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CLARION (cognitive architecture)

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Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction On-line ( CLARION ) is a computational cognitive architecture that has been used to simulate many domains and tasks in cognitive psychology and social psychology , as well as implementing intelligent systems in artificial intelligence applications. An important feature of CLARION is the distinction between implicit and explicit processes and focusing on capturing the interaction between these two types of processes. The system was created by the research group led by Ron Sun .

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131-457: CLARION is an integrative cognitive architecture, it is used to explain and simulate cognitive-psychological phenomena, which could potentially lead to an unified explanation of psychological phenomena. There are three layers to the CLARION theory, the first layer is the core theory of mind. The main theories consists of a number of distinct subsystems, which are the essential structures of CLARION, with

262-782: A better metacognition were reported to have used fewer strategies, but solved problems more effectively than students with poor metacognition, regardless of IQ or prior knowledge. A lack of awareness of one's own knowledge, thoughts, feelings, and adaptive strategies leads to inefficient control over them. Hence, metacognition is a necessary life skill that needs nurturing to improve one's quality of life. Maladaptive use of metacognitive skills in response to stress can strengthen negative psychological states and social responses, potentially leading to psychosocial dysfunction. Examples of maladaptive metacognitive skills include worry based on inaccurate cognitive conceptions, rumination, and hypervigilance. Continuous cycles of negative cognitive conceptions and

393-459: A basic action it is not just important what the agent can do but what the agent actually does. So raising one's right hand may only count as a basic action if it is done directly through the right hand. If the agent uses her left hand to lift the right hand then the raising of the right hand is not a basic action anymore. A contrasting view identifies basic actions not with bodily movements but with mental volitions. One motivation for this position

524-503: A chain smoker may have a negative impact on the health of the people around him. This is a side-effect of his smoking that is not part of his intention. The smoker may still be responsible for this damage, either because he was aware of this side-effect and decided to ignore it or because he should have been aware of it, so-called negligence . In the theory of enactivism , perception is understood to be sensorimotor in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving

655-556: A computerized token economy task first in which they can accumulate tokens to exchange food rewards. Monkeys were presented with multiple images of common objects simultaneously and then a moving border appearing on the screen indicating the target. Immediately following the presentation, the target images and some distractors were shown in the test. During the training phase, monkeys received immediate feedback after they made responses. They can earn two tokens if they make correct choices but lost two tokens if they were wrong. In Experiment 1,

786-460: A content from consciousness. One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events often appear to be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control. Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the standard account of actions in terms of intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think about something already needs to include

917-458: A core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a constituent of it. An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, and basic actions, for which this is not the case. Most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But many philosophers consider mental actions to be

1048-635: A distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations and decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. Conceptions of action try to determine what all actions have in common or what their essential features are. Causalist theories, like Donald Davidson 's account or standard forms of volitionalism, hold that causal relations between

1179-434: A dual representational structure in each subsystem (implicit versus explicit representations). Its subsystems include the action-centered subsystem, the non-action-centered subsystem, the motivational subsystem, and the meta-cognitive subsystem. The second layer consists of the computational models that implements the basic theory; it is more detailed than the first level theory but is still general. The third layer consists of

1310-416: A false sense of confidence about their ability to judge others, people will return to relying on social stereotypes. Cultural backgrounds influence social metacognitive assumptions, including stereotypes. For example, cultures without the stereotype that memory declines with old age display no age differences in memory performance. When it comes to making judgments about other people, implicit theories about

1441-418: A group combine with their implicit theories, more stereotypical judgments may be formed. Stereotypes that one believes others hold about them are called metastereotypes . Beran, Smith, and Perdue (2013) found that chimpanzees showed metacognitive monitoring in the information-seeking task. In their studies, three language-trained chimpanzees were asked to use the keyboard to name the food item in order to get

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1572-453: A lot of favorable knowledge about their family, but they may not maintain close relations with their family if it is of low importance. Metacognitive characteristics of attitudes may be key to understanding how attitudes change. Research shows that the frequency of positive or negative thoughts is the biggest factor in attitude change. A person may believe that climate change is occurring but have negative thoughts toward it such as "If I accept

1703-412: A mastery-oriented pattern. They immediately began to consider various ways that they could approach the task differently, and they increase their efforts. Cultural beliefs can act on this as well. For example, a person who has accepted a cultural belief that memory loss is an unavoidable consequence of old age may avoid cognitively demanding tasks as they age, thus accelerating cognitive decline. Similarly,

1834-405: A much greater impact on the attitude compared to ideas of others. Therefore, when people view lifestyle changes as coming from themselves, the effects are more powerful than if the changes were coming from a friend or family member. These thoughts can be re-framed in a way that emphasizes personal importance, such as "I want to stop smoking because it is important to me" rather than "quitting smoking

1965-463: A non-causal way. Some suggestions have been made on this issue but this is still an open problem since none of them have gathered significant support. The teleological approach, for example, holds that this relation is to be understood not in terms of efficient causation but in terms of final "causation" . One problem with this approach is that the two forms of causation do not have to be incompatible. Few theorists deny that actions are teleological in

2096-420: A pedestrian witnessing a terrible car accident may be morally responsible for calling an ambulance and for providing help directly if possible. Additionally to what the agent did, it is also relevant what the agent could have done otherwise, i.e. what powers and capacities the agent had. The agent's intentions are also relevant for responsibility, but we can be responsible for things we did not intend. For example,

