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154-662: The Battle of Mór on 30 December 1848 was a crucial victory for the Austrian Empire 's forces in crushing the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 . Antiquarian artefacts show that vine growing occurred even in the Roman period . Vine growing came to stay from the 11th century in this area. The ethnic German settlers and the Capuchin monks started to grow grape vines in the beginning of the 18th century. The oenological boom lasted until

308-519: A French chemist named Saint-Évre wrote an article in which he announced the discovery of the undecylic acid. At first, Görgei was disappointed that with this announcement his work would be pointless, but then he noticed that the French chemist was wrong in thinking that the undecylic acid was an original, undiscovered acid rather than a mixture of lauric and decanoic acids, which he demonstrated in his study. Görgei's results were published by Redtenbacher under

462-567: A Hungarian campaign to chase Windisch-Grätz and his troops out of Hungary. On 16–17 March, the Hungarian troops crossed the Tisza river; but, due to some unfounded rumors, Vetter decided to retreat to the starting position. During these events, Görgei was the only military commander who achieved notable success, by advancing from the north through Tokaj , Gyöngyös , Miskolc , and Mezőkövesd , by which he succeeded in diverting Windisch-Grätz's attention from

616-510: A Russian invasion. All the military and political advice seemed in favor of taking Buda first, rather than moving towards Vienna. According to Hungarian Historian Róbert Hermann, the capture of Buda after three weeks of siege (the only siege of the Hungarian Freedom War that ended in the taking of a fortress by assault; the remaining fortresses and castles were taken, by one or the other side, only after negotiations and then surrender)

770-491: A front of some 25-30 kilometers wide so that the troops could resist outnumbering enemy attacks at any point of it. Görgei explained in his reply that the battle was impossible to fight under Kossuth's conditions. Now Kossuth, dissatisfied with Görgei because of his answer and the surrender of Győr, he wrote a letter to his opponent, Perczel, urging him to confront the Austrians. Only unity and unity for God's sake! The homeland

924-400: A frontal attack of the enemy, the breaking of the weak Hungarian front line, cutting of his supply lines, and the occupation of Debrecen, the temporary Hungarian capital. Görgei later wrote in his memoirs that he knew that he could take these risks against such a weak commander as Windisch-Grätz. According to József Bánlaky and Tamás Csikány, Görgei failed to follow up his successes by taking

1078-408: A general battle plan, intervening only when needed, as he did at Tápióbicske and Isaszeg, where he turned, by his presence and decisiveness, the tide of battle in his favor. He took great risks at the start of both phases of his spring campaign because he left only a few troops in front of the enemy, while sending the bulk of his army to make encircling maneuvers, which, if discovered, could have led to

1232-444: A hard life. Records from the school show that his conduct was very good, he had no errors, his natural talents were exceptional, and his fervency and diligence were constant, being very severe with himself but also with the others. Despite this, in his letters he wrote that he despised the life of a soldier because he had to obey officers whom he did not respect and that he dreamed about a free and active life that he could not find in

1386-543: A huge plain . Another participant in the battle wrote that our position was extremely bad; the forest was not far from us, in which the enemy could arrange his army to attack without being harmed or even noticed. Mór Perczel's opinion on the defensibility of the Mór position was supported only by his brother Miklós Perczel: our position was so beautiful and good that if our artillerymen were not scared, we would have beaten [the enemy] brilliantly . In his war report written after

1540-478: A narrow strip of land in the west, Croatia, and a few land pockets and forts. In the battle of Isaszeg, Görgei had been close to encircling and completely destroying Windisch-Grätz's main Austrian army, which could have brought about a decisive end to the war; but the refusal of one of his army corps commanders, András Gáspár , to attack from the north, made possible the enemy escape. Görgei shared some responsibility for

1694-508: A place to live in Visegrád, where Görgei lived the last decades of his life. After Görgei's return and for the rest of his life, Hungarian public opinion was hostile, because of some false accusations. Kossuth's Letter from Vidin , written in the aftermath of Görgei's surrender, instilled a long-lasting hatred of Görgei amongst the Hungarians, many of whom came to believe that he was a traitor. In

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1848-407: A sharp turn when a person apprehended after a murder of a postman at Tatabánya claimed to be one of the attackers at Mór. Investigation eventually revealed that the evidence collection in the case of Kaiser and Hajdú was blatantly cursory, and that the key witness of the case might have lied in court; the guns used at the robbery were eventually found at the apartment of one of the new suspects. Mór

2002-472: A stage for music, drama and dance, row upon row of stalls filled with regional food, crafts, local wines and palinka. On the final Saturday evening of the festival a street party is held and the entire town turns into a big dance party. On 9 May 2002, around noon, two armed men entered an Erste Bank office in Mór. For reasons unknown, they shot everyone in the building, including the customers, and left with 7.3 million Forints . Six people died instantly,

2156-584: A straight direction, he would not have reached Győr until the evening of 26 December - provided he had not stumbled upon any of the Imperial columns surrounding the city. The reason for this is explained by the fact that the reports and directions given to him by Kossuth, Görgei, and the Government's Commissar General László Csány , and Perczel's own guide gave him wrong directions, but it cannot be ruled out that he deliberately avoided cooperation with Görgei, because it

2310-598: A student of chemistry at the University of Prague . He loved chemistry, writing this to his friend, Gusztáv Röszler, who had recommended him to professor Josef Redtenbacher , a great chemist at that time: [Y]our recommendation to Redtenbacher made me very happy. I am gaining life as never before. The science of chemistry itself, but also the leading of it by such a great professor as Redtenbacher, totally conquered me. Görgei's work in chemistry from this period are worthy of note: he conducted research into coconut oil, discovering

2464-428: Is twinned with: Battle of M%C3%B3r [REDACTED]   Austrian Empire The Battle of Mór took place during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 on 30 December 1848 between Austria and Hungarian Revolutionary Army . The Austrians were led by Croatian Ban Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić , while the Hungarians were led by Major General Mór Perczel . The Austrians were victorious and, subsequently,

2618-534: Is how it had been given at his birth. For example, Sándor Pethő's bibliographical book Görgey Artúr (Budapest, 1930), or Artúr's younger brother István Görgey's Görgey Arthur ifjusága és fejlődése a forradalomig [The youth of Artúr Görgey, and his development until the revolution] (Budapest, 1916) and Görgey Arthur a száműzetésben 1849–1867 [Artúr Görgey in exile, 1849–1867] (Budapest, 1918). But, recent historiography spells it Görgei (Róbert Hermann's and Tamás Csikány's works, for example). In Hungarian surnames ,

2772-422: Is in great danger. [... Please give me] some victory, my sweet Maurice! The continuous retreat has dampened the spirit of the army, - an attack, a victory must necessarily take place before the decisive battle! , – he wrote to the hot-headed general, for whom that was more than enough to take a hasty decision. Perczel received both Kossuth's and Csány's letters on 30 December. He called a War Council and against

2926-413: Is so sparse that the troops and guns can move freely in it in all directions . Meszéna tried to warn Perczel of these dangers, but his commander was undeterred. All that Meszéna succeeded in doing was that Perczel sent the corps' road engineers ( sappers ) forward on the road to Kisber, and had made a barricade of a couple of cut trees, to prevent the enemy from advancing. Due to the contiguous forest,

