Misplaced Pages

#950049

70-498: The Matochkin Strait is one of the largest fjords in the world. The banks along the strait are high and steep. Its length is approximately 100 kilometres (60 mi) and its width in its narrowest part is approximately 600 metres (660 yd). The strait is covered with ice for most of the year. There are abandoned fishing settlements along the strait (Matochkin Shar, Stolbovoy). The Tsar Bomba

140-471: A warhead weighing 75 tonnes (83 short tons ). For a comparative assessment, the weight of the warhead tested in 1964 by the UR-500 ICBM was 14 tonnes (15 short tons). The development of new designs of nuclear and thermonuclear ammunition requires testing. The operability of the device, its safety in emergency situations, and the calculated energy release during an explosion must be confirmed. The bomb

210-548: A 50% chance of surviving the test. The bomb, weighing 27 tonnes (30 short tons), was so large (8 m (26 ft) long by 2.1 m (6 ft 11 in) in diameter) that the Tu-95V had to have its bomb bay doors and fuselage fuel tanks removed. The bomb was attached to an 800-kilogram (1,800 lb), 1,600-square-metre (17,000 sq ft) parachute , which gave the release and observer planes time to fly about 45 km (28 mi) away from ground zero , giving them

280-589: A 50 percent chance of survival. The bomb was released two hours after takeoff from a height of 10,500 m (34,449 ft) on a test target within Sukhoy Nos . The Tsar Bomba detonated at 11:32 (or 11:33; USGS earthquake monitors list the event as occurring at 11:33:31 ) Moscow Time on 30 October 1961, over the Mityushikha Bay nuclear testing range (Sukhoy Nos Zone C), at a height of 4,200 m (13,780 ft) ASL (4,000 m (13,123 ft) above

350-600: A heavy, concentrated load, the Tu-95 bomber carrying the Tsar Bomba needed to have its engines, bomb bay, suspension and release mechanisms extensively redesigned. The Tsar Bomba's dimensional and weight drawings were passed in the first half of 1955, together with its placement layout drawing. The Tsar Bomba's weight accounted for 15% of the weight of its Tu-95 carrier as expected. The carrier, aside from having its fuel tanks and bomb bay doors removed, had its BD-206 bomb-holder replaced by

420-478: A large amount of radioactive fallout; nevertheless, it can be assumed that Tsar Bomba was relatively clean – more than 97% of the explosion power was provided by a thermonuclear fusion reaction, which does not create a significant amount of radioactive contamination. A 2015 expedition measuring the glaciers of Novaya Zemlya reported 65–130 times more radioactivity than the background in neighboring areas, due to nuclear testing, including Tsar Bomba. Andrei Sakharov

490-558: A length of 8 m (26 ft), weighing 26 tonnes (29 short tons) with a parachute system and structurally coordinated with the Tu-95 -202 carrier aircraft specially converted for its use. On 6 June 1956, the NII-1011 report described the RDS-202 thermonuclear device with a design power of up to 38 Mt (159 PJ) with the required task of 20–30 Mt (84–126 PJ). In reality, this device

560-524: A new, heavier beam-type BD7-95-242 (or BD-242) holder attached directly to the longitudinal weight-bearing beams. The problem of how to release the bomb was also solved; the bomb-holder would release all three of its locks in a synchronous fashion via electro-automatic mechanisms as required by safety protocols. A Joint Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers (Nr. 357-28ss)

630-566: A series of subcritical hydronuclear experiments with up to 100 grams (3.5 oz) of weapon-grade plutonium each. 73°23′19″N 55°12′56″E  /  73.38861°N 55.21556°E  / 73.38861; 55.21556 This Arkhangelsk Oblast location article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Tsar Bomba The Tsar Bomba (Russian: Царь-бомба , romanized : Tsar'-bomba , IPA: [t͡sarʲ ˈbombə] , lit.   ' Tsar bomb ' ; code name : Ivan or Vanya ), also known by

