35°42′32.38″N 139°43′7.88″E / 35.7089944°N 139.7188556°E / 35.7089944; 139.7188556
127-504: The collections of Waseda University Library (早稲田大学図書館; Waseda Daigaku Toshokan ) form one of the largest libraries in Japan. Established in 1882, they currently hold some 5.6 million volumes and 46,000 serials. The Waseda University Library (早稲田大学図書館; Waseda Daigaku Toshokan ) was originally established at the time of the founding of the university in 1882 (at that time called 東京専門学校; Tokyo Senmon Gakkou ). Its current Central Library building
254-488: A 20 mm hit to the chest and died 30 minutes later. Tail gunner Sgt. John Houston destroyed one attacker. The lead bomber, Consolidated B-32-20-CF Dominator , 42-108532 , "Hobo Queen II", piloted by 1st Lt. James Klein, was not seriously damaged but the second Consolidated B-32-35-CF Dominator , 42-108578 , lost an engine, had the upper turret knocked out of action, and partially lost rudder control. Both bombers landed at Yontan Airfield just past ~1800 hrs. having survived
381-468: A 36-hour period to ready as many aircraft as possible. This effort proved successful, and 83 percent of the B-29s were available for action compared to the average serviceability rate of 60 percent. Other ground crew loaded the aircraft with bombs and fuel. A total of 346 B-29s were readied. The 73rd Bombardment Wing contributed 169 B-29s and the 313th Bombardment Wing 121; both units were based on Saipan . At
508-480: A 9 September nosegear collapse and damage during lifting. B-32, 42-108578 , was scrapped at Kingman, Arizona after the war. 35°41′N 139°46′E / 35.683°N 139.767°E / 35.683; 139.767 Bombing of Tokyo (10 March 1945) On the night of 9/10 March 1945, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) conducted a devastating firebombing raid on Tokyo ,
635-421: A few feet and roads were rapidly cut by the fires. Crowds of civilians often panicked as they rushed towards the perceived safety of canals, with those who fell being crushed to death. The majority of those killed in the raid died while trying to evacuate. In many cases entire families were killed. One of the most deadly incidents occurred when the full bomb load of a B-29 landed in a crowd of civilians crossing
762-506: A large X pattern centered in Tokyo's densely populated working class district near the docks in both Koto and Chūō city wards on the water; later aircraft simply aimed near this flaming X. The individual fires caused by the bombs joined to create a general conflagration , which would have been classified as a firestorm but for prevailing winds gusting at 17 to 28 mph (27 to 45 km/h). Approximately 15.8 square miles (4,090 ha) of
889-444: A million people left the city in the following weeks, with more than 90 percent being accommodated in nearby prefectures . Due to the extent of the damage and the exodus from Tokyo, no attempt was made to restore services to large sections of the city. Estimates of the number of people killed in the bombing of Tokyo on 10 March differ. After the raid, 79,466 bodies were recovered and recorded. Many other bodies were not recovered, and
1016-669: A million residents lost their homes. The Tokyo Fire Department estimated a higher toll: 97,000 killed and 125,000 wounded. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department established a figure of 83,793 dead and 40,918 wounded and 286,358 buildings and homes destroyed. Historian Richard Rhodes put deaths at over 100,000, injuries at a million and homeless residents at a million. These casualty and damage figures could be low; Mark Selden wrote in Japan Focus : The figure of roughly 100,000 deaths, provided by Japanese and American authorities, both of whom may have had reasons of their own for minimizing
1143-514: A propaganda campaign focused on restoring confidence in the country's air and civil defense measures. These measures were generally unsuccessful. Few steps were taken to improve Tokyo's defenses after the raid. The majority of the 10th Air Division's senior officers were sacked or reassigned as punishment for the unit's failure on 10 March. Only 20 aircraft were sent to Tokyo to reinforce the 10th Air Division, and these were transferred elsewhere two weeks later when no further attacks were made against
1270-494: A quarter of all buildings in Tokyo at the time. This destruction rendered 1,008,005 survivors homeless. Most buildings in the Asakusa, Fukagawa, Honjo, Jōtō and Shitaya wards were destroyed, and seven other districts of the city experienced the loss of around half their buildings. Parts of another 14 wards suffered damage. Overall, 15.8 square miles (41 km ) of Tokyo was burned out. The number of people killed and area destroyed
1397-453: A raid was in progress was issued at 12:15 am, just after the B-29s began dropping bombs on Tokyo. The 10th Air Division sortied all of its available night interceptors, and the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division's searchlight and anti-aircraft units went into action. As expected by LeMay, the defense of Tokyo was not effective. Many American units encountered considerable anti-aircraft fire, but it was generally aimed at altitudes either above or below
