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90-449: The Eight Consciousnesses (Skt. aṣṭa vijñānakāyāḥ ) is a classification developed in the tradition of the Yogācāra school of Mahayana Buddhism . They enumerate the five sense consciousnesses, supplemented by the mental consciousness ( manovijñāna ), the defiled mental consciousness ( kliṣṭamanovijñāna ), and finally the fundamental store-house consciousness ( ālāyavijñāna ), which is

180-429: A degree of personal identity and to explain why it is that certain karmic results pertain to this particular individual. The seeds are momentary, but they give rise to a perfumed series which eventually culminates in the result including, from seeds of a particular type, the whole ‘inter-subjective’ phenomenal world." Also, Asanga and Vasubandhu write that the ālaya-vijñāna ‘ceases’ at awakening, becoming transformed into

270-504: A distinctly Yogācāra system over a period of some three hundred years stretching from 100 to 400 C.E. , culminating in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha , a short text by Asaṅga (circa 350), setting out a systematic presentation of the ālaya-vijñāna doctrine developed over the previous centuries. It is the doctrine found in this text in particular that Tsong kha pa, in his Ocean of Eloquence , treats as having been revealed in toto by

360-547: A dream there appear, even without a thing/object ( artha ), just in the mind alone, forms/images of all kinds of things/objects like visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, houses, forests, land, and mountains, and yet there are no [such] things/objects at all in that [place]. MSg II.6 Another classic statement of the doctrine appears in Dharmakīrti's Pramānaṿārttika ( Commentary on Epistemology ) which states: "cognition experiences itself, and nothing else whatsoever. Even

450-462: A dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there. In detail, three natures ( trisvabhāva ) are: Various Buddhist studies scholars such as Alan Spongberg, Mario D'amato, Daniel McNamara, and Matthew T. Kapstein have noted that there are two main interpretations of the three natures doctrine among the various texts of the Yogacara corpus. The two models have been named

540-611: A forerunner of the ālāyavijñāna. The Theravadin theory is also mentioned by Xuánzàng. The texts of the Yogācāra school gives a detailed explanation of the workings of the mind and the way it constructs the reality we experience. It is "meant to be an explanation of experience, rather than a system of ontology". The theory of the ālāyavijñana and the other consciousnesses developed out of a need to work out various issues in Buddhist Abhidharma thought. According to Lambert Schmithausen ,

630-522: A form of idealism (as supported by Garfield, Hopkins, and others) or whether it is definitely not idealist (Anacker, Lusthaus, Wayman). According to Lambert Schmithausen , the earliest surviving appearance of this term is in chapter 8 of the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra , which has only survived in Tibetan and Chinese translations that differ in syntax and meaning. The passage is depicted as a response by

720-456: A nihilistic position which only affirms emptiness as the ultimate. Schmithausen notes that philological study of Yogacara texts shows that they clearly reject the independent existence of mind and the external world. He also notes that the current trend in rejecting the idealistic interpretation might be related to the unpopularity of idealism among Western academics. Florin Delenau likewise affirms

810-514: A pot. Since we can be aware of a pot even when we are not "linked" to the potter's intentions (even after the potter is dead), a more complex series of mental interactions must be posited. Nevertheless, not all interpretations of Yogācāra's view of the external world rely on multiple relations between individual minds. Some interpretations in Chinese Buddhism , such as in Huayan , defended the view of

900-537: A pure consciousness. According to Waldron, while there were various similar concepts in other Buddhist Abhidharma schools which sought to explain karmic continuity, the ālaya-vijñāna is the most comprehensive and systematic. Waldron notes that the ālaya-vijñāna concept was probably influenced by these theories, particularly the Sautrantika theory of seeds and Vasumitra's theory of a subtle form of mind (suksma-citta) . Yogācāra sources do not necessarily describe

990-705: A result of royal or government patronage (such as the Dhammayuttika Nikāya of Thailand), due to the national origin of their ordination lineage (the Siam Nikāya of Sri Lanka ), because of differences in the interpretation of the monastic code, or due to other factors (such as the Amarapura Nikāya in Sri Lanka, which emerged as a reaction to caste restrictions within the Siam Nikāya). These divisions do not rise to