700-521: A short and intense flash lasting around 1 millisecond, followed by a second much more prolonged and less intense emission of light taking a fraction of a second to several seconds to build up. This signature, with a double intensity maximum, is characteristic of atmospheric nuclear explosions and is the result of the Earth's atmosphere becoming opaque to visible light and transparent again as the explosion's shock wave travels through it. The effect occurs because

770-432: A uranium-238 fusion tamper (which greatly amplifies the fusion reaction by fissioning uranium atoms with fast neutrons from the fusion reaction). This eliminated fast fission by the fusion-stage neutrons so that approximately 97% of the total yield resulted from thermonuclear fusion alone (as such, it was one of the "cleanest" nuclear bombs ever created, generating a very low amount of fallout relative to its yield). There

SECTION 10

#1732851787951

840-475: Is the two necessary fission trigger. The second stage was two relatively small thermonuclear charges with a calculated contribution to the explosion of 1.5 Mt (6 PJ), which were used for radiation implosion of the third stage, the main thermonuclear module located between them, and starting a thermonuclear reaction in it, contributing 50 Mt of explosion energy. As a result of the thermonuclear reaction, huge numbers of high-energy fast neutrons were formed in

910-607: The Tsar Cannon and the Tsar Bell , both of which were created as showpieces but whose large size made them impractical for actual use. The name "Tsar Bomba" does not seem to have been used for the weapon prior to the 1990s. The name "Kuzka's Mother" was inspired by the statement of Khrushchev to then US Vice President Richard Nixon : "We have funds at our disposal that will have dire consequences for you. We will show you Kuzka's mother!" The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) designated

980-577: The first secretary of the Communist Party , announced the upcoming tests of a 50-Mt bomb in his opening report at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 17 October 1961. Before the official announcement, in a casual conversation, he told an American politician about the bomb, and this information was published on 8 September 1961, in The New York Times . The Tsar Bomba

1050-450: The mesosphere when it peaked. The cap of the mushroom cloud had a peak width of 95 km (59 mi) and its base was 40 km (25 mi) wide. A Soviet cameraman said: The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in

1120-583: The Ministry of Medium Machine Building dated 23 May 1957). The CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a draft Joint Resolution on 12 March 1956, on the preparation and testing of izdeliye 202 , which read: Adopt a draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the preparation and testing of izdeliye 202 . Paragraphs required for inclusion in

1190-448: The Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee) and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on the preparation and testing of the 202 product was adopted. The project planned to develop a version of the RDS-37 with a capacity of 30 Mt (126 PJ). RDS-202 was designed with a maximum calculated power release of 50 Mt (209 PJ), with a diameter of 2.1 m (6 ft 11 in),

1260-525: The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing after the Test Ban Moratorium , with the detonation timed to coincide with the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Tested on 30 October 1961, the test verified new design principles for high-yield thermonuclear charges, allowing, as its final report put it, the design of a nuclear device "of practically unlimited power". The bomb

1330-536: The USSR in nuclear weapons, although thermonuclear charges had already been created in the USSR at this time. Also, there were no effective means of delivering nuclear warheads to the US, both in the 1950s and in 1961. The USSR was therefore not able to muster a possible realistic retaliatory nuclear strike against the US. Given the Soviet Union's actual strategic disadvantage in relation to America's nuclear weapons possessions, foreign policy and propaganda considerations during

1400-689: The United States, Castle Bravo , had been 15 Mt). After the Tsar Bomba test, the United States did not increase the power of its own thermonuclear tests and, in 1963 in Moscow, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water was signed. The main scientific result of the test was the experimental verification of the principles of calculation and design of multistage thermonuclear charges. It also confirmed

