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104-542: USS Rockville (EPCER-851) , also named USS PCE(R)-851 , PCER-851 and ARC San Andres (BO 151) , was a PCE-842 -class patrol craft of the United States Navy , Colombian Navy , and Columbian Coast Guard . Throughout her service, she served as a hospital ship , survey ship , evacuation ship, and research ship between 1943 and 1986. USS Rockville was laid down as USS PCER-851 on 18 October 1943 as one of thirteen Patrol Craft Escort Rescue (PCER) ships by

208-613: A Naval Reserve training ship to drill reserve sailors of the 1st Naval District until 1950. In June 1950 she was placed in reserve as a commissioned ship. On 22 November 1950 the PCER was recommissioned and served the rest of the year in New England . On 15 October 1951, she was re-designated as EPCER-851 (experimental patrol craft escort rescue) for use out of Washington DC with the Naval Research Laboratory . At some point with

312-472: A Terutsuki -class destroyer). Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation, crossing the "T" (a classic naval maneuver to limit the enemy ships' firepower). Evans ordered Johnston ' s guns to fire on the Japanese destroyers, who returned fire striking Johnston several times. At 09:06 Yahagi turned away to the west to unmask her torpedo battery. Hagen presumed this

416-464: A medical ship , she was built with an onboard surgery, pharmacy , 65 hospital beds and equipped with x-ray devices with accommodations for 57 patients. The added facilities were crewed by an additional 11 medical staff, bringing the total crew of the ship to 107. The space was facilitated by a longer forecastle that extended for most of the ship's length. The added weight was compensated with less anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons compared to

520-435: A US destroyer with her secondary battery around this time.) Johnston fired at least 40 rounds, with over 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure observed. Johnston reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding Haruna ' s 14 in (356 mm) return fire. At 08:26 and again at 08:34, Thomas requested an attack on the heavy cruisers to the east of the carriers. Responding at 08:30, Johnston bore down on

624-412: A better fit on such small aircraft carriers instead of the faster and heavier Grumman F6F Hellcats that were flown from the larger U.S. Navy carriers. Their pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip , Leyte, to rearm and refuel". Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. At about 07:20

728-417: A different approach to dealing with the threat. Kamikazes would often follow the tracer fire of ships at dark, so the commander ordered that no guns would be fired at incoming aircraft to deny them a path of approach. To decrease the human loss of attacks, the crew was spaced out above the waterline and below deck when an aircraft was spotted. To further bolster anti-air capabilities, the ship's gunnery officer

832-578: A fast carrier task force. Each had five single-mounted 5-inch (127 mm) guns and several light antiaircraft guns , none of which were effective against armored warships. Only their ten 21-inch (533 mm) Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers. An advantage the American destroyers had was the radar-controlled Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System, which provided coordinated automatic firing of their 5-inch (127 mm) guns as long as

936-537: A few minutes were required to bring Johnston ' s main battery and radar online; from its position in the rain, around 07:35 Johnston fired several dozen rounds at the lead Japanese destroyer 4.9 nmi (5.7 mi; 9.1 km) distant. Firing then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east, targeting several dozen more rounds at the closest ship 5.4 nmi (6.3 mi; 10 km) away. Neither target could be observed visually, and thus were not positively identified; Johnston ' s presumed "cruiser"

1040-509: A four-plane antisubmarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day's air strikes against the landing beaches. At 06:37, Ensign William C. Brooks, flying a Grumman TBF Avenger from St. Lo , sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's Third Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese. When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous, and he demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see pagoda masts . I see

1144-453: A friendly waterline shell hit en route to Mindoro before shooting down a Japanese aircraft, and later on aided in firefighting and survivor rescue. Minor damage was also sustained while pulling alongside the burning USS LST-472 . She returned to Leyte the same day before making for Hollandia, New Guinea , where she would remain until February for repairs. On February 3 the ship left for Saipan and arrived eight days later in preparation for

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1248-496: A full salvo of ten torpedoes. At 07:24, two or three struck, blowing the bow off Kumano . Minutes later, at 07:33, four torpedoes narrowly missed Kongō . (Morison asserts that Kongō was forced to turn away north to avoid these torpedoes, but this is not reflected in Kongō ' s own action report. It is unclear whether these torpedoes were fired by Johnston or Hoel .) The heavy cruiser Suzuya , suffering damage from air attacks,

1352-515: A huge cruiser firing at the helpless Gambier Bay , then closed to 3.0 nmi (3.4 mi; 5.5 km) and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly Haguro , scoring numerous hits. At 08:40, a more pressing target appeared astern: seven Japanese destroyers in two columns, closing to attack the carriers. (This was the Tenth Destroyer Squadron, led by the light cruiser Yahagi , which Hagen misidentified as

