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77-576: In 1971, Chile and Argentina agreed to binding arbitration by an international tribunal, under the auspices of the British Government, to settle the boundary dispute. On 22 May 1977 the British Government announced the decision, which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile. On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce Chile into negotiating

154-676: A US embassy cable spoke of the "tactics of disappearance". According to French journalist Marie-Monique Robin, these methods themselves had been taught to the Argentine military first by the French military , drawing on the experience of the 1957 Battle of Algiers , and then by their US counterparts. According to Noam Chomsky , starting in 1979, the Argentine military established covert military centers in Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Among others examples, Noam Chomsky says

231-410: A better Navy than yours. They are well armed, and are very strong. No Argentine official documents or statements concerning the planning of the war of aggression against Chile have been released. But so many individual accounts exist among the Argentine ranks that the existence of a plan has not been disputed. The Argentine Government planned to first occupy the islands around Cape Horn and then, in

308-620: A data analysis system developed during the "Dirty War" in Argentina, which was used to monitor electrical and water usage to pinpoint the coordinates of guerrilla safe-houses. Due in part to this support, a number of clandestine "safe-houses" operated by the insurgents were subsequently infiltrated and a clandestine network of the Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) was destroyed in Guatemala City. Argentine military advisors also participated in

385-524: A division of the islands that would produce a boundary consistent with Argentine claims. According to Argentine sources, after the Argentine repudiation of the arbitration award in January 1978, the invasion plans were given different names depending on the planning level and phase. Also, the targets of the invasion changed according to the political situation and to the information about the Chilean defense effort:

462-536: A few hours later aborted) military action to invade both those islands and continental Chile . The British Crown had previously in 1902 and 1966 acted as arbitrator between Chile and Argentina (see Arbitration 1902 here ), but on this occasion the statutory framework of the Arbitration was different. The Arbitration Agreement of 1971 stipulated: In this way the United Kingdom did not have any influence on

539-689: A meeting of the Conference of American Armies (CAA) held in the Nicaraguan capital city of Managua , junta members Gen. Roberto Viola and Admiral Emilio Massera secretly pledged unconditional support of Somoza regime in its fight against left-wing subversion and agreed to send advisors and material support to Nicaragua to assist President Somoza's National Guard. Pursuant with these military agreements, Somoza's Guardsmen were sent to police and military academies in Argentina to undergo training and Argentina began to send arms and advisors to Nicaragua to bolster

616-680: A number of Condor operations on Nicaraguan soil during the late-1970s, benefitting from close rapport between Argentine secret services and the Nicaraguan regime. The military in Argentina sent agents of the Batallón de Inteligencia 601 and the SIDE to Nicaragua in 1978 with the aim of apprehending and eliminating Argentine guerrillas fighting within the ranks of the Sandinistas. A special commando team from Argentina worked in conjunction with Somoza's OSN (Office of National Security) and its Argentine advisors with

693-521: A partial mobilization. For the postwar phase of the operation, the Argentine Navy prepared political instructions to be followed in the southern zone after the disputed islands were under Argentinian sovereignty. They defined the new border, navigation rights for Chilean ships, instructions in case of confrontations with the Chilean Navy , dealing with injured personnel, prisoners of war, etc. There

770-566: A proposition calling for a joint Latin American effort against, on his words, "leftist subversion", citing this as "the greatest military threat in the region". Pursuant with this plan (referred to as the "Viola Plan"), Argentina expanded its counterinsurgency and military assistance to El Salvador , Guatemala and Honduras at the behest of the military leadership in those countries. The role of Argentina in Central America reached its zenith in

847-845: A proxy. Argentina's military involvement in Central America began during the Nicaraguan Revolution between 1977 and 1979, when Argentina began supporting the Somoza family regime in Nicaragua in its fight against the Sandinista Front . Argentina supported the Somoza dictatorship until its overthrow by the Sandinistas in July 1979. In November 1979, before the 13th Conference of American Armies in Bogotá, Colombia , junta leader General Roberto Eduardo Viola offered

