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82-554: Yevgeny Ivanov may refer to: Yevgeny Ivanov (spy) (1926–1994), Russian naval attache and spy in London Yevgeni Ivanov (politician) (born 1964), Russian politician Evgeni Ivanov (volleyball) (born 1974), Bulgarian volleyball player Yevgeni Ivanov (footballer) (born 1979), Russian footballer Evgeni Ivanov (basketball) (born 1993), Bulgarian basketball player Yevgeny Nilovich Ivanov ( ru ) (1921–1945), Hero of

164-421: A megaton-class nuclear weapon. The Soviets were building nine sites—six for R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal ) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean ) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi). On 7 October, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado spoke at

246-715: A base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States". On 10 August, he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba. Che Guevara himself traveled to the Soviet Union on 30 August 1962, to sign off on the final agreement regarding the deployment of missiles in Cuba. The visit was heavily monitored by the CIA as Guevara had gained more scrutiny by American intelligence. While in

328-530: A capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States... the United States would act." Further, US credibility among its allies and people would be damaged if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic imbalance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that "it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality." On 18 October, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko , who claimed

410-420: A figure of 75. The US, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington - and Ethan Allen -class ballistic missile submarines , with the capability to launch 16 Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km). The Soviet First Secretary , Nikita Khrushchev , increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to

492-760: A future US invasion. Construction of launch facilities started shortly thereafter. A U-2 spy plane captured photographic evidence of medium- and long-range launch facilities in October. US President John F. Kennedy convened a meeting of the National Security Council and other key advisers, forming the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM). Kennedy was advised to carry out an air strike on Cuban soil in order to compromise Soviet missile supplies, followed by an invasion of

574-501: A great chance but there are quite some rewards to it." Thirdly, from the perspective of the Soviet Union and of Cuba, it seemed that the United States wanted to invade or increase its presence in Cuba. In view of actions including the attempt to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States , the ongoing campaign of violent terrorist attacks on civilians the US was carrying out against

656-471: A half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles." The Cuban leadership was further upset when on 20 September, the US Senate approved Joint Resolution 230, which expressed the US was determined "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally-supported military capability endangering the security of the United States". On the same day, the US announced a major military exercise in

738-639: A historian and adviser to Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on 16 October 2002, that Castro did not want the missiles, but Khrushchev pressured Castro to accept them. Castro was not completely happy with the idea, but the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them, both to protect Cuba against US attack and to aid the Soviet Union. In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They obtained

820-518: A lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin. Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation. The EXCOMM then discussed

902-414: A meeting with Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro . According to one report, Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. According to another source, Castro objected to the missiles' deployment as making him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to

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984-626: A personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that "under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba." The missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target most of the Continental US. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered

1066-456: A strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge." He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy "would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree". In May 1962, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the US's growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite

1148-916: Is an accepted version of this page Conflict resolved diplomatically The Cuban Missile Crisis , also known as the October Crisis ( Spanish : Crisis de Octubre ) in Cuba, or the Caribbean Crisis ( Russian : Карибский кризис , romanized :  Karibskiy krizis ), was a 13-day confrontation between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union , when American deployments of nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey were matched by Soviet deployments of nuclear missiles in Cuba . The crisis lasted from 16   to   28 October 1962. The confrontation

1230-674: Is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Yevgeny Ivanov (spy) Ivanov was born in Pskov in 1926, the son of an army officer. He joined the Red Navy in 1944. Ivanov subsequently served as a gunnery specialist in the Far East and Black Sea fleets . He underwent training with the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), before being posted to London on 27 March 1960 as Soviet assistant naval attaché. Ivanov

1312-732: Is not known whether Ivanov continued to work with the GRU but he was reportedly awarded the Order of Lenin late in his career. Keeler revealed that she met Ivanov again in Moscow in 1993. On January 17th, 1994, Ivanov was found dead in his Moscow flat at the age of 68. Ivanov's partially ghost-written memoirs The Naked Spy were published in 1992. In the book Ivanov stated that he had been able to obtain significant military intelligence by accessing British political circles. However he claimed that his GRU seniors remained unaware of his relationship with Keeler until

1394-607: Is widely considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into full-scale nuclear war . In 1961 the US government put Jupiter nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey. It had trained a paramilitary force of expatriate Cubans , which the CIA led in an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow its government. Starting in November of that year, the US government engaged in a violent campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Cuba, referred to as

1476-568: The Cuban Project , which continued throughout the first half of the 1960s. The Soviet administration was concerned about a Cuban drift towards China , with which the Soviets had an increasingly fractious relationship. In response to these factors the Soviet and Cuban governments agreed, at a meeting between leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in July 1962, to place nuclear missiles on Cuba to deter