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#17328701393261524-633: A range of mechanical problems which affected the B-29s. These failures led to the head of the Command being relieved in January 1945. Major General Curtis LeMay , the commander of XX Bomber Command, replaced General Haywood S. Hansell . Arnold and the Twentieth Air Force's headquarters regarded the campaign against Japan up to that time as unsuccessful, and LeMay understood that he would also be relieved if he failed to deliver results. He believed that changing
1651-400: A rough range of 75,000 to 200,000 deaths. Donald L. Miller , citing Knox Burger , stated that there were "at least 100,000" Japanese deaths and "about one million" injured. The entire bombing campaign against Japan killed more than 300,000 people and injured an additional 400,000, mostly civilians. After the war, Tokyo struggled to rebuild. In 1945 and 1946, the city received a share of
1778-486: A specific area, with the bombers attacking within a short timeframe, and the strong winds present over Tokyo. Few concerns were raised in the United States during the war about the morality of the 10 March attack on Tokyo or the firebombing of other Japanese cities. These tactics were supported by the majority of decision-makers and American civilians. Historian Michael Howard has observed that these attitudes reflected
1905-403: Is difficult to argue whether the raids were illegal under the international laws of the time. 16–17 February 1945: carrier-based aircraft , including dive bombers , escorted by Hellcat fighters attacked Tokyo. Over two days, over 1,500 American planes and hundreds of Japanese planes were in the air. "By the end of 17 February, more than five hundred Japanese planes, both on the ground and in
2032-449: Is not possible to know exactly how many died. Most of the bodies which were recovered were buried in mass graves without being identified. Many bodies of people who had died while attempting to shelter in rivers were swept into the sea and never recovered. Attempts to collect bodies ceased 25 days after the raid. The raid also caused widespread destruction. Police records show that 267,171 buildings were destroyed, which represented
2159-458: Is possible. Additionally, student/faculty ID holders from Keio University, Doshisha University, Hitotsubashi University, and Kansai University can access the library without a letter of introduction. Students from some foreign universities may be able to apply for privileged access if Waseda University has signed an agreement with that university, but in May 2014 there was no reference to these agreements on
2286-551: Is usually limited, except for special exhibitions. Among Waseda University Library's many unique collections are the following: Outside of the library system, Waseda University also has museums including the Waseda Theatre Museum , which contains its own collection. Waseda Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (part of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies ) also houses important special collections of materials like
2413-491: The 302nd Naval Air Group at Atsugi and the Yokosuka Air Group that made 10 gunnery passes. Japanese IJNAS aces Sadamu Komachi and Saburō Sakai were part of this attack. The B-32 piloted by 1st Lt. John R. Anderson, was hit at 20,000 feet; cannon fire knocked out the number two (port inner) engine, and three crew were injured, including Sgt. Anthony J. Marchione, 19, of the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron , who took
2540-588: The Doolittle Raid , a seaborne, small-scale air raid on Tokyo in April 1942. Strategic bombing and urban area bombing began in 1944 after the long-range B-29 Superfortress bomber entered service, first deployed from China and thereafter the Mariana Islands . B-29 raids from those islands began on 17 November 1944, and lasted until 15 August 1945, the day of Japanese surrender . Over half of Tokyo's industry
2667-531: The Eighth Air Force . The British Bomber Command focused on destroying German cities from early 1942 until the end of the war, and incendiaries represented 21 percent of the tonnage of bombs its aircraft dropped. Area bombing of German cities by Allied forces resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and massive firestorms in cities such as Hamburg and Dresden. Japanese forces conducted area bombing attacks on Chinese cities throughout
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#17328701393262794-521: The LORAN systems the B-29s used to navigate were more effective after dusk, it was also decided to conduct the attack at night. This led to a decision to direct the aircraft to attack individually rather than in formations as it was not possible for the B-29s to keep station at night. Flying individually would also lead to reductions in fuel consumption as the pilots would not need to constantly adjust their engines to remain in formation. These fuel savings allowed