2227-600: A proportional strength, opportunity will also be taken into account The role of the meta-cognitive subsystem is to monitor, direct, and modify the operations of all the other subsystems. Actions in the meta-cognitive subsystem include: setting goals for the action-centred subsystem, setting parameters for the action and non-action subsystems, and changing an ongoing process in both the action and non-action subsystems. Learning can be represented with both explicit and implicit knowledge individually while also representing bottom-up and top-down learning. Learning with implicit knowledge

2358-421: A result, Clarion theory can account for various phenomena, such as speed-up effects in learning, verbalization-related performance gains, performance gains in transfer tasks, and the ability to perform similarity-based reasoning, in terms of synergistic interaction between implicit and explicit processes. These interactions involve both the flow of activations within the architecture (e.g., similarity-based reasoning

2489-463: A significant positive correlation between memory accuracy and risk choice in two rhesus monkeys. That is, they were more likely to select the high-risk option if they answered correctly in the working memory task but select the low-risk option if they were failed in the memory task. Then Morgan et al. (2014) examine monkeys’ prospective metacognitive monitoring skills in Experiment 2. This study employed

2620-411: A significant presence of explicit processes). In addition, extensive work has been done on a complex minefield navigation task, which involves complex sequential decision-making. Work on organizational decision tasks and other social simulation tasks, as well as meta-cognitive tasks, has also been initiated. Other applications of the cognitive architecture include simulation of creativity and addressing

2751-447: A single chunk node, a collection of (micro)feature nodes, and links between the chunk node and the (micro)feature nodes. In this way a single chunk of knowledge may be expressed in both explicit (i.e., localist) and implicit (i.e., distributed) form, though such dual expression is not always required. The dual representational structure allows implicit and explicit processes to communicate and, potentially, to encode content redundantly. As

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2882-419: A square, or a star) and then they were required to peck the matched sample when three stimuli simultaneously appeared on the screen at the end of the retention interval. A safe key was also presented in some trials next to three sample stimuli which allow them to decline that trial. Pigeons received a high reward for pecking correct stimuli, a middle-level reward for pecking the safe key, and nothing if they pecked

3013-454: A stream of mental events and a higher level awareness of the flow of events. Mindfulness can be distinguished from some metacognition processes in that it is a conscious process. Although metacognition has thus far been discussed in relation to the self , recent research in the field has suggested that this view is overly restrictive. Instead, it is argued that metacognition research should also include beliefs about others' mental processes,

3144-413: A strict distinction between our agency and our body, which is not how things appear to us. One way to avoid this objection is to hold that volitions constitute bodily movements, i.e. are an aspect of them, instead of causing them. Another response able to soften this objection is to hold that volitions are not just the initial triggers of the bodily movements but that they are continuous activities guiding

3275-543: A task, and making graphic representations (e.g. concept maps, flow charts, semantic webs) of one's thoughts and knowledge. Carr, 2002, argues that the physical act of writing plays a large part in the development of metacognitive skills. Strategy Evaluation matrices (SEM) can help to improve the knowledge of cognition component of metacognition. The SEM works by identifying the declarative (Column 1), procedural (Column 2) and conditional (Column 3 and 4) knowledge about specific strategies. The SEM can help individuals identify

3406-564: A variety of psychological data, such as the serial reaction time task, the artificial grammar learning task, the process control task, a categorical inference task, an alphabetical arithmetic task, and the Tower of Hanoi task. The serial reaction time and process control tasks are typical implicit learning tasks (mainly involving implicit reactive routines), while the Tower of Hanoi and alphabetic arithmetic are high-level cognitive skill acquisition tasks (with

3537-535: A wall, in which the jumping itself (corresponding to the triggering) is considered an action, but the falling (corresponding to the entertaining of a content) is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control. Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent object that this account of mental actions is not complete. Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during meditation , they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing

3668-449: A woman who is aware of the stereotype that purports that women are not good at mathematics may perform worse on tests of mathematical ability or avoid mathematics altogether. These examples demonstrate that the metacognitive beliefs people hold about the self - which may be socially or culturally transmitted - can have important effects on persistence, performance, and motivation. The way that individuals think about attitude greatly affects

3799-429: Is wayward if the intention caused its goal to realize but in a very unusual way that was not intended, e.g. because the skills of the agent are not exercised in the way planned. For example, a rock climber forms the intention to kill the climber below him by letting go of the rope. A wayward causal chain would be that, instead of opening the holding hand intentionally, the intention makes the first climber so nervous that

3930-405: Is 'stable' in that learners' initial decisions derive from the pertinent facts about their cognition through years of learning experience. Simultaneously, it is also 'situated' in the sense that it depends on learners' familiarity with the task, motivation, emotion, and so forth. Individuals need to regulate their thoughts about the strategy they are using and adjust it based on the situation to which

4061-461: Is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that allows for the existence of both physical and mental actions. Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering. One influential account of mental action comes from Galen Strawson , who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness". According to this view,

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4192-399: Is a salient feature of good self-regulated learners, but does not guarantee automatic application. Reinforcing collective discussion of metacognition is a salient feature of self-critical and self-regulating social groups. The activities of strategy selection and application include those concerned with an ongoing attempt to plan, check, monitor, select, revise, evaluate, etc. Metacognition

4323-502: Is also important to note since there is an implicit layer, that not all declarative knowledge has to be explicit. The role of the motivational subsystem is to provide underlying motivations for perception, action, and cognition. The motivational system in CLARION is made up of drives on the bottom level, and each drive can have varying strengths. There are low level drives, and also high level drives aimed at keeping an agent sustained, purposeful, focused, and adaptive. The explicit layer of