1470-679: The acceptance ceremony. Bhangmeter A bhangmeter is a non-imaging radiometer installed on reconnaissance and navigation satellites to detect atmospheric nuclear detonations and determine the yield of the nuclear weapon. They are also installed on some armored fighting vehicles , in particular NBC reconnaissance vehicles , in order to help detect, localise and analyse tactical nuclear detonations. They are often used alongside pressure and sound sensors in this role in addition to standard radiation sensors. Some nuclear bunkers and military facilities may also be equipped with such sensors alongside seismic event detectors . The bhangmeter

SECTION 20

#1732851787951

1540-406: The air because of the shock wave but was able to recover and land safely. According to initial data, the Tsar Bomba had a nuclear yield of 58.6 Mt (245 PJ) (significantly exceeding what the design itself would suggest) and was overestimated at values all the way up to 75 Mt (310 PJ). Although simplistic fireball calculations predicted it would be large enough to hit the ground,

1610-500: The alphanumerical designation " AN602 ", was a thermonuclear aerial bomb , and the most powerful nuclear weapon ever created and tested. The Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov oversaw the project at Arzamas-16 , while the main work of design was by Sakharov, Viktor Adamsky , Yuri Babayev , Yuri Smirnov  [ ru ] , and Yuri Trutnev . The project was ordered by CPSU first secretary Nikita Khrushchev in July 1961 as part of

1680-442: The amount of light eventually starts to decrease, causing the second peak observed by the bhangmeter. The time between the first and second peaks can be used to determine its nuclear yield . The effect is unambiguous for explosions below about 30 kilometres (19 mi) altitude, but above this height a more ambiguous single pulse is produced. The name of the detector is a pun which was bestowed upon it by Fred Reines , one of

1750-418: The approximately 24 tons of Tsar Bomba by just over one ton: The uranium cladding was supposed to weigh about 2,800 kg (6,200 lb), the lead sheath of the same volume about 1,700 kg (3,700 lb). The explosion is one of the cleanest in the history of atmospheric nuclear tests per unit of power. The first stage of the bomb was a uranium charge with a capacity of 1.5 Mt, which in itself provided

1820-476: The blast, coming close enough to have its antiradiation paint scorched. The bhangmeter results and other data suggested the bomb yielded around 58 Mt (243 PJ), which was the accepted yield in technical literature until 1991, when Soviet scientists revealed that their instruments indicated a yield of 50 Mt (209 PJ). As they had the instrumental data and access to the test site, their yield figure has been accepted as more accurate. In theory,

1890-485: The blast. Soviet and Chinese radio stations mentioned the US underground nuclear test of a much smaller bomb (possibly the Mink test) carried out the day prior, without mentioning the Tsar Bomba test. The creation and testing of a superbomb were of great political importance; the Soviet Union demonstrated its potential in creating a nuclear arsenal of great power (at that time, the most powerful thermonuclear charge tested by

1960-422: The bomb could have easily been raised by another 50 Mt by using a uranium-238 sheath instead of lead. It was consciously decided to replace the cladding material and thus decrease the yield in order to reduce radioactive fallout below an acceptable level. It is sometimes believed that this change was made due to weight requirements, particularly in regard to its deployment by aircraft, but in reality it only reduced

2030-728: The bomb would have had a yield in excess of 100 Mt (418 PJ) if it had included the uranium-238 tamper which featured in the design but was omitted in the test to reduce radioactive fallout. As only one bomb was built to completion, that capability has never been demonstrated. The remaining bomb casings are located at the Russian Atomic Weapon Museum in Sarov and the Museum of Nuclear Weapons, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Of Technical Physics , in Snezhinsk . Tsar Bomba

2100-409: The bomb's own shock wave bounced back and prevented this. The 8-kilometre-wide (5.0 mi) fireball reached nearly as high as the altitude of the release plane and was visible at almost 1,000 km (620 mi) away. The mushroom cloud was about 67 km (42 mi) high (nearly eight times the height of Mount Everest ), which meant that the cloud was above the stratosphere and well inside

