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84-776: NML is located in several sites across the country including the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH) in Winnipeg, Manitoba . NML has a second site in Winnipeg, the JC Wilt Infectious Disease Research Centre on Logan Avenue which serves as a hub for HIV research and diagnostics in Canada. The three other primary sites include locations in Guelph , St. Hyacinthe and Lethbridge . The CSCHAH

168-399: A Category V body, must be curated at facilities rated BSL-4. Because the existing BSL-4 facilities in the world do not provide the level of cleanliness needed for such pristine samples, there is a need to design a facility dedicated to curation of restricted (potentially biohazardous ) extraterrestrial materials . The systems of such facilities must be able to contain unknown biohazards, as

252-450: A class III biosafety cabinet . Materials leaving the cabinet must be decontaminated by passing through an autoclave or a tank of disinfectant . The cabinets themselves are required to have seamless edges to allow easy cleaning. Also, the cabinet and all materials within must be free of sharp edges to reduce the risk of damage to the gloves. In a protective-suit lab, all work must be done in a class II biosafety cabinet by personnel wearing

336-508: A positive pressure suit . To exit a BSL-4 lab, personnel must pass through a chemical shower for decontamination, then a room for removing the positive-pressure suit, followed by a personal shower. Entry into the BSL-4 lab is restricted to trained and authorized individuals, and all persons entering and exiting the lab must be recorded. As with BSL-3 laboratories, BSL-4 labs must be separated from areas that receive unrestricted traffic. Also, airflow

420-496: A basis for and to maintain an atmosphere of public trust and confidence between the centre and the community. The committee consists of volunteer members representing a wide range of organizations including community residents, scientists, health care professionals, and agricultural professionals. The committee meets at least four times per year, holds regular public information sessions and issues reports on their activities. Other laboratories have been modelled on this approach. At

504-668: A cohort of Nairobi sex workers had a natural immunity to HIV/AIDS . This latter discovery suggested the possibility that a vaccine could eventually be developed. Dr. Plummer stepped down as the NML's Scientific Director General to take the position as senior adviser to the Agency's Chief Public Health Officer in 2014. He remained as a distinguished professor at the University of Manitoba prior to his death in February 2020. In 2015, Dr. Matthew Gilmour became

588-495: A facility which cares for vulnerable animals) would require BSL-3 conditions. Biosafety level 3 is appropriate for work involving microbes which can cause serious and potentially lethal disease via the inhalation route. This type of work can be done in clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production facilities. Here, the precautions undertaken in BSL-1 and BSL-2 labs are followed, as well as additional measures including: Also,

672-445: A lab-trailer, and a "lab in a suitcase". The lab-truck is generally used for in-country deployments at high-profile events such as the 2010 Olympics , the lab-trailer is used for international large-scale events where there may be a threat of bioterrorism or other deliberate acts involving infectious agents, and the lab in a suitcase is frequently used in remote areas of the world with little available infrastructure. An example would be

756-464: A military base at its premises. At the time, the facility contained organisms rated at BSL-2. Biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work with well-characterized agents which do not cause disease in healthy humans. In general, these agents should pose minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment. At this level, precautions are limited relative to other levels. Laboratory personnel must wash their hands upon entering and exiting

840-554: A number of changes to public health in Canada. Among those were the creation of the Public Health Agency of Canada , and the construction of a high-tech operations centre at CSCHAH. This operations centre is the hub of the National Microbiology Laboratory when there is an outbreak or a deployment of personnel off-site. It is equipped with three separate phone systems, can videoconference with 38 participants at

924-654: A number of scientific awards including Canadian Society of Microbiologists' Canadian Graduate Student Microbiologist of the Year Award; the Public Health Agency of Canada's Most Promising Researcher Merit Award and Dr. Andrés Petrasovits Public Health Merit Award; and Health Canada's Excellence Award in Collaborative Leadership and Award for Excellence in Science. Dr. Gilmour continues to be an Assistant Professor at

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1008-514: A piece of equipment that sterilizes materials with steam and pressure. Any liquids leaving the high-containment space go through a biowaste system that operates like a large autoclave to sterilize it. The high-containment labs are built as a box-in-a-box; they do not border exterior walls and there are mechanical spaces above and below them. CSCHAH is a high-security facility. Security staff work closely with local police, RCMP and CSIS to ensure an appropriate level of security at all times. Only