1456-528: A less powerful engine also much slower; however, because of its larger size, the PCE was able to undertake longer-range tasks over PC-461 -class vessels. The USN envisaged the PCE as enabling PCs and smaller vessels to undertake coastal patrols without being called-upon as often to perform open ocean and convoy escort duties, while simultaneously freeing-up some larger vessels - such as destroyer escorts and destroyers - from convoy ASW duties. The PCE-482 -class had

1560-431: A mechanical calculator for ballistics and another for own and target course and speed, fed by optical rangefinders. Color-coded dye loads were used in the battleships' armor-piercing shells so that the spotters of each ship could identify its own fall of shot , a common practice for the capital ships of many navies. The Americans, unfamiliar with battleship combat, were soon astonished by the spectacle of colorful geysers as

1664-503: A minimum of 14-inch guns, firing 1400-pound shells over a range of more than 20 miles. The heavy cruisers carried 8-inch batteries plus torpedo tubes, and were capable of 35 knots. The Japanese destroyers outnumbered Sprague's eleven to three. Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of Fanshaw Bay , St. Lo , White Plains , Kalinin Bay , Kitkun Bay and Gambier Bay . Screening for Taffy 3 were

1768-524: A protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 07:10, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then 8.9 nmi (10 mi; 16 km) away, and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted Johnston and soon shell splashes were bracketing the destroyer. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered Johnston to " flank speed , full left rudder"; Johnston , still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated at maximum speed towards

1872-401: A speed of 15.7 kn (18.1 mph; 29.1 km/h). The ships had a range of 8,500 nmi (9,800 mi; 15,700 km) at 12 kn (14 mph; 22 km/h). The normal armament on completion consisted of a single 3 in (76 mm) gun forward, two 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, backed up by 4 or 5 Oerlikon 20 mm cannon . A Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar was mounted between

1976-663: A squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his escorts to the rear of the formation to generate smoke to mask the retreating carriers and ordered the carriers to take evasive action, "chasing salvos" to throw off their enemy's aim, and then launched all available FM-2 Wildcat fighter planes and TBM Avenger torpedo bombers with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few carried anti-ship bombs or aerial torpedoes which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships. The Wildcats were deemed

2080-459: A standard crew complement of 99 officers and men . The class would ultimately see 68 total vessels built, serving with multiple navies around the world. The Admirable class had been developed as a smaller minesweeper than the Raven -class and Auk -class minesweepers, which would be cheaper and easier to build, while still having good seakeeping capabilities in high seas. An escort derivative of

2184-470: A task group of the Third Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack": rather than a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just changed to a circular anti-aircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a stern chase, which restricted

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2288-473: A third and forcing it to withdraw. One of the cruisers lost was Admiral Kurita's flagship, but he was rescued and transferred his flag to Yamato . Subsequently, the carriers of the Third Fleet launched a series of air strikes against Kurita's forces in the Sibuyan Sea, damaging several vessels and sinking Musashi , initially forcing Kurita to retreat. At the same time, the Third Fleet light carrier Princeton

2392-410: A top speed of only 18 knots, far less than the Japanese cruisers and destroyers capable of 30 knots. In addition, none of his ships had a gun larger than five inches, firing 54 pound shells, but unable to penetrate the Japanese cruiser or battleship armor, and had a limited range of seven miles. Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on October 25, 1944 and steamed southwards along

2496-778: The Caribbean to Newfoundland until January 1965. She was later stationed out of Norfolk to continue her mission with members of the Western Electric Company on board. In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 , which reduced the US Navy's budget by US$ 913 million. To cut costs, the US Atlantic Fleet placed Rockville and 54 other vessels into reduced operational status. In

2600-576: The Iwo Jima landings . On February 15 she made for the Volcano Islands to screen the approach, before she focused on beach patrols after arriving at Iwo Jima . On 1 March the ship departed to return to Leyte, escorting a tank landing ship . PCER-851 left Leyte for Okinawa on 27 March as part of the Southern Attack Force together with Destroyer Squadron 60 with the purpose of screening for

2704-563: The Pullman Standard Car Company of Chicago, Illinois . She was launched on 22 February 1944 and commissioned on 15 May 1944 as a medical rescue ship. PCER ships was a variation of the PCE-842 -class patrol craft , designed to focus in personnel transport and medical evacuation . The class was originally planned to serve as Convoy Rescue Transports (designated as APR), however the idea was abandoned before construction started. As