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924-611: A second phase, either to stop or continue hostilities according to the Chilean reaction. Argentina had already drafted a declaration of war . An Argentine complaint in the UN Security Council over Chile's military occupation of the disputed islands was to precede the attack. Rubén Madrid Murúa in "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978" , ("Memorial del Ejército de Chile", Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, S. 54-55), stated that

1001-412: A secondary goal since its control was believed to depend on the outcome of the clash of the navies. The combat-ready Chilean fleet sailed on 22 December 1978 from the fjords of Hoste Island to frustrate an Argentine landing. Rear Admiral Raúl López, Chief of the Chilean fleet, kept silent as to whether he would simply wait or initiate an attack on the enemy navy. Chilean biochemist Eugenio Berríos

1078-672: A series of arms interdiction programs in Central America to disrupt the supply of weapons to the insurgencies in the region. New York Times journalist Leslie Gelb explained that " Argentina would be responsible, with funds from North American intelligence, of attacking the flux of equipment which was transiting Nicaragua to El Salvador and Guatemala ". Operation Charly was executed by a group of military figures who had already taken part in Operation Condor , which had started as soon as 1973 and concerned international cooperation between intelligence agencies to permit greater repression of

1155-721: A squadron of the Batallón de Inteligencia 601 worked directly with the Lucas government's paramilitary death squads, most notably the Ejercito Secreto Anticommunista (ESA). Technical support from Argentina played a crucial role in the success of the army's urban counterinsurgency campaign carried out in Guatemala City in July 1981. By way of the Guatemalan military's new computer service (installed by Tadiran Electronics Industries Ltd. of Israel), Argentine advisors introduced

1232-409: Is reported to have worked on a plan to poison the water supply of Buenos Aires in the event of war. On D-day , a severe storm impeded Argentine operations in the disputed area. Meanwhile, Pope John Paul II , alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré , to both capitals. Six hours before landing,

1309-595: The East-West conflict ." In particular, the Argentine military was not satisfied with "annihilating" the opposition in the country, but repealed any distinction between internal and external policy. After attaining power in 1976, the National Reorganization Process formed close ties with the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua among other right-wing dictatorships in Latin America. In 1977 at

1386-646: The FMLN from Cuba and Nicaragua. In addition to agreeing to coordinate arms interdiction operations, the Argentine General Directorate of Military Industries (DGFM) supplied El Salvador with light and heavy weapons, ammunition and military spare parts worth U.S.$ 20 million in February 1982. The military junta in Argentina was a prominent source of both material aid and inspiration to the Guatemalan military during

1463-620: The Guatemalan Civil War , especially during the final two years of the Lucas government. Argentina's involvement had initially began in 1980, when the Videla regime dispatched army and naval officers to Guatemala, under contract from President Fernando Romeo Lucas García , to assist the security forces in counterinsurgency operations. Argentine involvement in Guatemala expanded when, in October 1981,

1540-631: The Pacific Ocean . The Argentine saw a reaffirmation of this principle in the Protocols of 1902 , according to Rizzo Romano the first arms control pact in the world, under which both countries agreed that the Chilean navy should have enough ships to defend the interests of Chile in the Pacific, and the Argentine navy should have enough ships to defend the interests of Argentina in the Atlantic. Chile doesn't consider

1617-705: The School of the Americas , was commander of a branch of the Honduran security forces known as the Fuerza de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP). Álvarez Martínez was a proponent of the "Argentine Method", viewing it as an effective tool against subversion in the hemisphere, and sought increased Argentine military influence in Honduras. Argentina's military program in Honduras expanded after 1981 when General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, offered his country to

