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Grumman F8F Bearcat

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The Grumman F8F Bearcat is an American single-engined, carrier-based fighter aircraft introduced in late World War II . It served during the mid-20th century in the United States Navy , the United States Marine Corps , and the air forces of other nations. It was Grumman Aircraft's last piston-engined fighter aircraft. Adapted versions of the Bearcat have broken speed records for piston-engined aircraft. Today, the Bearcat is popular among warbird owners and air racers .

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162-399: The Bearcat concept began during a meeting between Battle of Midway veteran F4F Wildcat pilots and Grumman vice president Jake Swirbul at Pearl Harbor on 23 June 1942. At the meeting, Lieutenant Commander Jimmie Thach emphasized one of the most important requirements in a good fighter plane was " climb rate ". Climb performance is strongly related to the power-to-weight ratio , and

324-419: A " ' glass jaw ': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one." Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration change deficiencies which limited their effectiveness. The IJN's fleet combat air patrol (CAP) had too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including a lack of radar . Poor radio communications with

486-582: A "meatball" by Allied aircrew ) that is still in use to this day , the United States removed all areas of red color (specifically removing the red center to the roundel) and removed any sort of national fin/rudder markings , which at that time had seven horizontal red stripes , from the American national aircraft insignia scheme by 6 May 1942. The British did likewise, starting with a simple paintover with white paint, of their "Type C" roundel's red center, at about

648-495: A Dark Slate Grey/Extra Dark Sea Grey disruptive pattern on top and Sky undersides, but were later painted overall dark blue. As it had become imperative for all Allied aircraft in the Pacific Theater of World War II to abandon all use of any "red devices" in their national insignia — to prevent any chance of misidentification with Japanese military aircraft, all of which bore the circular, all-red Hinomaru insignia (nicknamed

810-568: A PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers; another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later. Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and interceptors were scrambled. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based Marine fighters led by Major Floyd B. Parks , which included six F4Fs and twenty F2As, intercepted

972-537: A Zero at slow speed, one on one. In these instances I considered myself fortunate to survive a battle. Of my 21 victories, 17 were against Zeros, and I lost five aircraft in combat. I was shot down three times and I crashed one that ploughed into the line back at base and wiped out another F4U. VMF-113 was activated on 1 January 1943 at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro as part of Marine Base Defense Air Group 41. They were soon given their full complement of 24 F4U Corsairs. On 26 March 1944, while escorting four B-25 bombers on

1134-693: A better fighter than the F4F Wildcat. For them, it was not as important that the F4U could be recovered aboard a carrier, as they usually flew from land bases. Growing pains aside, Marine Corps squadrons readily took to the radical new fighter. From February 1943 onward, the F4U operated from Guadalcanal and ultimately other bases in the Solomon Islands . A dozen USMC F4U-1s of VMF-124, commanded by Major William E. Gise, arrived at Henderson Field (code name "Cactus") on 12 February. The first recorded combat engagement

1296-484: A complete IJN order of battle . Japan had a new codebook, but its introduction had been delayed, enabling HYPO to read messages for several crucial days; the new code, which took several days to be cracked, came into use on 24 May, but the important breaks had already been made. As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that

1458-431: A contract for 584 F4U-1 fighters, which were given the name "Corsair" – inherited from the firm's late-1920s Vought O2U naval biplane scout, which first bore the name – on 30 June of the same year. The first production F4U-1 performed its initial flight a year later, on 24 June 1942. It was a remarkable achievement for Vought; compared to land-based counterparts, carrier aircraft are "overbuilt" and heavier, to withstand

1620-589: A different opinion, stating that "In order to simplify spares problems and also to insure flexibility in carrier operations present practice in the Pacific is to assign all Corsairs to Marines and to equip FightRons [fighter squadrons] on medium and light carriers with Hellcats." VF-12 soon abandoned its aircraft to the Marines. VF-17 kept its Corsairs, but was removed from its carrier, USS Bunker Hill , due to perceived difficulties in supplying parts at sea. The Marines needed

1782-728: A follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan was adopted. Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign . This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from USS  Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant,

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1944-531: A lighter airframe. To meet this goal, the Bearcat's fuselage was about 5 ft (1.5 m) shorter than the Hellcat, and was cut down vertically behind the cockpit. This allowed the use of a bubble canopy , the first to be fitted to a US Navy fighter. The vertical stabilizer was the same height as the Hellcat's, but had an increased aspect ratio, giving it a thinner look. The wingspan was 7 ft (2.1 m) less than

2106-566: A radio operator/navigator. The Royal Navy hurriedly adopted higher-performance single-seat aircraft such as the Hawker Sea Hurricane and the less robust Supermarine Seafire alongside, but neither aircraft had sufficient range to operate at a distance from a carrier task force. The Corsair was welcomed as a more robust and versatile alternative. In November 1943, the Royal Navy received its first batch of 95 Vought F4U-1s, which were given

2268-521: A raid over Ponape, they recorded their first enemy kills, downing eight Japanese aircraft. In April of that year, VMF-113 was tasked with providing air support for the landings at Ujelang . Since the assault was unopposed, the squadron quickly returned to striking Japanese targets in the Marshall Islands for the remainder of 1944. Corsairs were flown by the "Black Sheep" Squadron ( VMF-214 , led by Marine Major Gregory "Pappy" Boyington ) in an area of

2430-495: A seaplane base, Midway's airstrips were a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island . Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex. It required the careful coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS  Enterprise and USS Hornet , forming Task Force 16 , were

2592-522: A shore-based unit in the Solomon Islands, VF-17 reinstalled the tail hooks so its F4Us could land and refuel while providing top cover over the task force participating in the carrier raid on Rabaul . The squadron's pilots landed, refueled, and took off from their former home, Bunker Hill and USS  Essex on 11 November 1943. Twelve USMC F4U-1s arrived at Henderson Field (Guadalcanal) on 12 February 1943. The U.S. Navy did not get into combat with

2754-467: A single unit. (In contrast, American air squadrons were considered interchangeable between carriers allowing for more flexibility.) The Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for the forthcoming battle. Thus, Carrier Division 5 , consisting of the two most advanced aircraft carriers of the Kido Butai , was not available which meant that Vice-Admiral Nagumo had only two-thirds of

2916-681: A squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and four Martin B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in total 122 aircraft. Although the F2As and SB2Us were already obsolete, they were the only aircraft available to the Marine Corps at the time. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese light carrier Shōhō had been sunk, while the fleet carrier Shōkaku had been severely damaged and

3078-523: A suicide ramming or out of control, the plane narrowly missed striking the bridge, which could have killed Nagumo and his staff, crashing into the ocean. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations. While the air strikes from Midway were happening, American submarine USS  Nautilus , commanded by Lieutenant Commander William Brockman , approached