2808-551: The Sixth Army were left vulnerable to Japanese attack on Leyte. Kurita, aboard the battleship Yamato , took his large force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers from the San Bernardino Strait and headed south toward Leyte, where they encountered Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), the northernmost of the three escort carrier groups under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague that comprised the only American forces remaining in

2912-615: The USS Somersworth and USS Fairview , both of which were present at the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. Sixty-eight Patrol Craft Escorts were built for the US Navy, and seventeen were delivered under the Lend-Lease Program to Allies during World War II. The PCEs proved to be an inexpensive substitute for larger and more valuable destroyers and destroyer escorts in convoy escort work. As of 2014 ,

3016-403: The "destroyer escort that fought like a battleship" combating armored cruisers (which were designed to withstand 5-inch gunfire). Around 07:40, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland maneuvered his small ship to evade the charging Heermann ; watching that destroyer approach the enemy, Copeland realized his own ship's heading and location put it in a textbook position to launch a torpedo attack at

3120-457: The 259 sorties from the five fleet carriers Intrepid , Essex , Lexington , Enterprise , and Franklin , and light carrier Cabot , the combination of which sank the massive battleship Musashi (sister to Yamato ) with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes. Halsey's Third Fleet, having spotted Japanese carriers, engaged them in the Battle off Cape Engaño . Although ordered to destroy enemy forces threatening

3224-781: The 3 inch gun and the ship's bridge, while depth charge projectors and rails were mounted on the ships' fantail. Later ships were fitted with a third Bofors gun and additional Oerlikons, while ships were later modified to mount three twin Bofors mounts and four Oerlikons. Some ships (including PCE-867 ) were armed with two 3-inch guns and three Oerlikons. The class was fitted with radar , sonar and other detection equipment for ASW. Some PCEs were later converted to Rescue Escorts, PCE(R), and to Amphibious Control Vessels, PCE(C), which were used in many U.S. amphibious landing operations during World War II, especially Leyte Gulf and Normandy . Two such ships, which were converted to Rescue Escorts, were

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3328-493: The 5-inch (127 mm) guns; even though targets were clearly visible and in range, he intended to launch torpedoes at 2.5 nmi (2.8 mi; 4.6 km). A stray shell, probably intended for one of the nearby destroyers, hit Roberts ' s mast which fell and jammed the torpedo mount at 08:00. Finally recovering, at 2.0 nmi (2.3 mi; 3.7 km), Roberts launched her torpedoes at Chōkai without being fired upon. Quickly reversing course, Roberts disappeared into

3432-547: The American Third Fleet away from the Allied landings on Leyte , using an apparently vulnerable force of Japanese carriers as bait. The landing forces , stripped of air cover by the Third Fleet, would then be attacked from the west and south by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force , and Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura 's Southern Force. Kurita's Center Force consisted of five battleships, including Yamato and Musashi ,

3536-433: The American carriers when they turned back south at 07:30. Despite his General Attack order, Kurita continued to dictate fleet course changes throughout the battle. Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three Fletcher -class destroyers—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with

3640-576: The Atlantic, reporting to the US Pacific Fleet on 15 September at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii . Here, she was loaded with additional medical equipment and boarded by additional medical personnel. The following day the ship sailed West, arriving at Milne Bay , New Guinea sometime in October. After her arrival she traveled to Manus before joining Task Force 79.11.3 at Leyte Gulf to escort transports. Afterwards,

3744-587: The Colombian Navy in 1986, and in 1986 ARC San Andres (BO 154) was commissioned into the Navy as a replacement for BO 151. PCE-842-class patrol craft The PCE-842 -class patrol craft escort was a United States Navy (USN) ship class of submarine chasers designed during World War II . The PCE-842 -class was the only class ever designated by the USN as the " patrol craft escort " (PCE) type (a PCE-905 -class

3848-458: The Japanese chase. Dennis was struck by a pair of cruiser shells, and John C. Butler ceased fire after expending her ammunition an hour into the engagement. The fast destroyer Hoel , captained by Commander Leon S. Kintberger, was the flagship of the small destroyer and destroyer escort screen of Taffy 3. As splashes from Japanese shells began bracketing the ships of the task group, Hoel started zig-zagging and laying smoke to help defend

3952-399: The Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after they had absorbed dozens of hits before they sank, although the decks would be littered with

4056-447: The Japanese to using only their forward guns, and restricted their anti-aircraft gunnery. Sprague's ships would not lose as much of their firepower in a stern chase, as their stern chase weapons were more numerous than their forward guns, and his carriers would still be able to operate aircraft. At 06:50 Admiral Sprague ordered a formation course change to 090, directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards