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1080-551: A seemingly innovative move, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states that the alayavijñana is always active subliminally and occurs simultaneously with, "supported by and depending upon" the six sense consciousnesses. According to Asanga 's Mahāyānasaṃgraha , the alayavijñana is taught by other Buddhist schools by different names. He states that the alaya is what the Mahasamghikas call the “root-consciousness” ( mulavijñana ), what

1170-597: A self-less construction and thus vijñapti-mātra is not the ultimate truth ( paramārtha-satya ) in Yogācāra. Thus according to Gold, while Vasubandhu's vijñapti-mātra can be said to be a “conventionalist idealism”, it is to be seen as unique and different from Western forms, especially Hegelian Absolute Idealism . The interpretation of Yogācāra as a type of idealism was standard until recently, when it began to be challenged by scholars such as Kochumuttom, Anacker, Kalupahana , Dunne, Lusthaus, Powers, and Wayman . Some scholars like David Kalupahana argue that it

1260-522: A single shared external world (bhājanaloka) which was still made of consciousness, while some later Indian thinkers like Ratnakīrti (11th century CE) defended a type of non-dual monism. This argument was famously defended in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā ( Examination of the Object of Consciousness ) and its main target is Indian atomism , which was the main theory of matter in the 5th century. The argument

1350-595: A total of nine legally recognized monastic orders in Burma today under the 1990 Law Concerning Sangha Organizations. The largest of these is the Thudhamma Nikaya , which was founded in the 1800s during the Konbaung dynasty . The term Nikāya Buddhism was coined by Masatoshi Nagatomifake as a non-derogatory substitute for Hinayana , meaning the early Buddhist schools . Examples of these groups are pre-sectarian Buddhism and

1440-409: A true Self." The eighth consciousness, ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse or repository consciousness), was defined as the storehouse of all karmic seeds ( bīja ), where they gradually matured until ripe, at which point they manifested as karmic consequences. Because of this, it is also called the "mind which has all the seeds" ( sarvabījakam cittam ), as well as the "basis consciousness" ( mūla-vijñāna ) and

1530-461: A very subtle way of believing in an 'I'... once we see why physical objects can't exist we will lose all temptation to think there is a true ' me' within. There are really just impressions, but we superimpose on these the false constructions of object and subject. Seeing this will free us from the false conception of an 'I'. Siderits notes how Kant had a similar notion, that is, without the idea of an objective mind independent world, one cannot derive

1620-417: A view which states "that the world as it appears to the unenlightened ones is mere representation of consciousness". Furthermore, according to Kochumuttom, in Yogācāra "the absolute state is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of subject-object distinction. Once thus defined as emptiness ( sunyata ), it receives a number of synonyms, none of which betray idealism." According to Dan Lusthaus ,

1710-432: Is soteriologically important to get rid of the idea of really existing external objects. According to Siderits, this is because: When we wrongly imagine there to be external objects we are led to think in terms of the duality of 'grasped and grasper', of what is 'out there' and what is ' in here' - in short, of external world and self. Coming to see that there is no external world is a means, Vasubandhu thinks, of overcoming

1800-634: Is a mereological nihilism ), since they are composites and composites made of parts do not have any causal efficacy (only individual atoms do). In disproving the possibility of external objects, Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā similarly attacks Indian theories of atomism and property particulars as incoherent on mereological grounds. This argument was defended by Dharmakīrti in his Ascertainment of Epistemology ( Pramāṇaviniścaya ), which calls it "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: sahopalambhaniyama ) . According to Dharmakīrti: Because [something blue]

1890-506: Is a kind of trick built into consciousness which "projects and constructs a cognitive object in such a way that it disowns its own creation - pretending the object is "out there" - in order to render that object capable of being appropriated." This reification of cognition aids in constructing the notion of a permanent and independent self, which is believed to appropriate and possess external 'things'. Yogācāra offers an analysis and meditative means to negate this reification, thereby also negating

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1980-582: Is a mistake to conflate the terms citta-mātra (which is sometimes seen as a different, more metaphysical position) with vijñapti-mātra (which need not be idealist). However, Delenau points out that Vasubandhu clearly states in his Twenty Verses and Abhidharmakosha that vijñapti and citta are synonymous. Nevertheless, different alternative translations for vijñapti-mātra have been proposed, such as representation-only, ideation-only, impressions-only and perception-only . Alex Wayman notes that one's interpretation of Yogācāra will depend on how

