Apoha (Sanskrit: अपोह) is a Buddhist epistemological theory first proposed by the philosopher Dignāga (c. 480 – c. 540 CE) in his seminal text Pramāṇasamuccaya . The theory went on to be significantly elaborated upon and extended by Dignāga's successor Dharmakīrti (6th or 7th century CE). Buddhist philosophers of the logico-epistemological school , of which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were the most influential, were nominalists , i.e., they held the position that the world is composed of unique particulars and that the concepts in terms of which we think and communicate have no counterpart in reality but are mere mental impositions. Our categories of thought and language are thus, according to the Buddhists, purely subjective – the result of our past karmic impressions that obscure from us the true nature of reality.
84-464: Jñānaśrīmitra (fl. 975-1025 C.E.) was an Indian Buddhist philosopher of the epistemological ( pramana ) tradition of Buddhist philosophy , which goes back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti . Jñānaśrīmitra was also known as a Yogācāra Buddhist who defended a form of Buddhist idealism termed Sākāravada which holds that cognitive content or aspects of consciousness ("ākāras") are real and not illusory. In addition to his philosophical works, Jñānaśrīmitra
168-562: A Buddha, the sambhoghakāyas . Jñānaśrīmitra's non-philosophical interests were poetry and literary theory. The Vṛttamālāstuti was composed by Jñānaśrīmitra as a devotional poem to the bodhisattva Manjushri and follows the standard Sanskrit poetic metre. His verses have also been preserved in other works including the Subhāṣitaratnakośa which is an anthology of poems produced by different authors. So far 12 of Jñānaśrīmitra are extant, all in their original Sanskrit and found on
252-433: A later cognition that defeats it. Jñānaśrīmitra's main problem with this view is that if reality is not determined by what manifests to consciousness, how can you have any confidence in any subsequent defeater cognition? Jñānaśrīmitra argues that this view is epistemically self-defeating since the defeater cognition is just another manifestation to consciousness which is as unreal as the cognition being defeated. This means that
336-486: A logical approach when commenting upon Nāgārjuna . He also started with a Sautrāntika approach when discussing the way appearances appear, to debate with realists, but then took a Middle Way view of the ultimate nature of phenomenon. But he used logical assertions and arguments about the nature of that ultimate nature. His incorporation of logic into the Middle Way system was later critiqued by Candrakīrti , who felt that
420-456: A logical argument about the external world as discussed by the Hindu schools was possible. Otherwise their views would be so different as to be impossible to begin a debate. Then a logical discussion could follow. This approach attempts to solve how the material world connects with the mental world, but not completely explaining it. When pushed on this point, Dharmakīrti then drops a presupposition of
504-570: A new commentary and approach to Madhyamaka, which became the normative form in Tibet. In this variant, the Madhyamaka approach of Candrakīrti was elevated instead of Bhāvaviveka's yet Tsongkhapa rejected Candrakirti's disdain of logic and instead incorporated logic further. The exact role of logic in Tibetan Buddhist practice and study may still be a topic of debate, but it is definitely established in
588-599: A particular causal condition that awakens it—lays down the continuity of a recollection of the accomplishment of an aim (arthakriyā) (a desire and so on), which is conducive to externally directed activity (bahirmukhapravṛttyanukūla). Then, on the part of a person who has some desire for the accomplishment of an aim, there is activity, avoidance, or doing nothing in conformity with the external object. Jñānaśrīmitra argues that every moment of awareness arises with an appearance or image (ākāra). Conceptual awareness events also contain attachment and desire, which propels an activity which
672-694: A proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state). Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama , so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment). Anumāna (अनुमान) means ‘ inference ’ in Sanskrit, though it often
756-434: A sequence of awareness events in time and space, any idea of a ‘person’, is a conceptual construct and so it is only relatively true. Also, any idea of causality is also just a conventional conceptual truth that does not exist ultimately. This also means all reasoning and epistemology are also conventional, and they cannot disprove the sheer manifestation of awareness itself, which is clearly present, and phenomenally obvious. It
840-529: A single manuscript. Unlike many of his contemporaries, his works are mainly composed in the form of a monograph rather than being written as a commentary on an existing work. A Tibetan-language work purported to have been written by Jñānaśrīmitra relating to tantra although it is uncertain and could possibly have been written by an author sharing the same name. Pramana Pramana ( Sanskrit : प्रमाण ; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means " proof " and "means of knowledge". In Indian philosophies, pramana are