3240-532: A total of 21 kills during the war. He remembered: I learned quickly that altitude was paramount. Whoever had altitude dictated the terms of the battle, and there was nothing a Zero pilot could do to change that — we had him. The F4U could outperform a Zero in every aspect except slow speed manoeuvrability and slow speed rate of climb. Therefore you avoided getting slow when combating a Zero. It took time but eventually we developed tactics and deployed them very effectively... There were times, however, that I tangled with

3402-604: Is an American fighter aircraft that saw service primarily in World War II and the Korean War . Designed and initially manufactured by Chance Vought , the Corsair was soon in great demand; additional production contracts were given to Goodyear , whose Corsairs were designated FG , and Brewster , designated F3A . The Corsair was designed and principally operated as a carrier-based aircraft , and entered service in large numbers with

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3564-554: Is maximized by wrapping the smallest and lightest possible airframe around the most powerful engine. Another goal was that the G-58 (Grumman's design designation for the aircraft) should be able to operate from escort carriers , which were then limited to the obsolescent F4F Wildcat, as the Grumman F6F Hellcat was too large and heavy. A small, lightweight aircraft would make this possible. After intensively analyzing carrier warfare in

3726-563: The 31st , 72nd , and 431st Bomb Squadrons. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing only three Zero fighters while destroying five Avengers, two SB2Us, eight SBDs, and two B-26s. Among the dead was Major Lofton R. Henderson of VMSB-241, killed while leading his inexperienced SBD squadron into action. The main airfield at Guadalcanal was named after him in August 1942. One B-26, piloted by Lieutenant James Muri , after dropping his torpedo and searching for an escape route, flew directly down

3888-547: The Aichi D3A 1 "Val" dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N 2 "Kate", which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable Mitsubishi A6M Zero . For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. In addition, many of

4050-583: The Dutch East Indies , the latter of which's oil resources were particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. Because of strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Imperial Navy (IJN), and infighting between the Navy's Imperial General Headquarters and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet ,

4212-471: The Dutch East Indies . In July and August 1945, Corsair naval squadrons 1834, 1836, 1841, and 1842 took part in a series of strikes on the Japanese mainland, near Tokyo. These squadrons operated from Victorious and Formidable. On 9 August 1945, days before the end of the war, Corsairs from Formidable attacked Shiogama harbor on the northeast coast of Japan. Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve pilot, Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray , of 1841 Squadron

4374-666: The Korean War and pressed into operational combat service. The F9F Panther and McDonnell F2H Banshee largely replaced the Bearcat as their performance and other advantages eclipsed piston-engined fighters. The first combat for the F8F Bearcat was during the French Indochina War (1946–1954), when nearly 200 Bearcats were delivered to the French forces in 1951. When the war ended in 1954 and French forces withdrew, 28 surviving Bearcats were donated to South Vietnam , and served with

4536-643: The New Hebrides . From April, these workshops became responsible for assembling all Corsairs for the RNZAF units operating the aircraft in the South West Pacific; and a Test and Despatch flight was set up to test the aircraft after assembly. By June 1944, 100 Corsairs had been assembled and test flown. The first squadrons to use the Corsair were 20 and 21 Squadrons on Espiritu Santo, operational in May 1944. The organization of

4698-681: The Pacific Theater of Operations for a year and a half, Grumman began development of the G-58 Bearcat in late 1943. In 1943, Grumman was introducing the F6F Hellcat , powered by the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engine, which provided 2,000 horsepower (1,500 kW). The R-2800 was the most powerful American engine, so it would be retained for the G-58. This meant that improved performance would have to come from

4860-508: The Republic of Vietnam Air Force from 1956. The Vietnamese Bearcats were retired from 1960 onwards, replaced with Douglas A-1 Skyraiders and North American T-28 Trojans as the Vietnam War (1957–1975) continued. F8Fs were also supplied to Thailand during the late 1940s. Bearcats have long been popular in air racing . A stock Bearcat flown by Mira Slovak and sponsored by Bill Stead won

5022-475: The U.S. West Coast . The Japanese operations in the Aleutians (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts considered the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, according to the original Japanese battle plan, AL was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. A one-day delay in

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5184-477: The Vought F4U Corsair , the Bearcat was marginally slower, but more maneuverable and climbed more quickly. Testing demonstrated a number of problems, notably a lack of horizontal stability, an underpowered trim system, landing gear that could be extended only at slow speeds, an unreliable airspeed indicator, and a cramped cockpit. The test pilots also requested that six guns be installed. The stability problem

5346-498: The Yokosuka Air Corps were relieved of their duties to plug the gap. Historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully believe that by combining the surviving aircraft and pilots from Shōkaku and Zuikaku , Zuikaku likely could have been equipped with almost a full composite air group. They note, however, that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their air groups must train as

5508-496: The heavy cruiser Tone and Chikuma; and 1 short-range Nakajima E8N "Dave" from the battleship Haruna ; an eighth aircraft from Tone launched 30 minutes late). Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force. As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 05:34,

5670-595: The 1930s, be dropped on enemy aircraft formations. In June 1938, the U.S. Navy signed a contract with Vought for a prototype bearing the factory designation V-166B , the XF4U-1, BuNo 1443. The Corsair design team was led by Rex Beisel . After mock-up inspection in February 1939, construction of the XF4U-1 powered by an XR-2800-4 prototype of the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp twin-row, 18-cylinder radial engine , rated at 1,805 hp (1,346 kW) went ahead quickly, as

5832-725: The 3 km World Speed Record for piston-driven aircraft (528.33 mph [850.26 km/h]), set in 1989, and a new time-to-climb record (3,000 metres [9,800 ft] in 91.9 seconds (6,425.9 ft/min [32.644 m/s]), set in 1972, breaking the 1946 record cited above). Data from F8F Bearcat in Action General characteristics Performance Armament Related development Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era Related lists Battle of Midway [REDACTED] Pacific Fleet [REDACTED] Combined Fleet 1941 1942 Second Sino-Japanese War The Battle of Midway

5994-413: The American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine H8K "Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part of Operation K , was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that

6156-575: The American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December 1941 attack, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly. Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway , a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) from Oahu . Midway

6318-428: The American ships was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea. Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ("spot") their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch. The few aircraft on

6480-413: The Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo 's carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the American fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle. This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of

6642-570: The Americans. In all, out of 18 carrier-based squadrons, eight saw combat, flying intensive ground attack/interdiction operations and claiming 47.5 aircraft shot down. At the end of World War II, under the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement, the aircraft had to be paid for or to be returned to the U.S. As the UK did not have the means to pay for them, the Royal Navy Corsairs were pushed overboard into

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6804-430: The Corsair entered service. Carrier suitability was a major development issue, prompting changes to the main landing gear, tail wheel, and tailhook . Early F4U-1s had difficulty recovering from developed spins, since the inverted gull wing's shape interfered with elevator authority. It was also found that the Corsair's left wing could stall and drop rapidly and without warning during slow carrier landings. In addition, if