1558-646: The Eisenhower administration and less than twelve months after the Cuban Revolution , the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed a plan for paramilitary action against Cuba. The CIA recruited operatives on the island to carry out terrorism and sabotage , kill civilians, and cause economic damage. At the initiative of the CIA Deputy Director for Plans , Richard Bissell , and approved by

1640-707: The Profumo affair became openly public in early June 1963, just three months after Profumo had lied in the House of Commons by denying an affair with Keeler, the ensuing scandal of Britain's war minister having an affair with the mistress of a Soviet spy resulted in several far-reaching consequences. On a personal level, Ivanov's relationship with Keeler caused Maya to leave him, while the Kremlin failed to show him much recognition. The double rejection led to Ivanov drinking heavily for some time afterwards. Ward took an overdose of barbiturates on

1722-526: The Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts. In February 1962, the US launched an embargo against Cuba , and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government, mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. "Open revolt and overthrow of

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1804-525: The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS: Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza ) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On 13 October, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. On 17 October, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy

1886-489: The UN General Assembly : "If... we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ." On 11 October in another Senate speech, Sen Keating reaffirmed his earlier warning of 31 August and stated that, "Construction has begun on at least

1968-426: The contiguous United States . Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University 's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs , points out, "The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets

2050-456: The "Photo Gap". No significant U-2 coverage was achieved over the interior of the island. US officials attempted to use a Corona photo-reconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed

2132-585: The Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do." Following the failed invasion, the US massively escalated its sponsorship of terrorism against Cuba. Starting in late 1961, using the military and the CIA, the US government engaged in an extensive campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against civilian and military targets on the island. The terrorist attacks killed significant numbers of civilians. The US armed, trained, funded and directed

2214-514: The Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62 , which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the US planned to invade Cuba. The Soviet leadership believed, based on its perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli . On 11 September, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to

2296-459: The Communist regime" was hoped by the planners to occur in the first two weeks of October. The terrorism campaign and the threat of invasion were crucial factors in the Soviet decision to position the missiles on Cuba, and in the Cuban government's decision to accept. The US government was aware at the time, as reported to the president in a National Intelligence Estimate , that the invasion threat

2378-403: The Cuban mainland. He chose a less aggressive course in order to avoid a declaration of war. On 22 October Kennedy ordered a naval blockade to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba. He referred to the blockade as a "quarantine", not as a blockade, so the US could avoid the formal implications of a state of war. An agreement was eventually reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Publicly,

2460-489: The Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international incident. In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) on 10 September, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy heavily restricted further U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as

2542-544: The Kennedy library transcribed some of them. On 16 October, President Kennedy notified Attorney General Robert Kennedy that he was convinced the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba and it was a legitimate threat. This made the threat of nuclear destruction by two world superpowers a reality. Robert Kennedy responded by contacting the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin . Robert Kennedy expressed his "concern about what

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2624-523: The Profumo affair becoming public knowledge, after the Soviet government had sensed a potential scandal involving MI5. Upon returning to the Soviet Union, Ivanov seemingly "disappeared" in the eyes of the international community by keeping a very low profile for the next 29 years, while he had actually continued his naval career, being assigned to the Black Sea Fleet , before publishing his memoirs in 1992. It

2706-643: The Soviet Embassy was considered by the Foreign Office but British Intelligence had hopes of turning the attaché into a double agent . Ivanov became friendly with osteopath Stephen Ward after being introduced to him by the managing editor of the Daily Telegraph during lunch at the Garrick Club . MI5 saw Ivanov as a potential defector and asked Ward to try to convince him to shift his allegiance to

2788-579: The Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees. The Soviet troops would arrive in Cuba heavily underprepared. They did not know that the tropical climate would render ineffective many of their weapons and much of their equipment. In the first few days of setting up the missiles, troops complained of fuse failures, excessive corrosion, overconsumption of oil, and generator blackouts. As early as August 1962,

2870-466: The Soviet Union [REDACTED] Topics referred to by the same term This disambiguation page lists articles about people with the same name. If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yevgeny_Ivanov&oldid=1172854767 " Category : Human name disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description

2952-516: The Soviet Union Guevara argued with Khrushchev that the missile deal should be made public but Khrushchev insisted on total secrecy, and swore the Soviet Union's support if the Americans discovered the missiles. By the time Guevara arrived in Cuba the United States had already discovered the Soviet troops in Cuba via U-2 spy planes. With important Congressional elections scheduled for November,

3034-461: The Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the Soviets were seen as retreating from a situation that they had started. Khrushchev's fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo 's embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the US and his ineptitude in precipitating

3116-480: The Soviet ship Kasimov , with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 jet bomber fuselages. In September 1962, analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its ICBM bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the island. Although in

3198-479: The Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that "it made no difference.... The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now." The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess

3280-622: The Soviets held a two-to-one advantage in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks, particularly in the European theatre. Khrushchev also had an impression of Kennedy as weak, which to him was confirmed by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 , particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall by East Germany to prevent its citizens from emigrating to