924-422: A theory of classification based on exclusion. He said that a category such as 'cow' is arrived at not by the inclusion of all objects we would, based on some criteria, identify as cows, but by the exclusion of all objects we would identify as 'non-cows.' Concepts thus involve a double negation - the category of 'cow' is, in fact, the category of all 'not non-cows.' Since a negation or an absence cannot, according to
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#17328557267921008-462: A trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are knower and knowable, each discussed in how they influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing. The two are called Pramātŗ (प्रमातृ, the subject, the knower) and Prameya (प्रमेय, the object, the knowable). The term Pramana is commonly found in various schools of Hinduism. In Buddhist literature, Pramana
1092-454: A word or concept is impossible. However, Dignāga believes that we can establish a connection between the word tree and the category of particulars it refers to by reference to the fact that the word does not apply to non-trees i.e. to objects in which the particular distinctive features of a 'tree' are absent. A word thus functions as a "limitation operator", delimiting the boundary between its referents and non-referents. An opponent might raise
1176-480: Is A, or x is not A, for all x. On the other hand, in the case of the nominally bound negation, 'x is A' and 'x is non-A' are two incompatible statements, but they are not contradictory; a third possibility, that x is neither A, nor non-A, exists. Because of this difference in the type of the two negations, 'x is not non-A' does not simply reduce to 'x is A.' A few decades after Dignāga, the philosopher Dharmakīrti significantly revised apoha theory. While Dignāga's account
1260-566: Is a form of perception and inference in Buddhist thought. Valid scriptures, valid minds and valid persons are considered in Buddhism as Avisamvadin ( mi slu ba , incontrovertible, indisputable). Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism. In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti . Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are usually categorized as expounding
1344-459: Is an actual reality, the buddha-nature ( tathāgatagarbha ), which is free from all superimposition and denial. This buddha-nature is described as lucidity ( prakāśa ) and the real aspects (ākāras) are appearances or manifestations of this ultimately real lucidity. These "appearances of lucidity" ( prakāśarūpa ) are also real and free from superimposition and denial, but sentient beings misunderstand their true nature as lucidity. In this sense, awareness
1428-420: Is derived from the Sanskrit roots, pra (प्र), a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and mā (मा) which means "measurement". Pramā means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand", with pramāṇa being a further nominalization of the word. Thus, the concept Pramāṇa implies that which is a "means of acquiring prama or certain, correct, true knowledge". Pramāṇa forms one part of
1512-399: Is directed away from the experience of the image itself. When we experience a cake, we are experiencing a specific variegated appearance. This appearance is such that it can support the conceptual construction of a "cake" (through attachment to pleasure, memory, and karmic habits) in our minds. This leads to an activity, such as attempting to consume the cake. While the variegated image is true,
1596-490: Is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference. Anupalabdhi (अनुपलब्धि) means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In
1680-783: Is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words). The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources. The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka , state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability. Different schools of Hindu philosophy accept one or more of these pramanas as valid epistemology. Carvaka school accepted only one valid source of knowledge—perception. It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid. Epistemologically,
1764-400: Is empty of determination and conceptualization (vikalpa), but not of its own nature as luminosity. Furthermore, the ultimately real and non-dual conscious manifestation is the field of a Buddha’s awareness (buddhagocara), it is the non-duality that a Buddha knows and which is always present. This is the citrādvaita (variegated non-duality) which is marvellous (āścarya). This non-dual Buddhahood
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#17328557267921848-612: Is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication
1932-557: Is held by the Gelug school leaning to a moderate realism with some accommodation of universals and the other held by the other schools who held that Dharmakīrti was distinctly antirealist. A key feature of Dignāga's logic is in how he treats generalities versus specific objects of knowledge. The Nyāya Hindu school made assertions about the existence of general principles, and in refutation Dignāga asserted that generalities were mere mental features and not truly existent. To do this he introduced