6966-472: The Corsair was "...an excellent carrier type and very easy to land aboard. It is no different than any other airplane." Two Navy units, VF-12 (October 1942) and later VF-17 (April 1943) were equipped with the F4U. By April 1943, VF-12 had successfully completed deck landing qualification. At the time, the U.S. Navy also had the Grumman F6F Hellcat, which did not have the performance of the F4U, but

7128-434: The Corsair's payload and range in the attack role and to help evaluate future viability of single- versus twin-engine fighter design for Vought. Lindbergh managed to get the F4U into the air with 4,000 pounds (1,800 kg) of bombs, with a 2,000 pounds (910 kg) bomb on the centerline and a 1,000 pounds (450 kg) bomb under each wing. In the course of such experiments, he performed strikes on Japanese positions during

7290-420: The Corsair, was considered simpler to land on a carrier by an inexperienced pilot and proved to be successful almost immediately after introduction. The Navy's decision to choose the Hellcat meant that the Corsair was released to the U.S. Marine Corps. With no initial requirement for carrier landings, the Marine Corps deployed the Corsair to devastating effect from land bases. Corsair deployment aboard U.S. carriers

7452-478: The F4U were given different armaments. While most Corsair variants had the standard armament of six .50 caliber M2 Browning machine guns, some models (like the F4U-1C) were equipped with four 20 millimeter M2 cannons for its main weapon. While these cannons were more powerful than the standard machine guns, they were not favored over the standard loadout. Only 200 models of this particular Corsair model were produced, out of

7614-594: The F4U-1D, but not separately designated in British use). 430 Brewster Corsairs (334 F3A-1 and 96 F3A-1D), more than half of Brewster's total production, were delivered to Britain as the Corsair Mk III. 857 Goodyear Corsairs (400 FG-1/-1A and 457 FG-1D) were delivered and designated Corsair Mk IV. The Mk IIs and Mk IVs were the only versions to be used in combat. The Royal Navy cleared the F4U for carrier operations well before

7776-644: The F4U-1s were assembled by Unit 60 with a further batch assembled and flown at RNZAF Station Hobsonville . In total there were 336 F4U-1s and 41 F4U-1Ds used by the RNZAF during the Second World War. Sixty FG-1Ds arrived late in the war. The first deliveries of lend-lease Corsairs began in March 1944 with the arrival of 30 F4U-1s at the RNZAF Base Depot Workshops (Unit 60) on the island of Espiritu Santo in

7938-454: The Hellcat's. Structurally, the fuselage used flush riveting and spot welding, with a heavy-gauge 302W aluminum alloy skin suitable for carrier landings. Armor protection was provided for the pilot, engine, and oil cooler. The Hellcat used a 13 ft 1 in (3.99 m), three-bladed Hamilton Standard propeller. A slight reduction in size was made by moving to a 12 ft 7 in (3.84 m) Aeroproducts four-bladed propeller. Keeping

8100-407: The Hellcat, the Bearcat was 20% lighter, had a 30% better rate of climb, and was 50 mph (80 km/h) faster. Another weight-saving concept the designers found was detachable wingtips. The wings were designed to fold at a point about 2 ⁄ 3 out along the span, reducing the space taken up on the carrier. Normally, the hinge system would have to be built very strong to transmit loads from

8262-755: The IJA for the Midway operation, the IJN agreed to support their invasion of the United States through the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska , part of the Alaska Territory . The IJA occupied these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers in Alaska. Most Americans feared that the occupied islands would be used as bases for Japanese bombers to attack strategic targets and population centers along

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8424-654: The Japanese Navy's JN-25b code. Since early 1942, the U.S. had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF." It was initially not known where "AF" was, but Commander Joseph Rochefort and his team at Station HYPO were able to confirm that it was Midway: Captain Wilfred Holmes devised a ruse of telling the base at Midway (by secure undersea communications cable ) to broadcast an uncoded radio message stating that Midway's water purification system had broken down. Within 24 hours,

8586-560: The Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though they destroyed four B5Ns and one Zero. Within the first few minutes, two F4Fs and thirteen F2As were destroyed, while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged, with only two remaining airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying three Japanese aircraft and damaging many more. Of the 108 Japanese aircraft that participated in this attack, 11 were destroyed (including 3 that ditched), 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged to some degree. 140 more were available to

8748-563: The Japanese at high speed. Browning, therefore, suggested a launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an hour to close on the Japanese at 25 kn (46 km/h; 29 mph). This would place them at about 155 nmi (287 km; 178 mi) from the Japanese fleet, assuming it did not change course. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriers Enterprise and Hornet a few minutes after 07:00. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown . Vought F4U Corsair The Vought F4U Corsair

8910-499: The Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force. These included six Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway from Hornet ' s VT-8 (Midway was the combat debut of both VT-8 and the Avenger); Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 ( VMSB-241 ), consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s of the 18th Reconnaissance and 69th Bomb Squadrons armed with torpedoes, and 15 B-17s of

9072-530: The Japanese fleet, attracting attention from the escorts. Around 08:20, she made an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a battleship and then dived to evade escorts. At 09:10, she launched a torpedo at a cruiser and again dived to evade escorts, with destroyer Arashi spending considerable time chasing Nautilus . In accordance with Yamamoto's orders for Operation MI, Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve, comprising two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed (this

9234-482: The Japanese fleet. Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare ", while naval historian Craig Symonds called it "one of the most consequential naval engagements in world history, ranking alongside Salamis , Trafalgar , and Tsushima Strait , as both tactically decisive and strategically influential." In response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo ,

9396-472: The Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū , fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes. Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserves to battle without proper anti-ship armament, and likely without fighter escort; he had just witnessed how easily

9558-512: The Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, so widely separated that they were essentially unable to support each other. This dispersal resulted in few fast ships being available to escort the Carrier Striking Force, thus reducing the number of anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers. Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave

9720-406: The Japanese leadership planned a "barrier" strategy to extend Japan's defensive perimeter. They hoped to lure the American aircraft carriers into a trap, clearing the seas for Japanese attacks on Midway, Fiji , Samoa , and Hawaii . The plan was undermined by faulty Japanese anticipations of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Crucially, U.S. cryptographers were able to determine

9882-455: The Japanese, but never launched, and were destroyed when their carriers sunk. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway: American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese, and most of Midway's land-based defenses remained intact. Japanese pilots reported to Nagumo that a second aerial attack on Midway's defenses would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7 June. Having taken off prior to

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10044-475: The Pacific War, this was due in part to operational circumstances; it primarily faced air-to-air combat in the Solomon Islands and Rabaul campaigns (as well as at Leyte and for kamikaze interception), but as operations shifted north and its mission shifted to ground attack the aircraft saw less exposure to enemy aircraft, while other fighter types were exposed to more air combat. Against the best Japanese opponents,

