American intervention 1965
81-480: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Quyet Thang ( transl. "Resolved to win" ), was a United States Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) security operation to reestablish South Vietnamese control over
162-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
243-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
324-499: A VC unit attacked two Regional Forces outposts near Trảng Bàng. The ARVN 43rd Ranger Battalion and a U.S. mechanized force from the 4th Battalion, 25th Infantry Division and the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment rushed to the area killing at least 287 VC in the ten-hour battle for the loss of 23 ARVN/U.S. killed. On 26 March, east of Hóc Môn ARVN Airborne forces found 128 dead VC who had apparently been killed by air and artillery strikes while moving south towards Saigon. On 27 March
405-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
486-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
567-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
648-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
729-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
810-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
891-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
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#1732852544148972-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
1053-509: A success and the U.S. claimed 2,658 VC killed. It was followed immediately by Operation Toan Thang I which expanded the security operation across III Corps. The official PAVN history described the operation and Operation Toan Thang I as "causing a great many difficulties for our units trying to approach their targets" for the May Offensive . [REDACTED] This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of
1134-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
1215-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
1296-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
1377-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
1458-657: The 9th Division , the D16, 267th, and 269th Main Force Battalions were in eastern Hậu Nghĩa Province northwest of Saigon. While most of these units had suffered heavy losses in the Tet Offensive, their continued presence applied pressure on Saigon and prevented the reestablishment of South Vietnamese Government control. COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland instructed II Field Force commander LTG Frederick C. Weyand and ARVN III Corps commander LTG Lê Nguyên Khang to sweep
1539-596: The Cambodian border where there was a strong concentration of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) activity during the Vietnam War . This area was reportedly the general location of COSVN , the headquarters for communist military and political activities in the southern half of Vietnam. War Zone C, located in the area designated as III Corps , was a section of South Vietnam with high strategic value due to its location in between Cambodia and Saigon as well as
1620-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
1701-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
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#17328525441481782-1048: The United States Army Center of Military History . Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
1863-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
1944-433: The 267th and 269th Battalions in forest 6 km north of Đức Hòa in eastern Hậu Nghĩa Province. The Allied force killed 36 VC and captured 10. From 15–17 March the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR and ARVN forces engaged the 272nd Regiment between Đức Hòa and Củ Chi , killing 273 VC before losing contact. On 20 March Troops L and M and an ARVN Battalion regained contact with the 272nd Regiment killing 142 VC that day and 57 more in
2025-462: The 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, and two companies from the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment , killed some 97 VC 5 km northeast of Trảng Bàng. On 28 March LTG Weyand moved the 199th Light Infantry Brigade from Biên Hòa Province to Tây Ninh Province to help the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division patrol the area between Tây Ninh and Dầu Tiếng to close the communist infiltration routes from Cambodia into central III Corps. This new operation
2106-775: The ARVN 7th and 8th Regiments, 5th Infantry Division in Bình Dương Province. The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division partnered with the ARVN 50th Regiment in Long An Province. The 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR moved into southeastern Hậu Nghĩa Province to support the ARVN 49th Regiment, 25th Infantry Division . The 2nd and 3rd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division worked with a cavalry squadron from the ARVN 25th Infantry Division and territorial units in northern and western Hậu Nghĩa Province. The operation commenced on 11 March. On 12 March, Troop M, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry and an ARVN Regional Force company engaged more than 100 VC from
2187-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
2268-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
2349-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
2430-605: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
2511-468: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
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2592-526: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
2673-452: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
2754-537: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
2835-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
2916-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
2997-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
3078-608: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
3159-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
3240-454: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
3321-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
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3402-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
3483-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
3564-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
3645-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
3726-807: The areas immediately around Saigon in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive . The operation started on 11 March 1968 and ended on 7 April 1968. While their Tet Offensive attacks on Saigon had been quickly repulsed, in early March, more than 20 Vietcong (VC) battalions remained near Gia Định Province , threatening the city. The 101st Regiment, the Đồng Nai Regiment and elements of the 165th Regiment were in southern Bình Dương Province , north of Saigon. Several battalions were in Thủ Đức District northeast of Saigon. Five or 6 unidentified battalions were in Long An Province southwest of Saigon. The 271st and 272nd Regiments of
3807-521: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
3888-490: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
3969-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
4050-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
4131-562: The districts surrounding Saigon. The 1st , 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions supported by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) would provide most of the maneuver battalions, with subordinate units in many cases pairing up with ARVN units. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade , worked with the elite South Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the Airborne Division in Gia Định Province. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades, 1st Infantry Division partnered with
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#17328525441484212-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
4293-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
4374-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
4455-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
4536-572: The fact that it was a popular jump off spot for PAVN/VC forces and supplies from the Ho Chi Minh Trail . War Zone C's boundaries followed the Cambodian border to the north and west, while its eastern boundary ran parallel to Highway 13 . The area included portions of Tay Ninh province , Binh Long province , and Binh Duong province . The area has been described as pathless jungles through mountainous regions and boggy swamps which made travel and transportation extremely difficult. The overall strategy that
4617-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
4698-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
4779-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
4860-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
4941-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
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#17328525441485022-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
5103-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
5184-523: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
5265-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
5346-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
5427-477: The same area 6 days later. Following these losses the 272nd Regiment withdrew into War zone C . On 24 March the 1st Brigade, 25th Division engaged the 7th Cu Chi Battalion near Trảng Bàng in northern Hậu Nghĩa Province killing 243 VC for the loss of 10 U.S. killed. In late March, Allied intelligence detected VC troop movements south from War Zone C to camps along the Saigon River . On the morning of 25 March,
5508-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
5589-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
5670-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
5751-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
5832-613: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
5913-483: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
5994-491: Was adhered to focused on disrupting and reducing bases from which PAVN/VC forces could operate from and threaten Saigon. U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces conducted small unit operations in this area, often re-sweeping previously explored areas, and established a more effective defense along the Cambodian border to prevent VC and PAVN troops from regaining access to bases in the southern provinces. War Zone C played host to several American combat operations throughout
6075-528: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
6156-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
6237-460: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. War zone C War Zone C was the area in South Vietnam centered around the abandoned town of Katum near
6318-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
6399-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
6480-458: Was named Operation Wilderness. The first week of April saw a sharp drop in enemy contact in the Quyet Thang operational area. Allied intelligence indicated that the VC had withdrawn to more remote areas. Rocket attacks on Saigon had become less frequent as the VC had been pushed back and ARVN forces were now able to reestablish control of the areas around the capital. The operation was considered
6561-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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