2016-400: Is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated. Arthāpatti (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In contemporary logic, this pramana is similar to circumstantial implication . As example, if a person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time
2100-413: Is never manifest, because for anything to be manifest is for it to be immediately present to reflexive awareness (svasamvitti), and a moment of awareness cannot be aware of something differentiated since it is a unitary undifferentiated self-awareness. This also means each awareness is “locked away” self-contained, without direct access to other awareness events (diachronically or synchronically). Any idea of
2184-465: Is not a mere truism that depends on a prior understanding of A, the two negations in the expression 'not non-A' have been explained to be different in nature. While the 'non' negates the noun A, i.e., it is nominally bound, the 'not' negates the verb 'is' in the sentence 'x is not non-A' (where x is an instance of type A), i.e., it is verbally bound. In the case of the verbally bound negation, the classical logical Law of Excluded Middle holds, i.e., either x
2268-424: Is not just an imageless consciousness, but it contains immeasurable marvellous qualities. Jñānaśrīmitra describes it as “variegated by the splendour of the major and minor marks”, and “the storehouse of excellent qualities, devoid of the mass of impure appearances that are connected to habituations to the unreal— but it is not at all without appearances.” These manifestations are the real compassionate manifestations of
2352-471: Is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta
2436-568: Is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception ( anubhava ) and remembered perception ( smriti ). The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception: Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception,
2520-863: Is referred to as Pramāṇavāda . Pramana is also related to the Indian concept of Yukti (युक्ति) which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose. Yukti and Pramana are discussed together in some Indian texts, with Yukti described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception. The texts on Pramana , particularly by Samkhya , Yoga , Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, include in their meaning and scope "Theories of Errors". These texts explore why human beings make error and reach incorrect knowledge, how can one know if one
2604-409: Is that "inference-warranting relations between two distinct entities must be effect-cause relations, and that the presence of such relations can be detected only through a specific sequence of perception and non-apprehension." Jñanasrimitra was a defender of Yogācāra idealism, affirming that "this entire triple-world is established to be nothing but consciousness ( vijñaptimātra )." Jñānaśrīmitra
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2688-676: Is the Pramāṇa-samuccaya . Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya played a crucial role in shaping the discipline of epistemology ( pramāṇaśāstra ), blending it with logical discourse. Dharmakīrti, influenced by Dignāga, further developed these ideas in his Pramanavarttika . These two rejected the complex Abhidharma -based description of how in the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika Following Scripture approach connected an external world with mental objects, and instead posited that
2772-458: Is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to " referents of positive expression" in Padartha . An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. Abhava was further refined in four types, by
2856-421: Is thus an ultimate existence which is irrefutable by proofs or reasons, which rely on determination. In his Sākārasiddhiśāstra, Jñānaśrīmitra seeks to explain a difficult issue, mainly how a variegated mental image (citravijñāne), like a multi-coloured butterfly wing, can possibly be experienced. The problem here is that this variegated experience does not seem unitary, but if it is manifold, this seems to refute
2940-433: Is to propose "a complex system that sharply divides what is manifest from what is constructed through determination (adhyavasāya) by processes of exclusion ( apoha ). What is determined, and so what is not manifest, does not ultimately exist—and it’s that that constitutes conventional existence." For Jñānaśrīmitra, error and confusion develop out of determination (adhyavasāya) which works through using exclusion (apoha). Thus,
3024-402: Is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later. The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam ,
3108-590: Is used to mean ‘ guess ’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana . In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state
3192-591: Is wrong, and, if so, how one can discover whether one's epistemic method was flawed or one's conclusion (truth) was flawed, in order to revise oneself and reach correct knowledge. Traditional Hinduism identifies six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (evidence/ perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), Anupalabdhi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). In verse 1.2.1 of
