around 15 years. The consultants estimated that over 30 years the light rail system would provide an 8% return on assets assuming an annual discount rate of 15% and an annual inflation rate of 7%. The study finally also recommended the extension of the light railway system to the Yuen Long new town. The consultants proposed the use of double deck trams each carrying 247 passengers (diesel buses then in operation could each only carry about half that number). The use of single deck trams
13915-595: Was intended that this railway would be operated by the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation or the Mass Transit Railway Corporation , depending on the location of the downtown terminal. At that time about the “Regional Express” concept, was not a high-speed rail, but only a commuter line connecting the city and the border with “rapid rail” services, in addition to the idea of a small number of intermediate stations being set up alongside
14036-449: Was personal tension between the two, exemplified by Michael Tien's denial that he was a good friend of K Y Yeung when the two briefed the media in 2002 on the findings of the investigation into the Siemens incident. (The investigation dealt with the payment of an additional HK$ 100 million to Siemens under a supplementary agreement to the telecommunications contract for the West Rail project, and
14157-518: Was raised in 2009), ensuring compliance with its obligations under a number of cross-border leases covering its rolling stock and other assets, and being the majority shareholder for West Rail Property Development Limited, which is responsible for the development of some 13 residential property sites along West Rail. In addition to the revenue earned from the concession payments made by the MTRCL, it earns rental revenue from leasing out four floors of Citylink Plaza above Sha Tin station . KCRC also retains
14278-520: Was ruled out on the grounds of capital cost because of the need to purchase a larger number of vehicles to provide the same total passenger carrying capacity for the system. It would later transpire that no light rail vehicle manufacturer could offer such double deck vehicles and none were prepared to invest in the manufacturing capacity needed to build such vehicles given the relatively small number required. Ultimately single deck vehicles had to be ordered, which although longer at 20.2 metres, can only achieve
14399-529: Was signed on 16 April 2012 at the headquarters of MTR. Train fare table G numbered trains (Business seat fare / VIP Class fare / First Class fare / Second Class fare; Unit: yuan; tickets for children, disabled veterans half price tickets, student tickets share a quarter discount of the fare for a Second Class ticket.) Guangzhou%E2%80%93Shenzhen%E2%80%93Hong Kong Express Rail Link Hong Kong section Only transfers with rapid transit systems are marked in this diagram The Hong Kong section of
14520-407: Was to reduce Guangzhou to Hong Kong travel time from 100 minutes to less than 60 minutes. In addition, effective integration with the national high-speed rail network and the connections with the planned Pearl River Delta intercity rapid rail transit network. The second phase of the study, included rail alignments, station locations and the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen line connections,
14641-431: Was twice that of a diesel bus but offered no greater passenger carrying capacity. They also offered less operational flexibility in that they required the provision of a fixed overhead power line. It was recognised, however, that a case for the use of trolley buses over diesel buses might made were the relative costs of diesel fuel versus electrical power to change. The consultants' final report of November 1978 recommended
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