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116-483: The types of reconnaissance include patrolling the local area of operations and long-range reconnaissance patrols , which are tasks usually realized in the United States of America by U.S. Army Rangers , cavalry scouts , and military intelligence specialists, using navy ships and submarines , reconnaissance aircraft , satellites to collect raw intelligence; and establishing observation posts . Moreover, espionage

232-414: A pontoon bridge for crossing water obstacles. Sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance implies collection and transfer of all data available on sanitary and epidemiological situation of the area of possible deployment and action of armed forces , the same data for the neighboring and enemy armed forces. The aim for the reconnaissance is to clear up the reasons of the specific disease origin- sources of

348-404: A relatively short battle that lasted only 9 days. When referring to reconnaissance, a commander's full intention is to have a vivid picture of his battlespace . The commander organizes the reconnaissance platoon based on: This analysis determines whether the platoon uses single or multiple elements to conduct the reconnaissance, whether it pertains to area , zone , or route reconnaissance ,

464-480: A few beaches, which the Americans designated by colors. The best beaches were around Sunharon Bay in the southeast: Blue Beach, 1 mile (1.6 km) south of Tinian Town, was 600 yards (550 m) long; Green Beach One, located between the two piers at Tinian Town, was also 600 yards (550 m) long; Green Beach Two, at the southern end of Tinian Town, was 400 yards (370 m) long; Red Beach One and Two were north of

580-556: A follow-up landing there. Naval troops approached the beachhead from the Ushi Point airfield. At around 02:00 on 25 July, a force of about 600 Japanese sailors encountered the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, on the left of the American beachhead, and charged into machine gun, mortar, rifle and 37 mm antitank gun canister shot fire. A furious fight ensued, in which Company A was reduced to just 30 men, but by 07:00 476 Japanese lay dead. In

696-619: A mountain artillery battalion with twelve 75mm guns, an anti-tank company with six 37 mm anti-tank guns , and a company of the 18th Infantry Regiment with twelve light tanks. The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Captain Bunzo Izumi. Part of the 43rd Division , it had been formed in Nagoya in July 1943. It was normally based on Saipan, but was conducting amphibious landing exercises on Tinian on 11 June and became cut off when Saipan

812-466: A patrol will vary from a few hours to several weeks depending on the nature of the objective and the type of units involved. There are several different types of patrol each with a different objective. The most common is to collect information by carrying out a reconnaissance patrol. Such a patrol may try to remain clandestine and observe an enemy without themselves being detected. Other reconnaissance patrols are overt, especially those that interact with

928-401: A point about 4 miles (6.4 km) offshore from Tinian Town, where they boarded landing craft using cargo nets, and then climbed back again. The empty landing craft then made a run for the shore until Japanese shore batteries started firing at them. The landing craft regrouped and made a second run, but turned back again 400 yards (370 m) from the beach. Around 10:00 the transports recovered

1044-408: A raid on the beaches in the west, so this was assigned to the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment. The rest of the 1st Battalion was dug in around Mount Lasso. The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment formed a mobile counterattack force, along with the tanks and a mobile artillery contingent of twelve Type 94 75 mm mountain guns . The reserve was positioned so as to quickly reach either

1160-422: A rifle company of about 200 men. No more than four LVTs could beach at the one time on White Beach 1, so the other four nosed up against the 3-to-10-foot (1 to 3 m) coral cliffs and the marines clambered over them. Company E of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, was first ashore there. It was opposed by a small number of Japanese defenders in crevices and a cave, who were eliminated after a brief action, allowing

1276-490: A rugged 580-foot (180 m) limestone hill mass of cliffs and ravines in the south. About 90 percent of the island (approximately 15,000 acres (6,000 ha)) was covered in sugar cane fields. The square fields gave the island a checker board look from the air. Fields were surrounded by drainage ditches or windbreaks of trees or hedgerows . Most of the island was encircled by jagged limestone cliffs that ranged from 6 to 100 feet (2 to 30 m) high. There were only

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1392-431: A rule. They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information. Often they assign supplementary tasks to their reconnaissance units, such as sabotage behind enemy lines, harassment, or counter-reconnaissance. Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitred. Reserves are kept on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when

1508-478: A single replacement draft of 1,268 men before the fighting began again on Tinian, but remained understength, and much of their equipment had been worn out through combat and hard use. The V Amphibious Corps had the support of Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper 's XXIV Corps Artillery with its two battalions of 155 mm guns and two battalions of 155 mm howitzers . For the Tinian operation, Harper also had command of

1624-451: A socio-cultural backdrop. It is information developed from data related to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be processed to increase situational awareness and understanding. The type of civil information that is needed in order to support military operations varies based on the environment and situation. Route reconnaissance

1740-413: A specified area; the military commander may utilize his reconnaissance assets to conduct an area reconnaissance to avoid being surprised by unsuitable terrain conditions, or most importantly, unexpected enemy forces. The area could be a town, ridge-line, woods, or another feature that friendly forces intend to occupy, pass through, or avoid. Within an area of operation (AO), area reconnaissance can focus

1856-559: A spoon, a spare pair of socks, a poncho and insect repellent. The assault troops were carried ashore in the 415 amphibious tractors (LVTs) of the Marine Corps's 2nd , 5th and 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalions and the Army's 534th, 715th and 773rd Amphibian Tractor Battalions. Fire support was provided by the Company D of the 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion; only one company could be employed due to