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1694-717: The death squads which began to act in Honduras in 1980 were attributed to the importation of the "Argentine method". In July 1980, the Grupo de Tareas Exterior (GTE, External Operations Group) headed by Guillermo Suárez Mason , of the 601 Intelligence Battalion, took part in the Cocaine Coup of Luis García Meza in Bolivia , with the assistance of the Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie and Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie . The Argentine secret services hired 70 foreign agents to assist in

1771-450: The "wise" decision of the (overthrown) enemy Allende, and in Argentina they criticized the "imprudent" decision of his former colleague in power, general Lanusse. The award was later fully recognized by Argentina in the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984 . Operation Charly Operation Charly (Spanish: Operación Charly ), was allegedly the code-name given to a program during

1848-615: The 1881 treaty were: Under the so-called oceanic principle Argentina believed that the uti possidetis doctrine operated such that, under the arrangements operated by the colonial administrations, Chile (then the Captaincy General of Chile ) had no territorial waters in the Atlantic Ocean and the Argentine (then the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata ) could not have territorial waters in

1925-583: The 1902 protocol as a border treaty and the word Pacific doesn't appear in the Boundary treaty, and hence claimed that the boundary between the Pacific and the Atlantic had never been defined. To resolve the conflicting interests of both countries, they decided in 1881 on an agreement; but nearly a century later there was still no mutual understanding of what that agreement had consisted of. Chile maintained it had only renounced rights to eastern Patagonia (today continental south Argentina) to obtain full possession of

2002-618: The 1970s and 1980s undertaken by the junta in Argentina with the objective of providing military and counterinsurgency assistance to right-wing dictatorships and insurgents in Central America. According to Noam Chomsky , the operation was either headed by the Argentine military with the agreement of the United States Department of Defense , or was led by the US and used the Argentinians as

2079-549: The Argentine General Staff planned the operation under the name "Planeamiento Conjunto de Operaciones Previstas contra Chile". The Argentines planned amphibious landings to seize the islands southwards of the Beagle Channel, along with massive land-based attacks: Men Ships Airplanes Men Ships Airplanes Men Ships Airplanes Men Ships Airplanes The Second Army Corps under

2156-452: The Argentine fleet turned back and Operation Soberanía was called off. Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile or only waited at the border for the result of the naval combat cannot be established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border which would be inconsistent with the two-phase war plan. Alejandro Luis Corbacho, in "Predicting the probability of war during brinkmanship crisis: The Beagle and

2233-650: The Argentine government never gave up on the use of military force to pressure Chile. After the invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982, the Argentine junta planned the military occupation of the disputed islands in the Beagle channel, as stated by Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo , chief of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands war, in an interview with the Argentine magazine Perfil : L.F. Galtieri: [Chileans] have to know that what we are doing now, because they will be

2310-581: The Argentine junta. On 19 September 1977 Hércules (built and completed in the UK) sailed to Argentina from the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness ; on 28 November 1981 Santísima Trinidad (built in Argentina, completed in the UK) sailed from Portsmouth . An overview of both countries' defense spending: * Costs in millions of 1979 US dollars . The Argentines' numerical advantage

2387-530: The Argentine military; the two purportedly agreed that Argentina would oversee the contras and the United States would provide money and weapons. In late-1981, President Reagan authorized the U.S. to support the contras by giving them money, arms, and equipment. This aid was transported and distributed to the Contras by way of Argentina. With new weapons and logistical support, the scale of Contra attacks increased and

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2464-521: The Atlantic Ocean. The Court sentenced also: The court rejected both the uti possidetis principle and the oceanic principle because: The tribunal considered that the exchange of Patagonia for the Strait of Magellan was the transaction behind the 1881 treaty: After careful consideration of all possible word meanings and interpretations of the text, the court refused the Atlantic clause: Chile accepted

2541-467: The Beagle Channel. Argentina was awarded all islands, islets and rocks near the north coast of the channel: Bridges, Eclaireurs, Gable , Becasses, Martillo and Yunque. At the eastern end of the channel, the judgement recognized the sovereignty of Chile over the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands and all their adjacent islets and rocks. The territorial waters established by these coasts, according to international maritime law, established Chilean rights in