4454-453: Is also more likely to influence behavior than certainty of the attitude. When considering a social behavior like voting a person may hold high importance but low certainty. This means that they will likely vote, even if they are unsure whom to vote for. Meanwhile, a person who is very certain of who they want to vote for, may not actually vote if it is of low importance to them. This also applies to interpersonal relationships. A person might hold

4585-550: Is an important aspect of metacognition. Writings on metacognition date back at least as far as two works by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC): On the Soul and the Parva Naturalia . This higher-level cognition was given the label metacognition by American developmental psychologist John H. Flavell (1976). The term metacognition literally means 'above cognition', and

4716-605: Is an important skill in cognitive regulation, it is about focusing cognitive resources on relevant information. Similarly, maintaining motivation to see a task to completion is also a metacognitive skill that is closely associated with the attentional control. The ability to become aware of distracting stimuli – both internal and external – and sustain effort over time also involves metacognitive or executive functions . Swanson (1990) found that metacognitive knowledge can compensate for IQ and lack of prior knowledge when comparing fifth and sixth grade students' problem solving. Students with

4847-426: Is between basic and non-basic actions . This distinction is closely related to the problem of individuation since it also depends on the notion of doing one thing by or in virtue of doing another thing, like turning on a light by flipping a switch. In this example, the flipping of the switch is more basic than the turning-on of the light. But the turning-on of the light can itself constitute another action, like

4978-488: Is important to my family". More research needs to be conducted on culture differences and importance of group ideology, which may alter these results. People have secondary cognitions about the appropriateness, justifiability, and social judgability of their own stereotypic beliefs. People know that it is typically unacceptable to make stereotypical judgments and make conscious efforts not to do so. Subtle social cues can influence these conscious efforts. For example, when given

5109-403: Is inevitable, or they are not, in which case there would be no need to posit them as an explanatory inert " ghost in the machine ". But it has been suggested that this constitutes a false dilemma : that volitions can play an explanatory role without leading to a vicious regress . John Stuart Mill , for example, avoids this problem by holding that actions are composed of two parts: a volition and

5240-404: Is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm". There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and

5371-424: Is problematic since it threatens to lead to a vicious regress : if something is an action because it was caused by a volition then we would have to posit one more volition in virtue of which the first trying can be regarded as an action. An influential criticism of the volitional explanations of actions is due to Gilbert Ryle , who argued that volitions are either active , in which case the aforementioned regress

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5502-531: Is represented through Q-learning, while learning with just explicit knowledge is represented with one-shot learning such as hypothesis testing. Bottom-up learning is represented through a neural network propagating up to the explicit layer through the Rule-Extraction-Refinement algorithm (RER), while top-down learning can be represented through a variety of ways. To compare with a few other cognitive architectures: CLARION has been used to account for

5633-664: Is supported by spreading activation among chunks through shared (micro)features) as well as bottom-up, top-down and parallel learning processes. In bottom-up learning, associations among (micro)features in the bottom level are extracted and encoded as explicit rules. In top-down learning, rules in the top level guide the development of implicit associations in the bottom level. Additionally, learning may be carried out in parallel, touching both implicit and explicit processes simultaneously. Through these learning processes knowledge may be encoded redundantly or in complementary fashion, as dictated by agent history. Synergy effects arise, in part, from

5764-481: Is that he has prostate cancer, another is that they have his favorite newspaper in the waiting area. Abdul is aware of both of these reasons, but he performs this action only because of the former reason. Causalist theories can account for this fact through causal relation: the former but not the latter reason causes the action. The challenge to non-causalist theories is to provide a convincing non-causal explanation of this fact. The problem of individuation concerns

5895-517: Is that volitions are the most direct element in the chain of agency: they cannot fail, unlike bodily actions, whose success is initially uncertain. One argument against this position is that it may lead to a vicious regress if it is paired with the assumption that an earlier volition is needed in order for the first volition to constitute an action. This is why volitionists often hold that volitions cause actions or are parts of actions but are not full actions themselves. Philosophers have investigated

6026-482: Is that we often do one thing by doing another thing: we shoot the gun by pulling the trigger or we turn on the light by flipping the switch. One argument against this view is that the different events may happen at different times. For example, Lincoln died of his injuries the following day, so a significant time after the shooting. This raises the question of how to explain that two events happening at different times are identical. An important distinction among actions

6157-408: Is the domain of interest of emergent systemics . Metacognition has two interacting phenomena guided by a person's cognitive regulation: Metacognition refers to a level of thinking and metacognitive regulation, the regulation of cognition and subsequent learning experiences that help people enhance their learning through a set of activities. It involves active metacognitive control or attention over

6288-459: Is to hold that basic actions correspond to the most simple commands we can follow. This position excludes most forms of muscle contractions and chemical processes from the list of basic actions since we usually cannot follow the corresponding commands directly. What counts as a basic action, according to this view, depends on the agent's skills. So contracting a given muscle is a basic action for an agent who has learned to do so. For something to be

6419-451: Is used to indicate cognition about cognition, or more informally, thinking about thinking. Flavell defined metacognition as knowledge about cognition and control of cognition. For example, a person is engaging in metacognition if they notice that they are having more trouble learning A than B, or if it strikes them that they should double-check C before accepting it as fact. J. H. Flavell (1976, p. 232). Andreas Demetriou 's theory (one of