1972-416: Is a patrol, usually small whose main mission is the gathering of information. Generally speaking recce patrols tend to avoid contact, although it is not unknown for recon patrols to "fight for information". A screening patrol combines a number of patrols to 'screen' a large area. This type of patrol is used by armored formations in desert theaters, and also by ground troops operating in urban areas. A screen

2088-427: Is assigned to gain detailed information about enemy forces within the zone, or when the enemy situation is vague by which the information concerning cross-country traffic-ability is desired. The reconnaissance provides the commander with a detailed picture of how the enemy has occupied the zone, enabling him to choose the appropriate course-of-action. As the platoon conducts this type of zone reconnaissance, its emphasis

2204-657: Is different from reconnaissance, because spies work as civilians in enemy territory. Reconnaissance is a mission to obtain information by visual observation or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. The word is derived from the Middle French word reconoissance . Reconnaissance conducted by ground forces includes special reconnaissance , armored reconnaissance , amphibious reconnaissance and civil reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance

2320-618: Is generally composed of a number of static observation posts . Battle of Tinian The Battle of Tinian was part of the Pacific campaign of World War II . It was fought between the United States and Japan on the island of Tinian in the Mariana Islands from 24 July until 1 August 1944. The battle saw napalm used for the first time. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943,

2436-402: Is imperative that a scout should know the history, tradition, religion, social customs, and superstitions of whatever country or people he is called on to work in or among. This is almost as necessary as to know the physical character of the country, its climate and products. Certain people will do certain things almost without fail. Certain other things, perfectly feasible, they will not do. There

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2552-558: Is no danger of knowing too much of the mental habits of an enemy. One should neither underestimate the enemy nor credit him with superhuman powers. Fear and courage are latent in every human being, though roused into activity by very diverse means. Patrolling Patrolling is a military tactic . Small groups or individual units are deployed from a larger formation to achieve a specific objective and then return. The tactic of patrolling may be applied to ground troops, armored units, naval units, and combat aircraft . The duration of

2668-527: Is on determining the enemy's locations, strengths, and weaknesses. This is the most thorough and complete reconnaissance mission and therefore is very time-intensive. A tracker needs to pay close attention to both the environment and the psychology of their enemy. Knowledge of human psychology, sociology, and cultural backgrounds is necessary to know the actions of the enemy and what they will do or where they will go next. Chief of Scouts Frederick Russell Burnham commented on reconnaissance and scouts, saying: It

2784-448: Is oriented on a given route (e.g., a road, a railway, a waterway; i.e., a narrow axis or a general direction of attack) to provide information on route conditions or activities along the route. A military commander relies on information about locations along his determined route: which of those that would provide best cover and concealment; bridge by construction type, dimensions, and classification; or for landing zones or pickup zones, if

2900-743: Is reconnaissance carried out by aircraft (of all types including balloons and uncrewed aircraft). The purpose is to survey weather conditions, map terrain, and may include military purposes such as observing tangible structures, particular areas, and movement of enemy forces. Naval forces use aerial and satellite reconnaissance to observe enemy forces. Navies also undertake hydrographic surveys and intelligence gathering . Reconnaissance satellites provide military commanders with photographs of enemy forces and other intelligence. Military forces also use geographical and meteorological information from Earth observation satellites . Types of reconnaissance: The techniques and objectives are not mutually exclusive; it

3016-530: Is the process of gathering a broad spectrum of civil information about a specific population in support of military operations. It is related to and often performed in conjunction with infrastructure reconnaissance (assessment and survey). Normally the focus of collection in the operational area for civil reconnaissance is collecting civil information relating to the daily interaction between civilians and military forces. Civil information encompasses relational, temporal, geospatial and behavioral information captured in

3132-579: Is up to the commander whether they are carried out separately or by the same unit. Reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) is a type of military operation or military tactic used specifically to probe an enemy's combat ability. While typical reconnaissance forces are small and armed only for self-defense, RIF use considerable (but not decisive) force in order to elicit a strong reaction by the enemy that more accurately reveals its own strength, deployment, preparedness, determination, and other tactical data. The RIF units can then fall back and report this data, or expand

3248-522: The 4th Marine Division , which was commanded by Major General Clifton B. Cates , who had succeeded Schmidt. Both had seen service earlier in the Pacific War: the 2nd Marine Division on Guadalcanal and Tarawa , and the 4th Marine Division in the Battle of Kwajalein , and had participated in the recent fighting on Saipan, where they had incurred 6,170 and 6,612 battle casualties respectively. They had absorbed

3364-467: The M3 Stuart light tanks of Company D with Ronson flamethrowers . In the afternoon, Company A came ashore on White Beach 2 without mishap. All three assault battalions were ashore by 08:20. On White Beach 1 the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, was followed by the 1st Battalion, which was ashore by 08:46, and the 3rd Battalion at 09:25. On White Beach 2, the reserve battalion, the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines,

3480-606: The aircraft carriers USS  Essex and Langley , and another 50 or more from the escort carriers USS  Gambier Bay and Kitkun Bay . Aslito Field-based Army Air Force Republic P-47 Thunderbolts of the 318th Fighter Group flew more than 100 sorties. The group's 19th Fighter Squadron had arrived on Saipan on 22 June after being catapulted from the escort carriers USS  Manila Bay and Natoma Bay , and had flown its first mission over Tinian that day. Attempts by destroyers to burn wooded areas with white phosphorus and thermite on 18 and 19 July failed due to