3080-495: Is well known that they had not liked each other since their clash after the great success at Ozora , when Görgei declared Perczel unfit to lead the army, while the latter wanted to shoot the disobedient Görgei in the head. Perczel is one of the most interesting personalities of the War of Independence, he was a talented soldier but immensely self-confident (he claimed that he saved the country at least three times in 1848–49, while everyone

3234-787: Is why this article also uses this form. Görgei was born as Johannes Arthur Woldemár Görgey at Toporc in Upper Hungary (today Toporec , Slovakia ) on 30 January 1818 to an impoverished Hungarian noble family of Zipser German descent who immigrated to the Szepes (today Spiš ) region during the reign of King Géza II of Hungary (1141–1162). During the Reformation , they converted to Protestantism. The family name refers to their origin from Görgő village ( Hungarian : görgői , lit. "of Görgő"), today Spišský Hrhov in Slovakia . In 1832, Görgei enrolled in

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3388-540: The Battle of Bábolna , was so delighted by the idea that he wanted to move with his troops out that night for attack, but his officers dissuaded him, pointing the tiredness of the troops. It was also mentioned, according to the diary of Hermann Dahlen , the Ban's aide-de-camp , that Mór lies in the middle of the vast Bakony forest, from which the enemy can easily slip away under cover of darkness through an area unknown to us . After

3542-479: The Hungarian Revolutionary Army . In his youth, Görgei was a talented chemist, with his work in the field of chemistry being recognized by many renowned Hungarian and European chemists. However, now he is more widely known for his role in the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849 . As the most successful general and greatest military genius of the Hungarian Revolutionary Army , he

3696-476: The Magyar Kémiai Folyóirat [Hungarian Chemistry Magazine]. Görgei's skills and achievements in chemistry were praised by Vojtěch Šafařík and Károly Than . Redtenbacher wanted to hire Görgei as a chemist at the university of Lemberg , but in the end Görgei retreated to the family domains at Toporc, because his uncle Ferenc had died and his widow had asked him to come home and help the family. After

3850-630: The Phylloxera bane in 1875-1880 that killed most of the vineyards. Afterwards, Ezerjó became the most important type of wine in Mór, which now belongs to the Hungaricums. Ezerjó is a heavy, late-ripening sort of vine. Unlike other parts of Hungary that produce sweet dessert wines, the wines from Mor tend to be clear and dry similar to a sauvignon blanc. Smaller, locally owned vineyards are giving away to commercial growers who have discovered Mor's perfect climate, soil, and humidity. Timed to coincide with

4004-481: The Vértes Hills . The decision to retreat from the town was taken at the last minute; if Görgei had stayed there for half a day longer, he and his troops would have been caught in a pincer by the Austrians. After the capture of Győr, Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz's main objective was to prevent Görgei's and Perczel's troops from joining. He entrusted this task to the corps of Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić. Kossuth

4158-522: The sapper school at Tulln , profiting from a tuition-free place offered by a foundation. Because his family was poor, this was a great opportunity for him; but initially, he did not want to be a soldier. During this period, he wrote to his father that he would rather be a philosopher or scientist than a soldier. He spent almost thirteen years in this school, receiving a military education. He decided not to accept money from his family, and ate very little, and wore poor clothes in an effort to train himself for

4312-482: The "y" instead of an "i" (used today), usually appears as the last letter of the names of nobles (as a locative adverb suffix: for example, 'Debreceni', meaning "from Debrecen"), because their names appeared in writing earlier than the names of people of common origin, so the nobiliary surnames retained the archaic spelling of the period when they were first written down. The surnames of the common people, which appeared later, after Hungarian spelling changed, had an "i" as

4466-402: The 14 April declaration. The Russians intervened in the struggle and made common cause with the Austrians, in mid-June 1849 the allies advanced into Hungary from all sides. Görgei found himself before a greatly superior enemy. The reinforcements that Kossuth had promised did not came, because on 7 June General Perczel, the commander of the southern Hungarian army, had suffered a heavy defeat in

4620-429: The 20th   century, this characterization was challenged by modern research. As a result, Görgei is less often considered treasonous, and his reputation as one of the most talented and successful Hungarian generals of the 19th   century has been restored, being now regarded as one of Hungary's greatest historical heroes. The earlier books and articles about Artúr Görgei usually gave his surname as Görgey , which

4774-542: The 22nd), scored a draw (at Turcsek 17 January 1849), and won two ( Igló on 2 February 1849, and Branyiszkó on the 5th). Kossuth, who did not want to give the supreme command to Görgei, conferred it on the Polish general Henryk Dembiński . Many officers from Görgei's Army of the Upper Danube ( György Kmety , Lajos Aulich ) were astonished at Kossuth's decision and sought to protest, but Görgei ordered them to accept it. One of

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4928-428: The 28th—but these were mostly due to the inattention of his brigade commanders. Görgei understood that with his inferior troops he could not stop the main Austrian army; and if he risked battle, he would have suffered a decisive defeat, which would have ended Hungary's bid for independence. In the war council held on 2 January 1849, Görgei convinced the other commanders that there was no other choice than to retreat from

5082-604: The 3. Dragoon and the Banderaial Hussar Regiments, which formed the vanguard of the Grammont Brigade, had to depart toward Mór at 4,45 o'clock on the next morning. Ferenc Ottinger 's cavalry brigade was ordered to leave for Seréd via Mór at 5 o'clock in the morning. One of the brigades of Hartlieb's division and the artillery reserve was also ordered to march to Mór, while its other brigade to Seréd. The march finally started at 5 a.m. Ottinger's brigade followed

5236-416: The 4. (Alexander) Hussars was probably also in reserve. Meszéna is said to have tried to persuade Perczel to create a larger reserve or to take a more favorable position, but he refused, stubbornly clinging to his own ideas, and even threatening Baron Meszéna [who tried to argue with him] with execution . Jelačić reported that the Hungarian position was protected by a steep and deep ditch running parallel to

5390-412: The 50th Battalion, and the 7. and 8. companies of the 35th Battalion, ordered in a skirmish chain, against the forest. According to some accounts, the two guns of the six-pounder infantry battery from the left flank and the cavalry battery also entered the forest, but Perczel's war report seems to indicate that he only deployed half a cavalry battery here. The decision turned out to be very unfortunate. As

5544-419: The 5th   Hungarian battalion, from Győr, to train newly enlisted men. Shortly after that, a former companion-in-arms, Lieutenant Imre Ivánka, Prime Minister Lajos Batthyány 's secretary, recommended him to Batthyány to work in the ministry. Görgei worked with Ivánka on a plan to organize the voluntary mobile national guards into four camps and was named captain of the national guard camp at Szolnok . Görgei

5698-603: The Austrians to Klagenfurt, in Carinthia , and was kept under surveillance until 1867, when amnesty issued as a result of the Hungarian-Austrian Compromise and the founding of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He then was able to return to Hungary. Over several years of hardships in different parts of Hungary, Görgei unsuccessfully tried to find a suitable job; and his brother, István Görgey, provided him with

5852-466: The Battle of Káty, from an Austro-Croatian army, reinforced with Serbian rebels, led by Josip Jelačić. Perczel could not send the reinforcements because he needed them there. A second problem was that many of his experienced generals, who had proved their talent in the spring campaign, were no longer available: ( János Damjanich had broken his leg, Lajos Aulich was ill, and András Gáspár had resigned from