6550-574: The neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development ) used the term hyper-cognition to refer to self-monitoring, self-representation, and self-regulation processes, which are regarded as integral components of the human mind. Moreover, with his colleagues, he showed that these processes participate in general intelligence , together with processing efficiency and reasoning, which have traditionally been considered to compose fluid intelligence . Metacognition also involves thinking about one's own thinking process such as study skills, memory capabilities, and

6681-573: The "right tool for the job" and modify learning strategies and skills based on their awareness of effectiveness. Individuals with a high level of metacognitive knowledge and skill identify blocks to learning as early as possible and change "tools" or strategies to ensure goal attainment. A broader repertoire of "tools" also assists in goal attainment. When "tools" are general, generic, and context independent, they are more likely to be useful in different types of learning needs. In one study examining students who received text messages during college lectures, it

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6812-570: The ability to monitor learning. This concept needs to be explicitly taught along with content instruction. A pithy statement from M.D. Gall et al. is often cited in this respect: "Learning how to learn cannot be left to students. It must be taught." Metacognition is a general term encompassing the study of memory-monitoring and self-regulation, meta-reasoning, consciousness / awareness and autonoetic consciousness / self-awareness . In practice these capacities are used to regulate one's own cognition, to maximize one's potential to think, learn and to

6943-414: The action of alerting the burglar. It is usually held that the chain or hierarchy of actions composed this way has a fundamental level at which it stops. The action at this fundamental level is called a basic action : it is not done by doing something else. For this reason, basic actions are simple while non-basic actions are complex. It is often assumed that bodily movements are basic actions , like

7074-447: The action-centered subsystem is to control both external and internal actions . The implicit layer is made of neural networks called Action Neural Networks, while the explicit layer is made up of action rules. There can be synergy between the two layers, for example learning a skill can be expedited when the agent has to make explicit rules for the procedure at hand. It has been argued that implicit knowledge alone cannot optimize as well as

7205-402: The agent performed the action. The most straightforward answer to this question cites the agent's desire. For example, John went to the fridge because he had a desire for ice cream. The agent's beliefs are another relevant feature for action explanation. So the desire to have ice cream does not explain that John went to the fridge unless it is paired with John's belief that there is ice cream in

7336-419: The agent's mental states and the resulting behavior are essential to actions. According to Davidson, actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions in the right way. Volitionalist theories include the notion of volitions in their account of actions. Volitions are understood as forms of summoning of means within one's power and are different from merely intending to do something later. Non-causalists, on

7467-463: The agent's role in the production of action. This role could include reflecting on what to do, choosing an alternative and then carrying it out. Another objection is that mere intentions seem to be insufficient to cause actions, that other additional elements, namely volitions or tryings, are necessary. For example, as John Searle has pointed out, there seems to be a causal gap between intending to do something and actually doing it, which needs an act of

7598-604: The associated emotional burden often lead to negative coping strategies such as avoidance and suppression. These can foster pervasive learned helplessness and impair the formation of executive functions, negatively affecting an individual's quality of life. The theory of metacognition plays a critical role in successful learning, and it's important for both students and teachers to demonstrate understanding of it. Students who underwent metacognitive training including pretesting, self evaluation, and creating study plans performed better on exams. They are self-regulated learners who utilize

7729-577: The association between reward and external stimuli through simple reinforcement models. However, many studies have demonstrated that the reinforcement model alone cannot explain animals’ behavioral patterns. Animals have shown adaptive metacognitive behavior even with the absence of concrete reward. Metacognitive-like processes are especially ubiquitous when it comes to the discussion of self-regulated learning . Self-regulation requires metacognition by looking at one's awareness of their learning and planning further learning methodology. Attentive metacognition

7860-401: The behavior is causalism : driving the car is an action because it is caused by the agent's intention to do so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history. Causalist theories include Donald Davidson 's account, which defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way, and volitionalist theories, according to which volitions form

7991-399: The belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token-identity reductionists. Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible. For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes. This viewpoint maintains that

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8122-431: The bodily movement corresponding to it. Volitions can also be used to explain how the agent knows about her own action. This knowledge about what one is doing or trying to do is available directly through introspection: the agent does not need to observe her behavior through sensory perception to arrive at this knowledge, unlike an external observer. The experience of agency involved in volitions can be distinguished from

8253-417: The bodily movements while they are occurring. Non-causalist or anti-causalist theories deny that intentions or similar states cause actions. They thereby oppose causalist theories like Davidson's account or standard forms of volitionalism. They usually agree that intentions are essential to actions. This brings with it the difficulty of accounting for the relation between intentions and actions in

8384-447: The burglar then alerting the burglar is part of the agent's actions. In an example from Anscombe 's manuscript Intention , pumping water can also be an instance of poisoning the inhabitants. One difficulty with theories of action that try to characterize actions in terms of causal relations between mental states and bodily movements, so-called causalist theories , is what has been referred to as wayward causal chains. A causal chain

8515-529: The cognition of others, such as judging the perceptions and emotional states of others. This is in part because the process of judging others is similar to judging the self. However, individuals have less information about the people they are judging; therefore, judging others tends to be more inaccurate; an effect called the fundamental attribution error . Having similar cognitions can buffer against this inaccuracy and can be helpful for teams or organizations, as well as interpersonal relationships. An example of

8646-399: The combination of both explicit and implicit. The role of the non-action-centered subsystem is to maintain general knowledge. The implicit layer is made of Associative Neural Networks, while the bottom layer is associative rules. Knowledge is further divided into semantic and episodic, where semantic is generalized knowledge, and episodic is knowledge applicable to more specific situations. It

