American intervention 1965
100-565: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation End Sweep was a United States Navy and United States Marine Corps operation to remove naval mines from Haiphong harbor and other coastal and inland waterways in North Vietnam between February and July 1973. The operation fulfilled an American obligation under
200-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
300-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
400-1088: A balanced force of surface minesweepers and helicopters supported by a significant number of support ships would be required in future mine clearance operations. Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
500-507: A check sweep of a few passes; if it was not clear that all mines in a given area had become inert, a more thorough clearance sweep was to be used. In the United States, the Chief of Naval Materiel , Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. , organized a Mine Warfare Program Office charged with controlling scientific and technical support to End Sweep. The program office ensured that resources were allocated to
600-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
700-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
800-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
900-659: A cover-up from both Liberty survivors and high-ranking Navy officers. The allegations concern the deliberateness of the Israeli attack and the suppression of evidence that would prove this. Captain Ward Boston , Admiral Kidd’s chief legal counsel, corroborated many of these claims in a 2004 affidavit. He also claimed that the entire Inquiry was a sham meant to exonerate Israel: “I know from personal conversations I had with Admiral Kidd that President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered him to conclude that
1000-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
1100-583: A gunnery and operations officer on destroyers in both Europe and the Pacific, and participated in various Allied landings in the Mediterranean as well as at Iwo Jima . His 23 years at sea during his 37-year naval career included 15 years in command of destroyers, destroyer divisions and squadrons and three U.S. fleets in the Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean; he also served as executive assistant and senior aide to
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#17328441857821200-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
1300-747: A major bombing offensive against North Vietnam. In addition, President of the United States Richard Nixon ordered the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet , Admiral Bernard A. Clarey , and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Seventh Fleet , Vice Admiral James L. Holloway , to begin the Operation Pocket Money mining campaign against Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports. The mining campaign, by U.S. Navy and United States Marine Corps attack aircraft from American aircraft carriers, began on 8 May 1972, and over
1400-406: A mine, was equipped with padding to protect her all-volunteer skeleton crew, and was modified so that her entire crew of six could remain topside during her minesweeping runs, ensuring that they would be blown overboard if she struck a mine rather than injured or killed by slamming into the overhead anywhere below decks. The Navy's newly created air mine countermeasures capability resided entirely in
1500-515: A minesweeping helicopter passed it and the explosion was captured on film by the helicopter ' s Swept Mine Locator . On 17 March 1973, Task Force 78 helicopters swept the ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha . Elsewhere in North Vietnam, U.S. Navy technical personnel prepared 50 North Vietnamese sailors to conduct their own minesweeping operations and American C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and helicopters from HMM-165 delivered minesweeping gear to
1600-415: A portion of the six months of End Sweep. Two helicopters were lost, and Enhance suffered fire damage during the operation. The overall cost of the operation, including repairs to Enhance , was $ 20,394,000 more than the cost expected for normal operations of the units involved. The six ocean minesweepers that had conducted actual minesweeping operations spent 439 hours involved in them. Although End Sweep
1700-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
1800-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
1900-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
2000-474: A specified period of time. Of course, the U.S. Navy also knew generally where the mines had been laid, although the inherent inaccuracy of aerial minelaying meant that the precise location of each mine was not known. Rear Admiral Brian McCauley became Commander, Mine Warfare Force, and Commander, Task Force 78, in September 1972. Task Force 78 was designated as Mine Countermeasures Force, U.S. Seventh Fleet, and
2100-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
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#17328441857822200-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
2300-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
2400-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
2500-543: The CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 (HM-12) , all of which were assigned to the operation. In addition, one detachment each from the Marine Corps ' s Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463) and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164) provided a total of 24 more CH-53s. The helicopters practiced for the operation off Charleston, South Carolina , where it
2600-714: The Chief of Naval Operations in the early 1960s, earning citations for his efforts in the Cuban Missile Crisis and several other crises. In 1967, he was chosen by his friend and colleague Admiral John S. McCain Jr. to head the Naval Court of Inquiry into the USS Liberty incident during the Six-Day War in June of that year. The Inquiry quickly became controversial amid allegations of
2700-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
2800-675: The Paris Peace Accord of January 1973, which ended direct American participation in the Vietnam War . It also was the first operational deployment of a U.S. Navy air mine countermeasures capability. The United States had largely disengaged from the Vietnam War when North Vietnam launched its Easter Offensive into South Vietnam in March 1972. In response, the United States Air Force and U.S. Navy launched Operation Linebacker ,
2900-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