4160-536: The Japanese with torpedoes. From his position on the damaged Hoel , he formed up the three destroyers of his command as best he could and at 07:40 ordered "Line up and let's go." Through rain showers and smoke, Hoel zig-zagged toward the Japanese fleet, followed by Heermann and Samuel B. Roberts . Kintberger now had to choose a target quickly as the distance closed rapidly. In the Combat Information Center , Executive Officer Fred Green quickly suggested

4264-424: The Japanese. At 07:15, Hagen concentrated fire on the leading cruiser squadron's flagship, the heavy cruiser Kumano . Firing the destroyer's 5-inch (127 mm) guns at their maximum range of 10 nmi (12 mi; 19 km), Johnston scored several hits on Kumano ' s superstructure, which erupted into flame and smoke. At 07:16, Sprague ordered Commander William Dow Thomas aboard Hoel , in charge of

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4368-561: The Pearl Harbor attack) and seven cruisers. As Shima's force encountered what was left of Nishimura's ships, he decided to retreat, stating "If we continued dashing further north, it was quite clear that we should only fall into a ready trap." At the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea , Halsey's Third Fleet savaged the Center Force, which had been detected on its way to landing forces from the north. Center Force lacked any air cover to defend against

4472-639: The Philippine Navy still operates the Miguel Malvar class with six PCEs as gun corvettes , with all the ships' ASW equipment already removed. The PCE is the most numerous major ship class of the Philippine Navy that, at one time, numbered more than ten vessels. 68 boats listed: 827 ... 860, 867 ... 886, 891 ... 904 Sold to a commercial interest, 23 December 1947; fate unknown Battle off Samar Seventh Fleet Combined Fleet Luzon Mindanao Naval operations The Battle off Samar

4576-524: The Philippine invasion area, Halsey was also ordered by Nimitz to destroy a major portion of the Japanese fleet if the opportunity arose. The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships Yamato , Nagato , Kongō , and Haruna ; heavy cruisers Chōkai , Haguro , Kumano , Suzuya , Chikuma , Tone ; light cruisers Yahagi , and Noshiro ; and 11 Kagerō -, Yūgumo - and Shimakaze -class destroyers. The battleships carried

4680-528: The US Navy and Royal Navy. The ships were 184 ft 6 in (56.24 m) long overall and 180 ft 0 in (54.86 m) between perpendiculars , with a beam of 33 ft 1 in (10.08 m) and a draft of 9 ft 5 in (2.87 m). Displacement was 850 long tons (860 t) standard and 903 long tons (917 t) full load. They were powered by two 1,000 horsepower (750 kW) General Motors 12-278A diesel engines driving two shafts via single reduction gearing. This gave

4784-592: The action, losing two escort carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort and numerous aircraft. Over 1,000 Americans died, comparable to the combined losses of American men and ships at the Coral Sea and Midway . Three Japanese cruisers were sunk by air attack, and three others were damaged. The Japanese had over 2,700 casualties. Taffy 3 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and Captain Ernest E. Evans of

4888-511: The afternoon shrapnel detonated one of the ship's 20mm magazines, injuring four. For the next month she would continue to serve as a part of the casualty care mission near Leyte Gulf. After the Battle off Samar , she handled the injured and survivors of Taffy 3 after the Navy was made aware of her nearby presence. PCER-851 and sister ship PCER-852 began operating in coordination with each other, sharing men and supplies while anchoring together to combine anti-air capabilities. Here, she received

4992-415: The area. Composed of only six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, Taffy 3 was intended to provide shore support and anti-submarine patrols, and did not have guns capable of penetrating the Japanese armor. The Japanese opened fire shortly after dawn, targeting Taffy 3's escort carriers, which Kurita mistook for the main carriers of the Third Fleet. The escort carriers fled for

5096-530: The battle, Kurita would be haunted by doubts about Halsey's actual location. The wind was from the North-Northeast and visibility was approximately 20 nmi (23 mi; 37 km) with a low overcast and occasional heavy rain squalls which the US forces would exploit for concealment in the battle to come. Steaming about 60 nmi (69 mi; 110 km) east of Samar before dawn on October 25, St. Lo launched

5200-407: The battle, the increasing severity of the air attack further convinced Kurita that he was engaging the Third Fleet's surface carriers. Satisfied with sinking what he believed were multiple carriers and worried the bulk of the Third Fleet was approaching, Kurita withdrew his fleet north, having failed to carry out his orders to attack the landing forces at Leyte Gulf. Taffy 3 sustained heavy losses in