10206-546: The Pacific without tailhooks installed. Corsairs also served well as fighter-bombers in the Central Pacific and the Philippines. By early 1944, Marine pilots were beginning to exploit the type's considerable capabilities in the close-support role in amphibious landings. Charles Lindbergh flew Corsairs with the Marines as a civilian technical advisor for United Aircraft Corporation in order to determine how best to increase

10368-603: The R-2800. But whereas the P-47 achieved its highest speed at 30,020 feet (9,150 m) with the help of an intercooled turbocharger , the F4U-1 reached its maximum speed at 19,900 ft (6,100 m) using a mechanically supercharged engine. The U.S. Navy received its first production F4U-1 on 31 July 1942, though getting it into service proved difficult. The framed "birdcage" style canopy provided inadequate visibility for deck taxiing, and

10530-438: The RNZAF in the Pacific and New Zealand meant that only the pilots and a small staff belonged to each squadron (the maximum strength on a squadron was 27 pilots): squadrons were assigned to several Servicing Units (SUs, composed of 5–6 officers, 57 NCOs, 212 airmen) which carried out aircraft maintenance and operated from fixed locations: hence F4U-1 NZ5313 was first used by 20 Squadron/1 SU on Guadalcanal in May 1944; 20 Squadron

10692-639: The Solomon Islands called " The Slot ". Boyington was credited with 22 kills in F4Us (of 28 total, including six in an AVG P-40 , although his score with the AVG has been disputed). Other noted Corsair pilots of the period included VMF-124's Kenneth Walsh , James E. Swett , Archie Donahue , and Bill "Casey" Case; VMF-215 's Robert M. Hanson and Donald Aldrich ; and VF-17's Tommy Blackburn , Roger Hedrick , and Ira Kepford . Nightfighter versions equipped Navy and Marine units afloat and ashore. One particularly unusual kill

10854-469: The U.S. Navy and Marines in World War II. It quickly became one of the most capable carrier-based fighter-bombers of the war. Some Japanese pilots regarded it as the most formidable American fighter and U.S. naval aviators achieved an 11:1 kill ratio . Early problems with carrier landings and logistics led to it being eclipsed as the dominant carrier-based fighter by the Grumman F6F Hellcat , powered by

11016-552: The U.S. Navy and showed that the Corsair Mk II could be operated with reasonable success even from escort carriers . It was not without problems; one was excessive wear of the arrester wires, due both to the weight of the Corsair and the understandable tendency of the pilots to stay well above the stalling speed. A total of 2,012 Corsairs were supplied to the United Kingdom. Fleet Air Arm (FAA) units were created and equipped in

11178-511: The U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast, remained largely unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began. At about 09:00 on 3 June, Ensign Jack Reid, piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol squadron VP-44 , spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi (580 mi; 930 km) to

11340-468: The US version of the widely used Hispano-Suiza HS.404 . Fifteen of these were later modified as F8F-1N night fighters with an APS-19 radar mounted under the starboard wing. An unmodified production F8F-1 set a 1946 time-to-climb record (after a run of 115 ft [35 m]) of 10,000 feet (3,048 m) in 94 seconds (6,383 ft/min [32.43 m/s]). The Bearcat held this record for 10 years until it

11502-653: The United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made its losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal campaign , is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific War . After expanding the war in the Pacific to include western colonies, the Japanese Empire quickly attained its initial strategic goals of British Hong Kong , the Philippines , British Malaya , Singapore , and

11664-474: The United States, at Quonset Point or Brunswick and then shipped to war theaters aboard escort carriers. The first FAA Corsair unit was 1830 NAS , created on the first of June 1943, and soon operating from HMS  Illustrious . At the end of the war, 18 FAA squadrons were operating the Corsair. British Corsairs served both in Europe and in the Pacific. The first, and also most important, European operations were

11826-786: The added benefit of minimizing complexity. (These Corsairs’ wings could still be manually folded. ) A second option was to remove the folding mechanism in the field using a kit, which could be done for Vought and Brewster Corsairs as well. On 6 December 1943, the Bureau of Aeronautics issued guidance on weight-reduction measures for the F4U-1, FG-1, and F3A. Corsair squadrons operating from land bases were authorized to remove catapult hooks, arresting hooks, and associated equipment, which eliminated 48 pounds of unnecessary weight. While there are no data to indicate to what extent these modifications were incorporated, there are numerous photos in evidence of Corsairs, of various manufacturers and models, on islands in

11988-649: The aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant all carriers of the Kidō Butai had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts in the carriers' hangars. In addition, Nagumo's carrier force suffered from several defensive deficiencies which gave it, in Mark Peattie 's words,

12150-562: The aircraft claimed a 12:1 kill ratio against the Mitsubishi A6M Zero and 6:1 against the Nakajima Ki-84 , Kawanishi N1K -J, and Mitsubishi J2M combined during the last year of the war. The Corsair bore the brunt of U.S. fighter-bomber missions, delivering 15,621 short tons (14,171 metric tons) of bombs during the war (70% of total bombs dropped by U.S. fighters during the war). Corsair losses in World War II were as follows: In

12312-553: The battle for the Marshall Islands. By the beginning of 1945, the Corsair was a full-blown "mudfighter", performing strikes with high-explosive bombs, napalm tanks, and HVARs . It proved versatile, able to operate everything from Bat glide bombs to 11.75 in (298 mm) Tiny Tim rockets. The aircraft was a prominent participant in the fighting for the Palaus , Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In November 1943, while operating as

12474-425: The best-handling piston-engined fighters ever built, its performance was sufficient to outperform some early jets. Its capability for aerobatic performance is illustrated by its selection as the second demonstration aircraft for the Navy's elite Blue Angels flight demonstration squadron in 1946, replacing the Grumman F6F Hellcat. The Blue Angels flew the Bearcat until the team was temporarily disbanded in 1950 during

12636-454: The carrier Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann , while the carriers USS  Enterprise and USS  Hornet survived the battle fully intact. After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign , Japan's capacity to replace its losses in materiel (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while

12798-534: The carrier. This saved 230 lb (100 kg). The design was completed in November 1943 and an order for two prototypes was placed on 27 November 1943 under the BuAir designation XF8F-1. The first prototype flew on 21 August 1944, only nine months after the design effort started. The initial flight test demonstrated a 4,800 ft/min (1,500 m/min) climb rate and a top speed of 424 mph (682 km/h). Compared to

12960-417: The carriers in an event of attack, and keeping them on the decks was much more dangerous than getting them airborne. Whatever the case, at that point there was no way to stop the American strike against him, since Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 (with Enterprise and Hornet having completed launching by 07:55, but Yorktown not until 09:08), so the aircraft that would deliver