2618-635: The CIA and the Argentine military as a base for conducting operations opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. By the end of 1981, 150 Argentine military advisors were active in Honduras training members of the Honduran security forces and providing training to the Nicaraguan Contras based in Honduras. According to the NGO Equipo Nizkor , though the Argentine mission in Honduras was downgraded after

2695-456: The Falklands War, Argentine officers remained active in Honduras until 1984, some of them until 1986, well after the 1983 election of Raúl Alfonsín . Battalion 316 's name indicated the unit's service to three military units and sixteen battalions of the Honduran army. This unit was charged with the task of carrying out political assassinations and torture of suspected political opponents of

2772-822: The German shipbuilding and engineering works Blohm + Voss and the Argentine Junta agreed to the building of four destroyers . In November 1978 France delivered two corvettes to Argentina, originally built for the apartheid Regime in South Africa . The corvettes, Good Hope and Transvaal , could not be delivered because of anti-apartheid embargoes ; in Argentina they were renamed Drummond and Guerrico . United States President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) would later improve relations to Argentina due to their military support for Nicaragua's Contras . (See Operation Charly ). The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to

2849-456: The Guatemalan government and the Argentine military junta formalized secret accords which augmented Argentine participation in government counterinsurgency operations. As part of the agreement, two-hundred Guatemalan officers were dispatched to Buenos Aires to undergo advanced military intelligence training, which included instruction in interrogation. In addition to working with the regular security forces, Argentine military advisors as well as

2926-476: The Malvinas conflicts" [3] considers the reasons for cancelling the operation (p. 45): The newspaper Clarín explained some years later that such caution was based, in part, on military concerns. In order to achieve a victory, certain objectives had to be reached before the seventh day after the attack. Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through

3003-553: The National Guard, in addition to similar services being provided by the United States. According to an Argentine advisor with the Nicaraguan National Guard, the intelligence techniques used by the Somoza regime consisted of essentially the same "unconventional" methods which had been used in Argentina's Dirty War (torture, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killings). Argentina's aid programs increased proportionate to

3080-670: The Nicaraguan Contras , particularly at Lepaterique base alongside some members of the Honduran security forces. In August 1981, a CIA official met with Honduran military staff, Argentine military and intelligence advisors, and the Contra leadership and expressed his support for the contra operations. On November 1, 1981, the Director of the CIA William Casey met with the Chief of Staff of

3157-469: The Strait of Magellan, but Argentina believed Chile received the Strait of Magellan in return for renouncing all coasts bordering the Atlantic Ocean. About the course of the Beagle Channel there were discrepancies. The eastern end of the Channel can be seen as a delta with an east-west arm and a north-south arm (around Navarino Island ). The channel specified in the border treaty of 1881 was seen by Chile as

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3234-406: The US in the "world struggle against Communism": " Argentina and the United States will march together in the ideological war which is starting in the world " [ sic ]. At one point, beginning in early-1982, plans were underway between the United States and the Argentine junta for the creation of a large Latin American military force, which would be directed by an Argentine officer, with

3311-528: The United States extended the Kennedy amendment to Argentina as well because of its human rights record, which led to the Armed Forces purchases shifting to Europe: France , Germany, and Austria exported weapons to Argentina even during the critical phase of the Beagle conflict, as Argentina had already rejected the international binding Arbitral Award. In December 1978, when the outbreak of war appeared unavoidable,

3388-400: The United States had established itself as the principle supplier of weapons to the Salvadoran security forces. According to secret documents from the Argentine military, the purpose of this aid was to strengthen inter-military relations between Argentina and El Salvador and "contribute to hardening [El Salvador's] position in the widening struggle against subversion, alongside other countries in