3596-683: The bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. After World War I , the United States had developed a series of contingency plans for the event of a war with Japan known as the Orange plans . These envisaged an advance through the Marshall and Caroline Islands to the Philippines, from whence Japan could be blockaded. The Mariana Islands figured only incidentally in

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3712-432: The destroyer escort USS  Elden and destroyer USS  Bancroft detected Japanese barges attempting to leave Sunharon Harbor and destroyed them. The bombardment was stepped up on 26 June, when the cruisers USS  Indianapolis , Birmingham and Montpelier began a week of systematic attacks. On 23 July, the day before the landing, three battleships , five cruisers and sixteen destroyers participated in

3828-400: The high-speed transports USS  Gilmer and Stringham . They were launched in rubber boats and paddled to within 500 yards (460 m) of the shore, then swam the rest of the way. The underwater demolition teams investigated the offshore reefs while the marines swam ashore and studied the beaches. Yellow Beach 1 was found to be strung with a double apron wire obstacle , with cliffs to

3944-418: The infection in various extreme situations, including local wars and armed conflicts , the ways of the infection transfer and all factors promoting to the infestation . After the armed forces have become stationary during wartime and emergency of peacetime the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance turns into sanitary and epidemiological surveillance and medical control of vital and communal activity of

4060-400: The 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines. In the morning, 267 Japanese dead were counted in this sector. In all, the counterattack cost Ogata about 1,200 dead. The nighttime actions had depleted the 4th Marine Division's ammunition, so Cates delayed attacking on 25 July until 10:00 to allow time to replenish. In the meantime, the rest of the 2nd Marine Division began landing. As they moved north along

4176-407: The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 50th Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment. The moonless night was lit up by Navy star shells . Five Japanese tanks were knocked out by bazookas , 75 mm halftracks and 37 mm antitank guns. The Japanese infantry charged the lines of the 2nd battalion, 23rd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines. Some broke through their lines, only to encounter

4292-691: The 4th Marine Division was given the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Marines , so it had four battalions of 75 mm pack howitzers. Two amphibious truck ( DUKW ) companies were assigned to move them ashore quickly. Each battalion was carried in an LST. Tanks were loaded onto LCMs. Eighteen of the LCMs, each carrying one tank, were each embarked on the dock landing ships (LSDs) USS  Ashland and Belle Grove . Another ten tank-carrying LCMs sailed to Tinian under their own power. The marines left their packs behind on Saipan and landed with coveralls , M1 helmets with camouflage covers, weapons, emergency rations,

4408-514: The Asiga Bay area was not far away, but could not move until dark, when American aircraft were not in the sky. Izumi's mobile counterattack force was ordered forward from its assembly position in the Mapo area. He moved along the side of the roads, where trees offered concealment from the air, and was only spotted from the air once. Ogata kept the 3rd Battalion in place at Tinian Town in case the Americans made

4524-642: The Commander in Chief , Admiral William D. Leahy . Sherman argued that the neutralization of Truk required the occupation of the Mariana Islands to cut the air route to Truk from Japan. On 12 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Nimitz to neutralize Truk and occupy the Mariana Islands. Tinian was considered a target from the outset, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith 's Northern Troops and Landing Force (NTLF)

4640-541: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet , Admiral Ernest J. King , specifically mentioned the Mariana Islands as "the key to the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications ." The Joint Chiefs of Staff envisaged the Marianas as a naval base, but another rationale for the capture of the Mariana Islands emerged with the development of the long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber. From

4756-463: The Japanese defenses there was excellent. The Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA), under the command of Brigadier General Joseph J. Twitty, assembled intelligence obtained from imagery intelligence , human intelligence and reference information, backed up by Ultra intelligence derived from code breaking and signals intelligence . JICPOA produced a report on Tinian's hydrography and geography on 10 May 1944, that also detailed

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4872-620: The Mariana Islands, the B-29s could reach all the most significant industrial targets in Japan, and they could be supported by sea. The air staff planners began incorporating the Mariana Islands into their long-range plans in September 1943. The Combined Chiefs endorsed this at the Cairo Conference in December, along with a two-pronged offensive, with the Central Pacific drive in conjunction with one along

4988-700: The NTLF. Fourteen pontoon barges were loaded with drums of fuel and towed to positions off the reef to supply fuel to amphibious vehicles and landing craft . After the initial landing, loaded trucks and trailers were embarked on landing craft, which shuttled them to Tinian where they unloaded at dumps and then returned on landing craft. Twenty landing craft mechanized (LCMs), ten landing craft tank (LCTs) and eight LSTs were assigned to this role, along with 88 2½-ton 6×6 trucks and 25 trailers. Marine divisions each had two battalions of 75 mm pack howitzers and two of 105 mm howitzers. The latter remained behind on Saipan, but

5104-700: The Operation Granite timetable by bypassing Truk and heading directly for Palau or the Marianas after the capture of the Marshall Islands. On 7 March, Nimitz and his Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC, where they were questioned by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army , General George C. Marshall , and the Chief of Staff to

5220-576: The Sunharon Bay beaches had good gradients and inland approaches, that there was a protected harbor for small craft, and facilities for unloading supplies. Whereas the northern beaches were too small to land and support a force of the size contemplated, and were exposed to the weather, so if it turned bad the movement of supplies from Saipan could be obstructed or halted. An advance from north to south would likely take longer than one from east to west, and while artillery support from Saipan would be available in