3276-566: The shruti , Vedas . Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge
3360-495: The Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge, Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means, Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony), while Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six pramanas are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge. The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of
3444-475: The Svātantrika approach. Modern Buddhist schools employ the 'three spheres' (Sanskrit: trimaṇḍala; Tibetan: 'khor gsum): When Madhyamaka first migrated to Tibet, Śāntarakṣita established a view of Madhyamaka more consistent with Bhāvaviveka while further evolving logical assertions as a way of contemplating and developing one's viewpoint of the ultimate truth. In the 14th century Je Tsongkhapa presented
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3528-544: The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: smṛti ("scripture, tradition"), pratyakṣa ("perception"), aitihya ("expert testimony, historical tradition"), and anumāna ("inference"). In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten pramanas are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge. The most widely discussed pramanas are: Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It
3612-806: The Vaiśeṣika school considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge: According to the Sankhya , Yoga , and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas: These are enumerated in sutra I.7 of the Yoga Sutras . The mode of Pramana itself in sutra I.6 is distinguished among 5 classes of vritti/mental modification, the others including indiscrimination, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory. The Nyāya school accepts four means of obtaining knowledge ( pramāṇa ), viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word. In Mimamsa school of Hinduism linked to Prabhakara considered
3696-484: The hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha . A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion). Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. Upamana , states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she
3780-553: The Buddhists, be objectively real (since absences are not caused and have no causal efficacy), this shows that concepts, though referring to a class of particulars, have no basis in reality. According to the Monier-Williams Sanskrit dictionary, the word apoha literally means 'pushing away' or 'removing.' In the context of this epistemological theory, a closer meaning would be 'excluding.' Another possible meaning, given in
3864-496: The DDSA Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, comes from apoha being thought of as the compound of apa and ūha . Ūha means reasoning, while apa is a prefix often used to indicate opposition. So, apoha could be taken to mean reverse or negative reasoning. The apoha theory is an attempt to bridge the gap between what the Buddhists saw as the ontologically dichotomous entities of the particular ( svalakṣaṇa ) and
3948-501: The Sautrāntrika position and shifts to a kind of Yogācāra position that extramental objects never really occur but arise from the habitual tendencies of mind. So he begins a debate with Hindu schools positing external objects then later to migrate the discussion to how that is logically untenable. Note there are two differing interpretations of Dharmakīrti's approach later in Tibet, due to differing translations and interpretations. One
4032-438: The ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti —the requirement that
4116-508: The collection of all objects that lack this feature; however, it does not say anything specific about the nature of those objects. In particular, it does not ascribe any common property to the particulars in question, which would be impossible as no such common property exists. Thus, 'non-A' denotes in a general form the absence of the distinctive feature of A, and so 'not non-A' denotes all particulars that would fall into category A. In order to show how thinking of category A as being 'not non-A'
4200-424: The concept "non-perception" as a pramana . The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth. Abhava (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be same as Abhava , while others consider Anupalabdi and Abhava as different. Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in
4284-403: The conceptual construction of "cake" is an erroneous determination which is bound to the image. This complex erroneous object never manifests to consciousness, only the image does. The main difference between determination and manifestation is that determination is focused on differentiation (pariccheda), especially the subject-object distinction (grāhyagrāhakabhāva). This difference, furthermore,