6006-532: The Chairman of the National Defence Commission (OHB), the country's true leader, asked Görgei to defend Győr. Kossuth, in successive letters, kept promising reinforcements to Görgei, but they took time to arrive. Most of the reinforcements were to arrive from the Hungarian troops in southern Hungary, which was too far from Győr. However, Kossuth was over-optimistic. Because of the distance, the majority of

6160-576: The Danube, the Chain Bridge , which disrupted the Hungarian supply lines and threatened the Hungarian troops and supply carriages, causing the Hungarians to make a long detour, which caused weeks of delay, and prevented their use of the Danube as a transport route. Besides that, he had to deploy a considerable portion of his force in order to monitor the Austrian troops in Buda, thus weakening any attack westward. Also,

6314-574: The Declaration of the Hungarian Independence, whose chief proponent was Kossuth. The latter refrained from naming Görgei as commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army, naming weak commanders, such as Henryk Dembiński or Lázár Mészáros, instead, thus weakening the army. After his surrender to the Russian army, he was not executed, like many of his generals, due to Russian intercession, but was taken by

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6468-690: The Grammont Brigade, the 3rd (Franz Joseph) Dragoon Regiment and the Banderial (the Ban's) Hussar Regiment were stationed in Kisbér, the Hartlieb Division, the batteries and artillery reserve in Mezőőrs, and the Ottinger Brigade in the settlements between Mezőörs and Kisbér. Jelačić had intended to give his troops a rest day on 30 December, but at his headquarters in Kisbér he was informed that Perczel had left

6622-623: The Habsburg emperor under the name Ferdinand I of Austria , dismissed the Batthyány Government and authorized the Ban of Croatia , Josip Jelačić . On 11 September 1848, when the troops of Jelačić crossed the Dráva river to enter Hungary, Görgei's national guards were ordered to come from Szolnok to Csepel Island to keep an eye on the movements of Croatian supplies. Here, Görgei organized the villagers from

6776-788: The Hungarian Honvéd army, training them for future battles. He debated with Kossuth about how to organize an effective defense of the border, and was forced to accept Kossuth's idea of aligning his units along the border, although he thought that grouping them further back would be a better choice. When, in the middle of December, the Austrian troops under Windisch-Grätz advanced across the Lajta river (the border between Austria and Hungary), Görgei slowly retreated, thus angering Kossuth, who thought that he should fight for every inch of Hungarian territory. Görgei understood that if he would have followed Kossuth's wishes, he would certainly have been crushed by

6930-496: The Hungarian armies: Vác (10 April), Nagysalló (19 April), and Komárom (26 April). The plan was similar to the first part: this time the IInd corps led by General Lajos Aulich, and two brigades led by colonels György Kmety and Lajos Asbóth demonstrated , diverting the attention of Windisch-Grätz from the Ist, IIId, and VIIth corps' pincer maneuver from the northwest, in order to relieve

7084-593: The Hungarian army for political reasons. ) Görgei was forced to put in their place other officers, who were capable soldiers, but were not experienced as army corps leaders, many of them lacking the capacity to act independently when needed. A third problem was that he could not adequately fulfill the duties of being both supreme commander and head of the war ministry at the same time, being forced to move frequently between Pest and his general staff office near Tata . Nevertheless, Görgei decided to attack Haynau's forces, hoping to break them and advance towards Vienna before

7238-543: The Hungarian army. The minimal objective of the Hungarians was to force the Austrians to retreat from the Danube–Tisza Interfluve . During these operations, due to the faults of some of Görgei's corps commanders (György Klapka and András Gáspár ), as well to Windisch-Grätz cautiousness, the latter managed to escape the trap of being surrounded; but nevertheless, because of his defeats at Hatvan (2 April), Tápióbicske (4 April), and Isaszeg (6 April), Windisch-Grätz

7392-400: The Hungarian artillery. Perczel, after his artillery repulsed Jelačić's infantry's attack in the forest, believed that the Austrian main force was there and therefore he has no need to fear an attack from other sides, thus he concentrated all his efforts on the forest. Major Horváth asked Perczel to send the 50. battalion to clear the forest. Perczel decided to send the 4. and 5. companies of

7546-448: The Hungarian border to Pest, can be seen as only partly successful; but this campaign was his first as commander of such a large, the main army of Hungary, being responsible for retreating before the numerically and technologically superior enemy forces without suffering a decisive defeat, having subordinates and the majority of his soldiers who were equally inexperienced. Although, strategically his decisions were not faultless, tactically he

7700-455: The Hungarian capitals. In spite of remonstrations from Kossuth, who wanted him to accept a decisive battle before the Hungarian capitals, Görgei maintained his resolve and retreated to Vác , letting Buda and Pest fall into the hands of the enemy, who entered the cities on 5 January 1849. The Hungarian Committee of National Defense, which temporarily functioned as the executive power in Hungary after

7854-467: The Hungarian corps could be bypassed unseen by the enemy also from the north. According to a post-operation diary written in 1850, Mór lies on the side of Csóka Hill in a narrow valley through which the small Gaja stream flows. The elevated plain on which the country town lies descends on three sides and forms a gentle curve with the opposite slopes of the Sárkány Ridge to the north, which is cut across by

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8008-421: The Hungarian main army led by Artúr Görgei lost the last chance to stop the Austrian armies which were threatening the Hungarian capitals Pest and Buda . As a result of this, the Austrian army led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz occupied on 5 January 1849 Pest and Buda. In the autumn of 1848, the defense of Western Hungary was entrusted to two armies quite far from each other. One of them

8162-416: The Hungarian plains. According to the military historian Róbert Hermann, the one-and-a-half months of Görgei's campaign to the east through northern Hungary was a strategic success, because Görgei prevented Windisch-Grätz from attacking with all his forces towards Debrecen, where the Hungarian government had taken refuge, thus putting an end to the Hungarian revolution, and because he provided enough time for

8316-530: The Hungarian right flank stopped the attempt of encirclement by the advancing Lika border guard battalion. At the same time on the right side of the road to Kisbér, the Ban pushed forward through the forest the 5th Jäger Battalion and the Gradiska Border Guard Battalion. The cavalry and artillery advancing on the road to Kisbér also received such artillery fire from one of the batteries of the Hungarian left wing that it saw better to retreat into

8470-505: The Hungarian struggle for independence. After the Battle of Pákozd of 29 September 1848—in which the Hungarian troops, led by János Móga, defeated the troops of Jelačić, saving the Hungarian capitals—Görgei's 2,500 troops, reinforced by 16,500 peasant militia from Tolna county , observed the movements of the Croatian reinforcements, led by Roth and Philipovich, blocked their retreat, and eventually forced them to surrender. Görgei's superior

8624-412: The Hungarian troops on the right wing and in the center were not involved in the battle. Art%C3%BAr G%C3%B6rgei Artúr Görgei de Görgő et Toporc (born Arthur Görgey ; Hungarian : görgői és toporci Görgei Artúr , German : Arthur Görgey von Görgő und Toporc ; 30 January 1818 – 21 May 1916) was a Hungarian military leader renowned for being one of the greatest generals of