5336-409: The Sunharon Bay or Asiga bay, depending on where the Americans made their main effort. The American forces were part of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance 's Fifth Fleet . The Joint Amphibious Forces (Task Force 51) were led by Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner and the expeditionary troops (Task Force 56) by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith. For the battle of Saipan, Turner had concurrently commanded

5452-606: The US and British Combined Chiefs of Staff endorsed a two-pronged attack through the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas . On 12 March 1944, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas , Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , was directed to neutralize Truk and occupy the Mariana Islands. The Mariana Islands were targeted because of their location astride the Japanese line of communications . Tinian lay too close to Saipan to allow it to be bypassed and remain in Japanese hands. Following

5568-487: The White Beach plan. To Spruance's relief, Turner agreed to make the decision unanimous. On 20 July, Spruance confirmed the day of the assault, J-Day (or Jig-Day, using the phonetic alphabet of the time), as 24 July. Hill then chose 0730 as H-Hour . Artillery bombardment of Tinian commenced on 20 June when Battery B of the 531st Field Artillery Battalion began shelling targets on Tinian with its 155 mm "Long Tom" guns. In

5684-576: The White Beaches. The Doodlebug drove up to the cliff face, firmly attached hooks to the cliff tops and then backed away from under the ramps, leaving them in place, with the other end falling into the water. The ramp crews checked that the ramps were firmly anchored and then the Doodlebugs drove over them to the top of the cliffs. The ramps were strong enough to hold the weight of a 35-short-ton (32 t) medium tank. Ten were built, of which six were used in

5800-416: The actual landing site on the north of the island. The 2nd Marine Division then landed behind the 4th Marine Division. The weather worsened on 28 July, damaging the pontoon causeways and interrupting the unloading of supplies, but on 30 July the 4th Marine Division occupied Tinian Town and the airfield. Japanese remnants conducted a last stand in the caves and ravines of a limestone ridge on the south portion of

5916-503: The afternoon of 28 July. A typhoon in the Philippine Sea caused heavy swells. At 18:00 all unloading ceased. USS  LST-340 ran aground on the reef, and efforts to refloat her were unsuccessful. On 13 August, she was pulled off the reef and towed to Tanapag Harbor, where she was beached. A control craft, LCC-25473 , was washed up on the reef at White Beach 1, but was salvaged the following day. The pontoon causeways were damaged on

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6032-480: The aircraft was lost. Another was forced down by Japanese fire the following day but landed safely behind American lines. The Marine artillery had the support of the Stinson OY Sentinel observation aircraft of VMO-2 and VMO-4 . The US naval bombardment commenced on 13 June, with the fire support ships of Task Force 52 engaging targets on Tinian that could interfere with operations on Saipan. On 25 June,

6148-461: The amphibious forces in the Tinian operation (Task Force 52) was entrusted to Turner's former deputy, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill , on 15 July. Although Turner and Smith remained in command of Task Forces 51 and 56 respectively, they sailed for Guam on 20 July, leaving the operation entirely in the hands of Hill and Schmidt. For the Tinian operation, the V Amphibious Corps had the 2nd Marine Division , commanded by Major General Thomas E. Watson and

6264-415: The armed forces. Area reconnaissance refers to the observation, and information obtained, about a specified location and the area around it; it may be terrain-oriented and/or force-oriented. Ideally, a reconnaissance platoon, or team, would use surveillance or vantage (static) points around the objective to observe, and the surrounding area. This methodology focuses mainly prior to moving forces into or near

6380-476: The army troops on the island, and the naval troops were not subject to his direct command. The Imperial Japanese Army force defending the island was the 50th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Kiyochi Ogata . This was part of the 29th Division , all the rest of which was located on Guam. The regiment was formerly based at Mukden in China, and had moved to Tinian in March 1944. It had three infantry battalions,

6496-488: The assault, carried to Tinian by Ashland . Cates assigned the 24th Marines to land on White Beach 1 one battalion at a time, starting with the 2nd Battalion, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 25th Marines landed on White Beach 2. The 23rd Marines was in reserve. The first wave of LVTs, consisting of eight LVTs for White Beach 1 and sixteen for White Beach 2, left the line of departure at 07:17 followed at close intervals by fourteen more waves. Eight LVTs carried

6612-538: The attack on Tinian. Plans to capture Tinian were prepared concurrently with those to capture Saipan. Tinian lay only 3.5 miles (5.6 km) from the southern tip of Saipan, and its proximity to Saipan meant that while it remained in Japanese hands, Japanese aircraft could attack Saipan by staging though Tinian. The garrison might raid Saipan, and they could observe ship and aircraft movements on Saipan and communicate them to Tokyo. Tinian also had value in its own right, as its flat terrain made it highly suitable for

6728-448: The average humidity in those months was 78 and 84 percent, respectively. Fair weather prevailed during the dry season from November to March, but the wet season from April to November was characterized by frequent rains and occasional typhoons . Sunharon Bay was little more than an anchorage, and was unusable in rough weather. According to a 1 January 1944 census, Tinian had a population of 18,000 Japanese civilians, most of whom worked in

6844-454: The beach and anti-personnel mines ashore, which the underwater demolition teams (UDTs), bomb disposal teams and engineers took until 13:37 to clear. Three LVTs were disabled by mines when they ventured inland from White Beach 2. The 4th Tank Battalion had trouble negotiating the reefs, potholes and mines on White Beach 2 and was diverted to White Beach 1. Despite its small size, nearly all vehicles were landed over White Beach 1. This included