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#17328557267924368-421: The context of Padārtha (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva (existent), Jneyatva (knowable) and Abhidheyatva (nameable). Specific examples of padartha , states Bartley, include dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (activity/motion), samanya/jati (universal/class property), samavaya (inherence) and vishesha (individuality). Abhava
4452-523: The conventional truth (which is illusory) is not what is manifest, but what is determined and imagined by the mind. Regarding external objects, Jñānaśrīmitra says that what it means for them to seem to be “external” is that they are objects of certain kinds of verbal and mental activity (pravṛtti). Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhi says: This is how it really works: Right as it is arising with some appearance (ākāra), conceptual construction (vikalpa)—propelled by diverse, beginningless habituations and relying upon
4536-518: The defender of the view that appearances are unreal cannot have a robust epistemology without any cognition to ground himself on. One critique of Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākāravada view is that if our conventional appearances are true and not in error, we would always already know the ultimate truth and there would be no need for a spiritual path or epistemology. Furthermore, things appear to be external, but they are agreed by all yogacarins to be mind-only. According to Davey K. Tomlinson, Jñānaśrīmitra's response
4620-399: The establishment of the ultimate way of abiding since it was beyond thought and concept was not the domain of logic. He used simple logical consequence arguments to refute the views of other tenet systems, but generally he thought a more developed use of logic and epistemology in describing the Middle Way was problematic. Bhāvaviveka's use of autonomous logical arguments was later described as
4704-399: The exclusion of what they are not. From the perspective of language, the function of a word is to act as the signifier of a referent. However, the individual instance of the utterance of a word and the particular object it refers to cannot constitute a sign function by themselves since their concomitance is unrepeatable - they have never been observed together in the past, nor will they be in
4788-796: The following pramanas as proper: In Advaita Vedānta , and Mimamsa school linked to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa , the following pramanas are accepted: Padmākara Translation Group (2005: p. 390) annotates that: Strictly speaking, pramana ( tshad ma ) means "valid cognition." In (Buddhism) practice, it refers to the tradition, principally associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, of logic ( rtags rigs ) and epistemology ( blo rigs ). Buddhism accepts only two pramana ( tshad ma ) as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha ( mngon sum tshad ma , perception) and Anumāṇa ( rjes dpag tshad ma , inference). Rinbochay adds that Buddhism also considers scriptures as third valid pramana , such as from Buddha and other "valid minds" and "valid persons". This third source of valid knowledge
4872-431: The future. Hence, their relationship is not learnable or something that can constitute knowledge. But what, then, is a word's invariable connection with its signified object, which makes it a source of knowledge? While other philosophical schools of Dignāga's time sought to explain this connection by positing objectively existent universals that inhere in particulars and which are the referents of words, Dignāga's rejection of
4956-608: The idea of Apoha , that the way the mind recognizes is by comparing and negating known objects from the perception. In that way, the general idea or categories of objects has to do with differences from known objects, not from identification with universal truths. So one knows that a perceived chariot is a chariot not because it is in accord with a universal form of a chariot, but because it is perceived as different from things that are not chariots. This approach became an essential feature of Buddhist epistemology. The contemporary of Dignāga but before Dharmakīrti, Bhāvaviveka , incorporated
5040-636: The idea that an awareness ent is an undifferentiated non-dual consciousness. This is the "one or many" argument which is used by various Buddhist philosophers to show that something cannot be real because it cannot be either a single thing nor many things. Jñānaśrīmitra argues that this binary opposition (unity and manifoldness) is a type of determination, a conceptual distinction which does not manifest to non-dual awareness. Variegated images are therefore neither unitary nor manifold, they are ely an image in which various elements come together, but they are not themselves distinct elements in opposition to each other (as
5124-506: The inner science of pramana, or logic, in particular are unnecessary is a terrible and evil spell, the aim of which is to prevent the perfect assimilation, through valid reasoning, of the Buddha's words Apoha Apoha theory was proposed to provide an explanation for how, in the absence of objectively existent universals , we are able to form concepts and effectively use them to communicate and achieve practical ends. Dignāga defined apoha as