3000-611: The United States Navy who served as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO 's Atlantic Fleet, and also as commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet from 1975 to 1978. He was the son of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd , who was killed on the bridge of the battleship Arizona during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor . In 1978 Kidd was among a number of retired four-star officers who testified before Congress in favor of
3100-470: The guided-missile frigate USS Worden (DLG-18) and destroyer USS Epperson (DD-719) . On 27 February 1973, the amphibious assault ships USS Tripoli (LPH-10) , USS New Orleans (LPH-11) , and USS Inchon (LPH-12) and the amphibious transport docks USS Dubuque (LPD-8) , USS Vancouver (LPD-2) , USS Ogden (LPD-5) , and USS Cleveland (LPD-7) joined
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3200-545: The tank landing ship USS Washtenaw County (LST-1166) was modified in Japan between November 1972 and February 1973 to serve in End Sweep as a "special device minesweeper," redesignated MSS-2. As such, she was intended to be used for check sweeps through waters which presumably were clear of active mines to ensure that passage indeed was safe. She was pumped full of polyurethane foam so that she would not sink if she struck
3300-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
3400-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
3500-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
3600-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
3700-661: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
3800-515: The North Vietnamese at Cat Bi Airfield outside Haiphong. Washtenaw County arrived at Haiphong from the Philippines on 6 April 1973, and made her first six check runs there on 14 April 1973, the first American ship to enter Haiphong harbor in over a decade. She had made only two out of a planned six runs the following day when further runs were suspended because the United States believed that
3900-808: The North Vietnamese government was not fulfilling its obligations under the Paris Peace Accords. Washington ordered a suspension of all minesweeping operations and, on 17 April 1973, Task Force 78 returned to Subic Bay for upkeep. On 13 June 1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed a joint communiqué in Paris which, among other things, required that the United States resume minesweeping no later than 20 June and complete all minesweeping no later than 13 July. With all mines by now past their latest possible sterilization date, End Sweep resumed on 18 June 1973. On 20 June, Task Force 78 completed its check sweeps of Haiphong, and soon had also cleared Hon Gai and Cam Pha. Next,
4000-409: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
4100-526: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
Operation End Sweep - Misplaced Pages Continue
4200-452: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
4300-537: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
4400-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
4500-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
4600-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
4700-608: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
4800-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
4900-454: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
5000-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
5100-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
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#17328441857825200-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
5300-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
5400-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
5500-460: The attack was a case of “mistaken identity” despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.” From 1975 to 1978, Kidd served as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Shortly after his 1978 retirement, Kidd was among a number of retired four-star officers who testified before Congress in favor of the controversial SALT II arms control pact. Kidd declared that while he was not entirely thrilled with
5600-521: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
5700-434: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
5800-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
5900-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
6000-559: The controversial SALT II arms control pact. Born in Cleveland, Ohio , Kidd graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1941; he was commissioned an ensign on December 19, 1941, just 12 days after his father was killed aboard his flagship. As Time described the event, when Kidd received his commission as ensign "the U.S. Naval Academy and its guests broke into a thunderous cheer— an unprecedented demonstration in honor of Ensign Kidd and his father." During World War II he served as
6100-594: The day after the peace accords were signed – Task Force 78 departed the Philippines for Haiphong. McCauley met in Haiphong with his North Vietnamese opposite, Colonel Hoang Huu Thai , on 5 February 1973 to coordinate North Vietnamese actions with those of Task Force 78. Minesweeping began on 6 February 1973, when the ocean minesweepers USS Engage (MSO-433) , USS Force (MSO-445) , USS Fortify (MSO-446) , and USS Impervious (MSO-449) swept coastal waters near Haiphong, protected by
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#17328441857826200-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
6300-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
6400-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
6500-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
6600-691: The following day. In addition to Engage , Force , Fortify , and Impervious , the ocean minesweepers USS Enhance (MSO-437) , USS Illusive (MSO-448) , USS Inflict (MSO-456) , USS Leader (MSO-490) , USS Conquest (MSO-488) , and USS Esteem (MSO-438) took part in some part of End Sweep; six of the ten ocean minesweepers conducted actual sweeping operations, as did Washtenaw County in her special role. Nine amphibious warfare ships, six fleet tugs , three salvage ships , and 19 destroyer -type ships also operated in Task Force 78 during at least
6700-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
6800-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
6900-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
7000-442: The minesweeping role due to their effectiveness and far greater mobility. Here, too, Navy mine warfare analysts differed with the popular impression. While helicopters swept three to six times faster than surface minesweepers, they also proved to be very demanding in terms of logistical support and manpower, and often were down for repair due to the high stress of minesweeping on the helicopters. Navy mine warfare analysts concluded that