2170-509: The combined energy of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki , 10 times the combined energy of all the conventional explosives used in World War II , one quarter of the estimated yield of the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa , and 10% of the combined yield of all other nuclear tests to date. A three-stage hydrogen bomb uses a fission bomb primary to compress a thermonuclear secondary, as in most hydrogen bombs, and then uses energy from

Matochkin Strait - Misplaced Pages Continue

2240-465: The command of Colonel S. M. Kulikov until 1959, and passed without major issues. Despite the creation of the Tu-95V bomb-carrier aircraft, the test of the Tsar Bomba was postponed for political reasons: namely, Khrushchev's visit to the United States and a pause in the Cold War. The Tu-95V during this period was flown to Uzyn , in today's Ukraine, and was used as a training aircraft; therefore, it

2310-606: The condition that each party could use its own technical means to monitor the ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere or in outer space. Bhangmeters were first installed, in 1961, aboard a modified US KC-135A aircraft monitoring the pre-announced Soviet test of Tsar Bomba . The Vela satellites were the first space-based observation devices jointly developed by the U.S. Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission . The first generation of Vela satellites were not equipped with bhangmeters but with X-ray sensors to detect

2380-434: The design of izdeliye 202 to ensure disarming of the product in the event of a failure of the parachute system, as well as their proposals reported to the CPSU Central Committee. Comrades Boris Vannikov and Kurchatov are assigned to edit the final version of this resolution. In 1960, KB-11 began developing a thermonuclear device with a design capacity of one hundred megatons of TNT (418 petajoules). In February 1961,

2450-506: The development and testing of this super-powerful bomb. To speed up the work on Tsar Bomba, it was based on the 202 Project, but was a new project, developed by a different group. In particular, in KB-11, six casings for the Project 202 bomb already manufactured at NII-1011 and a set of equipment developed for the 202 Project testing were used. Tsar Bomba had a "three-stage" design: the first stage

2520-419: The draft resolution: (a) The Ministry of Medium Engineering (Comrade Avraami Zavenyagin ) and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (Comrade Georgy Zhukov ) at the end of the preparatory work for the test of izdeliye 202 to report to the CPSU Central Committee on the situation; (b) The Ministry of Medium Engineering (Comrade Zavenyagin) to solve the issue of introducing a special stage of protection into

2590-628: The effects of a thermal pulse even at a distance of 270 km (170 mi). The heat from the explosion could have caused third-degree burns 100 km (62 mi) away from ground zero. A shock wave was observed in the air at Dikson settlement 700 km (430 mi) away; windowpanes were partially broken for distances up to 900 kilometres (560 mi). Atmospheric focusing caused blast damage at even greater distances, breaking windows in Norway and Finland. Despite being detonated 4.2 km (3 mi) above ground, its seismic body wave magnitude

2660-457: The fission reaction of large quantities of uranium-238. During the test, the bomb was used in a two-stage version. A. D. Sakharov suggested using nuclear passive material instead of the uranium-238 in the secondary bomb module, which reduced the bomb's energy to 50 Mt, and, in addition to reducing the amount of radioactive fission products, avoided the fireball's contact with the Earth's surface, thus eliminating radioactive contamination of

2730-456: The gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards ... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole Earth into it. The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural." The explosion of Tsar Bomba, according to the classification of nuclear explosions , was an ultra-high-power low-air nuclear explosion. All buildings in

2800-499: The intense single pulse of X-rays produced by a nuclear explosion. The first satellites which incorporated bhangmeters were the Advanced Vela satellites . Since 1980, bhangmeters have been included on US GPS navigation satellites. The silicon photodiode sensors are designed to detect the distinctive bright double pulse of visible light that is emitted from atmospheric nuclear weapons explosions . This signature consists of

2870-519: The leaders of KB-11 sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU with the subject line "Some questions of the development of nuclear weapons and methods of their use", which, among other things, raised the question of the expediency of developing such a 100 Mt device. On 10 July 1961, a discussion took place in the Central Committee of the CPSU, at which First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev supported