13122-458: The carriers of the Kidō Butai (機動部隊, "Mobile Strike Force") and so could not sail in company with them. The Kidō Butai would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the enemy toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the Kidō Butai would make best speed to defend them. Hence

13284-470: The clock, and in 72 hours she was restored to a battle-ready state, judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required. Her flight deck was patched, and whole sections of internal frames were cut out and replaced. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship USS  Vestal , herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard. Yorktown ' s partially depleted air group

13446-447: The code breakers picked up a Japanese message that "AF was short on water." No Japanese radio operators who intercepted the message seemed concerned that the Americans were broadcasting uncoded that a major naval installation close to the Japanese was having a water shortage, which Japanese intelligence might have suspected as deception. HYPO was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with

13608-534: The control surfaces and access panels, and in one case, an engine failure. The spin recovery standards also had to be relaxed, as recovery from the required two-turn spin proved impossible without resorting to an antispin chute. The problems clearly meant delays in getting the design into production. Reports coming back from the war in Europe indicated an armament of two .30 in (7.62 mm) synchronized engine cowling-mount machine guns, and two .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns (one in each outer wing panel)

13770-634: The cowl flaps across the top of the engine compartment, diverting oil and hydraulic fluid spray around the sides of the fuselage. The curved approach used with the Seafire was also adopted for landing Corsairs, ensuring the flight deck was kept in sight as long as possible. The Royal Navy initially received 95 "birdcage" F4U-1s from Vought which were designated Corsair Mk I in Fleet Air Arm service. Next from Vought came 510 "blown-canopy" F4U-1A/-1Ds, which were designated Corsair Mk II (the final 150 equivalent to

13932-421: The crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack. The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown , and benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as

14094-409: The date and location of the planned attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to prepare its own ambush. Four Japanese and three American aircraft carriers participated in the battle. The Japanese fleet carriers — Akagi , Kaga , Sōryū , and Hiryū , part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—were sunk, as was the heavy cruiser Mikuma . The U.S. lost

14256-467: The deckhead. The change in span brought about the added benefit of improving the sink rate , reducing the F4U's propensity to "float" in the final stages of landing. The Royal Navy developed a number of modifications to the Corsair that made carrier landings more practical. Among these were a bulged canopy (similar to the Malcolm Hood ), raising the pilot's seat 7 in (180 mm), and wiring shut

14418-446: The delayed scout plane from Tone signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east, but neglected to specify its composition. Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00. Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-arm the bombers and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 20–40 minutes elapsed before Tone ' s scout finally radioed

14580-599: The designation "Corsair [Mark] I". The first squadrons were assembled and trained on the U.S. East Coast and then shipped across the Atlantic. The Royal Navy put the Corsair into carrier operations immediately. They found its landing characteristics dangerous, suffering a number of fatal crashes, but considered the Corsair to be the best option they had. In Royal Navy service, because of the limited hangar deck height in several classes of British carrier, many Corsairs had their outer wings "clipped" by 8 in (200 mm) to clear

14742-549: The designation F3M-1. These differed primarily in having the R-2800-34W engine and a small increase in fuel capacity. Deliveries from Grumman began on 21 May 1945. The end of the war led to the Grumman order being reduced to 770 examples, with the GM contract being cancelled outright. An additional order was placed for 126 F8F-1Bs replacing the .50 cal machine guns with the 20 mm M2 cannon,

14904-469: The early days of World War II, Royal Navy fighter requirements had been based on cumbersome two-seat designs, such as the fighter/dive-bomber Blackburn Skua (and its turreted derivative the Blackburn Roc ) and the fighter/reconnaissance Fairey Fulmar , since it was expected that they would encounter only long-range bombers or flying boats and that navigation over featureless seas required the assistance of

15066-423: The end of the war indicate that the F4U and FG flew 64,051 operational sorties for the U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy through the conflict (44% of total fighter sorties), with only 9,581 sorties (15%) flown from carrier decks. F4U and FG pilots claimed 2,140 air combat victories against 189 losses to enemy aircraft, for an overall kill ratio of over 11:1. While this gave the Corsair the lowest loss rate of any fighter of

15228-433: The extreme stress of deck landings. The F4U incorporated the largest engine available at the time, the 2,000 hp (1,500 kW) 18-cylinder Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp radial . To extract as much power as possible, a relatively large Hamilton Standard Hydromatic three-blade propeller of 13 feet 4 inches (4.06 m) was used. To accommodate a folding wing, the designers considered retracting

15390-461: The fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control. The carriers' escorting warships were deployed as visual scouts in a ring at long range, not as close anti-aircraft escorts, as they lacked training, doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft guns. Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let

15552-485: The first Reno Air Race in 1964. Rare Bear , a highly modified F8F owned by Lyle Shelton , went on to dominate the event for decades, often competing with Daryl Greenamyer , another famous racer with victories in his own Bearcat ( Conquest I , now at the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum ) and holder of a piston-engined aircraft world speed record in it. Rare Bear also set many performance records, including

15714-416: The first airframe ever designed from the start to have a Double Wasp engine fitted for flight. When the prototype was completed, it had the biggest and most powerful engine, largest propeller, and probably the largest wing on any naval fighter to date. The first flight of the XF4U-1 was made on 29 May 1940, with Lyman A. Bullard, Jr. at the controls. The maiden flight proceeded normally until a hurried landing

15876-468: The first units began to convert off the type that year. The last Bearcats were withdrawn in 1952. The F8F prototypes were ordered in November 1943 and first flew on 21 August 1944, a mere nine months later. The first production aircraft was delivered in February 1945 and the first squadron, Fighter Squadron 19 ( VF-19 ), was operational by 21 May 1945, but World War II was over before the aircraft saw combat service. One problem that became evident in service

16038-612: The fleet carriers at his disposal: Kaga and Akagi forming Carrier Division 1 and Hiryū and Sōryū making up Carrier Division 2 . This was partly due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941 including raids on Darwin and Colombo . Nonetheless, the First Carrier Strike Force sailed with 248 available aircraft on the four carriers (60 on Akagi , 74 on Kaga (B5N2 squadron oversized), 57 on Hiryū and 57 on Sōryū ). The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were

16200-441: The general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships ) would be concealed from

16362-426: The intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals —was occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March. Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in American submarine activity and message traffic. This information

16524-434: The internal fuel capacity to 160 US gallons (610 L) and limiting the fixed armament to four .50 cal Browning M2/AN machine guns, two in each wing.(later 183 US gallons [690 L]) The limited range due to the reduced fuel load meant it would be useful in the interception role , but the Hellcat would still be needed for longer range patrols. A later role was defending the fleet against kamikaze attacks. Compared to