2070-448: Is also called the "seed consciousness" (種子識) or container consciousness . According to Yogācāra teachings, the seeds stored in the store consciousness of sentient beings are not pure. The store consciousness, while being originally immaculate in itself, contains a "mysterious mixture of purity and defilement, good and evil". Because of this mixture the transformation of consciousness from defilement to purity can take place and awakening

2160-433: Is also called the appropriating consciousness ("adana-vijñana") because the body is grasped and appropriated by it. It is also called the "alaya-vijñana" because it dwells in and attaches to this body in a common destiny ("ekayogakṣema-arthena"). It is also called mind ("citta") because it is heaped up and accumulated by [the six cognitive objects, i.e.:] visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles and dharmas. In

2250-457: Is also supported by Stefan Anacker. According to Thomas Kochumuttom, Yogācāra is a realistic pluralism which does not deny the existence of individual beings. Kochumuttom argues that Yogācāra is not idealism since it denies that absolute reality is a consciousness, that individual beings are transformations or illusory appearances of an absolute consciousness. Thus, for Kochumuttom, vijñapti-mātra means "mere representation of consciousness,"

2340-478: Is also the name given to its major theory of mind which seeks to deconstruct how we perceive the world. There are several interpretations of this main theory: various forms of Idealism , as well as a phenomenology or representationalism . Aside from this, Yogācāra also developed an elaborate analysis of consciousness ( vijñana ) and mental phenomena ( dharmas ), as well as an extensive system of Buddhist spiritual practice, i.e. yoga. The movement has been traced to

2430-465: Is based on the premise that a perception must resemble the perceived object ( ālambana ) and have been caused by the object. According to this argument, since atoms are not extended, they do not resemble the object of perception (which appears as spatially extended). Furthermore, collections of atoms might resemble the object of perception, but they cannot have caused it. This is because collections of things are unreal in classic Buddhist thought (thus it

2520-461: Is called the All. [1] Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." The early Buddhist texts speak of anusayā (Sanskrit: anuśayāḥ), the “underlying tendencies” or “latent dispositions” which keep beings caught in

2610-435: Is created. By creating these concepts human beings become "susceptible to grasping after the object" as if it were a real object ( sad artha ) even though it is just a conception ( vijñapti ). A similar perspective which emphasizes Yogācāra's continuity with early Buddhism is given by Walpola Rahula . According to Rahula, all the elements of this theory of consciousness with its three layers of vijñāna are already found in

2700-511: Is just as good at explaining the relevant phenomena of experience as any theory of realism that posits external objects. Therefore, he then applies the Indian philosophical principle termed the "Principle of Lightness" (Sanskrit: lāghava, which is similar to Occam's Razor ) to rule out realism since vijñapti-mātra is the simpler and "lighter" theory which "posits the least number of unobservable entities." Another objection that Vasubandhu answers

2790-668: Is most commonly used in reference to the Pali Buddhist texts of the Tripitaka namely those found in the Sutta Piṭaka . It is also used to refer to monastic lineages, where it is sometimes translated as a 'monastic fraternity'. The term Nikāya Buddhism is sometimes used in contemporary scholarship to refer to the Buddhism of the early Buddhist schools . In the Pāli Canon , particularly,

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2880-524: Is no physical medium or object in existence, since a suitably strong enough intention in one mind stream can have effects on another mind stream. From the mind-only position, it is easier to posit a mind to mind causation than to have to explain mind to body causation, which the realist must do. However, Siderits then goes on to question whether Vasubandhu's position is indeed "lighter" since he must make use of multiple interactions between different minds to take into account an intentionally created artifact, like

2970-487: Is not apprehended without the additional qualification of consciousness, [and] because [blue] is apprehended when this [qualification of consciousness] is apprehended, consciousness [itself] has the appearance of blue. There is no external object by itself. (PV 3.335) According this argument, any object of consciousness, like blue, cannot be differentiated from the conscious awareness of blue since both are always experienced as one thing. Since we never experience blue without

3060-416: Is often used interchangeably with the term citta-mātra in modern and ancient Yogacara sources. The standard translation of both terms is "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Several modern researchers object to this translation in favor of alternative like representation-only . The meaning of this term is at the heart of the modern scholarly disagreement about whether Yogacara Buddhism can be said to be