8777-776: The computational basis of consciousness (or artificial consciousness ). Meta-cognition Metacognition is an awareness of one's thought processes and an understanding of the patterns behind them. The term comes from the root word meta , meaning "beyond", or "on top of". Metacognition can take many forms, such as reflecting on one's ways of thinking, and knowing when and how oneself and others use particular strategies for problem-solving . There are generally two components of metacognition: (1) cognitive conceptions and (2) cognitive regulation system. Research has shown that both components of metacognition play key roles in metaconceptual knowledge and learning. Metamemory , defined as knowing about memory and mnemonic strategies,

8908-435: The concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements. It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action. Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that all actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding section above. However, there

9039-512: The confidence rating was introduced after they completed their responses in order to test the retrospective metamemory judgments. After each response, a high-risk and a low-risk choice were provided to the monkeys. They could earn one token regardless of their accuracy if they choose the low-risk option. When they chose high-risk, they were rewarded with three tokens if their memory response was correct on that trial but lost three tokens if they made incorrect responses. Morgan and colleagues (2014) found

9170-458: The container. Their results suggested that chimpanzees know what they have seen and show effective information-seeking behavior when information is incomplete. Morgan et al. (2014) investigated whether rhesus macaques can make both retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments on the same memory task. Risk choices were introduced to assess the monkey's confidence about their memories. Two male rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta ) were trained in

9301-406: The content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action. An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish

9432-446: The delay between baiting the reward and selecting the fence was longer. Their findings suggested that dogs have some aspect of information-searching behaviors but less flexibly compared to apes. Smith et al. (1995) evaluated whether dolphins have the ability of metacognitive monitoring in an auditory threshold paradigm. A bottlenosed dolphin was trained to discriminate between high-frequency tones and low-frequency tones. An escape option

9563-508: The discrimination task. Rats might have learned the association between intermediate stimuli and the decline option over time. Longer response latencies or some features inherent to stimuli can serve as discriminative cues to decline tests. Therefore, Templer, Lee, and Preston (2017) utilized an olfactory-based delayed match to sample (DMTS) memory task to assess whether rats were capable of metacognitive responding adaptively. Rats were exposed to sample odor first and chose to either decline or take

9694-435: The discrimination task. This behavioral pattern indicated that pigeons could evaluate the difficulty of the task internally and actively search for information when is necessary. Dogs have shown a certain level of metacognition that they are sensitive to information they have acquired or not. Belger & Bräuer (2018) examined whether dogs could seek additional information when facing uncertain situations. The experimenter put

9825-487: The domain of cognitive neuroscience , metacognitive monitoring and control has been viewed as a function of the prefrontal cortex , which receives (monitors) sensory signals from other cortical regions and implements control using feedback loops (see chapters by Schwartz & Bacon and Shimamura, in Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). Metacognition is studied in the domain of artificial intelligence and modelling . Therefore, it

9956-490: The domain of experimental psychology, an influential distinction in metacognition (proposed by T. O. Nelson & L. Narens) is between Monitoring—making judgments about the strength of one's memories—and Control—using those judgments to guide behavior (in particular, to guide study choices). Dunlosky, Serra, and Baker (2007) covered this distinction in a review of metamemory research that focused on how findings from this domain can be applied to other areas of applied research. In

10087-641: The evaluation of proper ethical / moral rules . It can also lead to a reduction in response time for a given situation as a result of heightened awareness, and potentially reduce the time to complete problems or tasks. In the context of student metacognition, D. N. Perkins and Gavriel Salomon observe that metacognition concerns students' ability to monitor their progress. During this process, students ask questions like “What am I doing now?”, “Is it getting me anywhere?", and “What else could I be doing instead?”. Perkins and Salomon argue that such metacognitive practices help students to avoid unproductive approaches. In

10218-405: The events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions. Mental actions, in the strict sense, are prefatory or catalytic : they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise. They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the intended contents will appear. Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off

10349-407: The experience of freedom, which involves the additional aspect of having various alternative routes of action to choose from. But volition is possible even if there are no additional alternatives. Volitionalists usually hold that there is a causal relation between volitions and bodily movements. Critics have pointed out that this position threatens to alienate us from our bodies since it introduces

10480-404: The first evidence that rats have the knowledge of what they know in a perceptual discrimination task. Rats were required to classify brief noises as short or long. Some noises with intermediate durations were difficult to discriminate as short or long. Rats were provided with an option to decline to take the test on some trials but were forced to make responses on other trials. If they chose to take

10611-422: The food. The food in the container was either visible to them or they had to move toward the container to see its contents. Studies shown that chimpanzees were more often to check what was in the container first if the food in the container was hidden. But when the food was visible to them, the chimpanzees were more likely to directly approach the keyboard and reported the identity of the food without looking again in

10742-399: The form of mental causation bridging the gap between mental intention and bodily movement. Volitionalism as a theory is characterized by three core theses: (1) that every bodily action is accompanied by a trying, (2) that tryings can occur without producing bodily movements and (3) that in the case of successful tryings, the trying is the cause of the bodily movement. The central idea of

10873-471: The four-choice memory test after a delay. The correct choices of odor were associated with high reward and incorrect choices have no reward. The decline options were accompanied by a small reward. In experiment 2, some “no-sample” trials were added in the memory test in which no odor was provided before the test. They hypothesized that rats would decline more often when there was no sample odor presented compared with odor presented if rats could internally assess