Matochkin Strait - Misplaced Pages Continue

2940-516: The leaderships of Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev made a response to the perceived US nuclear blackmail imperative. The creation of the Tsar Bomba represented a bluff in order to maintain the concept of nuclear deterrence . Also, on 23 June 1960, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued on the creation of a super-heavy ballistic missile N-1 (GRAU index – 11A52) with

3010-426: The main thermonuclear module, which, in turn, initiated the fast fission nuclear reaction in the nuclei of the surrounding uranium-238 , which would have added another 50 Mt of energy to the explosion, so that the estimated energy release of Tsar Bomba was around 100 Mt. The test of such a complete three-stage 100 Mt bomb was rejected due to the extremely high level of radioactive contamination that would be caused by

3080-474: The official history of the institute, the order on the creation of a research institute in the system of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was signed on 5 April 1955; work at the NII-1011 began a little later. At the second stage of development, from 1960 to a successful test in 1961, the bomb was called "item 602" and was developed at KB-11 (VNIIEF), V. B. Adamsky was developing, and besides him,

3150-458: The physical scheme was developed by Andrei Sakharov , Yu. N. Babaev, Yu. N. Smirnov, Yu. A. Trutnev. After the successful test of the RDS-37 , KB-11 employees (Sakharov, Zeldovich , and Dovidenko) performed a preliminary calculation and, on 2 February 1956, they handed over to N. I. Pavlov, a note with the parameters for charges of 150 Mt (628 PJ) and

3220-468: The possibility of increasing the power to 1 gigaton of TNT (4.2  EJ ). After the creation in 1955 of the second nuclear center – NII-1011, in 1956, by a resolution of the Council of Ministers, the center was assigned the task of developing an ultra-high-power charge, which was called "Project 202". On 12 March 1956, a draft Joint Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

3290-447: The resulting explosion to compress a much larger additional thermonuclear stage. There is evidence that the Tsar Bomba had several third stages rather than a single very large one. RDS-202 was assembled on the principle of radiation implosion, which was previously tested during the creation of RDS-37. Since it used a much-heavier secondary module than in the RDS-37, not one, but two primary modules (charges), located on two opposite sides of

3360-536: The second stage was separated into two fusion charges which were placed in the front and rear parts of the bomb, for which a synchronous detonation was required with a difference in initiation of no more than 100 nanoseconds. To ensure synchronous detonation of charges with the required accuracy, the sequencing unit of the detonation electronics was modified at KB-25 (now "Federal State Unitary Enterprise "NL Dukhov All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automation")(VNIIA). The initial three-stage design of Tsar Bomba

3430-576: The secondary module, were used to compress it. This physical charging scheme was later used in the design of the AN-602, but the AN-602 thermonuclear charge itself (secondary module) was new. The RDS-202 thermonuclear charge was manufactured in 1956, and was planned for testing in 1957, but was not tested and put into storage. Two years after the manufacture of the RDS-202, in July 1958, it was decided to remove it from storage, dismantle and use automation units and charge parts for experimental work (Order No. 277 of

3500-471: The shock wave expands, producing the first peak recorded by the bhangmeter. As it expands, the shock wave cools off and becomes less opaque to the visible light produced by the inner fireball. The bhangmeter starts eventually to record an increase in visible light intensity. The expansion of the fireball leads to an increase of its surface area and consequently an increase of the amount of visible light radiated off to space. The fireball continues to cool down so

3570-414: The soil and the distribution of large amounts of fallout into the atmosphere. Many technical innovations were applied in the design of Tsar Bomba. The thermonuclear charge was made according to the "bifilar" scheme – the radiation implosion of the main thermonuclear stage was carried out from two opposite sides. These secondary charges produced X-ray compression of the main thermonuclear charge. For this,