3150-592: Is possible. Through the process of purification the dharma practitioner can become an Arhat , when the four defilements of the mental functions of the manas-consciousness are purified. Yogacara The compound Yogācāra literally means "practitioner of yoga ", or "one whose practice is yoga", hence the name of the school is literally "the school of the yogins". Yogācāra was also variously termed Vijñānavāda (the doctrine of consciousness), Vijñaptivāda (the doctrine of ideas or percepts ) or Vijñaptimātratā-vāda (the doctrine of 'mere representation'), which

3240-590: Is primarily meant to aid in the practice of yoga and meditation and thus it also sets forth a systematic analysis of the Mahayana path of mental training (see five paths pañcamārga ). Yogācārins made use of ideas from previous traditions, such as Prajñāpāramitā and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition, to develop a novel analysis of conscious experience and a corresponding schema for Mahāyāna spiritual practice. In its analysis, Yogācāra works like

3330-406: Is similar to Idealism (and they compare it to the idealisms of Kant and Berkeley ), though they note that it is its own unique form and that it might be confusing to categorize it as such. The German scholar and philologist Lambert Schmithausen affirms that Yogacara sources teach a type of idealism which is supposed to be a middle way between Abhidharma realism and what it often considered

3420-513: Is sometimes used as a synonym with citta-mātra (mere citta ), which is also used as a name for the school that suggests Idealism . Schmithausen writes that the first appearance of this term is in the Pratyupanna samadhi sutra , which states "this (or: whatever belongs to this) triple world is nothing but mind (or thought: * cittamatra ). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear." Regarding existing Sanskrit sources,

3510-428: Is that of how one person can influence another's experiences, if everything arises from mental karmic seeds in one's mind stream. Vasubandhu argues that "impressions can also be caused in a mental stream by the occurrence of a distinct impression in another suitably linked mental stream." As Siderits notes, this account can explain how it is possible to influence or even totally disrupt (murder) another mind, even if there

3600-549: Is that we are only ever aware of mental images or impressions which manifest themselves as external objects, but "there is actually no such thing outside the mind." The term also appears in Asaṅga's classic work, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (no Sanskrit original, trans. from Tibetan) : These representations ( vijñapti ) are mere representations ( vijñapti-mātra ), because there is no [corresponding] thing/object ( artha )...Just as in

3690-591: Is the storehouse-consciousness which induces rebirth , causing the origination of a new existence. The ālayavijñāna is also described in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as the "mind which has all the seeds" ( sarvabījakam cittam ) which enters the womb and develops based on two forms of appropriation or attachment ( upādāna ); to the material sense faculties, and to predispositions ( vāsanā ḥ ) towards conceptual proliferations ( prapañca ). The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra also defines it in varying ways: This consciousness

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3780-466: The ālāyavijñāna is accepted by the various Madhyamaka schools, as well. The Yogācāra eightfold network of primary consciousnesses –  aṣṭavijñānāni in Sanskrit (from compounding aṣṭa , "eight", with vijñānāni , the plural of vijñāna "consciousnesses"), or Tibetan : རྣམ་ཤེས་ཚོགས་བརྒྱད་ , Wylie : rnam-shes tshogs-brgyad  –  is roughly sketched out in

3870-427: The Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra , developing various core concepts such as vijñapti-mātra , the ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), the turning of the basis ( āśraya-parāvṛtti), the three natures ( trisvabhāva ), and emptiness . They form a complex system, and each can be taken as a point of departure for understanding Yogācāra. One of the main features of Yogācāra philosophy is the concept of vijñapti-mātra . It

3960-459: The Pāli Canon , corresponding to the terms viññāna (sense cognition), manas (mental function, thinking, reasoning, conception) and citta (the deepest layer of the aggregate of consciousness which retains karmic impressions and the defilements ). Yogācāra works often define three basic modes or "natures" ( svabhāva ) of experience. Jonathan Gold explains that "the three natures are all one reality viewed from three distinct angles. They are

4050-514: The Triṃśikaikākārikā (Treatise in Thirty Stanzas). According to the traditional interpretation, Vasubandhu states that there are eight consciousnesses ( vijñānāni , singular: vijñāna ): According to Kalupahana, this classification of eight consciousnesses is based on a misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikaikākārikā by later adherents. The ālayavijñāna (Japanese: 阿頼耶識 arayashiki), or