11004-500: The fridge would be considered irrational if his reason for this is bad, e.g. because his belief that there is ice cream in the fridge is merely based on wishful thinking . The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. But in one sense the problem of responsibility is wider since we can be responsible not just for doing something but for failing to do something, so-called omissions . For example,

11135-466: The fridge. The desire together with the belief is often referred to as the reason for the action. Causalist theories of action usually hold that this reason explains the action because it causes the action. Behavior that does not have a reason is not an action since it is not intentional. Every action has a reason but not every action has a good reason. Only actions with good reasons are considered rational . For example, John's action of going to

11266-447: The implicit-explicit distinction independently from the distinction between procedural memory and declarative memory . To capture the implicit-explicit distinction, Clarion postulates two parallel and interacting representational systems capturing implicit an explicit knowledge respectively. Explicit knowledge is associated with localist representation and implicit knowledge with distributed representation. Explicit knowledge resides in

11397-516: The influence of culture on those beliefs, and on beliefs about ourselves. This "expansionist view" proposes that it is impossible to fully understand metacognition without considering the situational norms and cultural expectations that influence those same conceptions. This combination of social psychology and metacognition is referred to as social metacognition. Social metacognition can include ideas and perceptions that relate to social cognition . Additionally, social metacognition can include judging

11528-838: The interaction between social metacognition and self-concept can be found in examining implicit theories about the self. Implicit theories can cover a wide range of constructs about how the self operates, but two are especially relevant here; entity theory and incrementalist theory. Entity theory proposes that an individual's self-attributes and abilities are fixed and stable, while incrementalist theory proposes that these same constructs can be changed through effort and experience. Entity theorists are susceptible to learned helplessness because they may feel that circumstances are outside their control (i.e. there's nothing that could have been done to make things better), thus they may give up easily. Incremental theorists react differently when faced with failure: they desire to master challenges, and therefore adopt

11659-528: The interaction of these learning processes. Another important mechanism for explaining synergy effects is the combination and relative balance of signals from different levels of the architecture. For instance, in one Clarion-based modeling study, it has been proposed that an anxiety-driven imbalance in the relative contributions of implicit versus explicit processes may be the mechanism responsible for performance degradation under pressure. The Clarion cognitive architecture consists of four subsystems. The role of

11790-446: The legs is different from intending to do it later or merely wishing to do it: only in the former case does the patient learn that the treatment was unsuccessful. There is a sense in which tryings either take place or not, but cannot fail, unlike actions, whose success is uncertain. This line of thought has led some philosophers to suggest that the trying itself is an action: a special type of action called basic action . But this claim

11921-494: The memory strength. Alternatively, if the decline option was motivated by external environmental cues, the rats would be less likely to decline the test because no available external cues were presented. The results showed that rats were more likely to decline the test in no-sample trials relative to normal sample trials, supporting the notion that rats can track their internal memory strength. To rule out other potential possibilities, they also manipulated memory strength by providing

12052-460: The mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent. Those who hold

12183-571: The motivational system is composed of goals. explicit goals are used because they are more stable than implicit motivational states. The CLARION framework views that human motivational processes are highly complex and can't be represented through just explicit representation. Examples of some low level drives include: Examples of some high level drives include: There is also a possibility for derived drives (usually from trying to satisfy primary drives) that can be created by either conditioning, or through external instructions. Each drive needed will have

12314-407: The movement of the finger flipping the switch is part of the action as well as the electrons moving through the wire and the light bulb turning on. Some consequences are included in the action even though the agent did not intend them to happen. It is sufficient that what the agent does "can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional". So, for example, if flipping the light switch alerts

12445-451: The notion of trying is found in the second thesis. It involves the claim that some of our tryings lead to successful actions while others arise without resulting in an action. But even in an unsuccessful case there is still something: it is different from not trying at all. For example, a paralyzed person, after having received a new treatment, may test if the treatment was successful by trying to move her legs. But trying and failing to move

12576-416: The notion of metacognition is elaborated within a tripartite theoretical framework. Learner metacognition is defined and investigated by examining their person knowledge, task knowledge and strategy knowledge. Wenden (1991) has proposed and used this framework and Zhang (2001) has adopted this approach and investigated second language learners' metacognition or metacognitive knowledge. In addition to exploring

12707-407: The one hand, on the agent's belief that this bodily movement would turn on the light and, on the other hand, on the desire to have light. Because of its reliance on psychological states and causal relations, this position is considered to be a Humean theory of action . According to Davidson, it is not just the bodily behavior that counts as the action but also the consequences that follow from it. So

12838-405: The other hand, deny that intentions or similar states cause actions. The most well-known account of action, sometimes simply referred to as the standard account , is due to Davidson, who holds that actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions. Davidson explains the intentions themselves in terms of beliefs and desires . For example, the action of flipping a light switch rests, on

12969-473: The possibility that pigeons learned the association between escape responses and longer retention delay. In addition to DMTS paradigm, Castro and Wasserman (2013) proved that pigeons can exhibit adaptive and efficient information-seeking behavior in the same-different discrimination task. Two arrays of items were presented simultaneously in which the two sets of items were either identical or different from one another. Pigeons were required to distinguish between

13100-478: The pressing of one's finger against the trigger, while the consequences of these movements, like the firing of the gun, are non-basic actions . But it seems that bodily movements are themselves constituted by other events (muscle contractions) which are themselves constituted by other events (chemical processes). However, it appears that these more basic events are not actions since they are not under our direct volitional control. One way to solve these complications