8778-430: The Hungarian troops to cross the Austrian border, decided to personally encourage the Hungarian army. In a war council, the old commanders, led by Móga, declared that an assault on the Austrian border would bring with it a Hungarian defeat, pointing at the numerical superiority of the enemy. Kossuth argued, "Our cause is linked with Vienna – separated from it, nobody will give us any importance." He warned that

8932-459: The Ottoman Empire. The ministry council accepted Görgei's plan, but unfortunately because of his required presence at the council, Görgei was unable to concentrate his troops against Haynau's army, freshly deployed from the northern to the southern banks of the Danube, when they attacked Győr on 28 June. Görgei arrived only at the end of the battle, when it was too late to rescue the situation for

9086-532: The Russians at Világos , thus ending the revolution. Görgei's difficult relationship with Lajos Kossuth , the foremost politician and president-governor of revolutionary Hungary, impacted the course of the war of independence, Görgei's military career, and his post-revolutionary life until his death. During his campaigns in the winter and summer of 1848–1849. Görgei clashed with Kossuth over their differing opinions on military operations and because Görgei disapproved of

9240-571: The VII corps arriving at the battlefield only after the battle ended). The Hungarian officers revolted against the Polish commander and demanded his dismissal and that a Hungarian general be put in his place. Among the generals whom the Hungarian officers would accept as the supreme commander, Görgei was the most popular; and in an officers meeting held in Tiszafüred , in the presence of the government's chief commissary Bertalan Szemere , they elected Görgei as

9394-436: The advice of his more learned officers, decided to accept the battle with the enemy. His decision was allegedly influenced also by the fact that he was informed by the commander of one of his divisions, whose soldiers still had no rifles, Lieutenant Colonel István Szekulits, that if the enemy is not held at Mór, he will not be able to take a comfortable distance from the pursuing enemy, thus they will arrive at Székesfehérvár at

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9548-409: The army himself; but when the corps commanders— György Klapka , Lajos Aulich, János Damjanich —declared that Görgei was the ablest commander for that job, he had to accept it. Thus, Görgei became acting head only a few days before the start of the spring campaign. The plan of the spring campaign had to take into account the fact that the enemy troops were numerically superior to the Hungarians. So, it

9702-523: The army. Following graduation, he served in the Nádor Hussar regiment, undertaking the role of adjutant . By 1837, he had reached the rank of lieutenant and entered the Hungarian Noble Guard at Vienna , where he combined military service with a course of study at the university. In 1845, on his father's death, Görgei happily left the army, feeling that the military life did not suit him, to be

9856-644: The assistant priest-mediator of the 35th Honvéd Battalion, asked the Calvinist pastor to chime the bell for the service, and some of the Honvéds prayed in the church, asking for help from "the God of the Hungarians". Then the Austrian cannons started to roar, signaling that the enemy started its attack. Because of the unexpected attack, the soldiers, in their haste, could not all find their own units, so they mixed up in improvised units, and so they ran out in front of Mór. In front of

10010-409: The battle, Perczel described his position at Mór as on the one hand, I had not to fear of being outflanked, on the other hand, I dominated the whole countryside with my cannons, and finally, the enemy, who had a huge number of cavalry, could not deploy in front of me because of the forest... It is to be noted that the K.u.k. war reports outline that the Hungarian position was very advantageous, but

10164-461: The besieged fortress of Komárom , force the Austrians to retreat from the capitals, and eventually to encircle them. This maneuver resulted in success, except for the encirclement of the enemy troops, which escaped, retreating from all Hungary, except for a strip of land near the Austrian border. These Hungarian successes were achieved despite the changing of the Austrian high command (Alfred Zu Windisch-Grätz, Josip Jelačić, and Ludwig von Welden ) and

10318-422: The bulk of his army around Buda and Pest, to prevent Görgei turning to the west and attacking Vienna, thus preventing the Austrians from attacking the provisional capital of Debrecen, and providing time for the Hungarian troops east of Tisza to reorganize. He also sent needed money and ore supplies from mining towns such as Körmöcbánya , Selmecbánya , and Besztercebánya to Debrecen. Another of Görgei's goals

10472-457: The command of Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz . Perczel was threatened by an attack from the south and west, by two army corps, each of about 6,000 men. The enemy invasion was not long in coming. On 14 December, Lieutenant General Balthasar von Simunich's division launched an attack at the Nádas Pass, the northernmost point of the Hungarian line, and on 16 December the attack of

10626-412: The command; Görgei refused. In the end, Móga remained the commander during the Battle of Schwechat , where the Austrian troops of Windisch-Grätz and Jelačić routed the Hungarian army, which was composed mainly of inexperienced national guards and peasants. Görgei led the advance guard and achieved some success, but the lack of experience of the soldiers and the commanders made all his actions useless, and

10780-413: The commander-in-chief, with their decision ratified by Szemere. When Kossuth heard about this, he was angered and rushed to the military camp, thinking that Görgei was its organizer and declaring that he would order Görgei executed for this revolt. But when he arrived at Tiszafüred and saw that the majority of the officers supported Görgei, Kossuth was forced to accept the situation. However, he declared that

10934-550: The concentration of the Hungarian forces behind the Tisza river, clearing the Szepes region of enemy troops, and thus securing with this the whole territory between Szeged and the Galician border as a Hungarian hinterland from which a future counterattack could be launched. During his retreat, he fought five notable battles, of which he lost two (Szélakna on 21 January 1849, and Hodrusbánya on

11088-421: The crossing of the main Hungarian forces at Cibakháza , forcing the Austrian commander to take a defensive position, and thus ceding the initiative to the Hungarians before the start of their Spring Campaign. At the end of March 1849, Görgei was named as acting commander by Kossuth because Vetter had fallen ill. Before this, Kossuth again hesitated, trying to find somebody else, even thinking of taking command of

11242-568: The defeat of Jelačić's army, the people of Vienna revolted , forcing the emperor to flee to Olmütz . The Hungarian troops led by János Móga, who had defeated Jelačić at Pákozd, advanced to the Hungarian–Austrian border; and many people thought that it should come to the aid of the revolutionaries in the imperial capital, which was at that time defended only by the troops of Jelačić. The Hungarian officers, many of whom were foreign and unsure of what to do, said that they would agree to this only if

11396-514: The defeat of the revolution, in 1851, Görgei received an award and 40 Hungarian pengős , as an honorarium, from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for his achievements in chemistry during the two and a half years he worked in this field. In March 1848, during the early days of the Hungarian revolution, Görgei was in Vienna and Prague, preparing to marry Adéle Aubouin, a French- Huguenot girl, who

11550-420: The disadvantages of the army's deployment at Mór: The position at Mór is not favorable, it has no advantage for defense, and is [also] dangerous against an enemy who advances out of the forest from the direction of Kisbér, as he can surround the position from all sides . He considered the army's position particularly dangerous because of the forest within a cannon shot distance towards Kisbér, because this forest

11704-461: The edge of the forest. The vanguard of the Grammont Brigade which marched ahead on the morning of 30 December, and the Lieutenant-Colonel squadron of the Banderial (the Ban's) Hussars Regiment led by Colonel Sermage, struck Perczel's outposts beyond Sárkány at about 8 o'clock, and then, emerging from the woods north of Mór, drove back Perczel's advance guard. The Hungarian sappers retreated to