7100-728: The new device became known as the Magnetic Orange Pipe (MOP). Task Force 78 was activated as a unit of the Seventh Fleet on 24 November 1972, while peace talks still were underway in Paris, and the ships and helicopter units making it up secretly gathered in the Philippines . The talks broke down in December 1972, however, so the task force awaited further developments into January 1973 while its helicopter crews practiced towing their minesweeping equipment in Subic Bay. On 28 January 1973 –
7200-529: The next several months laid thousands of mines in North Vietnamese waters. Eventually, North Vietnam and the United States negotiated an end to the war and signed the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973. A protocol to the agreement called for the United States to neutralize American mines in North Vietnam ' s coastal and inland waterways. Under the Hague Convention of 1907 , the United States
7300-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
7400-425: The operation had been made relatively easy by the U.S. Navy ' s knowledge of the types and locations of the mines that had been laid, the selection of only magnetic mines during the minelaying campaign, and the planned self-sterilization of so many mines before sweeping began. The American public and many U.S. Navy personnel came away from End Sweep with the impression that helicopters had replaced surface ships in
7500-492: The operation that allowed the rapid development of shallow-water minesweeper gear and precision navigation and locating systems, the latter providing minesweeping forces with an improved capability to determine the configuration of a minefield and to adjust their daily operations accordingly. Ten ocean minesweepers (MSOs) were assigned to Task Force 78 to sweep deep-water approaches to North Vietnamese ports and inland waterways and to serve as helicopter control vessels. In addition,
7600-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
7700-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
7800-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
7900-523: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
8000-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
8100-561: The proposed treaty's verification procedures, "the alternative of having no ceiling at all, considering our position at this point in the so-called race, I find totally unacceptable." He also taught the law of the sea at the College of William and Mary . His six children included Navy Captain Isaac C. Kidd III. Kidd died of cancer at age 79 at his home in Alexandria, Virginia , and was buried in
8200-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
8300-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
8400-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
8500-403: The task force concentrated on the coastal areas off Vinh . The final minesweeping operations took place on 5 July 1973 and the next day, Rear Admiral McCauley informed the North Vietnamese that the United States had concluded its mine countermeasures operations in North Vietnamese waters. Operation End Sweep ended officially on 27 July 1973, and Task Force 78 withdrew from North Vietnamese waters
8600-431: The task force, carrying the 31 CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters of HM-12, HMM-165, and HMH-463. The helicopters swept the main shipping channel to Haiphong the same day. The next day, however, President Nixon ordered a suspension of End Sweep in response to North Vietnamese delays in releasing prisoners-of-war . End Sweep resumed on 6 March 1973. On 9 March 1973, a mine exploded – the only one to explode during End Sweep – as
8700-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
8800-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
8900-593: Was a great success in the eyes of the American leadership and general public, U.S. Navy mine warfare analysts were less sanguine about what the operation had demonstrated. It was unusual in the U.S. Navy for a minesweeping operation to enjoy the political visibility and priority that End Sweep did, allowing the operation to make use of an amount and quality of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps staff, operational, and scientific resources not generally available to minesweeping, and analysts cautioned that such circumstances could not be counted on in future mine clearance campaigns. Moreover,
9000-664: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
9100-483: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
9200-480: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
9300-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
9400-408: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. Isaac Campbell Kidd Jr. (August 14, 1919 – June 27, 1999) was an American admiral in
9500-567: Was created for the upcoming minesweeping operation that would become known as End Sweep. Minesweeping equipment and U.S. Navy personnel trained in minesweeping both were in short supply, so, in order to minimize the danger of mine explosions to American personnel and equipment, Task Force 78 planners devised an operational scheme in which minesweeping was limited to areas in which the mines already had rendered themselves inert. If all mines known to be in an area also were known to have passed their self-sterilization dates, Task Force 78 planned to conduct
9600-405: Was discovered that the Marine Corps pilots ' inexperience in towing the heavy Mark 105 hydrofoil minesweeping sleds posed a risk to the personnel and equipment involved, a particularly unacceptable risk because of the scarcity and expense of the sleds. As a result, a scientist devised a buoyant, magnetized pipe filled with styrofoam which any helicopter pilot could tow easily. Painted orange,
9700-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
9800-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
9900-460: Was required to eliminate the mine threat it had created after the end of hostilities. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy ' s Mine Warfare Force (MINEWARFOR) began planning for removal of the mines as soon as Nixon ordered the mining campaign to begin. In order to ease post-war minesweeping, only mines that could be cleared by magnetic sweeps were used, and the vast majority of mines laid were programmed either to self-destruct or render themselves inert after
10000-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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