SECTION 50

#1732851787951

3640-414: The surface of the early fireball is quickly overtaken by the expanding "case shock", the atmospheric shock wave composed of the ionised plasma of what was once the casing and other matter of the device. Although it emits a considerable amount of light itself, it is opaque and prevents the far brighter fireball from shining through. The net result recorded is a decrease of the light visible from outer space as

3710-530: The target) (some sources suggest 3,900 m (12,795 ft) ASL and 3,700 m (12,139 ft) above target, or 4,500 m (14,764 ft)). By this time the Tu-95V had already escaped to 39 km (24 mi) away, and the Tu-16 53.5 km (33.2 mi) away. When detonation occurred, the shock wave caught up with the Tu-95V at a distance of 115 km (71 mi) and the Tu-16 at 205 km (127 mi). The Tu-95V dropped 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) in

3780-555: The test as "JOE 111" using their "JOE" counting scheme, which had begun with RDS-1 in 1949. The development of a super-powerful bomb began in 1956 and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, from 1956 to 1958, it was "product 202", which was developed in the recently created NII-1011 . The modern name of NII-1011 is the "Russian Federal Nuclear Center or the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics" (RFNC-VNIITF). According to

3850-809: The theory that there is no fundamental limit to the power of a thermonuclear charge. This fact had probably been first postulated in October 1949 (three years before the Ivy Mike test which utilized the Teller-Ulam design ), when in the supplement to the official report of the General Advisory Committee of the US Atomic Energy Commission , nuclear physicists Enrico Fermi and Isidor Isaac Rabi stated that thermonuclear weapons can potentially have "unlimited destructive power". The explosive power of

3920-471: The village of Severny, both wooden and brick, located 55 km (34 mi) from ground zero within the Sukhoy Nos test range, were destroyed. In districts hundreds of kilometres from ground zero, wooden houses were destroyed; stone ones lost their roofs, windows, and doors; and radio communications were interrupted for almost one hour. One participant in the test saw a bright flash through dark goggles and felt

3990-423: Was a modification of an earlier project, RN202, which used a ballistic case of the same size but a very different internal mechanism. A number of published books, even some authored by those involved in product development of 602, contain inaccuracies that are replicated elsewhere, including wrongly identifying Tsar Bomba as RDS-202 or RN202. In the mid-1950s, the United States had an unconditional superiority over

4060-490: Was a strong incentive for this modification, since most of the fallout from a test of the bomb would probably have descended on populated Soviet territory. The first studies on "Topic 242" began immediately after Igor Kurchatov talked with Andrei Tupolev (then held in late 1954). Tupolev appointed his deputy for weapon systems, Aleksandr Nadashkevich, as the head of the Topic. Subsequent analysis indicated that to carry such

4130-473: Was capable of yielding approximately 100 Mt through fast fission (3,000 times the power of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs); however, it was thought that this would have resulted in too much nuclear fallout , and the aircraft delivering the bomb would not have had enough time to escape the explosion. To limit the amount of fallout, the third stage and possibly the second stage had a lead tamper instead of

4200-575: Was detonated in October 1961, in the vicinity of Matochkin Strait, over the Novaya Zemlya archipelago . It is also the site where, from 1963 to 1990, about 39 underground nuclear tests took place in a vast array of tunnels and shafts under Mount Lazarev and other massifs. After 2000, Russia started to reactivate the test site by enlarging old tunnels and starting construction work. Each summer since then various subcritical hydronuclear experiments have taken place. In 2004, Rosatom reportedly performed

4270-477: Was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by a team led by Hermann Hoerlin. The bhangmeter was invented, and the first proof-of-concept device was built, in 1948 to measure the nuclear test detonations of Operation Sandstone . Prototype and production instruments were later built by EG&G , and the name "bhangmeter" was coined in 1950 by Frederick Reines . Bhangmeters became standard instruments used to observe US nuclear tests . A Mod II bhangmeter