4140-499: The vijñapti-mātra theory is closer in some ways to Western Phenomenological theories and Epistemological Idealism . However, it is not a form of metaphysical idealism because Yogācāra rejects the construction of any type of metaphysical or ontological theories. Moreover, Western idealism lacks any counterpart to karma, samsara or awakening, all of which are central for Yogācāra. Regarding vijñapti-mātra, Lusthaus translates it as "nothing but conscious construction" and states it

4230-499: The ālaya-vijñāna, being a kind of vijñāna, has an object as well (as all vijñāna has intentionality ). That object is the sentient being's surrounding world, that is to say, the "receptable" or "container" ( bhājana ) world. This is stated in the 8th chapter of the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, which states that the ādānavijñāna is characterized by "an unconscious (or not fully conscious?) steady perception (or "representation") of

4320-466: The "All-encompassing foundation consciousness", forms the "base-consciousness" ( mūlavijñāna ) or "causal consciousness". According to the traditional interpretation, the other seven consciousnesses are "evolving" or "transforming" consciousnesses originating in this base-consciousness. The store-house consciousness accumulates all potential energy as seeds ( bīja ) for the mental ( nāma ) and physical ( rūpa ) manifestation of one's existence ( nāmarūpa ). It

4410-459: The "Discourse Basket" or Sutta Piṭaka , the meaning of nikāya is roughly equivalent to the English collection and is used to describe groupings of discourses according to theme, length, or other categories. For example, the Sutta Piṭaka is broken up into five nikāyas: In the other early Buddhist schools the alternate term āgama was used instead of nikāya to describe their Sutra Piṭaka s. Thus

4500-563: The "appropriating consciousness" ( ādānavijñāna ). According to the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra , this kind of consciousness underlies and supports the six types of manifest awareness, all of which occur simultaneously with the ālaya. William S. Waldron sees this "simultaneity of all the modes of cognitive awareness" as the most significant departure of Yogācāra theory from traditional Buddhist models of vijñāna, which were "thought to occur solely in conjunction with their respective sense bases and epistemic objects". As noted by Schmithausen ,

4590-457: The "pivot" model and "progressive" model by these Western scholars. The "pivot" model, found in texts like the Triṃśikā and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha , presents the dependent nature as a kind of "ontological pivot" since it is the basis for conceptual construction (the imagined nature) and for the perfected nature (which is nothing but absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature). As such,

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4680-597: The Buddha and transmitted to suffering humanity through the Yogācāra founding saints (Tib. shing rta srol byed ): Maitreya[-nātha], Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. While some noteworthy modern scholars of the Gelug tradition (which was founded by Tsongkhapa 's reforms to Atisha 's Kadam school) assert that the ālāyavijñāna is posited only in the Yogācāra philosophical tenet system, all non-Gelug schools of Tibetan buddhism maintain that

4770-423: The Buddha to a question which asks "whether the images or replicas ( *pratibimba ) which are the object ( *gocara ) of meditative concentration (* samadhi ), are different/separate ( *bhinna ) from the contemplating mind ( *citta ) or not." The Buddha says they are not different, "Because these images are vijñapti-mātra." The text goes on to affirm that the same is true for objects of ordinary perception. The term

4860-519: The Mahīśāsakas call “the aggregate which lasts as long as samsara” ( asaṃsārikaskandha ) and what the Sthaviras call the bhavaṅga . The store-house consciousness receives impressions from all functions of the other consciousnesses, and retains them as potential energy, bīja or "seeds", for their further manifestations and activities. Since it serves as the container for all experiential impressions it

4950-542: The Receptacle ( *asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti )." The ālaya-vijñāna is also what experiences rebirth into future lives and what descents into the womb to appropriate the fetal material. Therefore, the ālaya-vijñāna's holding on to the body's sense faculties and "profuse imaginings" ( prapañca ) are the two appropriations which make up the "kindling" or "fuel" (lit. upādāna ) that samsaric existence depends upon. Yogācāra thought thus holds that being unaware of

5040-473: The Three Natures ) gives a brief definition of these three natures: What appears is the dependent. How it appears is the fabricated. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only fabrication. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As

5130-442: The Yogācāra school was the doctrine of eight consciousnesses. These "eight bodies of consciousnesses" ( aṣṭa vijñānakāyāḥ ) are: the five sense -consciousnesses (of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and bodily sense), mentation (mano or citta ), the defiled self-consciousness ( kliṣṭamanovijñāna ), and the storehouse or substratum consciousness ( Skt: ālayavijñāna ). Traditional Buddhist descriptions of consciousness taught just