3362-448: The Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement not to invade Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed to dismantle all of the offensive weapons it had deployed to Turkey. There has been debate on whether Italy was also included in the agreement. While the Soviets dismantled their missiles, some Soviet bombers remained in Cuba, and

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3444-490: The Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. EXCOMM discussed several possible courses of action: The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical: They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill

3526-491: The Soviets' operation entailed elaborate denial and deception , known as " maskirovka ". All the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment. The Soviet code-name

3608-488: The U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. This identification was made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg Penkovsky , a double agent in the GRU working for the CIA and MI6 . Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in

3690-400: The US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp. The deployment would include short-range tactical weapons (with a range of 40 km, usable only against naval vessels) that would provide a "nuclear umbrella" for attacks upon the island. By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba

3772-542: The US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognized: "The advantage is, from Khrushchev's point of view, he takes

3854-469: The US from inside the Soviet Union. The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965. Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles ( MRBMs and IRBMs ). The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not

3936-415: The US government's demands, made as part of the hostile US reaction to Cuban government policy, were unacceptable. With the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War , the United States government sought to promote private enterprise as an instrument for advancing US strategic interests in the developing world. It had grown concerned about the expansion of communism . In December 1959, under

4018-512: The US suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Soviet-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2 ) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. McCone was suspicious. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, "made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield

4100-790: The United Kingdom. On the weekend of 8–9 July 1961, Ivanov was at a pool party at the Cliveden estate when Christine Keeler met John Profumo , the British Secretary of State for War . Keeler's subsequent affair with Profumo went on at a time when she was also having sex with Ivanov. This was at a time when Cold War tensions were already heightened, just 15 months before the Cuban Missile Crisis . Ward and Ivanov are said to have asked Keeler to quiz Profumo as to when American nuclear missiles would be taken to then- West Germany . When

4182-505: The United States kept the naval quarantine in place until 20 November 1962. The blockade was formally ended on 20 November after all offensive missiles and bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba. The evident necessity of a quick and direct communication line between the two powers resulted in the Moscow–Washington hotline . A series of agreements later reduced US–Soviet tensions for several years. The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and

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4264-424: The West . The half-hearted nature of the Bay of Pigs invasion reinforced Khrushchev's and his advisers' impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet aide wrote, "too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak". Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, "I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have

4346-431: The analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missile transporters, it was believed, could make such turns without undue difficulty. The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. The United States had been sending U-2 surveillance over Cuba since

4428-666: The crisis became enmeshed in American politics. On 31 August, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union was "in all probability" constructing a missile base in Cuba. He charged the Kennedy administration with covering up a major threat to the US, thereby starting the crisis. He may have received this initial "remarkably accurate" information from his friend, former congresswoman and ambassador Clare Boothe Luce , who in turn received it from Cuban exiles. A later confirming source for Keating's information possibly

4510-603: The crisis. According to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States , Anatoly Dobrynin , the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation". In late 1961, Fidel Castro asked for more SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles from the Soviet Union . The request was not acted upon by the Soviet leadership. In the interval, Castro began criticizing the Soviets for lack of "revolutionary boldness", and began talking to China about agreements for economic assistance. In March 1962, Castro ordered

4592-403: The effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads, but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that

4674-407: The evening of 30 July 1963, just hours after a damning summing up by the judge at his trial on charges of living off the immoral earnings (i.e. prostitution) of Keeler and Mandy Rice-Davies . Ward slipped into a coma and was rushed to hospital; he was found guilty in absentia on 31 July, but died on 3 August before sentence could be passed. Ivanov was recalled to Moscow on 22 January 1963, prior to

4756-621: The failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on 30 August, when a U-2 operated by the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2 was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). US officials were worried that one of

4838-443: The images. At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers, in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on 22 October by National Security Action Memorandum 196. Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy tape-recorded all of their proceedings, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of

4920-632: The island would mean war. The Soviets continued the Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On 7 September, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On 11 September,

5002-472: The island's structural weaknesses. The US government provided weapons, money, and its authority to the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista that ruled Cuba until 1958. The majority of the Cuban population had tired of the severe socioeconomic problems associated with the US domination of the country. The Cuban government was thus aware of the necessity of ending the turmoil and incongruities of US-dominated prerevolution Cuban society. It determined that

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5084-559: The island, economic sanctions against the country, and the earlier attempt to invade it , Cuban officials understood that America was trying to overrun the country. As a result, to try to prevent this, the USSR would place missiles in Cuba and neutralise the threat. This would ultimately serve to secure Cuba against attack and keep the country in the Socialist Bloc. Another major reason why Khrushchev planned to place missiles on Cuba undetected