1092-739: A range of viral diseases, including hepatitis and other blood-borne pathogens, respiratory viruses and viral exanthemata, such as measles . Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens - dealing with viral, bacterial and rickettsial zoonoses (diseases transmitted to humans from other species), such as West Nile Virus and Lyme disease , along with risk group 4 agents such as Ebola, Marburg and Lassa fever viruses. HIV and Retrovirology - providing laboratory services and scientific expertise relating to HIV and emerging retroviruses . The Science Technology Core and Services Division works with these divisions to provide technological approaches, including genomics , proteomics and bioinformatics . There

1176-520: A scientific review paper stated that the CSCHAH "has become the prototype for modern BSL4 laboratories". In 2009, Mexico sought help from NML in identifying the unknown respiratory pathogen which was to become known as the pandemic H1N1 influenza. NML's involvement in the response to the West African Ebola outbreak . For a period of about 18 months, teams from NML travelled to West Africa to aid in

1260-537: A time, and can connect via satellite to remote locations around the world. Virtually all staff at NML are trained in the Incident Command System and are able to jump into action at a moment's notice if there is a public health event of some type. A three-story expansion to the building was completed in 2011. The expanded and renovated areas include specimen receiving, shipping and receiving, bio-repository, media preparation, office, and meeting space. CSCHAH

1344-535: Is a biosafety level 4 infectious disease laboratory facility, the only one of its kind in Canada. With maximum containment, scientists are able to work with pathogens including Ebola , Marburg and Lassa fever . The NML's CSCHAH is also home to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 's National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease , and thus the scientists at the NML share their premises with animal virologists . The National Microbiology Laboratory

1428-565: Is a set of biocontainment precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed laboratory facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) to the highest at level 4 (BSL-4). In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels in a publication referred to as BMBL. In the European Union ,

1512-520: Is also the Public Health Risk Sciences Division , which is a specialized resource that provides scientific knowledge and solutions to better assess public health risks and enable decisions, with specific attention to infectious disease threats transmitted from food, the animals, or the physical environment. These science-based divisions are complemented and supported by numerous other units that ensure their ongoing operations such as

1596-404: Is devoted to Containment Level 4 (CL4) at NML. These agents have the potential for aerosol transmission, often have a low infectious dose and produce very serious and often fatal disease; there is no licensed treatment or vaccine available. This level of containment represents an isolated unit independent of other areas. CL4 emphasizes maximum containment of the infectious agent by completely sealing

1680-479: Is expected to take 7 to 10 years from design to completion, and an additional two years is recommended for the staff to become proficient and accustomed to the facilities. According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published on 4 October 2007, a total of 1,356 CDC/USDA registered BSL-3 facilities were identified throughout the United States. Approximately 36% of these laboratories are located in academia. 15 BSL-4 facilities were identified in

1764-437: Is held in high regard within the international containment laboratory community. CSCHAH is a state-of-the-art, 332,766 square foot complex. Built to exceed national and international standards, CSCHAH maintains its high level of excellence through ongoing maintenance and regular upgrades. The complex is built as a series of program-specific blocks interconnected by an area dedicated to common elements for both departments such as

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1848-593: Is obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to permit working with them at a lower level. This level is also used for work with smallpox virus, though this work is only performed at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, United States, and the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia. Sample-return missions that bring back to Earth, samples from

1932-557: Is only required for circumstances where personnel might be exposed to hazardous material. BSL-1 laboratories must have a door which can be closed to limit access to the lab. However, it is not necessary for BSL-1 labs to be isolated from the general building. This level of biosafety is appropriate for work with several kinds of microorganisms including non-pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus , Bacillus subtilis , Saccharomyces cerevisiae and other organisms not suspected to contribute to human disease. Due to

2016-403: Is the highest level of biosafety precautions, and is appropriate for work with agents that could easily be aerosol-transmitted within the laboratory and cause severe to fatal disease in humans for which there are no available vaccines or treatments. BSL-4 labs are generally set up to be either cabinet laboratories or protective-suit laboratories. In cabinet laboratories, all work must be done within

2100-476: Is the same type of laboratory found in doctors' offices, hospitals and universities. In a Level 2 lab, work with infectious materials is done inside a biosafety cabinet (BSC) and appropriate personal protective gear is worn relative to activities (gloves, eye protection, lab coats, gowns, etc.). Risk Group 2 pathogens worked with in Level 2 can cause disease but are not a serious hazard and they are often circulating in