3465-445: The arbitration is often presented as a plot by the UK. Pablo Lacoste in his work "La disputa por el Beagle y el papel de los actores no estatales argentinos" (Argentine Civil Society Agencies in the Beagle Dispute) says: Chile kept in mind the Argentine breach of the arbitration agreement. The award brought the military dictatorships on both sides to the border to a unique and paradoxical situation: in Chile they celebrated

3542-412: The case of an invasion. A defensive position was built up the narrowest part of Brunswick Peninsula to avoid or delay an Argentine capture of Punta Arenas . In contrast to the defensive war planned by the Chilean Army in Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales, the Chilean army had plans for an attack to invade the Argentine part of Tierra del Fuego , but control of the island of Tierra del Fuego was considered

3619-447: The command of Leopoldo Galtieri would protect the north of Argentina from a potential Brazilian attack and its II Brigada de Caballería blindada would protect the Argentine region of Río Mayo in Chubut Province from a possible Chilean attack. The Argentine Armed Forces expected between 30,000 and 50,000 dead in the course of the war. Argentina solicited a Peruvian attack in Chile's north, but Peru rejected this demand and ordered only

3696-485: The coup. The cocaine trade helped fund the covert operations. Ariel Armony, president of the Goldfarb Center in the Colby College , stated in journalist María Seoane 's article that "it would be more appropriate to speak of a dirty war at a continental level than isolated conflicts at a national scale", and that "in this war the distinction between combatants and civilian population were erased, while national frontiers were subordinated to "ideological frontiers" of

3773-453: The early 1980s with National Reorganization Process 's involvement in covertly directing the Contra rebellion in Nicaragua in conjunction with the CIA. In December 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri , in a palace revolution , replaced General Viola as the head of Argentina's military junta. A few days before assuming power, Galtieri exposed in a speech in Miami the Argentine government's decision to constitute itself as an unconditional ally of

3850-406: The east-west arm, but by Argentina as the north-south arm. Following this controversy, two clauses were in dispute: Chile argued the Channel clause ( ... to Chile shall belong all the islands to the south of Beagle Channel up to Cape Horn,... ), while Argentina the Atlantic clause ( ... the other islands there may be on the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego ... ). Some Chileans argued that

3927-458: The election of U.S. President Ronald Reagan , the Argentine government sought arrangements for the Argentine military to organize and train the contras in Honduras in collaboration with the Honduran government and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . Shortly thereafter, Argentina oversaw the relocation of Contra bases from Guatemala to Honduras. There, some Argentine Special force units, such as Batallón de Inteligencia 601 , began to train

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4004-497: The embargo took effect, but they arrived without any armament. In 1980 Chile was excluded from UNITAS joint naval maneuvers because of human rights violations. Germany , Austria and the United Kingdom the traditional supplier of the Chilean Armed Forces, did not supply weapons to Chile. In 1974 the Argentine Navy incorporated two modern Type 209 submarines , Salta and San Luis , complementing two older GUPPY submarines, Santa Fe and Santiago del Estero . In 1978,

4081-537: The government, effectively implementing the "Argentine Method" in Honduras. At least 184 suspected government opponents including teachers, politicians, and union bosses were assassinated by Battalion 316 during the 1980s. Argentina played a role in supporting the Salvadoran government during the El Salvador Civil War . As early as 1979, the National Reorganization Process supported the Salvadoran government militarily with intelligence training, weapons and counterinsurgency advisors. This support continued until well after

4158-400: The growth of the popular movement against the Somoza regime and the degree of isolation of the Somoza regime. Following the suspension of U.S. military aid and training in 1979, Argentina became one of the Somoza regime's principal sources of arms alongside Israel, Brazil and South Africa. In addition to providing arms and training to Somoza's National Guard, the Argentine junta also executed

4235-419: The initial aim of landing in El Salvador and pushing the revolutionaries to Honduras to exterminate them, and then to invade Nicaragua and topple the Sandinista regime. The operation would have been protected by a remodelling of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). Within the framework of Operation Charly, the Argentine military also implemented, with the help of the Reagan Administration,