16686-428: The legs allowed the hydraulic pressure to be released gradually as the aircraft landed. The Corsair was not considered fit for carrier use until the wing stall problems and the deck bounce could be solved. Meanwhile, the more docile and simpler-to-build F6F Hellcat had begun entering service in its intended carrier-based use. The Navy wanted to standardize on one type of carrier fighter, and the Hellcat, while slower than

16848-446: The length of Akagi while being fired upon by fighters and anti-aircraft fire, which had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their own flagship; the B-26 strafed Akagi , killing two men. Another B-26, piloted by Lieutenant Herbert Mayes, did not pull out of its run after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and instead flew directly at Akagi ' s bridge . Either attempting

17010-560: The long "hose nose" and nose-up attitude of the Corsair made it difficult to see straight ahead. The enormous torque of the Double Wasp engine also made it a handful for inexperienced pilots if they were forced to bolter . Early Navy pilots called the F4U the "hog", "hosenose", or "bent-wing widow maker". Carrier qualification trials on the training carrier USS Wolverine and escort carriers USS Core and USS Charger in 1942 found that, despite visibility issues and control sensitivity,

17172-478: The main landing gear rearward, but for the chord of wing that was chosen, making the landing gear struts long enough to provide ground clearance for the large propeller was difficult. Their solution was an inverted gull wing , which considerably shortened the required length of the struts. The anhedral of the wing's inboard section also permitted the wing and fuselage to meet at the optimum angle for minimizing drag , without using wing-root fairings. The bent wing

17334-593: The only carriers available to the Pacific Fleet . During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, USS  Lexington had been sunk and USS  Yorktown suffered so much damage that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown sortied and ultimately played a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with

17496-447: The only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two Kongō -class fast battleships , two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway. The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamoto's three battleships were unable to keep pace with

17658-449: The outer portions of the wing to the main spar in the inner section, which adds considerable weight. Instead of building the entire wing to be able to withstand high-g loads, only the inner portion of the wing was able to do this. The outer portions were more lightly constructed, and designed to snap off at the hinge line if the force exceeded 7.5 g. In this case, the aircraft would still be flyable and could be repaired after returning to

17820-456: The outer) meant the location of the wing fuel tanks had to be changed. In order to keep the fuel tank close to the center of gravity , the only available position was in the forward fuselage, ahead of the cockpit. Accordingly, as a 237 US gal (897 L) self-sealing fuel tank replaced the fuselage mounted armament, the cockpit had to be moved back by 32 in (810 mm) and the fuselage lengthened. Later on, different variants of

17982-441: The pilot with a limited rear view over his shoulders. A rectangular Plexiglas panel was inset into the lower center section to allow the pilot to see directly beneath the aircraft and assist with deck landings. The engine used was the more powerful R-2800-8 (B series) Double Wasp which produced 2,000 hp (1,500 kW). On the wings the flaps were changed to a NACA slotted type and the ailerons were increased in span to increase

18144-446: The presence of a single carrier in the American force. This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16 . The other carrier was not sighted. Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi , leading Carrier Division 2 ( Hiryū and Sōryū ), recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 16 D3A1 dive bombers on Sōryū and 18 on Hiryū , and half the ready cover patrol aircraft. Nagumo's opportunity to hit

18306-406: The prop clear of the deck required long landing gear, which, combined with the shortened fuselage, gave the Bearcat a significant "nose-up" profile on land. The hydraulically operated undercarriage used an articulated trunnion that extended the length of the oleo legs when lowered; as the undercarriage retracted, the legs were shortened, enabling them to fit into a wheel well, which was entirely in

18468-402: The reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes. Had Nagumo instead launched the available aircraft around 07:45 and risked the ditching of Tomonaga's aircraft, they would have formed a powerful and well-balanced force with the potential to sink two American carriers. Furthermore, fueled and armed aircraft inside the ships presented a significant additional hazard for damage to

18630-403: The right wing to stall at the same time as the left. Other problems were encountered during early carrier trials. The combination of an aft cockpit and the Corsair's long nose made landings hazardous for newly trained pilots because of the lack of visibility due to said features. During landing approaches, it was found that oil from the opened hydraulically powered cowl flaps could spatter onto

18792-504: The roll rate, with a consequent reduction in flap span. IFF transponder equipment was fitted in the rear fuselage. These changes increased the Corsair's weight by several hundred pounds. The performance of the Corsair was superior to most of its contemporaries. The F4U-1 was considerably faster than the Grumman F6F Hellcat and only 13 mph (21 km/h) slower than the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt . All three were powered by

18954-507: The sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack. To do battle with an enemy expected to muster four or five carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas , needed every available flight deck. He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey 's two-carrier ( Enterprise and Hornet ) task force at hand, though Halsey

19116-504: The same Double Wasp engine first flown on the Corsair's initial prototype in 1940. The Corsair's early deployment was to land-based squadrons of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy. The Corsair served almost exclusively as a fighter-bomber throughout the Korean War and during the French colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria . In addition to its use by the U.S. and British, the Corsair

19278-661: The sea in Moreton Bay off Brisbane, Australia. Equipped with obsolescent Curtiss P-40s , Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) squadrons in the South Pacific performed impressively, in particular in the air-to-air role. The American government accordingly decided to give New Zealand early access to the Corsair, especially as it was not initially being used from carriers. Some 424 Corsairs equipped 13 RNZAF squadrons, including No. 14 Squadron RNZAF and No. 15 Squadron RNZAF , replacing Douglas SBD Dauntlesses as well as P-40s. Most of

19440-773: The series of attacks ( Operation Tungsten ) in April, July, and August 1944 on the German battleship  Tirpitz , for which Corsairs from HMS  Victorious and HMS  Formidable provided fighter cover. It appears the Corsairs did not encounter aerial opposition on these raids. From April 1944, Corsairs from the British Pacific Fleet took part in several major air raids in South East Asia beginning with Operation Cockpit , an attack on Japanese targets at Sabang island, in

19602-408: The single-engined fighter, the Navy requested the maximum obtainable speed, and a minimum stalling speed not higher than 70 miles per hour (110 km/h). A range of 1,000 miles (1,600 km) was specified. The fighter had to carry four guns, or three with increased ammunition. Provision had to be made for antiaircraft bombs to be carried in the wing. These small bombs would, according to thinking in

19764-499: The skinning for the top and bottom of each outer wing, aft of the main spar and armament bays, and for the ailerons , elevators , and rudder . The elevators were also constructed from plywood. The Corsair, even with its streamlining and high-speed abilities, could fly slowly enough for carrier landings with full flap deployment of 50°. In part because of its advances in technology and a top speed greater than existing Navy aircraft, numerous technical problems had to be solved before

19926-506: The slower ships could not be with the Kidō Butai . The distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave implications during the battle. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the scout planes carried by the cruisers and carriers, and the additional anti-aircraft capability of the cruisers and the other two battleships of the Kongō -class in the trailing forces, were unavailable to help Nagumo. To obtain support from