2184-401: Is tightly controlled to ensure that air always flows from "clean" areas of the lab to areas where work with infectious agents is being performed. The entrance to the BSL-4 lab must also employ airlocks to minimize the possibility that aerosols from the lab could be removed from the lab. All laboratory waste, including filtered air, water, and trash must also be decontaminated before it can leave

2268-584: The CSIRO 's Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) if he could have the newly released United States' National Institutes of Health and the British equivalent requirements for the development of infrastructure for bio-containment reviewed by AAHL personnel with a view to recommending the adoption of one of them by Australian authorities. The review was carried out by CSIRO AAHL Project Manager Bill Curnow and CSIRO Engineer Arthur Jenkins. They drafted outcomes for each of

2352-623: The Canadian Institute of Health Research , and other organizations). By 2018 the NML was beginning to use genomics and advanced computing to study microbes at the genetic level in so-called "dry lab" facilities, as opposed to "wet labs" with Petri dishes and cell cultures . The NML (PHAC) fired Chinese nationals Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng from their jobs as BSL4 infectious disease researchers in January 2021; previously in July 2019

2436-532: The People's Liberation Army from at least 2016 to 2020. NML is renowned for its work on a broad spectrum of infectious diseases from seasonal influenza to Ebola and its accomplishments are too many to detail. Some recent examples of the work done by NML include their involvement in the response to the West African Ebola outbreak. For a period of about 18 months, teams from NML travelled to West Africa to aid in

2520-606: The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). In 2014, the WIV's National Bio-safety Laboratory was built at a cost of 300 million yuan (US$ 44 million), in collaboration and with assistance from the French government 's CIRI lab . In 2007 a scientific review paper stated that the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health , which was designed in the early 1990s, "has become the prototype for modern BSL4 laboratories". Starting with

2604-523: The 1970s, participation in the conferences continued to expand and by 1983 discussions began regarding the creation of a formal organization. The American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) was officially established in 1984 and a constitution and bylaws were drafted the same year. As of 2008, ABSA includes some 1,600 members in its professional association. In 1977, Jim Peacock of the Australian Academy of Science asked Bill Snowdon, then chief of

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2688-762: The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic near the facilities of the WIV, work in biocontainment facilities has been politicized, especially in the US Senate for example as the result of Rand Paul 's work. Russia asked questions on 25 October 2022 in the United Nations over the presence in Ukraine of biolabs. In April 2023, Sudan's descent into civil war caused worries at the World Health Organization over its National Public Laboratory as contending factions battled over its area and NPL staff were kicked out in favor of installing

2772-520: The European Union departs from the United States and classifies HIV and hepatitis B – G as Risk Group 3 agents best handled at BSL-3. Prions , the infectious agents that transmit prion diseases such as vCJD , are typically handled under Biosafety Level 2 or higher. This is due to the lack of any evidence of aerosol transmission and relatively higher infective dose of prion diseases, though some circumstances (such as handling animal-infective prions in

2856-516: The Government of Canada. This modern facility is home to two laboratories: the Public Health Agency of Canada 's National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 's National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD). It was the workplace of approximately 550 federal employees prior to the Covid-19 outbreak; since then it has been home to over 800 staff. While most of

2940-603: The J.C. Wilt Infectious Diseases Research Centre on Logan Avenue. The other facilities are located in Guelph, ON; St. Hyacinthe, QC and Lethbridge, AB. NML is divided into five main laboratory divisions which are supported by scientific and administrative services. The primary NML divisions are: Bacterial Pathogens - focussing on bacterial diseases such as tuberculosis and antibiotic resistant organisms. Enteric Diseases - focussing on food and water-borne pathogens including E.coli and Salmonella . Viral Diseases - addressing

3024-1047: The Office of Science Planning, Program Support and Services, Scientific Informatic Services, Science Support and Client Services, Surveillance and References Services, the Facility and Property Management Division, and the Biorisk and Occupational Safety Services Division. NML also funds the National Reference Centre for Parasitology in Montreal and has a Laboratory Liaison Technical Officer in most provincial labs. NML employs scientists (MD, PhD, and DVM), biologists, and laboratory technologists, but it also includes informatics specialists, biosafety experts, specialized operations and maintenance staff, and administrative staff, among others. In total, there are approximately 600 staff members as of 2016. The laboratory has collaborated with scientists from