11858-463: The enemy, to the Hungarian camp in the fortified Győr. Görgei's hussars defeated the enemy units advancing with overconfidence in a rearguard action in the Battle of Moson , and therefore Windisch-Grätz decided not to launch a frontal attack against the Hungarian army, but to surround it. But this took time, so between 19 and 26 December Görgei won some time to organize his troops in Győr. Lajos Kossuth ,

12012-537: The enlistment period of the Hungarian national guards would expire soon; and if they did not engage the Austrians, they would go home without any fighting. He also said that if only one of the Hungarian commanders would say that he would attack, showing a plan by which success could be achieved, he would make that person the commander. At that moment Görgei stood up and said, "We have no other choice than to advance because if we do not advance, we will lose more than losing three battles." Hearing that, Kossuth wanted to give him

12166-402: The failure to make the best of this opportunity because, wrongly thinking that Gáspár had already begun to attack, he did not urge his general on. Also playing an important role in the liberation of the country were the troops of Józef Bem , who liberated Transylvania , and Mór Perczel, who liberated much of southern Hungary, except for Croatia . However, Görgei was the commander who achieved

12320-551: The final decision about who would be the commander would be announced after he presented the facts to the Parliament. In Debrecen, Kossuth and his political supporters ignored the wishes of the Hungarian generals to name Görgei and designated Antal Vetter as commander-in-chief. On 8 March, by way of consolation, Görgei was decorated with the Second Class Military Order of Merit. In the middle of March, Vetter planned

12474-414: The first decisions of the new commander was to order many of the Hungarian units, under the lead of Görgei and Klapka, to retreat, enabling the Austrian troops of General Franz Schlik to escape from their encirclement. On 25–27 February 1849, Dembiński, after making mistake after mistake, lost the Battle of Kápolna (in which Görgei's VII corps could not participate; because of Dembiński's poor deployment,

12628-409: The foreign or wavering officers and soldiers to remain with the army, halting its dissolution, and to defend Hungary with all determination. After the proclamation, Görgei chose to retreat eastward, through the northern Gömör-Szepes Ore and Tátra mountain ranges, and to conduct operations on his own initiative, forcing the Austrian commander Windisch-Grätz to send troops in pursuit as well as keep

12782-455: The fortress and move with the bulk of his troops to southern Hungary, to the confluence of the rivers Maros and Tisza. Görgei thought this new plan completely wrong: that the region which they wanted to concentrate the troops was completely racked by the war, that the most important fortress of the region, Temesvár was in the hands of the enemy, and that this retreat would provide enough time for Haynau and Paskevich to unite their forces against

12936-409: The four companies advanced, they came within range of the Hungarian artillery, and the gunners, unwilling to fire on their own infantry, ceased fire. Jelačić used this opportunity to push forward a battery on the road to Kisbér. The Hungarian infantry companies advanced in the woods, but there, being caught in the crossfire of the superior enemy infantry and the aforementioned battery, and as a result of

13090-448: The government for the recent defeats and the evacuation of the capitals, but also declared that he, along with his army, would not put down their weapons and that he would fight with all his energy and power against the imperials to defend the Hungarian revolution and the April laws . This proclamation was seen at once by Kossuth as a revolt against his authority, but it convinced the majority of

13244-403: The grape harvest is the annual Wine Days of Mor festival, usually occurring in late September or early October. For one week each year, the town's population explodes to support this rural festival that highlights local culture. It includes the selection of a "Wine Princess" who oversees the festival, a multi-national parade celebrating Hungary's equestrian roots as well as the local wine culture,

13398-623: The greatest success by defeating the main Austrian army—which constituted the most experienced, and best-equipped forces of the Austrian Empire, and had Austria's best as its commanders—forcing them to retreat from the most developed central and western parts of the country, including the capitals. Görgei achieved his successes with a numerically and technologically inferior army (47,500 Hungarian soldiers, having 198   cannons, vs 55,000 Austrian soldiers with 214   cannons and rockets), which lacked heavy cavalry (relying almost completely on

13552-442: The harsh winter, marching in the mountains, several times Görgei and his troops escaped encirclement by the Austrian troops (at one point escaping by opening a formerly closed mine tunnel and passing through it to the other side of a mountain). Then, on 5 February 1849, they broke through the mountain pass of Branyiszkó , defeated General Deym in the Battle of Branyiszkó , and united with the Hungarian troops led by György Klapka on

13706-452: The imperial army's imminent attack. While he waited for the attack, which ultimately came on 14 December 1848, Görgei reorganized his army, sending home the national guards and the peasant militias—who had been the first to flee from the Schwechat battlefield and were deemed ineffective in fighting against the well trained, professional imperial army—and increased the number of the battalions of

13860-433: The initial attempt to break through was unsuccessful, causing the Hungarian infantry heavy casualties. During the spring campaign, Görgei's tactical outlook changed drastically, from being an extremely cautious commander who planned for slow, calculated movements, to a general full of energy, quick in action and ready to take risks if necessary to achieve his goals. Görgei understood that the main cause of Dembiński's failure

14014-418: The last letter. Being of noble birth, initially, Görgei had a "y" at the end of his surname; but during the 1848–49 revolution, a period of an anti-nobiliary reaction, many Hungarians from noble families changed the last letter of their surnames from "y" to "i". For example, the renowned novelist Mór Jókay became Mór Jókai . Görgei similarly changed his name, because of his progressive liberal views. Even after

14168-445: The light Hussar cavalry), and having relatively very few soldiers fighting in the other types of units common in the armies of that period ( chasseurs , grenadiers , lancer cavalry, dragoons , cuirassiers ), and with constant shortages of weapons and ammunition. Several times these shortages caused the Hungarian infantry to not engage in long shooting duels with the Austrians, but to employ bayonet charges , which were repeated if

14322-405: The main Russian forces arrived. This plan was maybe the only rational way to end—if not with full success, but with at least a compromise—this war against overwhelmingly superior enemy forces. The place for the Hungarian concentration, the fortress of Komárom (one of the strongest fortresses of the empire), was the best choice, if they wanted to have a chance of success, and avoid having to retreat to

14476-414: The main Russian troops led by Paskevich arrived from the north. Despite an initial victory in the Battle of Csorna on 13 June, his troops were not so successful afterwards. In the next battle, fought at Zsigárd on 16 June 1849, while he was in the capital to participate in the meeting of the ministry council, his troops were defeated; his presence on the battlefield could have brought a better result. In

14630-412: The main force, some 3,000 paces opposite the forest. Jelačić saw the Hungarians' position as very advantageous. Therefore, he decided that since he only had three infantry battalions at his disposal, to halt the troops of Grammont in the forest outside the Hungarian firing line, and sent orders to Ottinger to hurry with his cavalry as fast as possible, and to Hartlieb to hurry up as well. Jelačić's plan

14784-499: The main imperial forces began on the right bank of the Danube . The much superior enemy broke through at several points the Hungarian brigades deployed in a thin line and advanced unhindered towards the town of Győr . Thanks to the vigilance of individual brigade commanders and the helpfulness of the local Hungarian population, most of the separated troops, with longer or shorter detours, made their way, without being captured or destroyed by

14938-457: The main road. The hills surrounding the valley are covered with forest, from which the highway emerges about a thousand paces away from the village. Only one side of the Csóka hill is planted with vines. The exit from the forested gorge on the side of Sárkány can be therefore hit [with cannons] even more effectively from the Mór hill. The enemy, however, did not tie himself to the road, as the forest to