4312-418: The islands and waterways concerned, first on the Chilean Naval Transport Vessel "Aquiles" , and then on the Argentine Naval Transport Vessel "ARA Bahia Aguirre" . In the border treaty of 1855 Chile and Argentina had agreed to retain the borders of the Spanish colonial administration. This principle, known in jurisprudence as Uti possidetis , served two purposes: the first was to divide the territory between

4389-433: The judgement immediately and enacted it into its domestic law on 14 June 1977 ( decree n°416 over the base lines ). On 25 January 1978 Argentina repudiated the arbitration award. According to Argentina: It has been argued that the Argentine claims over the Beagle Channel could not be sustained from a legal point of view and that in practice many of their assertions were subjective. The court awarded navigable waters on

4466-428: The judgement: the procedure, the legal framework, the judges and the matter in dispute had all been defined by both countries. The procedure had four phases: Chile handed over to the Court 14 volumes and 213 maps, and Argentina 12 volumes and 195 maps. During the first fortnight of March 1976, the Court, accompanied by the Registrar and Liaison Officers from both sides, visited the Beagle Channel region, and inspected

4543-416: The left-wing opposition. US journalist Martha Honey documented the exportation of "social control techniques" which the Argentine army had "brutally perfected" in Argentina to Central American countries. Among the counter-insurgency tactics exported to Central America by Argentina within the framework of Operation Charly, were the systemic use of torture , death squads and forced disappearances —

4620-427: The next in turn. Augusto Pinochet foresaw a long and bloody war, a kind of partisan war: Beagle Channel Arbitration On 22 July 1971 Salvador Allende and Alejandro Lanusse , the Presidents of Chile and Argentina , signed an arbitration agreement (the Arbitration Agreement of 1971 ). This agreement related to their dispute over the territorial and maritime boundaries between them, and in particular

4697-465: The north bank of the eastern part of the Channel to Argentina, but otherwise it met all Chilean claims. Although the arbitration concerned only small islands, the direction of the new demarcation of the frontier would under international maritime law give Chile significant rights running into the Atlantic Ocean, and would also significantly reduce the claims of Argentina on the Antarctic continent and its waters. The Argentine rejection led both countries to

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4774-445: The objective of capturing exiled squadrons from the ERP and the Montoneros . Following the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle by the Sandinista Front , Argentina played a central role in the formation of the Contras . Shortly after the Sandinista victory in July 1979, agents from Argentine intelligence began to organize exiled members of Somoza's National Guard residing in Guatemala into an anti-Sandinista insurgency. Following

4851-420: The passes over the Andean Mountains. On p. 46: According to Clarín, two consequences were feared. First, those who were dubious feared a possible regionalization of the conflict. Second, as a consequence, the conflict could acquire great power proportions. In the first case decisionmakers speculated that Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil might intervene. Then the great powers could take sides. In this case,

4928-473: The ranks of the Contras swelled as recruitment became more feasible. By the end of 1982, the Contras were conducting attacks deeper inside Nicaragua than before. In the immediate aftermath of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979, the National Reorganization Process dispatched a large Argentine military mission to Honduras. At the time, General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez , a former student of Argentina's Colegio Militar de la Nación (class of 1961) and graduate of

5005-409: The region." In fall of 1981, the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan requested that the high command of the Argentine military increase its assistance to El Salvador. The Argentine government ratified an agreement by which U.S. intelligence would provide the Argentine government with intelligence and logistics support for an arms interdiction program to stem the flow of military supplies to

5082-579: The resolution of the conflict would depend not on the combatants, but on the countries that supplied the weapons. Unlike the prelude to the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands , from the beginning of Operation Soberanía there were no critical misconceptions on Argentina's side about Chile's commitment to defend its territory: the entire Chilean Navy was in the disputed area, an unequivocal fact at Cape Horn. As stated by David R. Mares in "Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America": These Chilean advantages do not imply that it could have won