5220-482: The appearance, the process, and the emptiness of that same apparent entity." According to Paul Williams , "all things which can be known can be subsumed under these Three Natures." Since this schema is Yogācāra's systematic explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness ( śūnyatā ), each of the three natures are also explained as having a lack of own-nature ( niḥsvabhāvatā ). The Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa ( Exposition of

5310-520: The basis for the ego and disturbing emotions . Based on the Kangyur , the Kagyu scholar 3rd Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje additionally points out that it must also have an immediate aspect, with the power to give rise to the six primary consciousnesses. According to Gareth Sparham, The ālaya-vijñāna doctrine arose on the Indian subcontinent about one thousand years before Tsong kha pa. It gained its place in

5400-523: The basis of straightforward cognition in combination with inferential cognition , is asserted, uncommonly, in Yogācāra . Deluded awareness Tibetan : ཉོན་ཡིད་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : nyon-yid rnam-shes This Eighth Consciousness , posited on the basis of inferential cognition , is asserted, uncommonly, in Yogācāra . "Storehouse" or "repository" consciousness Tibetan : ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : kun-gzhi rnam-shes 種子識 , 阿賴耶識 , or 本識 The first five sense-consciousnesses along with

5490-613: The basis of the other seven. This eighth consciousness is said to store the impressions ( vāsanāḥ ) of previous experiences, which form the seeds ( bīja ) of future karma in this life and in the next after rebirth . All surviving schools of Buddhist thought accept – "in common" – the existence of the first six primary consciousnesses (Sanskrit: vijñāna , Tibetan : རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : rnam-shes ). The internally coherent Yogācāra school associated with Maitreya , Asaṅga , and Vasubandhu , however, uniquely – or "uncommonly" – also posits

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5580-417: The circle of samsara. These potential tendencies are generally seen as unconscious processes which "lie beneath" our everyday consciousness, and according to Waldron "they represent the potential, the tendency, for cognitive and emotional afflictions (Pali: kilesā , Sanskrit: kleśāḥ ) to arise". The Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, which relied closely on the sutras, developed a theory of seeds ( bīja , 種子) in

5670-406: The concept of a subjective "I". But Kant drew the opposite conclusion to Vasubandhu, since he held that we must believe in an enduring subject, and thus, also believe in external objects. Yogācāra gives a detailed explanation of the workings of the mind and the way it constructs the reality we experience. The central Yogācāra theory of mind is that of the eight consciousnesses. A key innovation of

5760-711: The constant co-cognition argument. This argument is found in Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā ( Twenty Verses ) and is an inference to the best explanation . It argues that consciousness-only can provide an account of the various features of experience which are explained by the existence of mind-independent material objects. This is coupled with a principle of ontological parsimony to argue in favor of idealism. Vasubandhu mentions three key features of experience which are supposed to be explained by matter and refutes them: According to Mark Siderits, after disposing of these objections, Vasubandhu believes he has shown that mere cognizance

5850-620: The dependent nature is the basis for the imagined nature, but not the basis for the perfected nature. The perfected nature on the other hand is a fundamentally pure true reality (which nevertheless is covered by adventitious defilements). As the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra states: Nik%C4%81ya Nikāya ( निकाय ) is a Pāli word meaning "volume". It is often used like the Sanskrit word āgama ( आगम ) to mean "collection", "assemblage", "class" or "group" in both Pāḷi and Sanskrit. It

5940-455: The eight consciousnesses as absolutely separate or substantial phenomena. For example, Kalupahana notes that the Triṃśika describes the various forms of consciousness as transformations and functions of a being's stream of consciousness. These transformations are threefold according to Kalupahana. The first is the ālaya and its seeds, which is the flow or stream of consciousness, without any of

6030-433: The existence of two additional primary consciousnesses, kliṣṭamanovijñāna and ālayavijñāna , in order to explain the workings of karma . The first six of these primary consciousnesses comprise the five sensory faculties together with mental consciousness, which is counted as the sixth. The kliṣṭamanovijñāna is described as an afflicted consciousness, which exhibits an ongoing subtle clinging to self that provides

6120-470: The experience of blue, they cannot be differentiated empirically . Furthermore, we cannot differentiate them through an inference either, since this would need to be based on a pattern of past experiences which included the absence or presence of the two elements. Thus, this is a type of epistemological argument for idealism which attempts to show there is no good reason to accept the existence of mind-independent objects. Vasubandhu also explains why it