15092-432: The march of the bulk of the Ban's army from a mile distance, closed by Hartlieb's division and the artillery reserve, also at a distance of a mile, an hour and a half of walking. Jelačić had also ordered the 3rd Dragoon Regiment to the vanguard, but they received the order late due to a mistake and did not appear on the battlefield until after the Ottinger Brigade had arrived. The Hungarian troops were assembled at 6 a.m. in

15246-406: The market square of Mór, where they "were shivering from the cold" until 7 a.m. The cold is emphasized by all those former soldiers who wrote recollections about the battle, and there is no doubt that the hour of unnecessary waiting did not help the morale of the soldiers. At 7 o'clock the order came for everyone to return to their quarters, which caused discontent. At half past eight, György Halászi,

15400-447: The mounds east of Sárkány. He had about 6,000 soldiers at that time, because the other 4,000 or so, were marching in another direction toward Buda and Pest . According to historian József Bánlaky, Perczel's troops also included a small detachment from Görgei's Army of the Upper Danube. On the 29th, Kossuth ordered Görgei to clash with Windisch-Grätz's main army. He outlined a purely illusory battle plan: he demanded that Görgeit defend

15554-414: The much superior imperial army (he had 28,000 inexperienced soldiers against Windisch-Grätz's 55,000 imperial troops). On 30 December 1848, at Kossuth's urging and before Görgei arrived, Mór Perczel engaged and was heavily defeated by imperial troops led by Josip Jelačić in the Battle of Mór , thus leaving Görgei alone in a hopeless struggle against a vastly superior Austrian army. Görgei's retreat from

15708-538: The next battle, at Pered , fought at 20–21 June, he was present; but, despite all his efforts, the intervention on Haynau's behalf of a Russian division of more than 12,000 soldiers led by Lieutenant General Fyodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin decided the fate of this engagement. On 26 June Görgei was again in the capital at a ministry council, and tried to convince Kossuth to concentrate all the Hungarian troops, except those from Transylvania and southern Hungary, around Komárom, to decisively strike against Haynau's troops, before

15862-453: The northern part of Transdanubia from the enemy invasion. The best way to do this seemed to be the plan of Perczel's troops to join Görgei's army in Győr. However, Perczel did not arrive in Győr. He did not hurry in a straight line to Győr, but when he retreated from Lendva , made a detour to Körmend , and then headed for Devecser instead of Pápa , losing about two days, but even following

16016-413: The offensive against the Austrian frontier, contenting himself with besieging Buda , the Hungarian capital, taking the castle of Buda on 21 May 1849 instead of attacking Vienna and using that strategic opportunity, which the Hungarian victories from the spring campaign created, to win the war. Some of the representatives of the new generation of Hungarian historians, such as Róbert Hermann, believe that

16170-426: The officers expressed their fear that Windisch-Grätz would prevent them from attacking with some counter-order, Jelačić vowed to lead them against the enemy, to reach Perczel, he added with a laugh, even if I have to chase him to Asia . Then he raised his glass: To our victory! To those who will stand out in battle tomorrow. Jelačić, therefore, gave his officers the next day's marching orders. Colonel Ullrich with

16324-566: The overwhelmed Hungarian forces (17,000 Hungarians against 70,000 Austro-Russian soldiers); but he managed nevertheless to successfully cover their retreat towards Komárom, by personally leading hussar charges against the advancing enemy forces. After learning about the defeat at Győr , and the advance of the main Russian forces led by Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich from the north, the Hungarian government—following Kossuth's lead in another ministry council, held this time without Görgei—abandoned Görgei's plan of concentration and ordered him to abandon

16478-411: The panic of the volunteers, who started to flee, decided the battle's outcome. Görgei successfully protected the retreating Hungarians, preventing a complete rout. On 9 October, after the battle of Schwechat, Görgei was named colonel. On 1 November, Görgei, only 32, was named general and appointed commander of the army of the Upper Danube, being charged with protecting Hungary's western frontier against

16632-513: The people of Vienna asked them to do it; but the Viennese revolutionaries were reluctant to officially ask for Hungarian aid. In the meantime, the Austrian commander Windisch-Grätz , having crushed the revolution in Prague, came with his army to Vienna to crush the revolution there, with an overwhelming numerical superiority (80,000 Austrian soldiers against 27,000 Hungarians). Kossuth, waiting in vain for

16786-513: The portfolio of minister of war, while retaining the command of the troops in the field. Meanwhile, at the parliament in Debrecen , Kossuth formally proposed the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty , which the parliament accepted, declaring the total independence of Hungary on 14 April 1849. Although he did not oppose it when Kossuth divulged his plan at Gödöllő after the battle of Isaszeg, Görgei

16940-646: The position of leadership necessary to start talks with the Habsburgs; but the Peace Party refused to help him, fearing a military dictatorship. So, he abandoned this plan. However, Görgei was wrong when he thought that the Hungarian Declaration of Independence had caused the Russian intervention when it came, because the Austrians had asked for, and the Czar agreed to, Russia's sending troops to Hungary before learning of

17094-435: The praise of the enemy's position and strength was a constant topos of the imperial war report writers and served no other purpose than to make the victories won over the "rebels" even more “magnificent”. Lieutenant General Jelačić's I. Corps, which formed the right wing of Windisch-Grätz's army that attacked Hungary on 16 December, had several parts which before the battle, were stationed in various locations. On 29 December,

17248-547: The presence in it of decanoic acid and lauric acid . He started his research in the spring of 1847 in Prague but finished the experiments at home in Toporc, sending the results to the Imperial and Royal Academy of Vienna on 21 May 1848. His method for the separation of the fatty acids homologs was not the traditional way of using fractional distillation , but instead using the solubility of barium salts. His research can be summarized as follows: Just before Görgei started his study,

17402-461: The presence in southern Hungary of the 15,000-strong Austrian troops led by Josip Jelačić, which might come north by surprise to help the garrison of Buda, threatened to cut Hungary in two; and only the liberation of Buda could diminish this danger. Kossuth also urged Görgei to take the capital; he hoped that such a success would convince the European powers to recognize Hungary's independence, and prevent

17556-445: The reasons for his actions, Perczel accepted his plans and ostensibly pardoned, but continued to resent, him. On 7 October 1848, thanks to Görgei's plans, Roth's and Philipovich's Croatian troops were forced to surrender at Ozora , the Hungarians taking almost 9,000 prisoners, together with their weapons and ammunition, including 12 guns; this being the most successful pincer maneuver of the Hungarian freedom war. On 6 October, after

17710-468: The region to observe and capture the envoys and supply carriages sent from Croatia to Jelačić and back. On 29 September, the Croatian ban sent the wealthy pro-Habsburg Hungarian noble, Count Ödön Zichy , to inform the commanders of the Croatian reserve troops, led by Major General Karl Roth and Major General Nicolaus Philippovich von   Philippsberg, about his decision to attack the Hungarian capitals of Buda and Pest . Görgei's troops captured Zichy, who

17864-527: The renewed assaults of the enemy infantry, they were forced to retreat from the forest. In repulsing the Hungarian attack, the 5th Jäger Battalion particularly distinguished itself. The two companies of the 35th Battalion retreated in relative order, while the two companies of the 50th Battalion were partly broken up and partly captured during the retreat. The latter two companies, which retreated (or rather ran) in small groups, could only be partially reorganized; their soldiers made their way toward Mór. For now,