6960-442: The beaches from Saipan; (3) the airfield at Ushi Point could be quickly captured and utilized; (4) tactical surprise could be attained; (5) the whole operation could be conducted from Saipan as a shore-to-shore movement; and (6) supplies could be preloaded on vehicles and driven straight to dumps, thereby avoiding congestion on the beaches. Spruance called for a vote, in order of seniority, and Watson, Schmidt, Hill and Smith voted for

7076-553: The bombardment. The battleship USS  Colorado engaged the three 140 mm coast defense guns at Faibus San Hilo Point, which could enfilade the White Beaches from defilade of the artillery on Saipan. Sixty 16-inch shells completely destroyed the battery. Meanwhile, the battleships USS  Tennessee and California fired 480 14-inch and 800 5-inch rounds into Tinian Town, reducing it to rubble. The bombardment lifted for three periods of 40 to 60 minutes to allow for aerial bombardment . At least 200 sorties were flown from

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7192-427: The center of the American line another attack developed at the boundary between the 24th and 25th Marines. About 200 Japanese soldiers broke through the lines of Company K, 25th Marines, and divided into two groups. One group attacked Battery D, 14th Marines . The attack was halted with the help of Browning .50 caliber machine gun fire from Batteries E and F. Company C of the 8th Marines was sent to their aid, but found

7308-411: The civilian population. A combat patrol is a group with sufficient size (usually platoon or company) and resources to raid or ambush a specific enemy. It primarily differs from an attack in that the aim is not to hold ground . A clearing patrol is a brief patrol around a newly occupied defensive position in order to ensure that the immediate area is secure. Clearing patrols are often undertaken on

7424-413: The coast through terrain characterized by coral rocks and thick undergrowth, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was held up by a force of 20 to 25 Japanese that it took until 11:30 to overcome. On their right, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, reached the Ushi Point airfield, and the 24th Marines reached airfield No. 3. The 25th Marines was confronted by the most formidable obstacle of the day, Mount Maga, which

7540-411: The conclusion of the Battle of Saipan on 9 July, Major General Harry Schmidt 's V Amphibious Corps began preparations to invade nearby Tinian. The Japanese defending the island were commanded by Colonel Kiyochi Ogata , the commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment. This regiment was part of the 5,000 Army troops on the island. There were also about 4,000 Imperial Japanese Navy personnel on Tinian,

7656-435: The conflict into a full engagement if enemy weaknesses are revealed. Other methods consist of hit-and-run tactics using rapid mobility, and in some cases light-armored vehicles for added fire superiority, as the need arises. Maintaining active RIF can be used to limit, or even deny, enemy reconnaissance. Nazi Germany's reconnaissance during World War II is described in the following way: The purpose of reconnaissance and

7772-580: The cruiser Cleveland and the destroyer Remey silenced the battery, but did not destroy it; this was accomplished on 28 July by Tennessee , with 70 14-inch and 150 5-inch rounds. The majority of the ships for the assault of Tinian were loaded at Tanapag Harbor on Saipan by troops of the Saipan Island Command. Ten preloaded tank landing ships (LSTs) with three and a half days' supply of water, rations, medical supplies and ammunition on their top decks were allocated to each division and eight to

7888-490: The days leading up to the landing, the XXIV Corps Artillery used 24,536 rounds on 1,509 counter-battery fire , harassing fire and area bombardment missions. The XXIV Corps Artillery had its own observation aircraft, nine Piper L-4 Grasshoppers based at Aslito Field on Saipan. One was forced to ditch off Tinian Town on 28 July due to engine failure. The crew was rescued by the cruiser USS  Louisville but

8004-407: The development of air bases. There were already airfields that looked promising for development into B-29 airfields. Ushi Point Airfield (Airfield No. 1) was the main airfield; it had a hard-surfaced runway 4,750 feet (1,450 m) long. Two other airfields were in use and another was under construction: Airfield No. 3, which lay immediately south of no.1; Airfield No. 2, at Gurguan Point ; and

8120-507: The early stages, unfavorable weather could prevent it being moved to Tinian to cover the advance once it moved further south. In view of these objections, Schmidt ordered a reconnaissance of the Yellow and White Beaches. On the night of 10/11 July, Companies A and B of Captain James L. Jones 's V Amphibious Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion and Underwater Demolition Teams 5 and 7 set out in

8236-566: The edges of the cane fields. Approximately 40 miles (64 km) of narrow gauge railways connected the sugar plantations with Tinian Town. The senior Japanese officer on Tinian was Vice Admiral Kakuji Kakuta , the commander of First Air Fleet . His headquarters was in Manila but he was on Tinian on an inspection tour when US aerial operations in the Marianas Islands began on 11 June and became cut off. He exercised no command authority over

8352-451: The enemy at the beach, but be prepared to shift two-thirds of the force elsewhere." Ogata was aided by the geography of Tinian, which limited the possible landing sites. He positioned the 3rd Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment and most of the heavy weapons of the 56th Naval Guard Force, around Sunharon Bay beaches. The Northern Sector around Asiga Bay was covered by the 2nd Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment. He did not expect anything more than

8468-423: The enemy force to reveal their location by moving or by returning fire. Reconnaissance-pull is a tactic that is applied at the regiment to division level and defined as locating and rapidly exploiting enemy weaknesses. It is the ability to determine enemy positions and create exploitable gaps through which friendly forces can pass while avoiding obstacles and strong points. A textbook example of reconnaissance-pull