5304-422: The battleship Kongō to turn north out of formation; Kongō acted independently for the remainder of the battle. Concerned that his destroyers would burn too much fuel in a stern chase of what he presumed were fast carriers while obstructing his battleships' line of fire, Kurita ordered his destroyers to the rear of his formation at 07:10, a decision which had immediate consequences, as the Tenth Destroyer Squadron

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5408-469: The biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" Yamato alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined. Brooks had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, consisting of four battleships, six heavy cruisers , two light cruisers , and about ten destroyers. They were approaching from the west-northwest only 17 nmi (20 mi; 31 km) away, and they were already well within gun and visual range of

5512-510: The carriers and Roberts . Hampered by the closing range and slow rate of fire, Chikuma fired with difficulty at her small, fast opponent. (Early in the battle, when it had become apparent that Roberts would have to defend the escort carriers against a surface attack, chief engineer Lt. "Lucky" Trowbridge bypassed all the engine's safety mechanisms, enabling Roberts to go as fast as 28 kn (32 mph; 52 km/h).) Roberts did not share Chikuma ' s problem of slow rate of fire. For

5616-406: The carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target. The Japanese and the American ships were now intertwined in a confused jumble. The heavy smoke had made the visibility so poor by 08:40 Johnston nearly collided with Heerman while it crossed the formation to engage the Japanese destroyers, forcing Samuel B. Roberts to evade them both. Gambier Bay and Hoel were sinking. Finding targets

5720-429: The closest task group, Taffy 3. Armed only with depth charges in case of an encounter with enemy submarines, the aviators nevertheless carried out the first attack of the battle, dropping several depth charges which just bounced off the bow of a cruiser. The lookouts of Taffy 3 spotted the anti-aircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, achieving complete tactical surprise. At about

5824-499: The coast of Samar , hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away as he had in fact done. Kurita had been advised that Nishimura's Southern Force had been destroyed at Surigao Strait and would not be joining his force at Leyte Gulf. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that they had successfully lured away Halsey's Third Fleet of battleships and fleet carriers. Through most of

5928-457: The command of Takeo Kurita , had suffered significant damage and appeared to be retreating westward. However, by the next morning, the Japanese force had turned around and resumed its advance toward Leyte Gulf . With Admiral William Halsey Jr. lured into taking his powerful Third Fleet north after a decoy fleet and the Seventh Fleet engaged to the south, the recently-landed 130,000 men of

6032-423: The course of the battle. After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs, using their smoke for concealment. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think the destroyers were cruisers, and the destroyer escorts were full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor allowed armor-piercing rounds to pass right through without exploding, until

6136-471: The cover of rain squalls and launched their aircraft in defense, while the three destroyers and destroyer escort USS  Samuel B. Roberts , led by USS  Johnston , launched a torpedo attack that sank one ship and sent the Japanese strike force into disarray. Japanese aircraft from the base at Luzon launched kamikaze attacks on the retreating American task force, sinking one escort carrier and damaging three others. With Taffy 2's aircraft joining

6240-426: The dead and the seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by Gambier Bay , which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers. At 07:00, Commander Ernest E. Evans of the destroyer Johnston , responded to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting by laying down

6344-452: The deck of Johnston and into her portside engine room, which cut the destroyer's speed in half to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h) and disrupted electric power to her aft gun mounts. Hagen reports them as 14-inch (356 mm) shells from the battleship Kongō , at a range of 7 nmi (8.1 mi; 13 km), but this is unlikely, as Kongō was on the far side of the Japanese formation and Kongō ' s action report states that she

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6448-544: The designation, she was disarmed. Her complement would also change to 5 officers, 55 enlisted, and 12 technical/scientific personnel. She conducted a variety of experiments with the laboratory, including sonar effectiveness, acoustic surveys , and oceanic mapping . On 15 February 1956 the ship was renamed Rockville after small towns in Connecticut and Maryland , followed by being fitted with an electronics laboratory and workshop. The Rockville conducted sonar testing from

6552-409: The destroyers Hoel , Heermann and Johnston , and destroyer escorts Dennis , John C. Butler , Raymond , and Samuel B. Roberts . These six escort carriers carried about 165 aircraft, equivalent to two fleet carriers. Each carrier had a squadron composed of twelve to fourteen FM-2 Wildcat fighters and an equivalent number of Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. Yet, the carriers had

6656-541: The effect of having the crew feel like they were alone in the ocean as they at times had no communication with other vessels. After her commissioning, PCER-851 reported with Task Group 26.1 on 10 July 1944 at Bermuda , where she patrolled the area for the next month. In that time, she escorted allied submarines from Norfolk, Virginia to the British West Indies and transferred the captured crew of U-505 to Newport News, Virginia . On 20 August, PCER-851 left