3108-635: The Scientific Director General of the National Microbiology Laboratory and the Laboratory for Foodborne Zoonoses. Dr. Gilmour spearheaded the partnership that brought these two laboratories together under the National Microbiology Laboratory umbrella. He was previously the Chief, Enteric Diseases and subsequently the Program Director, Bacteriology and Enteric Diseases at the NML. Dr. Gilmour has won

3192-483: The U.S. in 2007, including nine at federal labs. As of May 2021, there are 42 BSL-4 facilities in operation around the world, with a further 17 planned or under construction. The following is a list of existing BSL-4 facilities worldwide. A North Carolina Mosquito & Vector Control Association (NCMVCA) study highlighted safety concerns. In the United States, laboratories can be funded by federal, state, private, non-profit, or academically. The last accounts for 72% of

3276-934: The U.S. that were accredited biosafety levels 3 or 4. The Proceedings of a Workshop on "Developing Norms for the Provision of Biological Laboratories in Low-Resource Contexts" provides a list of BSL-3 laboratories in those countries. Biosafety level 3 is commonly used for research and diagnostic work involving various microbes which can be transmitted by aerosol and/or cause severe disease. These include Francisella tularensis , Mycobacterium tuberculosis , Chlamydia psittaci , Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus , Eastern equine encephalitis virus , SARS-CoV-1 , MERS-CoV , Coxiella burnetii , Rift Valley fever virus , Rickettsia rickettsii , several species of Brucella , chikungunya , yellow fever virus , West Nile virus , and Yersinia pestis . Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)

3360-592: The University of Manitoba in 1976. Between 1984 and 2001, Dr. Plummer lived in Nairobi, Kenya where he spearheaded the development of the world renowned "Kenya AIDS Control Program," established by the Universities of Manitoba and Nairobi . This HIV epidemiological work was central to global understanding of the risk factors for HIV transmission and how to prevent its spread. Dr. Plummer was the first to reveal that heterosexual women could also be infected with HIV/AIDS and that

3444-563: The University of Manitoba's Department of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases as well as the Secretary Treasurer of the Canadian Association for Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (CACMID). Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health ( CSCHAH ) is an infectious disease laboratory complex in Winnipeg , Manitoba , owned and operated by

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3528-501: The Winnipeg-based Smith Carter Architects and Engineers Inc., visited laboratories around the world to seek best practices in containment and design. Construction finished toward the end of 1997, with the first programs beginning in the spring of 1998 following an extensive commissioning process. The rest of the laboratories then became operational one by one. The official opening took place in 1999. Since then,

3612-463: The committee's request, CSCHAH developed reporting guidelines to determine the extent of communication around any incidents that may take place at the centre. This ensures that the committee and others are apprised of incidents of any significance in a timely manner plus they have access to information on each and every incident no matter how minor, at their meetings. Biosafety level A biosafety level ( BSL ), or pathogen/protection level ,

3696-535: The community. Environmental contamination must be minimized by the use of hand washing sinks and decontamination facilities such as autoclaves . Examples include E-coli ; whooping cough ; and seasonal influenza . NML also has Containment Level 3 (CL3) laboratories (8.6% of lab space). Risk Group 3 pathogens may be transmitted by the airborne route, often need only a low infectious dose to produce effects, and can cause serious or life-threatening disease. CL3 emphasizes additional primary and secondary barriers to minimize

3780-493: The country. These programs protect human health, animal health, and international trade. In the 1980s, both Agriculture Canada (prior to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency being formed) and Health Canada identified the need to replace existing laboratory space that was reaching the end of its lifespan as well as the need for Containment Level 4 space in the country. Numerous benefits were identified for housing both laboratories in one building, including cost savings. Winnipeg

3864-412: The design and construction of the facility, the engineering controls, and the training and techniques of staff are all focused on protecting lab workers, containing the pathogens, and preventing contamination of materials to ensure accurate diagnosis and research. All of these factors vary depending on the level of containment. The vast majority (87.7%) of NML's lab space is Containment Level 2 (CL2). This

3948-436: The diagnostic capabilities of all participants and contribute to disease surveillance around the world. The Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence (CNPHI) is an innovation developed by NML staff. It is a secure web-based system that compiles information from various surveillance systems and issues alerts to users. More than 4,000 public health officials across Canada now subscribe to it. CNPHI tools assist in determining