13231-764: The process in learning situations. The skills that aid in regulation involve planning the way to approach a learning task, monitoring comprehension, and evaluating progress towards the completion of a task. Metacognition includes at least three different types of metacognitive awareness when considering metacognitive knowledge: These types of metacognitive knowledge also include: In short, strategic knowledge involves knowing what (factual or declarative knowledge), knowing when and why (conditional or contextual knowledge) and knowing how (procedural or methodological knowledge). Similar to metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive regulation or "regulation of cognition" contains three skills that are essential. Metacognitive control

13362-592: The question of whether two actions are identical or of how actions should be counted. For example, on April 14, 1865, John Wilkes Booth both pulled the trigger of his gun, fired a shot and killed Abraham Lincoln . On a fine-grained theory of individuation , the pulling, the firing and the killing are three distinct actions. In its most extreme form, there is one distinct action for every action type. So, for example, since "singing" and "singing loudly" are two different action types, someone who sings loudly performs at least these two distinct actions. This kind of view has

13493-636: The relationships between learner metacognition and performance, researchers are also interested in the effects of metacognitively-oriented strategic instruction on reading comprehension (e.g., Garner, 1994, in first language contexts, and Chamot, 2005; Zhang, 2010). The efforts are aimed at developing learner autonomy , interdependence and self-regulation . Metacognition helps people to perform many cognitive tasks more effectively. Strategies for promoting metacognition include self-questioning (e.g. "What do I already know about this topic? How have I solved problems like this before?"), thinking aloud while performing

13624-411: The responsibilities of climate change, I must change my lifestyle". These individuals would not likely change their behavior compared to someone that thinks positively about the same issue such as "By using less electricity, I will be helping the planet". Another way to increase the likelihood of behavior change is by influencing the source of the attitude. An individual's personal thoughts and ideas have

13755-419: The reward behind one of the two fences in which dogs can see or cannot see where the reward was hidden. After that, dogs were encouraged to find the reward by walking around one fence. The dogs checked more frequently before selecting the fence when they did not see the baiting process compared with when they saw where the reward was hidden. However, contrary to apes, dogs did not show more checking behaviors when

13886-424: The rope slips through his hand and thus leads to the other climber's death. Davidson addresses this issue by excluding cases of wayward causation from his account since they are not examples of intentional behavior in the strict sense. So bodily behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by intentions in the right way . One important objection to Davidson's theory of actions is that it does not account for

14017-497: The safe key and longer retention interval. Adams and Santi (2011) also employed the DMTS procedure in a perceptual discrimination task during which pigeons were trained to discriminate between durations of illumination. Pigeons did not choose the escape option more often as the retention interval increased during initial testing. After extended training, they learned to escape the difficult trials. However, these patterns might be attributed to

14148-454: The same as those that are used to verify an answer to a math question. A number of theorists have proposed a common mechanism behind theory of mind , the ability to model and understand the mental states of others, and metacognition, which involves a theory of one's own mind's function. Direct evidence for this link is limited. Several researchers have related mindfulness to metacognition. Mindfulness includes at least two mental processes:

14279-656: The same design except that two monkeys were asked to make low-risk or high-risk confidence judgment before they make actual responses to measure their judgments about future events. Similarly, the monkeys were more often to choose high-risk confidence judgment before answering correctly in working memory task and tended to choose the low-risk option before providing an incorrect response. These two studies indicated that rhesus monkeys can accurately monitor their performance and provided evidence of metacognitive abilities in monkeys. In addition to nonhuman primates, other animals are also shown metacognition. Foote and Crystal (2007) provided

14410-400: The sampled odor twice and varying the retention interval between the learning and the test. Templer and colleagues (2017) found rats were less likely to decline the test if they had been exposed to the sample twice, suggesting that their memory strength for these samples was increased. Longer delayed sample test was more often declined than short delayed test because their memory was better after

14541-403: The sense of being goal-oriented. But the representation of a goal in the agent's mind may act as an efficient cause at the same time. Because of these problems, most of the arguments for non-causalism are negative: they constitute objections pointing out why causalist theories are unfeasible. Important among them are arguments from wayward causation: that behavior only constitutes an action if it

14672-499: The short delay. Overall, their series of studies demonstrated that rats could distinguish between remembering and forgetting and rule out the possibilities that decline use was modulated by the external cues such as environmental cue associations. Research on metacognition of pigeons has shown limited success. Inman and Shettleworth (1999) employed the delayed match to sample (DMTS) procedure to test pigeons’ metacognition. Pigeons were presented with one of three sample shapes (a triangle,

14803-469: The specific implemented models and simulations of the psychological processes or phenomena. The models of this layer arise from the basic theory and the general computational models. The distinction between implicit and explicit processes is fundamental to the Clarion cognitive architecture. This distinction is primarily motivated by evidence supporting implicit memory and implicit learning . Clarion captures

14934-526: The stability versus malleability of human characteristics predict differences in social stereotyping as well. Holding an entity theory of traits increases the tendency for people to see similarity among group members and utilize stereotyped judgments. For example, compared to those holding incremental beliefs, people who hold entity beliefs of traits use more stereotypical trait judgments of ethnic and occupational groups as well as form more extreme trait judgments of new groups. When an individual's assumptions about

15065-436: The strategy is being applied. At a professional level, this has led to emphasis on the development of reflective practice , particularly in the education and health-care professions. Recently, the notion has been applied to the study of second language learners in the field of TESOL and applied linguistics in general (e.g., Wenden, 1987; Zhang, 2001, 2010). This new development has been much related to Flavell (1979), where