18018-580: The resignation of the Batthyány government on 2 October 1848, retreated to Debrecen . This retreat had a negative effect on the officers of foreign origin in the Hungarian army, who left in great numbers, which threatened to cause the army's total dissolution. On 5 January 1849, in Vác, irritated by these events and blaming his defeats on the government's interference, Görgei issued the Proclamation of Vác, which blamed

18172-399: The revolution made him change his noble surname from Görgey to Görgei. He first met Kossuth on 30 August 1848, when he proposed building a factory to produce percussion caps and primers, for which the politician promised to obtain funds. In August 1848, the danger of an imperial attack against Hungary grew day by day. Finally, at the beginning of September, King Ferdinand   V of Hungary,

18326-577: The revolution was suppressed, he kept using Görgei instead of Görgey; and although in some works which appeared after his death, and translations to Hungarian of his works—such as Mein Leben und Wirken in Ungarn in den Jahren 1848 und 1849 [My life and work in Hungary in 1848 and 1849], translated by his younger brother István Görgey in 1911, when the Görgey form is used—Görgei was the preferred form until his death, which

18480-526: The right flank, the 47th Home Army Battalion took up position, which was led by Major Ferenc Meszéna, the Chief of the General Staff. On the north side of the vineyard north of Mór, two seven-pounder howitzers and a six-pounder gun were deployed under the command of Lieutenant Mike. Behind them were 4 companies of the 47th Battalion; the other two companies took a position in the stone-fenced tavern from Átk, which

18634-409: The right, the 50th and on the left the 35th Honvéd battalions were positioned. In the second line took place the 66th Honvéd Battalion, 3 companies of the I. (Imperial) Hussars, 2 companies of the 9. (Nicholas) Hussars, and 8 guns of the 6th Cavalry Battery. This is probably also the place where the sappers retreated. Perczel had also two one-pounder guns, which were supposedly in reserve. A company of

18788-461: The robbery. This claim seemed more plausible, as both suspects had criminal records, and the witness reports seemed to fit their likeness; a month later, however, police major László Ferenczi admitted that all evidence in the case was indirect, and that the DNA tests failed to bring a result. The two men were arraigned, found guilty and sentenced between 2004 and 2006. In February 2007, however, events took

18942-429: The same time. Perczel, however, failed to reconnoiter the enemy's forces, and similarly failed to inform Görgei about his plan to fight Jelačić. He did not inform even the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel János Horváth, sent by Görgei to maintain contact between their armies, who only learned of the battle from the sound of the cannonade. According to the memoirs of Major General Ferenc Meszéna, he warned Perczel of

19096-462: The sending of reinforcement troops under Ludwig von Wohlgemuth from the Austrian hereditary provinces to Hungary. The spring campaign led by Artúr Görgei, combined with the successes of the Hungarian armies in the other fronts, forced the armies of the Austrian Empire and its allies, which at the beginning of March had controlled three-quarters of Hungary, to evacuate almost all of Hungary, except for

19250-475: The settlement that morning with 8,000-10,000 men (according to other sources, 8,000 infantry, 600-800 cavalry and 24 guns) and marched to Mór. Major General Zeisberg, the Corps Chief of Staff, suggested Jelačić to attack the enemy. Jelačić, who had set up his headquarters in the castle owned by Kázmér Batthyány (one of the most radical Hungarian politicians) in Kisbér, apparently inspired by his earlier success in

19404-417: The siege of Buda was not a mistake by Görgei because at that point he had not enough troops to attack towards Vienna because the Austrians had concentrated around Pozsony a fresh army that was two times the size of Görgei's, and also far better equipped. To achieve a victory with his tired troops, who had almost completely run out of ammunition, would have been virtually impossible. Görgei hoped that, while he

19558-767: The title: Über die festen, flüchtigen, fetten Säuren des Cocusnussöles [About the solid, volatile, fatty acids of coconut oil] (Sitzungsberichte der mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Classe der k. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien [Meeting reports of the mathematical and scientific department of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna]. 1848. 3.H. p.   208–227); by Justus von Liebig in Heidelberg ( Annalen der Chemie und Pharmazie . 1848. 66. Bd. 3.H. p.   290–314); and again, more than 50 years later, by Lajos Ilosvay in 1907 in

19712-438: The town, the troops were put in order. Hungarian army : Right wing Center Commander's guards Left wing Reserve Total Austrian army : Grammont brigade Infantry 2936 Cavalry Artillery Brigade total Ottinger brigade Cavalry Artillery Total The Hungarian troops were deployed north of Mór along the road to Kisbér, in two lines: a mixture of hussars, infantry and cannons. On

19866-464: The troops ordered from Bácska and Bánság could only join Görgei's army, only at the end of December or the beginning of January when he already retreated in Budapest . Kossuth also intended Perczel's corps as such a reinforcement, on 16 December when the news of Simunich's attack arrived. Both Kossuth and Görgei hoped that the latter's and Perczel's armies, in cooperation with each other, could defend

20020-574: The two survivors died in the hospital the following day. The case was not only notable for the brutality shown by the perpetrators, but also for the police confusion that followed: four days after the incident, police claimed that they had apprehended the two gunmen, Szilárd Horváth (who voluntarily gave himself up) and Róbert Farkas ; the claim turned out to be false, however, as Horváth proved his alibi, and Farkas turned out to be an unlikely suspect as well. On 22 July police arrested Ede Kaiser and László Hajdú , who were also suspected to have committed

20174-429: The west of it was very sparse and could be traversed with little effort by artillery, and, moreover, the position from Mór was dominated from the opposite heights. So it wasn't hard to calculate that such a position was almost undefendable... According to an officer, The hills and forests to the west of the city were ceded to the imperialists, [thus] our whole army stretched like an open book [in front of them] along

20328-436: The winter to organize and increase the army. This would have been crucial for the defense of the country, because, for example, nearly a third of Perczel's army was completely unarmed, and more than a third of Görgei's army was made up of fresh recruits who had not yet held a rifle in their hands. The opposing Austrian imperial army was much superior, both in numbers and in training. Görgei faced an army of nearly 55,000 men under

20482-402: The woods until the Ottinger Brigade arrived. In addition to this, the bridge at the edge of the forest was held under crossfire by the Hungarian artillery, but only here could the K.u.K. artillery break out of the forest. About the actions of the Grammont Brigade's infantry battery, both the Austrian and the Hungarian sources are silent, probably because they could not give a successful answer to

20636-410: Was 10-20 paces from them. The left wing was positioned in front of a hill pass at Timár, opposite the portion of the forest from where Perczel expected the Austrians to attack. On the left flank, led by Colonel András Gáspár , in the first line, in front of the infantry, the 7 guns of the infantry battery, divided into two half-batteries; behind them, next to the town, in line with the city center, on

20790-412: Was General Mór Perczel , a nobleman with almost no military experience, who lacked Görgei's knowledge of the theory and practice of warfare. Seeing that some of Perczel's orders were wrong and could allow for the escape of the enemy, Görgei gave contradictory orders to his troops. Perczel became angry and wanted to put Görgei in front of a firing squad; but when the latter explained to the officers' council