4032-414: The diagnostics during the outbreak. Their ongoing work on developing both a vaccine and treatment was fast-tracked into clinical trials during this period to help stop the outbreak. The primary reason for housing the two laboratories in the same complex was economic. It saves the citizens of Canada money by only having one facility to operate with a number of shared services also keeping costs down. However,

4116-450: The diagnostics during the outbreak. They worked closely with the World Health Organization and Médecins sans frontières to ensure people were properly diagnosed so that they could be properly cared for and isolated from others to stop the spread. Also during this outbreak, a promising vaccine and treatment for Ebola that were developed at NML, in conjunction with collaborators, were fast tracked into clinical trials so that they could get to

4200-479: The environment. This includes various microbes that cause mild disease to humans, or are difficult to contract via aerosol in a lab setting. Examples of pathogens classified as "Risk Group 2" in the United States include seasonal influenza, SARS-CoV-2 , hepatitis A , B , and C viruses, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus , Salmonella , Plasmodium falciparum , and Toxoplasma gondii . Notably,

4284-455: The existence or extent of an outbreak through the recognition of related cases across jurisdictions. From 2000 to 2014, Dr. Frank Plummer was the Scientific Director General of the National Microbiology Laboratory. Under Dr. Plummer's guidance, the NML developed into one of the world's premier institutions in the research, detection, and response to global infectious disease and bio-security threats. Dr. Plummer received his medical degree from

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4368-580: The facility perimeter with confirmation by negative pressure testing, isolation of the researcher from the pathogen by an enclosed positive pressure suit, and decontamination of air and all other materials. Examples include Ebola, Nipah , Marburg , and 1918 pandemic influenza . NML programs are housed in several facilities across the country. Two of these facilities are in proximity to each other in Winnipeg: The Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health on Arlington Street and

4452-520: The facility that came to be named the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (often referred to locally as "the Virology Lab") began with an official ground-breaking in December 1992. The joint venture design team of Toronto-based Dunlop Architects and Winnipeg-based Smith Carter Architects and Engineers visited 30 laboratories to seek best practices in containment and design. Construction

4536-466: The facility which houses the BSL-3 lab must have certain features to ensure appropriate containment. The entrance to the lab must be separated from areas of the building with unrestricted traffic flow. Also, the lab must be behind two sets of self-closing doors (to reduce the risk of aerosols escaping). The construction of the lab is such that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets are not permitted, and any seams in

4620-557: The facility. Biosafety level 4 laboratories are used for diagnostic work and research on easily transmitted pathogens which can cause fatal disease. These include a number of viruses known to cause viral hemorrhagic fever such as Marburg virus , Ebola virus , Lassa virus , and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever . Other pathogens handled at BSL-4 include Hendra virus , Nipah virus , and some flaviviruses . Also, poorly characterized pathogens which appear closely related to dangerous pathogens are often handled at this level until enough data

4704-579: The facility. Health Canada reports that world-wide until 1999 there were recorded over 5,000 cases of accidental laboratory infections and 190 deaths. The first prototype Class III (maximum containment) biosafety cabinet was fashioned in 1943 by Hubert Kaempf Jr., then a U.S. Army soldier, under the direction of Arnold G. Wedum, Director (1944–1969) of Industrial Health and Safety at the United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories , Camp Detrick , Maryland . Kaempf

4788-411: The floors, walls, and ceilings are sealed to allow easy cleaning and decontamination. Also, windows must be sealed, and a ventilation system installed which forces air to flow from the "clean" areas of the lab to the areas where infectious agents are handled. Air from the lab must be filtered before it can be recirculated. A 2015 study by USA Today journalists, identified more than 200 lab sites in

4872-513: The funding. High-containment labs that are registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Select Agent Program must adhere to Department of Defense standards. Since BSL3 and 4 laboratories in the United States are regulated by either the CDC or USDA or another federal agency (depending on the pathogens they handle), no single federal agency

4956-426: The lab. Research with these agents may be performed on standard open laboratory benches without the use of special containment equipment. However, eating and drinking are generally prohibited in laboratory areas. Potentially infectious material must be decontaminated before disposal, either by adding a chemical such as bleach or isopropanol or by packaging for decontamination elsewhere. Personal protective equipment