6210-464: The eye, ear, etc.), and six consciousnesses "exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the sensorium ." The six consciousnesses are also not substantial entities, but a series or stream of events (dharmas), which arise and vanish very rapidly moment by moment. This is the Abhidharma doctrine of "momentariness" (kṣaṇavada), which Yogācāra also accepts. Yogācāra expanded

6300-731: The first centuries of the common era and seems to have developed as some yogis of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika traditions in north India adopted Mahayana Buddhism . The brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both c. 4-5th century CE), are considered the classic philosophers and systematizers of this school, along with the figure of Maitreya . Yogācāra was later imported to Tibet and East Asia by figures like Shantaraksita (8th century) and Xuanzang (7th-century). Today, Yogācāra ideas and texts continue to be influential subjects of study for Tibetan Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism . [REDACTED] Religion portal Yogācāra philosophy

6390-1154: The first four Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka  – the second division of the Tipitaka in the Pali Canon  – as first committed to writing during the Theravada school's fourth council at Sri Lanka in 83 (BCE). Both individually and collectively: these first six, so-called "common" consciousnesses are posited – in common – by all surviving buddhist tenet systems. Eye Consciousness Tibetan : མིག་གི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : mig-gi rnam-shes Ear Consciousness Tibetan : རྣའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : rna’i rnam-shes Nose Consciousness Tibetan : སྣའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : sna’i rnam-shes Tongue Consciousness Tibetan : ལྕེའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : lce’i rnam-shes Body Consciousness Tibetan : ལུས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : lus-kyi rnam-shes Mental Consciousness Tibetan : ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ , Wylie : yid-kyi rnam-shes This Seventh Consciousness , posited on

6480-526: The first mention of the concept occurs in the Yogācārabhumiśāstra , which posits a basal consciousness that contains seeds for future cognitive processes. It is also described in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha of Asaṅga . Vasubandhu is considered to be the systematizer of Yogācāra thought. Vasubandhu used the concept of the six consciousnesses , on which he elaborated in

6570-473: The first six vijñānas , each corresponding to a sense base ( ayatana ) and having their own sense objects (sounds etc). Five are based on the five senses, while the sixth ( mano-vijñāna), was seen as the surveyor of the content of the five senses as well as of mental content like thoughts and ideas. Standard Buddhist doctrine held that these eighteen "elements" (dhatus), i.e. six external sense bases (smells, sounds etc.), six internal bases (sense organs like

6660-462: The following table. Each of these Six Common Consciousnesses  –  referred to in Sanskrit as pravṛttivijñānāni  – are posited on the basis of valid straightforward cognition , on any individual practitioner's part, of sensory data input experienced solely by means of their bodily sense faculties. The derivation of this particular dual classification schema for these first six, so-called "common" consciousnesses has its origins in

6750-408: The idealist nature of Yogācāra texts, while also underscoring how Yogācāra retains a strong orientation to a soteriology which aims at contemplative realization of an ultimate reality that is an ‘inexpressible essence’ ( nirabhilāpyasvabhāva ) beyond any subject-object duality. Similarly, Jonathan Gold writes that the Yogācāra thinker Vasubandhu can be said to be an idealist (similar to Kant ), in

6840-536: The imagined nature is an incorrect way of experiencing the dependent, while the perfected nature is the correct way. The "progressive model" meanwhile can be found in the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its bhāṣya . In this model, it is the perfected nature which is the primary element of the three natures schema. Here, the perfected nature is the pure basis of reality, while

6930-535: The level of forming separate sects within the Theravāda tradition, because they do not typically follow different doctrines or monastic codes, nor do these divisions extend to the laity. In Burma , nikaya monastic orders have emerged in response to the relative conservativeness with which the Vinayas are interpreted, and the hierarchical structure within the nikaya. Since 1980, no new nikayas have been allowed, and there are

7020-450: The mindstream ( cittasaṃtāna , 心相續, lit. "mind-character-continuity") to explain how karma and the latent dispositions continued throughout life and rebirth. This theory later developed into the alayavijñana view. The Theravāda theory of the bhavaṅga may also be a forerunner of the ālāyavijñana theory. Vasubandhu cites the bhavaṅgavijñāna of the Sinhalese school ( Tāmraparṇīyanikāya ) as