20944-533: Was against dethronement because he thought that this would provoke the Austrians into asking for Russian intervention. He thought that declining to demand dethronement and using the significant military successes he had achieved as arguments in an eventual negotiation with the Austrians might convince them to recognize Hungary's autonomy under the rule of the House of Habsburg, and the April Laws of 1848. He believed that this

21098-470: Was charged with treason for his pro-Austrian activities, court-martialed , and hanged. This bold act of Görgei impressed Kossuth, who saw in him a great future leader of the Hungarian armed forces, promoting the 30-year-old major to the rank of general. Later, when a conflict between the two arose, Kossuth tried to prevent Görgei from becoming the leader of the main Hungarian forces because he saw him as his greatest opponent; this conflict caused difficulties in

21252-407: Was conducting the siege of Buda, new Hungarian troops would be conscripted, the Hungarian generals who were operating in southern Hungary would send him reinforcements, the issue of lack of ammunition would be resolved; and that then he would have a chance to defeat the Austrian troops. He also knew that the castle of Buda had a 5,000-strong Austrian garrison that controlled the only stone bridge across

21406-522: Was decided to defeat them in detail . The plan was that the VIIth Hungarian Corps would feint to divert the attention of the Austrian commanders, while the other three Hungarian army corps (the Ist, the IInd, and the IIIrd) would advance from the south, getting around the enemy, and fall on their rear, forcing them to retreat over the Danube, leaving the Hungarian capitals (Pest and Buda) in the hands of

21560-406: Was forced to retreat from the interfluve, taking refuge in the Hungarian capitals. In two of these battles (Tápióbicske and Isaszeg), the intervention of Görgei on the battlefield, who spoke personally to the hesitant Klapka, ordering him to hold his position and to counterattack, decided the battle for the Hungarians. The second part of the spring campaign resulted in three important successes for

21714-419: Was happening down there on the battlefield.". On the mound near the road to Kisbér, were placed 6 guns of the six-pounder infantry battery , behind them a detachment of 34 of the 5th (Radetzky) Hussars, and a company of the 9th (Miklós) Hussars. The position of the battery was not particularly advantageous either: according to one soldier, the enemy cavalry coming from the left flank could only be spotted when it

21868-475: Was later assigned to go to Istanbul and Smyrna (today İzmir ) to buy weapons for the newly conscripted Hungarian troops; but soon it became clear that their merchants were not trustworthy. Instead, Görgei was sent to the state factory at Wiener Neustadt to buy percussion caps and to Prague to buy primers from the Sellier & Bellot factory; he accomplished this mission successfully. The egalitarian ideals of

22022-422: Was mostly successful. The maximal goal of defending the border and repulsing the enemy was impossible to achieve, even if Perczel's troops would have joined him at Győr. He managed to accomplish the minimal goal, that of saving his troops from destruction at the hands of the superior forces of Windisch-Grätz. He suffered only two defeats that can be deemed important—at Nagyszombat on 16 December, and at Bábolna on

22176-457: Was on the right side of the road to Vértesnána. A hussar platoon was detached to secure the right flank. On the right edge of the center, personally commanded by Perczel, was deployed the 48th Honvéd Battalion, and to the left of it the detached Bereg company. The position of the 48th ( Szabolcs ) Battalion was so concealed from the left flank that the memoirs of one of the soldiers recalled that "we could neither see nor hear anything of what

22330-516: Was one of the greatest Hungarian military successes of the war. Görgei was not in sympathy with the new regime, and he had refused the First Class Military Order of Merit for the taking of Buda, and also Kossuth's offer of a field-marshal's baton, saying that he did not deserve these and did not approve of the greed of many soldiers and officers for rank and decorations, wanting to set an example for his subordinates. However, he accepted

22484-605: Was plotting against him...), and considered anyone who did not think the same as he did a traitor. So practically he taught that everyone was a traitor. Besides, he became a commander of an army corps with no military training, thanks to the fact that he was a radical politician and a former police chief. Unfortunately, his unsuitability as a reliable general has been repeatedly demonstrated, and in addition to his great victories, he has been defeated repeatedly because of his disappointing mistakes. At dawn on 27 December, Görgei evacuated Győr and moved his troops in several columns towards

22638-478: Was seriously worried by the abandoning of Győr. Thus, in increasingly impatient letters, he demanded Görgei to confront the enemy. In the meantime, Perczel's army reached Kisbér on 28 December, and on 29 December it retreated through the Strait of Sárkány (Dragon) to Mór. On the night of 29 December, Perczel positioned his army on the heights from Mór, on both sides of the road from Sárkány, and set up his outposts on

22792-641: Was the Army of Upper Danube of about 28,000, led by Major General Artúr Görgei , deployed from the Nádas Pass in the Little Carpathians to the southern shore of Lake Fertő . Major General Mór Perczel had about 9-10 000 soldiers stationed along the Mura river , keeping an eye on the enemy who was preparing to invade Hungary from Croatia and Styria . The Hungarian political and military leadership hoped that there would be no enemy attacks in 1848 so that they could use

22946-473: Was the lady companion of a maiden relative of Redtenbacher. Görgei married her in the Lutheran church in Prague. After he finished his research in chemistry at his home at Toporc, he went to Pest, hearing about the 17 May 1848 call of the Hungarian government for decommissioned officers to join the newly established Hungarian army. He was conscripted into the revolutionary honvéd (army) at the rank of captain, with

23100-449: Was the latter's extreme cautiousness, which prevented him from concentrating his troops before the Battle of Kápolna. Fearful of being encircled, Dembiński had deployed his units so far from each other that they could not support each other when attacked. Görgei started the spring campaign as a mature commander, who let his corps commanders (János Damjanich, Lajos Aulich, György Klapka, András Gáspár) make independent decisions while following

23254-543: Was the leader of the victorious Spring Campaign and liberated almost all of Western Hungary from Austrian occupation. In recognition of his military successes, he was awarded by the Hungarian Government and was appointed Minister of War. In the last days of the revolution, he was appointed the " dictator " of Hungary . On 13 August 1849, when he realised that he would not be able to fight newly arrived and superior Austrian and Russian armies, he surrendered his troops to

23408-545: Was the only choice to convince the Habsburgs not to ask Russia's help against Hungary, which he thought would cause destruction and national tragedy. Preventing Russian intervention is why Görgei attempted to initiate secret talks with the Hungarian Peace Party (who were in favor of a compromise with the Austrians), to help him stage a coup d'état to overthrow Kossuth and the Hungarian government led by Szemere, to achieve

23562-417: Was to break through the Hungarian right flank with his infantry, cut off the Hungarian retreat, and attack the Hungarian left flank with his cavalry. Meanwhile, Major General Zeisberg, the Ban's Chief of Staff, observed the enemy positions. Jelačić slowly pushed his infantry forward in the forest, and on the road to Kisbér he tried to advance his artillery and the banderial hussars, but the six-pounder gun on

23716-411: Was to relieve the border fortress of Lipótvár from an enemy siege and to take the defenders and the provisions from this fort to Debrecen; but he saw that this would be too risky, due to the danger of encirclement by the enemy. So, he renounced this plan, and Lipótvár was forced to surrender to the Austrians on 2 February 1849. Despite this, he succeeded in accomplishing other goals mentioned earlier. In

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