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#17328557267925208-459: The manifestation of consciousness (i.e. prakāśa , the radiance, lucidity or shining forth of awareness) is the ultimate existence. Since consciousness is ultimate, appearances which manifest from consciousness are also real, not illusory. Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhi argues that the idea that something which is non-existent could manifest from that which is real (i.e. consciousness) is incoherent. This idea he terms asatkhyāti, "the manifestation of
5292-403: The meaning of the word 'tree', we cannot possibly do so through observing all the particular objects that concord with that category, as they are infinite in number. Further, since all the objects are unique particulars, it is not possible to determine which object falls in the category 'tree' if we have not previously ascribed the label to it. Therefore, forming a positive category corresponding to
5376-600: The means which can lead to knowledge, and serve as one of the core concepts in Indian epistemology . It has been one of the key, much debated fields of study in Hinduism , Buddhism and Jainism since ancient times. It is a theory of knowledge, and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired. While
5460-408: The mental domain never connects directly with the external world but instead only perceives an aspect based upon the sense organs and the sense consciousnesses. Further, the sense consciousnesses assume the form of the aspect (Sanskrit: Sākāravāda) of the external object and what is perceived is actually the sense consciousness which has taken on the form of the external object. By starting with aspects,
5544-598: The nonexistent". Thus, for Jñānaśrīmitra, if consciousness is real (as all yogacarins agree), then the images which manifest or radiate from it must also be real. Nirakaravadins like Ratnākaraśānti say that false imagination (vikalpa) can make an unreal object manifest to awareness. Jñānaśrīmitra seeks to deny this and prove that if anything manifests to consciousness, it must exist (and further, to prove that what does not manifest, does not exist). Ratnākaraśānti argues in his texts that an appearance can, upon analysis, be shown to be unreal, because it can be shown to be illusory by
5628-906: The number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Three central pramanas which are almost universally accepted are perception ( Sanskrit : pratyakṣa), inference ( anumāna ), and "word", meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts ( Śabda ); and more contentious ones, which are comparison and analogy ( upamāna ), postulation, derivation from circumstances ( arthāpatti ), and non-perception, negative/cognitive proof ( anupalabdhi ). Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence and possibility of error, by each school of Indian philosophies. The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six pramanas are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge. For example,
5712-428: The object of comparison is called upamanam , while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya . Thus, explains Monier Williams , if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam , the moon is upamanam , and charmingness is samanya . The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method
5796-414: The objection, if anvaya cannot establish the category as it would involve the inclusion of an infinite number of instances, does vyatireka not involve the exclusion of an infinite number of instances? Dignāga explains that the exclusion does not happen at the individual level but collectively, in accordance with the general theory of exclusion. The absence of the defining feature of the category demarcates
5880-430: The opponent claims). This is because differentiation itself is never manifested to any single awareness event. To separate out the various elements of one variegated image is just a relative and conceptual move. The key point for Jñānaśrīmitra is that what makes something metaphysically real is that it manifests to awareness, not whether it can be understood as one thing or as manifold. According to Jñānaśrīmitra, emptiness
5964-481: The particulars is thus denied, while still allowing for them to be conceptualised as belonging to the same class by the observer. Thus, for Dharmakīrti, the basis for our categorisation of a particular into a class of objects is not some property inherent to that particular, but the capacity of the particular to have a certain effect on us. To illustrate this point, he gives the example of a collection of antipyretic herbs, all of which reduce fever when consumed. However,
6048-417: The perceptual apparatus of the observer, they judge to be of the same kind. Thus, the particulars, though completely distinct from one another, cause the same effect on the observer – not due to any shared property of the particulars in question, but due to the nature of the perceptual mechanism of the perceiver, which is seen as conditioned by their karma , and therefore distortionary. Any shared property among