15196-508: The strength and weaknesses about certain strategies as well as introduce them to new strategies that they can add to their repertoire. Action (philosophy) In philosophy , an action is an event that an agent performs for a purpose , that is, guided by the person's intention . The first question in the philosophy of action is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes . According to Ludwig Wittgenstein , it involves discovering "What

15327-420: The test and respond correctly, they would receive a high reward but no reward if their classification of noises was incorrect. But if the rats decline to take the test, they would be guaranteed a smaller reward. The results showed that rats were more likely to decline to take the test when the difficulty of noise discrimination increased, suggesting rats knew they do not have the correct answers and declined to take

15458-454: The test to receive the reward. Another finding is that the performance was better when they had chosen to take the test compared with if the rats were forced to make responses, proving that some uncertain trials were declined to improve the accuracy. These responses pattern might be attributed to actively monitor their own mental states. Alternatively, external cues such as environmental cue associations could be used to explain their behaviors in

15589-461: The top level of the architecture, whereas implicit knowledge resides in the bottom level. In both levels, the basic representational units are connectionist nodes, and the two levels differ with respect to the type of encoding. In the top level, knowledge is encoded using localist chunk nodes whereas, in the bottom level, knowledge is encoded in a distributed manner through collections of (micro)feature nodes. Knowledge may be encoded redundantly between

15720-475: The two arrays of items in which the level of difficulty was varied. Pigeons were provided with an “Information” button and a “Go” button on some trials that they could increase the number of items in the arrays to make the discrimination easier or they can prompt to make responses by pecking the Go button. Castro and Wasserman found that the more difficult the task, the more often pigeons chose the information button to solve

15851-469: The two levels and may be processed in parallel within the two levels. In the top level, information processing involves passing activations among chunk nodes by means of rules and, in the bottom level, information processing involves propagating (micro)feature activations through artificial neural networks . Top-down and bottom-up information flows are enabled by links between the two levels. Such links are established by Clarion chunks, each of which consists of

15982-576: The two. Deliberations and decisions are relevant for actions since they frequently precede the action. It is often the case that several courses of action are open to the agent. In such cases, deliberation performs the function of evaluating the different options by weighing the reasons for and against them. Deciding then is the process of picking one of these alternatives and forming an intention to perform it, thereby leading toward an action. Explanations can be characterized as answers to why-questions. Explanations of actions are concerned with why

16113-515: The unintuitive consequence that even the most simple exercises of agency result in a vast number of actions. Theories of coarse-grained individuation of actions, on the other hand, hold that events that constitute each other or cause each other are to be counted as one action. On this view, the action of pulling the trigger is identical to the action of firing the gun and to the action of killing Lincoln. So in doing all of these things, Booth performed only one action. One intuition in favor of this view

16244-429: The way that they behave. Metacognitions about attitudes influence how individuals act, and especially how they interact with others. Some metacognitive characteristics of attitudes include importance, certainty, and perceived knowledge, and they influence behavior in different ways. Attitude importance is the strongest predictor of behavior and can predict information seeking behaviors in individuals. Attitude importance

16375-521: The will to be overcome. Volitionalists aim to overcome these shortcomings of Davidson's account by including the notion of volition or trying in their theory of actions. Volitions and tryings are forms of affirming something, like intentions . They can be distinguished from intentions because they are directed at executing a course of action in the here and now, in contrast to intentions, which involve future-directed plans to do something later. Some authors also distinguish volitions , as acts of

16506-425: The will, from tryings , as the summoning of means within one's power. But it has been argued that they can be treated as a unified notion since there is no important difference between the two for the theory of action because they play the same explanatory role. This role includes both the experiential level, involving the trying of something instead of merely intending to do so later, and the metaphysical level, in

16637-410: The world. Alva Noë states: 'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us... [we]: crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look...'...'Perception is a mode of activity on the part of the whole animal...It cannot be represented in terms of merely passive, and internal, processes...' Some philosophers (e.g. Donald Davidson ) have argued that

16768-399: The wrong stimuli. Inman and Shettleworth's (1999) first experiment found that pigeons’ accuracies were lower and they were more likely to choose the safe key as the retention interval between presentation of stimuli and test increased. However, in Experiment 2, when pigeons were presented with the option to escape or take the test before the test phase, there was no relationship between choosing

16899-573: Was available on some trials associated with a small reward. Their studies showed that dolphins could appropriately use the uncertain response when the trials were difficult to discriminate. There is consensus that nonhuman primates, especially great apes and rhesus monkeys, exhibit metacognitive control and monitoring behaviors. But less convergent evidence was found in other animals such as rats and pigeons. Some researchers criticized these methods and posited that these performances might be accounted for by low-level conditioning mechanisms. Animals learned

17030-502: Was caused by an intention in the right way, not in any way. This critique focuses on difficulties causalists have faced in explicitly formulating how to distinguish between proper and wayward causation. An important challenge to non-causalism is due to Davidson. As he points out, we usually have many different reasons for performing the same action. But when we perform it, we often perform it for one reason but not for another. For example, one reason for Abdul to go for cancer treatment

17161-476: Was suggested that students with higher metacognitive self-regulation were less likely than other students to have their learning affected by keeping mobile phones switched on in classes. Finally, there is no distinction between domain-general and domain-specific metacognitive skills. This means that metacognitive skills are domain-general in nature and there are no specific skills for certain subject areas. The metacognitive skills that are used to review an essay are

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