6760-436: The final decisive blows at 09:00, which knocked out her remaining engine. Dead in the water and sinking, Roberts ' s part in the battle was over. Gunner's Mate Paul H. Carr was in charge of the aft 5-inch (127 mm) gun mount, which had fired nearly all of its 325 stored rounds in 35 minutes before a breech explosion caused by the gun's barrel overheating. Carr was found dying at his station, begging for help loading

6864-432: The fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks. Yamato reported sinking a "cruiser" (the Japanese consistently overestimated the size of the US ships engaged) with a main battery salvo at 07:27. Destroyer Kishinami , which was also firing at Johnston at the time, reported "The Yamato sank one enemy cruiser" at 07:28. However, Johnston

6968-548: The first volleys of shellfire found their range. Nagato used a brilliant pink; Haruna used a greenish-yellow variously described as green or yellow by the Americans; and Kongō used a blood-red dye which could appear red, purple, or even blue in some circumstances. Yamato used no dye loads, so her shell splashes appeared white. Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for large fleet carriers and assumed that he had

7072-476: The formation entered the squall, and the Japanese fire slackened markedly as they did not have gunnery radar that could penetrate the rain and smoke. Kurita meanwhile was already experiencing the consequences of ordering a General Attack, as his Fifth Cruiser and Tenth Destroyer Divisions cut across the course of the Third Battleship Division in their haste to close with the American carriers, forcing

7176-468: The gun director was pointing at the target. A dual-purpose system, the Mark 37's gunfire radar and antiaircraft capabilities allowed the destroyers' guns to remain on target despite poor visibility and their own radical evasive maneuvering. The Japanese reliance on optical range finders aided by color-coded dye loads in each shell and mechanical calculators made it difficult for them to identify their targets through

7280-572: The injured and dead from USS Montpelier , USS New Orleans , and USS Lamson , as well as numerous other naval and merchant ships. The ship accompanied forces going to Ormoc Bay in December before joining Task Group 78.3 as a rescue and evacuation ship during the Mindoro amphibious assaults on15 December. By this time, she was the only rescue ship in the Philippine Islands. PCER-851 suffered

7384-519: The largest battleships afloat, escorted by cruisers and destroyers. Nishimura's flotilla included two battleships and would be followed by Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima 's cruisers and destroyers. On the night of October 23, the American submarines Dace and Darter detected Center Force entering the Palawan Passage along the northwest coast of Palawan Island . After alerting Halsey, the submarines torpedoed and sank two cruisers, while crippling

7488-453: The last round he was holding into the breech. He was awarded a Silver Star , and the guided-missile frigate USS  Carr  (FFG-52) was later named for him. The guided-missile frigates Samuel B. Roberts  (FFG-58) and Copeland  (FFG-25) were named for the ship and its captain. Companion destroyer escorts USS  Raymond , Dennis , and John C. Butler also launched torpedoes. While they missed, this helped slow

7592-463: The leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation, Johnston closed to 3.0 nmi (3.4 mi; 5.5 km), now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits. During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 08:20, emerging through smoke and rain squalls, Johnston was confronted by a 36,600-ton Kongō -class battleship (probably Haruna , which reported engaging

7696-533: The leading heavy cruiser. Over his ship's 1MC public-address circuit, he told his crew "This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can." Without orders and indeed against orders, he set course at full speed to follow Heermann in to attack the cruisers. Under the cover of the smokescreen from the destroyers, Roberts escaped detection. Not wanting to draw attention to his small ship, Copeland repeatedly denied his gun captain permission to open fire with

7800-402: The main invasion force. Her low speed made it difficult to follow the force, so she was reassigned to escort a crippled dock landing ship which fell behind the main force. At 0610 on 1 April about ten miles off Hagushi Beach, a Zeke kamikaze took the crew by surprise before diving on the ship and barley overshooting, crashing astern. The type of ship and the large amount of kamikazes led to

7904-539: The new design was proposed for supply under the Lend-Lease scheme to Britain's Royal Navy (which had already rejected the Admirable class as minesweepers), and when the United States Navy realized that a shortage of engines might prevent it from receiving additional PC-461 -class submarine chasers beyond those already on order, it was decided to build the escort variant, designated as Patrol Craft Escort (PCE) for both

8008-452: The next 35 minutes, from as close as 2.6 nmi (3.0 mi; 4.8 km), her guns would fire almost her entire supply of 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition on board—over 600 rounds. However, unknown to the crew of Roberts , shortly after Roberts engaged Chikuma , Heermann also aimed her guns at the cruiser. However, Chikuma was not alone, and soon, the Japanese fleet's multicolored salvos were bracketing Roberts , indicating that she