5040-465: The laboratories in the facility have been instrumental in responding to a number of significant infectious disease outbreaks: The 2003 SARS outbreak when NML led the laboratory response; the 2003 BSE case when NCFAD provided the diagnosis of the initial case and then undertook testing as part of a vast investigation; the 2004 avian influenza outbreak in BC for which NCFAD led the laboratory investigation. In 2007

5124-409: The laboratory space is dedicated to Containment Level 2 (also known as Biosafety Level 2) and Containment Level 3 laboratories, CSCHAH is the only facility in Canada operating Containment Level 4 (CL4) laboratories and is the first facility in the world to have both human and animal Level 4 laboratories under one roof. Both NML and NCFAD operate critical diagnostic testing programs relied on across

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5208-403: The lead laboratory in Canada, NML rapidly developed diagnostic tests and equipped provincial labs to be able to test for the new virus. NML also assisted Mexico by providing additional testing and sent staff to their national laboratory to enable to help them set up their own testing protocols. In the international laboratory sector, NML has developed different types of mobile labs : a lab-truck,

5292-568: The levels of security. AAHL was notionally classified as "substantially beyond P4". These were adopted by the Australian Academy of Science and became the basis for Australian legislation. It opened in 1985 costing AU$ 185 million, built on Corio Oval . The Australian Animal Health Laboratory is a Class 4/ P4 Laboratory. In 2003, the Chinese Academy of Sciences approved the construction of mainland China's first BSL-4 laboratory at

5376-415: The library, cafeteria, and theatre. CSCHAH houses laboratories to manage any type of infectious organism from the most common to the most exotic. Containment Level 2 (CL2) laboratories are the same as what can be found at a hospital or doctor's office; 60.8% of CSCHAH lab space is dedicated to level 2. Containment Level 3 involves specific engineering controls and protocols to ensure the safety of lab staff,

5460-494: The likelihood that the human pathogen will actually cause disease in a human, and whether treatment and preventative measures are available. It can depend on the type of work being done as to which level of containment is needed for pathogens from specific risk groups; as an example, culturing (or growing) a virus or bacterium requires higher containment than some diagnostic tests. NML operates Containment Level 2, 3 and 4 laboratories. In human health infectious disease laboratories,

5544-476: The lobby area is open to the public; all guests must be escorted within the secure area at all times. All staff working in the facility have Secret Level II security clearance. The Community Liaison Committee to the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health was struck by the ministers of Health and Agriculture in 1999. The committee's first meeting took place in January 2000. It was to create

5628-757: The multiple deployments over the years to combat outbreaks of Ebola in Africa. This model was adopted by many other countries during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. NML houses the secretariats for both the Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network (CPHLN) and the Global Health Security Action Group – Laboratory Network (GHSAG-LN). The role of CPHLN is to provide a forum for public health laboratory leaders to share knowledge. The GHSAG-LN network's goals are to coordinate

5712-640: The need for new laboratory space including high-containment. Numerous benefits were identified for housing both laboratories in one building and Winnipeg was chosen as the site; an announcement to that effect was made in October 1987. After some debate, the spot chosen for the site was a city works yard near to the Health Sciences Centre (a major teaching hospital), the University of Manitoba 's medical school, and other life science organizations. Construction of

5796-458: The pair had been dismissed from their positions as unpaid members of the University of Winnipeg for their agency in a mysterious trans-Pacific shipment of BSL4-grade virus materials back to their homeland when the RCMP was called in. Human pathogens are classified into risk groups. The criteria to determine the group includes the level of risk to the health of a person or to public health, as well as

5880-475: The partnership between these two world leading labs also allows for collaboration and cooperation on established, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. Many of the viruses, bacteria and prions studied at CSCHAH are zoonotic , meaning that they can transfer from animals to humans. Co-location of these labs allows scientists to work together on these shared challenges and to take advantage of each other's complementary expertise and unique resources. This model

5964-506: The people that needed it as soon as possible. Another accomplishment was the response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. In April 2009, the Mexican national lab approached NML for assistance with identifying a respiratory virus that was causing outbreaks in Mexico . NML was able to quickly identify the new virus and recognize that it matched the virus that was beginning to circulate in the U.S. As

6048-497: The public and the environment; 35.5% of CSCHAH lab space is CL3 space, the majority of which is dedicated to animal pathogens. Although the facility is thought of as a "Level 4 facility," only 3.7% of lab space is used for CL4. Level 4, with its special construction and biosafety suits, is necessary to work with the most serious of pathogens including Ebola, Nipah, and Marburg. Following the SARS outbreak in 2003, lessons learned resulted in