2921-476: The Mariana Islands . These islands were close enough to Japan for the B-29s to conduct a sustained bombing campaign against Tokyo and most other Japanese cities. The first Superfortress flight over Tokyo took place on 1 November, when a reconnaissance aircraft photographed industrial facilities and urban areas in the western districts of the city. The remainder of Tokyo was photographed in subsequent reconnaissance flights, and these images were used to plan
3048-516: The National Diet Library does not have. Because of this, its collection is an important resource in the study of pre-war Japanese history and literature. The library consists of a central library and four main branch libraries, each located on a different campus. These branches include the S. Takata Memorial Research Library (with limited student access), the Library of Science and Engineering,
3175-722: The Twentieth Air Force operating out of mainland China in Operation Matterhorn under XX Bomber Command , but these could not reach Tokyo. Operations from the Northern Mariana Islands commenced in November 1944 after the XXI Bomber Command was activated there. The high-altitude bombing attacks using general-purpose bombs were observed to be ineffective by USAAF leaders due to high winds—later discovered to be
3302-606: The University of Maryland, College Park . Bombing of Tokyo in World War II Second Sino-Japanese War The bombing of Tokyo ( 東京空襲 , Tōkyō kūshū ) was a series of air raids on Japan launched by the United States Army Air Forces during the Pacific Theatre of World War II in 1944–1945, prior to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . The raids that were conducted by
3429-614: The jet stream —which carried the bombs off target. Between May and September 1943, bombing trials were conducted on the Japanese Village set-piece target, located at the Dugway Proving Grounds . These trials demonstrated the effectiveness of incendiary bombs against wood-and-paper buildings, and resulted in Curtis LeMay 's ordering the bombers to change tactics to utilize these munitions against Japan. The first such raid
3556-471: The 10 March raid and other attacks on urban areas. The overall plan for the strategic bombing campaign against Japan specified that it would commence with precision bombing raids against key industrial facilities, and later include firebombing attacks on cities. The first target directive issued to the XXI Bomber Command by its parent unit, the Twentieth Air Force , on 11 November, 1944 specified that
3683-574: The 1950s. Between 1948 and 1951 the ashes of 105,400 people killed in the attacks on Tokyo were interred in Yokoamicho Park in Sumida Ward . A memorial to the raids was opened in the park in March 2001. The park has a list of names of people who died due to the bombings is made based on applications from bereaved families; it had 81,273 names as of March 2020. Bereaved families can submit applications to
3810-407: The 314th Bombardment Wing's B-29s would have to fly a greater distance, they each carried 5 short tons (4.5 t) of bombs. The attack force began departing its bases at 5:35 pm local time on 9 March. It took two and three quarter hours for all of the 325 B-29s which were dispatched to take off. Turbulence was encountered on the flight to Japan, but the weather over Tokyo was good. There
3937-439: The 53rd Air Regiment operating 25 or 26 night fighters. The regiment was experiencing difficulties converting to the night fighter role, which included an overly intensive training program that exhausted its pilots. Tokyo's civil defenses were also lacking. The city's fire department comprised around 8,000 firemen spread between 287 fire stations, but they had little modern firefighting equipment. The firefighting tactics used by
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4064-603: The Air Staff wanted to wait to use the incendiaries until a large-scale program of firebombing could be mounted, to overwhelm the Japanese city defenses. Several raids were conducted to test the effectiveness of firebombing against Japanese cities. A small incendiary attack was made against Tokyo on the night of 29/30 November 1944, but caused little damage. Incendiaries were also used as part of several other raids. On 18 December, 84 XX Bomber Command B-29s conducted an incendiary raid on
4191-520: The American airmen reported only 76 sightings of Japanese fighters and 40 attacks by them over the course of the raid. Several Japanese pilots were killed when their aircraft ran out of fuel and crashed. Five of the downed B-29s managed to ditch in the sea, and their crews were rescued by United States Navy submarines. American casualties were 96 airmen killed or missing, and 6 wounded or injured. The surviving B-29s arrived back at their bases in