SECTION 60

#1732851787951

4340-693: Was developed to observe the detonations of Operation Buster-Jangle (1951) and Operation Tumbler-Snapper (1952). These tests lay the groundwork for a large deployment of nationwide North American bhangmeters with the Bomb Alarm System (1961-1967). US president John F. Kennedy and the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, under

4410-464: Was developed with an estimated power of 15 Mt (63 PJ), after testing the products "40GN", "245" and "205" its tests were deemed inappropriate and canceled. The Tsar Bomba differs from its parent design – the RN202 – in several places. The Tsar Bomba was a three-stage bomb with a Trutnev-Babaev second- and third-stage design, with a yield of 50 Mt. This is equivalent to about 1,570 times

4480-539: Was dropped by parachute from a Tu-95V aircraft, and detonated autonomously 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) above the cape Sukhoy Nos of Severny Island , Novaya Zemlya , 15 km (9.3 mi) from Mityushikha Bay , north of the Matochkin Strait . The detonation was monitored by United States intelligence agencies, via a KC-135A aircraft (Operation SpeedLight ) in the area at the time. A secret U.S. reconnaissance aircraft named "Speed Light Alpha" monitored

4550-526: Was estimated at 5.0–5.25. Immediately after the test, several United States politicians condemned the Soviet Union. Prime Minister of Sweden Tage Erlander saw the blast as the Soviets' answer to a personal appeal to halt nuclear testing that he had sent the Soviet leader in the week prior to the blast. The British Foreign Office , Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen , Prime Minister of Denmark Viggo Kampmann and others also released statements condemning

4620-537: Was issued on 17 March 1956, which mandated that OKB-156 begin conversion of a Tu-95 bomber into a high-yield nuclear bomb carrier. These works were carried out in the Gromov Flight Research Institute from May to September 1956. The converted bomber, designated the Tu-95V , was accepted for duty and was handed over for flight tests which, including a release of a mock-up "superbomb", were conducted under

4690-473: Was no longer listed as a combat aircraft. With the beginning of a new round of the Cold War in 1961, the test was resumed. The Tu-95V had all connectors in its automatic release mechanism replaced, the bomb bay doors removed and the aircraft itself covered with a special, reflective white paint . In late 1961, the aircraft was modified for testing Tsar Bomba at the Kuibyshev aircraft plant. Nikita Khrushchev ,

4760-679: Was officially known as "product 602" ( изделие 602 ) or "AN602", and codenamed "Ivan". The usage of different names can be a source of confusion. The Tsar Bomba, being a modification of the RN202 , is sometimes mistakenly labelled as RDS-37, RDS-202 or PH202 (product 202). It has also been referred to as RDS-220 in a number of relatively recent western publications. Unofficially, the bomb would later become known as "Tsar Bomba" and " Kuzka's mother " ( Кузькина мать , Kuz'kina mat' ). The name Tsar Bomba (loosely translated as Emperor of Bombs ) comes from an allusion to two other Russian historical artifacts,

4830-632: Was one of the most prominent speakers against nuclear proliferation. He played a key role in signing the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Sakharov became an advocate of civil liberties and reforms in the Soviet Union. In 1973 he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and in 1974 was awarded the Prix mondial Cino Del Duca . He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, but was not allowed to leave the Soviet Union to collect it. His wife Yelena Bonner read his speech at

4900-679: Was tested on 30 October 1961. The Tupolev Tu-95 V aircraft No. 5800302, laden with the bomb, took off from the Olenya airfield , and flew to State Test Site No. 6 of the USSR Ministry of Defense located on Novaya Zemlya with a crew of nine: The test was also attended by the Tupolev Tu-16 laboratory aircraft, no. 3709, equipped for monitoring the tests, and its crew: Both aircraft were painted with special reflective paint to minimize heat damage. Despite this, Durnovtsev and his crew were given only

#950049