6132-421: The relative ease and safety of maintaining a BSL-1 laboratory, these are the types of laboratories generally used as teaching spaces for high schools and colleges . At this level, all precautions used at Biosafety level 1 are followed, and some additional precautions are taken. BSL-2 differs from BSL-1 in that: Biosafety level 2 is suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and

6216-406: The release of infectious organisms into the immediate laboratory and the environment. Additional features to prevent transmission of CL3 organisms are appropriate respiratory protection, HEPA filtration of exhausted laboratory air, and strictly controlled laboratory access. Examples include tuberculosis ; West Nile virus ; and pandemic H1N1 influenza . A small percentage of laboratory space (3.6%)

6300-660: The same biosafety levels are defined in a directive . In Canada the four levels are known as Containment Levels. Facilities with these designations are also sometimes given as P1 through P4 (for pathogen or protection level), as in the term P3 laboratory . At the lowest level of biosafety, precautions may consist of regular hand-washing and minimal protective equipment. At higher biosafety levels, precautions may include airflow systems, multiple containment rooms, sealed containers, positive pressure personnel suits , established protocols for all procedures, extensive personnel training, and high levels of security to control access to

6384-483: The size of any putative alien microorganism is unknown. Ideally, it should filter particles down to 10 nanometers , and release of a particle 50 nanometers or larger is unacceptable under any circumstance. Because NASA and ESA are collaborating on the Mars Sample Return campaign, due to return samples from Mars in the early 2030s, the need for a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is becoming more pressing. An SRF

6468-417: The three principal biological warfare (BW) laboratories of the U.S. Army. Because of the potential implication of the work conducted at biological warfare laboratories, the conferences were restricted to top level security clearances . Beginning in 1957, these conferences were planned to include non-classified sessions as well as classified sessions to enable broader sharing of biological safety information. It

6552-430: The year and provides 24/7 response to biological or chemical issues. Any material exiting the level 3 or 4 laboratories must be sterilized or decontaminated in some manner. Air is drawn into the laboratories through the use of negative air pressure before being filtered out through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. Laboratory waste such as gloves, test tubes, and pipette tips are removed via an autoclave ,

6636-547: Was chosen as the site and an announcement was made in October 1987. After some debate, the spot chosen for the site was a city works yard near to the Health Sciences Centre (a major teaching hospital) and the University of Manitoba's medical school. The City of Winnipeg transferred the title for $ 1. Construction of the facility that came to be named the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health (often referred to locally as "the Virology Lab") began with an official groundbreaking in December 1992. The design team, headed by

6720-578: Was designed for safety; it was built to meet or exceed all national and international standards. The construction, engineering controls and sterilization systems are geared toward the highest level of safety. Safety is of paramount importance to everyone working in the facility. Extensive Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are in place and everyone is well-trained for the specific area they work in. A safety and environmental services (SES) team provides numerous "hands-on" demonstrations and presentations on biosafety and occupational health and safety throughout

6804-543: Was largely complete by the end of 1997 with the first programs beginning in the spring of 1998 and all laboratories coming on line after that. The official opening took place in June 1999. Following the SARS outbreak in 2003, the Public Health Agency of Canada was formed in 2004 to provide a stronger focus on public health and emergency preparedness in the country. It is a member of the federal Health Portfolio (along with Health Canada,

6888-457: Was not until 1964, however, that conferences were held in a government installation not associated with a biological warfare program. Over the next ten years, the biological safety conferences grew to include representatives from all federal agencies that sponsored or conducted research with pathogenic microorganisms. By 1966, it began to include representatives from universities, private laboratories, hospitals, and industrial complexes. Throughout

6972-614: Was preceded by the Bureau of Microbiology which was originally part of the Laboratory Centre for Disease Control of Health Canada in Ottawa . In the 1980s, Health Canada identified both the need to replace existing laboratory space that was reaching the end of its lifespan and the need for Containment Level 4 space in the country. Around the same time, Agriculture Canada (prior to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency being formed) also identified

7056-452: Was tired of his MP duties at Detrick and was able to transfer to the sheet metal department working with the contractor, the H.K. Ferguson Co. On 18 April 1955, fourteen representatives met at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland. The meeting was to share knowledge and experiences regarding biosafety , chemical, radiological, and industrial safety issues that were common to the operations at

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