8584-450: The evening, 15,614 marines, soldiers and sailors had landed on Tinian, at a cost of 15 men killed and 225 wounded. Ogata immediately attempted to organized a counterattack, in keeping with Japanese doctrine at the time of repulsing the attack on the beach. The 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, was already in the vicinity of the American beachhead, and was able to probe the hastily-positioned defenses for weaknesses. The 2nd Battalion in

8700-415: The following night. They found that although White Beach 1 was only 60 yards (55 m) long, the cliffs for 150 yards (140 m) on either side were only 6 to 10 feet (1.8 to 3.0 m) high with small breaks, and could be negotiated by infantry without ladders or nets. Only the central 70 yards (64 m) of White Beach 2 could be reached by amphibian vehicles. Both White Beaches had gentle grades and it

8816-422: The following techniques may be used as long as the fundamentals of reconnaissance are applied. Scouts may also have different tasks to perform for their commanders of higher echelons, for example: the engineer reconnaissance detachments will try to identify difficult terrain in the path of their formation, and attempt to reduce the time it takes to transit the terrain using specialist engineering equipment such as

8932-598: The force from becoming surprised. It is paramount to obtain information about the available space in which a force can maneuver without being forced to bunch up due to obstacles. Terrain-oriented route reconnaissance allows the commander to obtain information and capabilities about the adjacent terrain for maneuvering his forces, to include, any obstacles (minefields, barriers, steep ravines, marshy areas, or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination) that may obstruct vehicle movement—on routes to, and in, his assigned area of operations. This requirement includes

9048-450: The four battalions of the 27th Infantry Division Artillery and five Marine Corps 105 mm howitzer battalions, two each from the two marine divisions and one from the V Amphibious Corps, for a total of thirteen battalions, each of which had twelve guns or howitzers. The rest of the 27th Infantry Division, except for the 105th Infantry , was in reserve, but on four hours' notice to embark for Tinian. American intelligence about Tinian and

9164-585: The island. Although the island was declared secure on 1 August, mopping up patrols continued into 1945. Tinian became an important base for further US operations in the Pacific. North Field became operational in February 1945 and West Field in March. The Seabees built six 8,500-foot (2,600 m) runways for the Twentieth Air Force 's Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers. Bombers based on Tinian took part in

9280-536: The landing craft, and headed for the transport area off the White Beaches. While covering the feint, Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott were hit by the three Japanese 6-inch guns, which were concealed in caves 3,500 yards (3,200 m) southwest of the Tinian Town pier. Colorado was hit twenty-two times, killing 43 men and wounding 198. Norman Scott was hit six times, killing the captain, Commander Seymore Owens and 18 of his men and wounding 47. Colorado ,

9396-419: The landing force (Task Force 52) and Smith had also commanded the NTLF and V Amphibious Corps , but with simultaneous operations on Guam in prospect, it was desirable for these roles to be separated. On 12 July, Smith became the commander of the newly established Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and handed over command of the V Amphibious Corps and NTLF (Task Group 56.1) to Major General Harry Schmidt . Command of

9512-400: The locations of many of the defenses, and issued a series of topographic maps. A series of oblique aerial photographs were taken of Tinian's beaches. The headquarters of the Japanese 31st Army on Saipan was overrun in mid-June, and captured documents provided a full order of battle of the Japanese forces on Tinian. The Americans estimated the strength of the Japanese garrison as 8,039, which

9628-549: The main force being the 56th Naval Guard Force, under the command of Captain Goichi Oie . Most of the island was surrounded by coral cliffs, so Ogata concentrated his forces on the southwest of the island, where the best landing beaches were located. Major General Clifton B. Cates 's 4th Marine Division landed on Tinian on 24 July 1944, supported by naval bombardment and the guns of the XXIV Corps Artillery , firing across

9744-524: The narrowness of the beaches. The shore party for White Beach 1 was provided by the Army's 1341st Engineer Combat Battalion and that of White Beach 2 by the 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines . Captain Paul J. Halloran , the NTLF Construction Officer, designed a landing ramp that could be carried by an LVT. This creation was named a "Doodlebug". The Doodlebugs allowed vehicles to scale the low cliffs around

9860-533: The naval personnel had some training as infantry. In addition, there were three civilian defence organizations of little military value, the Civilian Militia, the Home Guard Organization, and Youth Organization, and about sixty comfort women , none of whom survived the battle. After Saipan had fallen on 9 July, the prospects for the garrison of Tinian were grim. Ogata expected that Tinian would be

9976-428: The need arises. In many cases, the commander may act upon a force-oriented route reconnaissance by which the enemy could influence movement along that route. For the reconnaissance platoons, or squads, stealth and speed—in conjunction with detailed intelligence-reporting—are most important and crucial. The reconnaissance platoon must remain far enough ahead of the maneuver force to assist in early warning and to prevent

10092-420: The next target, and on 25 June he issued a operational order that announced: "the enemy on Saipan... can be expected to be planning a landing on Tinian. The area of that landing is estimated to be either Tinian Harbor or Asiga (northeast coast) Harbor." He adhered to the Japanese doctrine of defense against amphibious attacks at the water's edge. Each of the sector commanders was ordered to "be prepared to destroy

10208-436: The night of 29 July. The one at White Beach 1 broached and the one at White Beach 2 broke in two. The White Beach 1 causeway was restored to service on 31 July, only to broach again. With the Ushi Point airfield in American hands, the 121st Naval Construction Battalion commenced its repair on 27 July, filling in the bomb and shell craters. By that evening, an airstrip 2,500 feet (760 m) long and 150 feet (46 m) wide