20088-417: The throttle were suddenly advanced (for example, during an aborted landing ) the left wing could stall and drop so quickly that the fighter could flip over with the rapid increase in power. These potentially lethal characteristics were later solved through the addition of a small, 6 in (150 mm)-long stall strip to the leading edge of the outer right wing, just outboard of the gun ports. This allowed

20250-477: The time the U.S. Navy removed the red-center from their roundel. Later, a shade of slate gray center color replaced the white color on the earlier roundel. When the Americans starting using the added white bars to either side of their blue/white star roundel on 28 June 1943; SEAC British Corsairs, most all of which still used the earlier blue/white Type C roundel with the red center removed, added similar white bars to either side of their blue-white roundels to emulate

20412-470: The time. What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others. For instance, although Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks,

20574-458: The total of 12,571. Other variants were capable of carrying mission specific weapons such as rockets and bombs. The F4U was able to carry up to a total of eight rockets, or four under each wing. It was able to carry up to four thousand pounds of explosive ordnance. This helped the Corsair take on a fighter bomber role, giving it a more versatile role as a ground support aircraft as well as a fighter. In addition, 150 lb (68 kg) of armor plate

20736-744: The type until September 1943. The work done by the Royal Navy 's FAA meant those models qualified the type for U.S. carrier operations first. The U.S. Navy finally accepted the F4U for shipboard operations in April 1944, after the longer oleo strut was fitted, which eliminated the tendency to bounce. The first US Corsair unit to be based effectively on a carrier was the pioneer USMC squadron VMF-124 , which joined Essex in December 1944. They were accompanied by VMF-213 . The increasing need for fighter protection against kamikaze attacks resulted in more Corsair units being moved to carriers. U.S. figures compiled at

20898-489: The unescorted American bombers had been shot down. Japanese naval doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire. The arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, and then launch

21060-480: The west-southwest of Midway. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force. Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found Tanaka's transport group 570 nmi (660 mi; 1,060 km) to the west. Harassed by heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Although their crews reported hitting four ships, none were actually hit and no significant damage

21222-590: The wheel atop the lower end of the strut when retracted. A pair of rectangular doors enclosed each wheel well, leaving a streamlined wing. This swiveling, aft-retracting landing gear design was common to the Curtiss P-40 (and its predecessor, the P-36 ), as adopted for the F4U Corsair's main gear and its Pacific War counterpart, the Grumman F6F Hellcat . The oil coolers were mounted in the heavily anhedraled inboard section of

21384-422: The windscreen, severely reducing visibility, and the undercarriage oleo struts had bad rebound characteristics on landing, allowing the aircraft to bounce down the carrier deck. The first problem was solved by locking the top cowl flaps in front of the windscreen down permanently, then replacing them with a fixed panel. The undercarriage bounce took more time to solve, but eventually a "bleed valve" incorporated in

21546-548: The wing. An additional benefit of the inward-retracting units was a wide track, which helped counter propeller torque on takeoff and gave the F8F good ground and carrier deck handling. The design team had set the goal that the G-58 should weigh 8,750 lb (3,970 kg) fully loaded. As development continued, this was found to be impossible to achieve, as the structure of the new fighter had to be made strong enough for aircraft carrier landings. Weight-saving measures included restricting

21708-441: The wings, alongside the supercharger air intakes, and used openings in the leading edges of the wings, rather than protruding scoops. The large fuselage panels were made of aluminum and were attached to the frames with the newly developed technique of spot welding , thus mostly eliminating the use of rivets. While employing this new technology, the Corsair was also the last American-produced fighter aircraft to feature fabric as

21870-467: Was a better deck landing aircraft. The Corsair was declared "ready for combat" at the end of 1942, though qualified to operate only from land bases until the last of the carrier qualification issues were worked out. VF-17 went aboard the USS ; Bunker Hill in late 1943, and the Chief of Naval Operations wanted to equip four air groups with Corsairs by the end of 1943. The Commander, Air Forces, Pacific had

22032-557: Was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that took place 4–7 June 1942, six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea . The U.S. Navy under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz , Frank J. Fletcher , and Raymond A. Spruance defeated an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto , Chūichi Nagumo , and Nobutake Kondō north of Midway Atoll , inflicting devastating damage on

22194-566: Was a shock to the Japanese and highlighted a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers. This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on Naval Station Pearl Harbor would induce all of

22356-415: Was addressed on the second prototype by adding a triangular fillet to the front of the vertical stabilizer. The extra guns could not be incorporated due to weight and balance considerations. The Navy placed a production contract for 2,023 aircraft based on the second prototype on 6 October 1944. On 5 February 1945, they awarded another contract for 1,876 slightly modified aircraft from General Motors , given

22518-576: Was also used by the Royal New Zealand Air Force , French Naval Aviation , and other air forces until the 1960s. From the first prototype delivery to the U.S. Navy in 1940, to final delivery in 1953 to the French, 12,571 F4U Corsairs were manufactured in 16 separate models. Its 1942–1953 production run was the longest of any U.S. piston-engined fighter. In February 1938, the U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics published two requests for proposal for twin-engined and single-engined fighters. For

22680-586: Was awarded the Navy Cross . At war's end, Corsairs were ashore on Okinawa , combating the kamikaze , and also were flying from fleet and escort carriers. VMF-312 , VMF-323 , and VMF-224 and some other Marine units met with success in the Battle of Okinawa . Since Corsairs were being operated from shore bases, while still awaiting approval for U.S. carrier operations, 965 FG-1As were built as "land planes" without their hydraulic wing folding mechanisms, hoping to improve performance by reducing aircraft weight, with

22842-522: Was broken by a jet fighter (which still could not match the Bearcat's short takeoff distance). In 1948, Grumman introduced a number of improvements to produce the F8F-2. Among the changes were a modified cowling design, taller vertical fin, and the slightly more powerful R-2800-30W engine producing 2,240 hp (1,670 kW). In total, 293 F8F-2s were produced, along with 12 F8F-2N night fighters and 60 F8F-2P reconnaissance versions. Production ended in 1949, and

23004-425: Was delayed until late 1944, by which time the last of the carrier landing problems, relating to the Corsair's long nose, had been tackled by the British. Production F4U-1s featured several major modifications from the XF4U-1. A change of armament to six wing-mounted .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns (three in each outer wing panel) and their ammunition (400 rounds for the inner pair, 375 rounds for

23166-470: Was doctrinal: dive bombers were to be armed on the flight deck). The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located. At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets. This was a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike. Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40,

23328-414: Was heavier and more difficult to construct, however, offsetting these benefits. The Corsair's aerodynamics were an advance over those of contemporary naval fighters. The F4U was the first U.S. Navy aircraft to feature landing gear that retracted into a fully enclosed wheel well. The landing gear oleo struts —each with its own strut door enclosing it when retracted—rotated through 90° during retraction, with