8112-474: The now fleeing CVEs . When the Japanese had closed to 8.9 nmi (10 mi; 16 km), Kintberger opened fire, and was in turn targeted by the Japanese. Yamato ' s 6.1-inch (155 mm) guns scored a hit on Hoel ' s bridge at 6.9 nmi (8.0 mi; 13 km), knocking out all voice radio communication, killing four men and wounding Kintberger and Screen Flag Officer Commander William Dow Thomas. Admiral Sprague then ordered Thomas to attack

8216-451: The port stanchions and gun tub supports were ripped off when pulling away from the burning Laffey . Due to the damage, 4x4 wood planking was used to shore up the gun platforms until they could be properly tended to by a repair ship . PCER-851 left the island chain on 28 June, where she docked at Saipan on 4 July and escorted USS Rockwall to Pearl Harbor, arriving on the 19th. The ship underwent repairs at Pearl until mid-August when

8320-652: The rain and smoke and limited their ability to maneuver while firing. The different colored splashes the Japanese shells made as they hit the water by the American ships after a near miss prompted one American sailor to quip "They're shooting at us in Technicolor !" The four John C. Butler -class destroyer escorts were smaller and slower because they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. They were armed with two 5-inch (127 mm) guns without automatic fire control, and three torpedoes, although their crews rarely trained for torpedo attacks. Since

8424-454: The rudder. Shellfire knocked out the remaining engine, leaving Johnston dead in the water at 09:40. Her attackers concentrated their fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." At 09:45, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but

8528-471: The same time, others in Taffy ;3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At about 07:00, Yamato opened fire at a range of 17 nmi (20 mi; 31 km). Lacking the Americans' gunnery radars and Ford Mark I Fire Control Computer , which provided co-ordinated automatic firing solutions as long as the gun director was pointed at the target, Japanese fire control relied on

8632-526: The same year Rockville was ordered inactive, decommissioned and struck from the Navy list on 21 December 1968. On 5 June 1969, Rockville was transferred to the Colombian Navy as a survey ship under the name ARC San Andres (BO 151). She was transferred to the Colombian Coast Guard in the 1980s. Sometime later in the 1980s she was once again retired. She was no longer listed as being a part of

8736-401: The ship idled off the coast before the commanding officers of PCER-851 and PCER-852 went ashore and explained the purpose and capabilities of their ship to the beach-master. The ships were then ordered to receive casualties from Dulag Beach on the 20th to 25th in support of an amphibious landing as a part of a "casualty care" mission. After the first few boatloads of wounded were on board,

8840-478: The small destroyer screen, to attack. Struggling to form an attack formation, the three small ships Hoel , Heermann and Samuel B. Roberts began a long sprint to get into firing position for their torpedoes. Johnston pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target. Johnston closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at 4.4 nmi (5.1 mi; 8.2 km) she fired

8944-501: The smoke. A lookout reported at least one torpedo hit, but in reality the Chōkai was not hit by a torpedo. By 08:10, Roberts was nearing the carrier formation. Through the smoke and rain, the heavy cruiser Chikuma appeared, firing broadsides at the carriers. Copeland changed course to attack and told his gun captain, "Mr Burton, you may open fire." Roberts and Chikuma began to trade broadsides. Chikuma now divided her fire between

9048-432: The standard PCE-842 design. A common criticism of the design was the lack of long range surface detection equipment, which forced the crew to manually watch for aircraft. This became exceptionally problematic after the first appearances of kamikazes . The problem was also compounded by the lack of a short range radio, meaning the ship was not able to get any warnings of incoming aircraft from nearby units. This also had

9152-564: The sunk Johnston was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor . Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz wrote afterwards that the success of Taffy 3 was "nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty." The Battle off Samar has been cited by historians as one of the greatest last stands in naval history. The overall Japanese strategy at Leyte Gulf—a plan known as Shō-Go 1—called for Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa 's Northern Force to lure

9256-507: The torpedoes had a range of only about 5.5 nmi (6.3 mi; 10.2 km), they were best used at night: during daylight, an attack on heavy warships would have to pass through a gauntlet of shellfire that could reach out to 25 nmi (29 mi; 46 km). In this battle they would be launched against a fleet led by the largest battleship in history, although it was the ships' ability to generate dense, heavy smoke from their funnels and chemical smoke generators which would most influence

9360-464: The vessel received a message from a liberty ship requesting assistance. Instead of sending the ship's whaleboat to ferry men ship to ship, PCER-851 pulled up alongside the transport, taking onboard several P-38 Army pilots shot down by friendly fire. This tactic would become standard for all other rescues when weather allowed. On the 25th she was instructed to join Task Group 78.2 off Tacloban . In