7110-702: The non- Mahāyāna portion of the Sanskrit-language Sutra Piṭaka is referred to as "the Āgamas" by Mahāyāna Buddhists. The Āgamas survive for the most part only in Classical Tibetan and Chinese translation. They correspond closely with the Pāḷi nikāyas. Among the Theravāda nations of Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, nikāya is also used as the term for a monastic division or lineage; these groupings are also sometimes called "monastic fraternities" or "frateries". Nikāyas may emerge among monastic groupings as

7200-471: The notion of a solid self. According to Lusthaus, this analysis is not a rejection of external phenomena, and it does not grant foundational or transcendent status to consciousness. In this interpretation, instead of offering an ontological theory, Yogācāra focuses on understanding and eliminating the underlying tendencies ( anuśaya ) that lead to clinging concepts and theories, which are just cognitive projections ( pratibimba , parikalpita ). Thus, for Lusthaus,

7290-475: The orientation of the Yogācāra school is largely consistent with the thinking of the Pāli nikāyas and seeks to realign Mahayana with early Buddhist theory. According to the contemporary philosopher Jan Westerhoff, Yogācāra philosophers came up with various arguments in defense of the consciousness-only view. He outlines three main arguments: the explanatory equivalence argument, the causation-resemblance argument, and

7380-479: The other two natures are both impaired by ignorance. As the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa states: "The imputed and the other-dependent are to be known as having defiled characteristics. The perfected is asserted to have the characteristic of purity." In this text, the dependent nature is seen as something which must be abandoned since it has the "appearance of duality" (dvayākāra). As such, in this "progressive" model,

7470-470: The particular objects of perception, are by nature just consciousness itself." According to Bruce Cameron Hall, the interpretation of this doctrine as a form of subjective or absolute idealism has been "the most common 'outside' interpretation of Vijñānavāda , not only by modern writers, but by its ancient opponents, both Hindu and Buddhist." Scholars such as Jay Garfield , Saam Trivedi, Nobuyoshi Yamabe, Paul Williams, and Sean Butler argue that Yogācāra

7560-443: The processes going on in the ālaya-vijñāna is an important element of ignorance ( avidya ). The ālaya is also individual, so that each person has their own ālaya-vijñāna, which is an ever changing process and therefore not a permanent self. According to Williams, this consciousness "seen as a defiled form of consciousness (or perhaps sub- or unconsciousness), is personal, individual, continually changing and yet serving to give

7650-419: The qualifier mātra is to be understood in this context, and he objects to interpretations which claim that Yogācāra rejects the external world altogether, preferring translations such as "amounting to mind" or "mirroring mind" for citta-mātra . For Wayman, what this doctrine means is that "the mind has only a report or representation of what the sense organ had sensed." The representationalist interpretation

7740-492: The sense that for him, everything in experience as well as its causal support is mental, and thus he gives causal priority to the mental. At the same time however, this is only in the conventional realm, since "mind" is just another concept and true reality for Vasubandhu is ineffable, "an inconceivable 'thusness' ( tathatā )." Indeed, the Vimśatikā states that the very idea of vijñapti-mātra must also be understood to be itself

7830-409: The six vijñāna schema into a new system which with two new categories. The seventh consciousness developed from the early Buddhist concept of manas , and was seen as the defiled mentation ( kliṣṭa-manas ) which is obsessed with notions of "self". According to Paul Williams , this consciousness "takes the substratum consciousness as its object and mistakenly considers the substratum consciousness to be

7920-548: The sixth consciousness are identified in the Suttapiṭaka, especially in the Sabbasutta, Saṃyuttanikāya 35.23 : "Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak." "As you say, lord," the monks responded. The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks,

8010-429: The term appears in the first verse of Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā ( Twenty Verses ), which states: This [world] is vijñaptimātra , since it manifests itself as an unreal object ( artha ), just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like ( vijñaptimātram evaitad asad arthāvabhāsanāt yathā taimirikasyāsat keśa candrādi darśanam ). According to Mark Siderits, what Vasubandhu means here

8100-419: The usual projections on top of it. The second transformation is manana , self-consciousness or "Self-view, self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love". It is "thinking" about the various perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness". The ālaya is defiled by this self-interest. The third transformation is visaya-vijñapti , the " concept of the object". In this transformation the concept of objects

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