23490-417: Was hit by flak but pressed home his attack on the Japanese destroyer escort Amakusa , sinking it with a 1,000 lb (450 kg) bomb but crashing into the sea. He was posthumously awarded Canada's last Victoria Cross , becoming the second fighter pilot of the war to earn a Victoria Cross as well as the final Canadian casualty of World War II. FAA Corsairs originally fought in a camouflage scheme with

23652-553: Was in drydock for months of repair. Although the fleet carrier Zuikaku escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group and was in port at the Kure Naval District in Hiroshima, awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available can be attributed to the growing inability of the IJN to properly train pilots faster than they were killed in action. In desperation, instructors from

23814-625: Was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea in Yamato , assumed Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to reveal his position. These messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons that remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions. Nimitz had one critical advantage: U.S. cryptanalysts had partially broken

23976-512: Was inflicted. Early the following morning, the Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00. This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the battle. At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway, consisting of 36 D3As and 36 B5Ns, escorted by 36 Zero fighters. At the same time, he launched his seven search aircraft (2 B5Ns from Akagi and Kaga; 4 Aichi E13A "Jakes" from

24138-402: Was installed, along with a 1.5 in (38 mm) bullet-proof windscreen which was set internally, behind the curved Plexiglas windscreen. The canopy could be jettisoned in an emergency, and half-elliptical planform transparent panels, much like those of certain models of the Curtiss P-40 , were inset into the sides of the fuselage's turtledeck structure behind the pilot's headrest, providing

24300-486: Was insufficient. The U.S. Navy 's November 1940 production proposals specified heavier armament. The increased armament comprised three .50 caliber machine guns mounted in each wing panel. This improvement greatly increased the ability of the Corsair to shoot down enemy aircraft. Formal U.S. Navy acceptance trials for the XF4U-1 began in February 1941. The Navy entered into a letter of intent on 3 March 1941, received Vought's production proposal on 2 April, and awarded Vought

24462-663: Was killed. Despite efforts to get Saratoga (which had been undergoing repairs on the American West Coast) ready, the need to resupply and assemble sufficient escorts meant she was unable to reach Midway until after the battle. On Midway, the U.S. Navy had by 4 June stationed four squadrons of PBYs —31 aircraft in total—for long-range reconnaissance duties, and six brand-new Grumman TBF Avengers from Hornet ' s VT-8 . The Marine Corps stationed 19 Douglas SBD Dauntless , seven F4F-3 Wildcats , 17 Vought SB2U Vindicators , and 21 Brewster F2A Buffalos . The USAAF contributed

24624-687: Was made when the elevator trim tabs failed because of flutter. On 1 October 1940, the XF4U-1 became the first single-engined U.S. fighter to fly faster than 400 mph (640 km/h) by flying at an average ground speed of 405 mph (652 km/h) from Stratford to Hartford . The USAAC 's twin engine Lockheed P-38 Lightning had flown over 400 mph in January–February 1939. The XF4U-1 also had an excellent rate of climb, although testing revealed some requirements would have to be rewritten. In full-power dive tests, speeds up to 550 mph (890 km/h) were achieved, but not without damage to

24786-404: Was on 14 February 1943, when Corsairs of VMF-124 under Major Gise assisted P-40s and P-38s in escorting a formation of Consolidated B-24 Liberators on a raid against a Japanese aerodrome at Kahili . Japanese fighters contested the raid and the Americans got the worst of it, with four P-38s, two P-40s, two Corsairs, and two Liberators lost. No more than four Japanese Zeros were destroyed. A Corsair

24948-692: Was outside the effective range of almost all the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. It was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would be compelled to defend it vigorously. The U.S. did consider Midway vital: after the battle, the establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Naval Air Facility Midway Island allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi (1,900 km). In addition to serving as

25110-504: Was practical, while initially holding Yorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found. Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. He left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning , to work out the details and oversee the launch. The carriers had to launch into the wind, so the light southeasterly breeze would require them to steam away from

25272-532: Was rebuilt using whatever planes and pilots could be found. Scouting Five (VS-5) was replaced with Bombing Three (VB-3) from USS  Saratoga . Torpedo Five (VT-5) was replaced by Torpedo Three (VT-3) . Fighting Three (VF-3) was reconstituted to replace VF-42 with sixteen pilots from VF-42 and eleven pilots from VF-3, with Lieutenant Commander John Thach in command. Some of the aircrew were inexperienced, which may have contributed to an accident in which Thach's executive officer Lieutenant Commander Donald Lovelace

25434-434: Was replaced with an explosives system to blow the wingtips off together, which also worked well, but this ended when a ground technician died due to an accidental triggering. In the end, the wings were reinforced, and the aircraft was limited to 7.5 g. Postwar, the F8F became a major U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps fighter, equipping 24 fighter squadrons in the Navy and a smaller number in the Marines. Often mentioned as one of

25596-454: Was responsible for one of the kills, albeit due to a midair collision. The fiasco was referred to as the "Saint Valentine's Day Massacre". Despite the debut, the Marines quickly learned how to make better use of the aircraft and started demonstrating its superiority over Japanese fighters. By May, the Corsair units were getting the upper hand, and VMF-124 had produced the first Corsair ace, Second Lieutenant Kenneth A. Walsh , who would rack up

25758-483: Was scored by Marine Lieutenant R. R. Klingman of VMF-312 (the "Checkerboards") over Okinawa. Klingman was in pursuit of a Japanese twin-engine aircraft at high altitude when his guns jammed due to the gun lubrication thickening from the extreme cold. He flew into and chopped off the enemy's tail with the large propeller of the Corsair. Despite smashing five inches (130 mm) off the end of his propeller blades, he managed to land safely after this aerial ramming attack. He

25920-591: Was stricken with shingles and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance , Halsey's escort commander. Nimitz also hurriedly recalled Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher 's task force, including the carrier Yorktown , from the South West Pacific Area . Despite estimates that Yorktown , damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, would require several months of repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard , her elevators were intact and her flight deck largely so. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around

26082-403: Was the snap-off wingtips not working as expected. While they worked well under carefully controlled conditions in flight and on the ground, in the field, where aircraft were repetitively stressed by landing on carriers and since the wings were slightly less carefully made in the factories, a possibility arose that only one wingtip would break away with the possibility of the aircraft crashing. This

26244-562: Was then relocated to 2 SU on Bougainville in November. In all there were ten front line SUs plus another three based in New Zealand. Because each of the SUs painted its aircraft with distinctive markings and the aircraft themselves could be repainted in several different color schemes, the RNZAF Corsairs were far less uniform in appearance than their American and FAA contemporaries. By late 1944,

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