5159-420: The target being first only the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands, then the "little" Evout, Hoorn, Deceit and Barnevelt islands, then both groups of islands. Finally, on Friday 15 December 1978 Argentina's President Jorge Videla signed the order to invade on 21 December 1978 at 04:30 as the beginning of the invasion, but it was postponed to the next day because of the bad weather conditions in the landing zone. At

5236-402: The text "until it touches the Beagle Channel" in article III meant that Argentina had no navigable waters in the Beagle Channel, although this interpretation was not supported by the Chilean claim. A unanimous judgement was handed over to Queen Elizabeth II on 18 April 1977. The French judge André Gros gave a dissenting vote, not concerning the result but the reason. On 2 May 1977 the judgement

5313-483: The time of the crisis, the Argentine military was substantially larger than that of Chile; in addition, the Chilean regime was more politically isolated and had suffered deteriorating relations with its main suppliers of arms. The Chilean military, however, had the advantage of defending difficult terrain, as well as being a more professional force, while decades of intervention by the Argentine armed forces in day-to-day politics had degraded their professional skills. There

5390-429: The title to the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands near the extreme end of the American continent, which was submitted to binding arbitration under the auspices of the United Kingdom government. On 2 May 1977 the court ruled that the islands belonged to Chile (see the Report and decision of the Court of Arbitration ). On 25 January 1978 Argentina repudiated the arbitration decision and on 22 December 1978 started (and

5467-473: The two countries, and the second to preclude the creation of Res nullius areas that could have been taken in possession by other powers (such as the United States of America , the UK or France – although the Beagle Channel had been unknown until 1830 and there had been no Spanish settlements south of Chiloé ). The boundary treaty of 1881 described, without any map, the course of the 5600 km border as follows: The controversial articles II and III of

5544-491: The verge of war. On 22 December 1978 Argentina started military action to invade the islands. Only last minute papal mediation prevented the outbreak of armed conflict. The award was a defeat for Argentine foreign policy and initiated an uncoupling from the international community. The arbitration was completely separate from the Falkland Islands issue, a fact that is often obfuscated or publicly denied in Argentina, where

5621-518: The war against Argentina, but that is not the relevant point. To deter their neighbors the Chileans do not have to demonstrate a capability to win. They need, instead, to make a credible case that a military adventure against Chile would not be cheap. In 1978, the Argentine Junta could not be very confident that war would produce a low-cost victory against Chile. Although it had called off the operation,

5698-483: Was announced to the governments of both countries. It involved the border running approximately along the center of the Channel, and awarded both Chile and Argentina sovereignty over navigable waters in the Channel: Whaits Island , the islets called Snipe, Eugenia, Solitario, Hermanos, Gardiner and Reparo, and the bank known as Herradura were awarded to Chile. All of these lie near the southern bank of

5775-662: Was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean regime's human rights record, with the United States expressing particular concern after Orlando Letelier 's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C. , though the U.S. helped install the Pinochet administration initially. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment , later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 . 16 Northrop F-5 's were delivered to Chile before

5852-471: Was counterbalanced by the following factors: The Ambassador of the United States in Argentina (1978) Raúl Castro described the attitude of the Argentine military towards a possible war with the following: They supposed that they were going to invade Chile, Santiago especially. It seemed to them something very easy; Just a matter of crossing the border and that the Chileans were going to surrender right away. And I told them: No, no, you are mistaken. They have

5929-470: Was no surprise factor, since the Chilean military kept movements of the Argentine fleet under surveillance and monitored the build-up of Argentine troops. Chilean troops were deployed along the border, ready to meet any invaders. Chile planted mines in certain areas along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru. and dynamited some mountain passes. Parts of route 9-CH between Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales were selected to serve as extra airstrips in

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