Misplaced Pages

Defence Industrial Strategy

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.

The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) is a United Kingdom government policy which was published as a white paper on 15 December 2005. The purpose of the DIS is stated to be to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with the equipment they require, on time, and at best value for money. This is achieved through the maintenance of sovereign capabilities, i.e. the capabilities of UK companies in key defence areas.

#829170

17-724: The DIS is structured into three parts. Part A outlines the strategy, part B reviews the UK defence industry, and part C describes the implications of the DIS and how it is to be implemented. The DIS builds upon the Defence Industrial Policy published in 2002 and the Strategic Defence Review of 1998. UK defence procurement was radically changed by the government of Margaret Thatcher - cost plus contracts and "national champions" were abandoned in favour of competitive tendering. This made

34-548: A major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to Operation Granby during the Gulf War . It also should be able to undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as in Bosnia ) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment - which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces - if this were made necessary by

51-542: A second crisis (as in Operation Veritas in Afghanistan ). It would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months. The Armed Forces must also retain the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a bigger (pre- Options for Change ) force as part of NATO 's collective defence should a major strategic threat re-emerge. The next wholesale review of

68-645: The Eurofighter . However the Trident system was essential to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, a policy adopted by Labour, and was already nearing completion. Likewise the Eurofighter was nearing production and withdrawal would lead to loss of considerable investment and severe penalties from the partner nations. Its overall strategic conclusions were that the British Armed Forces should be able to respond to

85-733: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Netherlands . U.S. service members serving in SFOR were awarded the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and the NATO Medal . SFOR operated as part of Operation Joint Guard and Operation Joint Forge. As time progressed, the numbers of troops allotted to SFOR declined. On 2 December 2004, SFOR disbanded and its functions were assumed by military units from

102-564: The Labour Government that had gained power a year previously. Then Secretary of State for Defence , George Robertson , set out the initial defence policy of the new government, with a series of key decisions designed to enhance the United Kingdom 's armed forces. Two of the largest defence procurement projects were excluded from the 1998 SDR, the Vanguard -class Trident submarines and

119-527: The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 and later published a white paper titled "National security through technology" in 2012. The following government initiated the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 then held a consultation on a "Defence industrial policy" in 2016. Strategic Defence Review The Strategic Defence Review ( SDR ) was a British policy document produced in July 1998 by

136-640: The British Armed Forces was the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 . Following the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon announced that work would be undertaken on a New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review. This reviewed again the UK's defence posture and plans to ensure that the country possessed the right capabilities and

153-608: The Defence Technology Strategy which takes forward some of the themes introduced in the DIS. This document discusses where science and technology research should focus on to deliver the capabilities identified in the DIS. An updated version of the DTS is expected to be published by the Defence Technology Innovation Centre (DTIC) in 2008. After the following coalition government came to power, it initiated

170-523: The UK "lose almost completely the strong industrial base that has supplied our armed forces. UK sovereignty could be threatened." The DIS has been widely seen as confirming BAE Systems as the UK's "national champion". Of the key industrial capabilities which must be maintained several are dominated by BAE, including naval vessels and submarines, armoured fighting vehicles (over 95% of the UK’s AFVs are BAE products), fixed-wing aircraft, general munitions (with

187-542: The UK defence procurement market the most open in the world and in contrast to the European continent and America. The DIS reverts to the concept of "national champions" to maintain vital capabilities, as identified by the Ministry of Defence "to maintain appropriate sovereignty and thereby protect UK national security." The Defence Industries Council warned in 2004 that the continuation of a totally "open market" approach would see

SECTION 10

#1732852456830

204-463: The assigned zone) The three AOs were known collectively as Multi-National Divisions until the end of 2002 where they were reduced in scope to Multi-National Brigades. SFOR operated under peace enforcement , not peacekeeping , rules of engagement . For example, it was cleared, in 1997, to neutralise Serb radio-television facilities. During its mandate, SFOR arrested 29 individuals who were charged with war crimes . Those arrested were transferred to

221-528: The close of 2002, and to approximately 7,000 by the close of 2004. During NATO's 2004 Istanbul Summit the end of the SFOR mission was announced. It was replaced by the European Union 's EUFOR Althea, on 2 December 2004 at NATO HQ, Camp Butmir, Sarajevo, B-H. Operation Joint Forge was succeeded by the EU's Operation Althea . SFOR was divided into three zones of operation: (Some units had troops stationed outside

238-541: The exception of certain "niche capabilities abroad") and Network Enabled Capability (defined as C4ISTAR in the DIS). After the publication of the DIS BAE Systems CEO Mike Turner said "If we didn't have the DIS and our profitability and the terms of trade had stayed as they were... then there had to be a question mark about our future in the U.K." The year after the release of the DIS the government released

255-518: The right forces to meet the additional challenges faced after 9/11. The review concluded; SFOR The Stabilisation Force ( SFOR ) was a NATO -led multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Bosnian War . Although SFOR was led by NATO, several non-NATO countries contributed troops. It was replaced by EUFOR Althea in December 2004. The stated mission of SFOR

272-777: Was established in Security Council Resolution 1088 on 12 December 1996. It succeeded the much larger Implementation Force IFOR which was deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 20 December 1995 with a one-year mandate. The commanders of the SFOR, who each served one-year terms, were General William W. Crouch , General Eric Shinseki , General Montgomery Meigs , Lt. General Ronald Adams , Lt. General Michael Dodson , Lt. General John B. Sylvester , Lt. General William E. Ward , Major General Virgil Packett and Brigadier General Steven P. Schook . SFOR operated in support of NATO Operation Joint Guard and Operation Joint Forge . Troop levels were reduced to approximately 12,000 by

289-514: Was to "deter hostilities and stabilise the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and co-ordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina". SFOR

#829170