10324-403: The north coast of New Guinea . In response, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , produced a campaign plan called Operation Granite, which tentatively scheduled the capture of Mariana Islands of Saipan , Tinian and Guam for November 1944 as the culmination of the Central Pacific campaign. By February 1944, there was consideration of advancing

10440-447: The north, where the beaches were poorer but the defenses were weaker and tactical surprise could be attained. Independently, Hill's staff arrived at the same conclusion. Turner was not convinced. "If we go ashore at Tinian Town," Smith told him, "we'll have another Tarawa. Sure as hell! The Japs will murder us. What's more, we probably will be repulsed, and that will upset our entire timetable. What do you say to that?" Turner noted that

10556-575: The northwest coast: the 65-to-75-yard (59 to 69 m) White Beach One and the 200-yard (180 m) White Beach Two. The small size of the White and Yellow beaches made them unattractive: a division normally required a landing beach 1,000 yards (910 m) long. There was little seasonal variation in temperature, which ranged from an average of 76 °F (24 °C) in January to 80 °F (27 °C) in June, but

10672-451: The occupation of a location, and during stand to in the transition from night to day routine and vice versa. A standing patrol is a static patrol, probably known as an OP/LP(Observation Post/Listening post) in US and NATO terminology. Standing patrols are usually small (half section/section) static patrols intended to provide early warning, security or to guard some geographical feature, such as dead ground. A reconnaissance (recce) patrol

10788-422: The original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitred are changed. The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security forces. When their reconnaissance units meet superior enemy forces, they fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the enemy. Reconnaissance-by-fire (or speculative fire ) is the act of firing at likely enemy positions to cause

10904-445: The piers, with a combined width of 825 yards (754 m); and Orange Beach, 1 ⁄ 2 mile (0.80 km) north of Red Beach One, was 340 yards (310 m) long. There were two beaches on the east coast at Asiga Bay: the 355-yard (325 m) Yellow Beach One and the 200-yard (180 m) Yellow Beach Two. These were flanked by cliffs and subject to heavy surf when there was an easterly wind. There were also two small beaches on

11020-512: The plans, as they lay north of the direct route between Hawaii and the Philippines. During World War II , the islands attracted the attention of naval and air strategists. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the US and British Combined Chiefs of Staff had endorsed an offensive in the Central Pacific along the lines envisaged in the Orange plans. In his formulation of the strategy,

11136-454: The reconnaissance on the specific area that is critical to the commander. This technique of focusing the reconnaissance also permits the mission to be accomplished more quickly. Area reconnaissance can thus be a stand-alone mission or a task to a section or the platoon. The commander analyzes the mission to determine whether the platoon will conduct these types of reconnaissance separately or in conjunction with each other. Civil reconnaissance

11252-417: The rest of the 2nd Battalion and the shore party of the 1341st Engineer Battalion to land unopposed. Two pillboxes guarded White Beach 2, which were bypassed by the first waves, but reduced by later ones; fifty dead Japanese were found inside. Both beaches had mines; none exploded on White Beach 1, where they had been allowed to deteriorate, but the area around White Beach 2 was sown with anti-boat mines on

11368-471: The situation in hand. About 100 dead Japanese were found in the area; two men of Battery D were killed. The other group was engaged in a wooded area by 60 mm mortars . The attack in the center cost the Japanese about 500 dead, most of whom were from the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment. Many were caught on the barbed wire and killed by machine gun fire. On the right, the 23rd Marines were attacked by five or six Japanese tanks, accompanied by infantry of

11484-727: The size of trees and the density of forests due to their effects on vehicle movement. Route reconnaissance also allows the observation for fields of fire along the route and adjacent terrain. This information assists planners as a supplement to map information. Zone reconnaissance focuses on obtaining detailed information before maneuvering their forces through particular, designated locations. It can be terrain-oriented, force-oriented, or both, as it acquire this information by reconnoitering within—and by maintaining surveillance over—routes, obstacles (to include nuclear-radiological, biological, and chemical contamination), and resources within an assigned location. Also, force-oriented zone reconnaissance

11600-404: The south that were 20 to 25 feet (6.1 to 7.6 m) high and unscalable without ladders or cargo nets . A strong current was encountered by the groups sent to reconnoitre the White Beaches, and the rubber boats wound up too far north. Consequently, the reconnaissance of White Beach 1 was carried out by the group intended to land on White Beach 2, and that of White Beach 2 had to be carried out

11716-421: The south-west which were more favorable for an amphibious landing. American forces quickly changed their landing location to the northern beaches and planned a small and hasty " deception " operation off the southern beach, which resulted in a complete surprise for the Japanese forces. As a result, American forces were able to fight the Japanese force on land, where they had the advantage, leading to light losses and

11832-406: The southern tip of Saipan. It covered about 50 square miles (130 km ), measuring 10 + 1 ⁄ 4 miles (20 km) from north to south, and 5 miles (8 km) across at its widest point. The terrain was generally low and flat, making it suitable for airfields. There were two hills in the north: the 390-foot (120 m) Mount Maga and the 564-foot (172 m) Mount Lasso. There was also

11948-439: The strait from Saipan. Instead of landing in the southwest, they landed on the northwest coast, where there were two small beaches that were lightly defended. These beaches were flanked by low coral cliffs that the marines were able to surmount with the aid of ramps mounted on modified amphibious tractors (LVTs). A successful feint in the southwest by Major General Thomas E. Watson 's 2nd Marine Division distracted defenders from