6132-494: The reality of universals called for an alternative explanation. Dignāga attempts to solve this problem by defining words and concepts not as affirmative in nature but as negative. He takes the two established inductive categories of observation used in Indian philosophy - concordance ( anvaya ) and difference ( vyatireka ) - to elaborate. The meaning of a word cannot be inducted through anvaya alone as if we are trying to understand
6216-400: The schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa (termination of what existed), atyanta-abhava (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), anyonya-abhava (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and pragavasa (prior, antecedent non-existence). Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts, specifically
6300-446: The six forms of pramana can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference pramanas . The science and study of pramanas is called Nyaya . Pramāṇa literally means "proof" and is also a concept and field of Indian philosophy. The concept
6384-454: The theory of apoha and its relation to epistemology. He also defends the theory from Hindu critics, who posited competing theories of meaning. Jñanasrimitra's Vyāpticarcā ( Analysis of Pervasion ) focuses on inferential relations which in Indian thought is termed vyapti (pervasion). This refers to the epistemic relations between two distinct entities such as smoke and fire. According to Horst Lasic, Jñanasrimitra's position on this topic
6468-498: The theory of "exclusion" ( apoha ) outlined by Dignaga ( c. 480 – c. 540 CE) and how it relates to the philosophy of language , meaning and the nature of conceptual thoughts and awareness. The basic theory behind apoha is that meaning comes from what something is not. For example, "cow" gets its meaning by excluding every non-cow. This was the basic theory of language used by Buddhist pramāṇa philosophers. In his Apohaprakaraṇa ("Monograph on Exclusion"), Jñanasrimitra elaborates on
6552-455: The tradition. Ju Mipham remarked in his 19th-century commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṅkāra : The Buddha's doctrine, from the exposition of the two truths onward, unerroneously sets forth the mode of being of things as they are. And the followers of the Buddha must establish this accordingly, through the use of reasoning. Such is the unerring tradition of Śakyamuni. On the other hand, to claim that analytical investigation in general and
6636-441: The two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa (positive) or asadrupa (negative) relation—both correct and valuable. Like other pramana , Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed
6720-687: The universal ( sāmānyalakṣaṇa ). A particular is, according to the Buddhists of the logico-epistemological school, a real object that is composed of an infinite number of unique characteristics and can, therefore, never be adequately represented through concepts or words. Universals, conversely, are abstract categories of particulars that we construct mentally to derive knowledge about the conventional world through inference and verbal communication; they have no ontological reality but are purely subjective. Since particulars are infinitely constituted and unrepresentable, universals are not definable in terms of them; they can only be defined in negative terms, i.e., through
6804-639: The view of the Sautrāntika tenets, though one can make a distinction between the Sautrāntikas Following Scripture ( Tibetan : ལུང་གི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ , Wylie : lung gi rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa ) and the Sautrāntikas Following Reason ( Tibetan : རིགས་པ་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ , Wylie : rigs pa rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa ) and both these masters are described as establishing the latter. Dignāga's main text on this topic
6888-418: Was a 'top-down' approach which sought to show what characteristics of our concepts allow them to refer to multiple particulars without possessing any ontological reality, Dharmakīrti took a 'bottom-up' approach in which he showed how particulars give rise to concepts through a causal chain. This involves particulars generating perceptual images in the mind of the observer, which, due to the constraints imposed by
6972-502: Was a major defender of the Sākāra ("with images") school of Yogācāra Buddhism against Ratnākaraśānti , the principal defender of the rival Nirākāra school. This doctrine holds that all awareness events arise together with an "ākāra" (appearance, image, phenomenal form). Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhiśāstra is his main defense of Sākāravada while his Advaitabinduprakaraṇa is his main defense of idealism (vijñaptimātratā). For Jñānaśrīmitra,
7056-507: Was also a skilled poet and a dvāra-paṇḍita (gate-scholar) of Vikramaśīla university. Among his many students who declared themselves to be his students or were declared by others include Ratnakīrti , Atiśa and Advayavajra among others. Jñānaśrīmitra was also well-known by Hindu and Jain thinkers and his name has been referenced in the works of Udyana , Madhavaand Śaṅkaramiśra. Jñanasrimitra's philosophical work focused on Buddhist logic and epistemology ( pramāṇa ), especially
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