5166-559: The latter would react by launching a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US. Finally, placing nuclear missiles on Cuba was a way for the USSR to show their support for Cuba and support the Cuban people who viewed the United States as a threatening force, as the USSR had become Cuba's ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire". Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. ,

5248-452: The misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev , who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles. Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the US was perceived to have a "splendid first strike " capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to

5330-514: The months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery. That evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT , Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the President. McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of

5412-509: The new President John F. Kennedy , the US launched the attempted Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. It used CIA-trained forces of Cuban expatriates . The complete failure of the invasion, and the exposure of the US government role before the operation began, was a source of diplomatic embarrassment for the Kennedy administration . Afterward, former President Eisenhower told Kennedy that "the failure of

5494-405: The ousting of Anibal Escalante and his pro-Moscow comrades from Cuba's Integrated Revolutionary Organizations . This affair alarmed the Soviet leadership as well as raised fears of a possible US invasion. As a result, the Soviet Union sent more SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles in April as well as a regiment of regular Soviet troops. Historian Timothy Naftali has contended that Escalante's dismissal

5576-632: The past the flights had been conducted by the CIA, pressure from the Defense Department led to that authority being transferred to the Air Force. Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960 , it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight. When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on 9 October, poor weather kept

5658-517: The planes from flying. The US first obtained U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on 14 October, when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristóbal , Pinar del Río Province (now in Artemisa Province ), in western Cuba. On 15 October, the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed

5740-836: The story broke in the UK, since he saw no need to report upon a private relationship. Ivanov is portrayed by Jeroen Krabbé in the 1989 film Scandal , and by Ian Conningham in Andrew Lloyd Webber 's stage musical Stephen Ward the Musical , which opened at the Aldwych Theatre on 19 December 2013. Ivanov was portrayed by Visar Vishka, a Yugoslavian -born actor, in the 2019 BBC TV drama series, The Trial of Christine Keeler . Peter Sellers portrayed Ivanov in British audio comedy Fool Britannia (1963). Cuban Missile Crisis This

5822-418: The subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the US government. The first consignment of Soviet R-12 missiles arrived on the night of 8 September, followed by a second on 16 September. The R-12 was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable liquid propellant fuelled missile that could deliver

5904-427: The terrorists, most of whom were Cuban expatriates. Terrorist attacks were planned at the direction and with the participation of US government employees and launched from US territory. In January 1962, US Air Force General Edward Lansdale described the plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret report, addressed to Kennedy and officials involved with Operation Mongoose. CIA agents or "pathfinders" from

5986-519: The world that the Soviets were building missiles "like sausages" but Soviet missiles' numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions. The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700 of them, but they were unreliable and inaccurate. The US had a considerable advantage in its total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required for their accurate delivery. The US also led in missile defensive capabilities, naval and air power; however,

6068-563: Was Operation Anadyr . The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Sea , and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences. Specialists in missile construction, under the guise of machine operators and agricultural specialists, arrived in July. A total of 43,000 foreign troops would ultimately be brought in. Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei Biryuzov, Head of

6150-432: Was a key reason for Cuban acceptance of the missiles. When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged " missile gap " with the Soviets. In fact, the US at that time led the Soviets by a wide margin, which would only increase over time. In 1961, the Soviets had only four R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By October 1962, some intelligence estimates indicated

6232-460: Was a motivating factor behind the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to Naftali, Soviet foreign policy planners were concerned Castro's break with Escalante foreshadowed a Cuban drift toward China and sought to solidify the Soviet-Cuban relationship through the missile basing program. The Cuban government regarded US imperialism as the primary explanation for

6314-528: Was accompanied to Britain by his wife Maya, daughter of Alexander Gorkin , chairman of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union . Ivanov's English was described as competent and the Russian couple were reportedly popular in diplomatic social circles. However MI5 documents declassified and released in October 2022 described him as a heavy drinker and reckless driver who harassed female guests at parties. A complaint to

6396-484: Was happening" and Dobrynin "was instructed by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba". Khrushchev further assured Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no intention of "disrupting the relationship of our two countries" despite the photo evidence presented before President Kennedy. The US had no plan in place because until recently its intelligence had been convinced that

6478-546: Was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans "with more than words.... the logical answer was missiles". The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky on 4 July and Khrushchev on 7 July. From the very beginning,

6560-553: Was one." A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was that Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin , controlled by the American, British and French within Communist East Germany , into the Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if

6642-605: Was the West German ambassador to Cuba, who had received information from dissidents inside Cuba that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba in early August and were seen working "in all probability on or near a missile base" and who passed this information to Keating on a trip to Washington in early October. Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, and spy flights and minor military harassment from US forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were

6724-408: Was to "level the playing field" with the evident American nuclear threat. America had the upper hand as they could launch from Turkey and destroy the USSR before they would have a chance to react. After the emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev had finally established mutual assured destruction , meaning that if the United States decided to launch a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union,

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