12064-503: The sugar cane industry, and 26 ethnic Chamorro people ; most of the original population had been forcibly removed to other islands. The main settlements were Tinian Town in the south and two small villages around Ushi Point Airfield in the north. The former was the administrative center of the island, while the latter housed airfield workers. The primary road network consisted of roads approximately 18 feet (5.5 m) wide and surfaced with crushed coral. They were generally straight, following

12180-456: The types of units employed to obtain information are similar in the U.S. and the German Armies. German tactical principles of reconnaissance, however, diverge somewhat from those of the U.S. The Germans stress aggressiveness, attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitered, and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in employing reconnaissance units in force as

12296-496: The unfinished Airfield No. 4 near Tinian Town . Along with the other Mariana Islands, Tinian was claimed for Spain by Miguel López de Legazpi in 1565. Guam was seized by the United States in the Spanish-American War , and Spain sold the remaining islands to Germany. They were occupied by Japan during World War I and became part of Japan's South Seas Mandate . Tinian lay just 3 + 1 ⁄ 2 miles (10 km) from

12412-633: The wet foliage, so napalm was tried for the first time. The 318th Fighter Group flew 18 napalm sorties, but results were inconclusive, as the best mixture had not yet been devised, but it had some success setting the canefields alight. On J-Day, 24 July, a feint was made to distract the defenders from the actual landing site. This was carried out by the 2nd and 8th Marines of the 2nd Marine Division. The attack transports USS  Calvert , Fuller , Heywood , J. Franklin Bell and Knox and troopships John Land and Winged Arrow took them to

12528-431: Was ashore by 09:30. DUKWs carrying the artillery began landing at 13:15, the 23rd Marines at 14:00, and the 2nd Marine Division's 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, at 17:00. The planned beachhead was occupied, and the marines strung barbed wire and established fields of fire in anticipation of a Japanese counterattack. Two pontoon causeway piers were placed during the night, allowing loaded trucks to come ashore from LSTs. By

12644-528: Was captured with a double envelopment . The following day, the 25th Marines captured the steeper and more imposing Mount Lasso without opposition, as the Japanese had pulled out during the night. The advance had now begun to outrun the range of the artillery on Saipan, so the 105 mm howitzer battalions of the 10th and 14th Marines displaced to Tinian on 26 and 27 July and rejoined their divisions. The marines pressed forward on 27 and 28 July against sporadic Japanese resistance. The weather abruptly worsened on

12760-526: Was documented during the Tinian landings of World War II , utilized by the United States Marine Corps 's Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion , from V Amphibious Corps . Aerial photography and the confirmation by the amphibious reconnaissance platoons determined that the Japanese defenders had largely ignored the northern beaches of the island, focusing most of their defensive effort on beaches in

12876-515: Was invaded. It provided a fourth infantry battalion that Ogata incorporated into the island's defense. The Army forces on Tinian totaled about 5,000 men. Most were well-trained combat veterans with prior combat experience in the war in China . They were skilled in camouflage and the use of their weapons. They were well-equipped, in many cases with new weapons, and their morale was high. The main Imperial Japanese Navy force on Tinian

12992-423: Was ordered to "land on, seize, occupy and defend Saipan. Then be prepared to seize Tinian on order." The American forces assaulted Saipan on 15 June. The Battle of Saipan lasted until 9 July, when the island was declared "secured". The cost was high: 14,111 of the 71,034 NTLF personnel were killed, wounded or missing in action . Mopping up operations continued until October, but preparations began immediately for

13108-482: Was possible for LCVPs to land on the reef 50 yards (46 m) from the beach and for infantry to wade ashore from there. With this information in hand, a conference was held on board Turner's flagship, the USS ; Rocky Mount , on 12 July. Schmidt made the case for a landing on the White Beaches, citing six factors: (1) that a landing at Sunharon Bay would be too costly; (2) that the XXIV Corps Artillery could cover

13224-471: Was quite accurate. The XXIV Corps Artillery began bombarding Tinian on 20 June, even as the fighting on Saipan continued, and its Saipan-based observation aircraft conducted daily flights over Tinian. The intelligence reports revealed that the best landing beaches were around Sunharon Bay, but they were also the most heavily defended. The staff of the 4th Marine Division, particularly the plans officer, Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson , preferred to land in

13340-512: Was ready for use, and it was fully restored to its 4,700-foot (1,400 m) length the next day. On 29 July, a P-47 landed and took off again. Hill summoned the 9th Troop Carrier Squadron from Eniwetok and its Douglas C-47 Skytrains , together with the Curtiss C-46 Commandos of VMR-252 , delivered 33,000 rations from Saipan on 31 July. On the return trip they carried wounded. A parachute drop of 30 short tons (27 t) of supplies

13456-646: Was the 56th Naval Guard Force ( Keibitai ), under the command of Captain Goichi Oie . He accepted Ogata as the commander on Tinian, but to avoid embarrassment, he did not inform his subordinates that their orders came from an Army officer. His force of 1,400 troops and 600 laborers was equipped with three 6-inch and ten 140 mm coast defence guns, and ten 120 mm and four 76.2 mm general purpose guns, twenty-four 25 mm and six 7 cm antiaircraft guns, and three 12 cm dual-purpose guns. Along with airfield construction crews, flight technicians and staff, there were about 4,000 sailors of various units on Tinian. Most of

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