9464-608: The war ended. In total, she earned three battle stars during the conflict. In mid-October, PCER-851 left Pearl Harbor for the US East Coast, arriving at Norfolk in late November. In January 1946 the ship sailed to New London, Connecticut for operations with the Underwater Sound Laboratory . She left in March before going to Boston, Massachusetts on March 19. On 12 April the ship was decommissioned and entered service as

9568-409: Was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist Kumano . The effect of Johnston ' s attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smokescreen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy. At 07:30, three battleship main battery shells passed through

9672-510: Was forced to turn away just as they were gaining on the right flank of the American formation. For the Second Destroyer Squadron, the consequences were more significant if less immediate: ordered to fall in behind Third Battleship Division, Yahagi and her accompanying destroyers steamed north from their position on the south side of Kurita's formation seeking division flagship Kongō , leaving no Japanese units in position to intercept

9776-603: Was in response to his fire. From as close as 3.5 nmi (4.0 mi; 6.4 km), Hagen fired and claimed a dozen hits on the "destroyer leader" ( Yahagi ) before it veered off, Yahagi ' s detailed action report records one. Hagen then shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, claiming five hits before it too turned away. At 09:20 the entire Tenth Destroyer Squadron turned west to fire their torpedoes from 5.2 nmi (6.0 mi; 9.6 km) before turning east in response to Kurita's recall order. Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from

9880-412: Was most likely the battleship Haruna . At 07:37, Commodore Thomas ordered a torpedo attack via voice radio. Johnston and Heermann acknowledged. As Johnston continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged Hoel . Evans had Johnston rejoin the attack, to provide gun support to Thomas's small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking Tone ,

9984-524: Was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor . As the Japanese destroyer Yukikaze cruised slowly nearby, Robert Billie and several other crewmen saw her captain salute the sinking Johnston . Although destroyer escorts were conceived as inexpensive small ships that could protect slow cargo convoys against submarines, they retained a basic anti-ship capability with torpedoes and 5-inch (127 mm) guns. USS  Samuel B. Roberts  (DE-413) distinguished herself in this battle as

10088-457: Was not difficult. After 09:00, with Hoel and Samuel B. Roberts out of the fight, the crippled Johnston was an easy target. She exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers. Johnston continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 09:20, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans commanded the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating

10192-418: Was not engaging any targets at that time, as she was blinded by a rain squall. Based on the bearing and the angle of fall, it is far more likely that they were 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells fired by Yamato from a range of 10.029 nmi (11.541 mi; 18.574 km), as, moments later, three 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells from Yamato struck Johnston ' s bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing

10296-413: Was not sunk. Already depleted before the battle, her remaining store of oil did not fuel a catastrophic explosion. The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts. Johnston ' s search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. Also damaged, the fire control radar was quickly returned to service. Only

10400-456: Was planned, but none of the operational vessels served under the nominal class). The PCE design was derived from the 180-foot (55 m) Admirable -class minesweeper to complement the 173-foot (53 m) PC-461 -class submarine chasers that were used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in coastal areas. At 185 feet long and 640 tons, the PCE is more than twice the displacement of the PC but with

10504-427: Was sunk by a Japanese bomb , with secondary explosions causing damage to a cruiser assisting alongside. In the Battle of Surigao Strait , Nishimura's ships entered a deadly trap. Outmatched by the U.S. Seventh Fleet Support Force, they were devastated, running a gauntlet of torpedoes from 39 PT boats and 22 destroyers before coming under accurate radar-directed gunfire from six battleships (five of them survivors of

10608-580: Was the centermost action of the Battle of Leyte Gulf , one of the largest naval battles in history , which took place in the Philippine Sea off Samar Island, in the Philippines on October 25, 1944. It was the only major action in the larger battle in which the Americans were largely unprepared. After the previous day's fighting, the Imperial Japanese Navy 's First Mobile Striking Force , under

10712-406: Was traded medical whiskey for single and twin 50 caliber machine guns with aviation personnel. She would continue patrolling duties until the 6th, where she rescued survivors and bodies from kamikaze damaged ships, including USS LCS-82 , Maryland , Laffey , Morrison and Ingraham . The fact that the rescue ships were not designed to come along other ships became apparent when half of

10816-407: Was under fire from Yamato , Nagato , and Haruna . In a desperate bid to avoid approaching shells, Copeland ordered full back, causing the salvo to miss. Now, however, his small ship was an easy target, and at 08:51, cruiser shells found their mark, damaging one of her boilers. At 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h), Roberts began to suffer hits regularly. Credit is given to Kongō for striking

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