4318-620: The Chinese city of Hankou which caused extensive damage. That day, the Twentieth Air Force directed XXI Bomber Command to dispatch 100 B-29s on a firebombing raid against Nagoya . An initial attack took place on 22 December which was directed at an aircraft factory and involved 78 bombers using precision bombing tactics. Few of the incendiaries landed in the target area. On 3 January, 97 Superfortresses were dispatched to firebomb Nagoya. This attack started some fires, which were soon brought under control by firefighters. The success in countering
4445-464: The Japanese Government's official broadcaster Radio Tokyo reported the attack it was labeled "slaughter bombing". Other radio broadcasts focused on B-29 losses and the claimed desire of Japanese civilians to continue the war. American newspaper reports focused on the physical damage to Tokyo, made little reference to casualties and did not include estimates of the death toll. This resulted from
4572-523: The Japanese and United States Governments. As of 2011, the Tokyo Memorial Hall honored 105,400 people killed in the raid, the number of people whose ashes are interred in the building or were claimed by their family. As many bodies were not recovered, the number of fatalities is higher than this number. The large population movements out of and into Tokyo in the period before the raid, deaths of entire communities and destruction of records mean that it
4699-431: The Japanese aviation industry remained the primary target, the directive placed a stronger emphasis on firebombing raids against Japanese cities. The directive also called for a large-scale trial incendiary raid as soon as possible. This attack was made against Tokyo on 25 February. A total of 231 B-29s were dispatched, of which 172 arrived over the city; this was XXI Bomber Command's largest raid up to that time. The attack
4826-524: The Japanese capital city. This attack was code-named Operation Meetinghouse by the USAAF and is known as the Tokyo Great Air Raid ( 東京大空襲 , Tōkyō dai-kūshū ) in Japan. Bombs dropped from 279 Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers burned out much of eastern Tokyo. More than 90,000 and possibly over 100,000 Japanese people were killed, mostly civilians, and one million were left homeless, making it
4953-460: The Japanese did not expect the Americans to change to low altitude bombing tactics. The military forces assigned to protect Tokyo were insufficient to stop a major raid. The Eastern District Army's Kanto Air Defense Sector was responsible for the air defense of the Tokyo region, and was accorded the highest priority for aircraft and anti-aircraft guns . The 1st Anti-Aircraft Division controlled
5080-518: The Kototoi Bridge over the Sumida River causing hundreds of people to be burned to death. Few places in the targeted area provided safety. Many of those who attempted to evacuate to the large parks which had been created as refuges against fires following the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake were killed when the conflagration moved across these open spaces. Similarly, thousands of people who gathered in
5207-685: The Mariana Islands between 6:10 and 11:27 am local time on 10 March. Many of the bombers were streaked with ashes from the fires. Widespread fires rapidly developed across northeastern Tokyo. Within 30 minutes of the start of the raid the situation was beyond the fire department's control. An hour into the raid the fire department abandoned its efforts to stop the conflagration. Instead, the firemen focused on guiding people to safety and rescuing those trapped in burning buildings. Over 125 firemen and 500 civil guards who had been assigned to help them were killed, and 96 fire engines destroyed. Driven by
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5334-632: The Masuda Collection on politics and law in Indonesia in the 1950s–1960s and the Nishijima Collection on the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. The Waseda University Library system generally limits access to students, faculty, research fellows, alumni association members, and Waseda Supporters Club members (with a donation of ¥30,000). However, with a letter of introduction from another university library requesting access to specific materials, entry
5461-472: The Superfortresses to carry twice their usual bomb load. USAAF intelligence had determined that the Japanese had only two night fighter units, and these were believed to pose little threat. As a result, LeMay decided to remove all of the B-29s' guns other than those at the rear of the aircraft to reduce the weight of the aircraft and further boost the weight of bombs they could carry. While LeMay made
5588-787: The Tokyo Air Raid. In 2007, 112 members of the Association for the Bereaved Families of the Victims of the Tokyo Air Raids brought a class action against the Japanese government, demanding an apology and 1.232 billion yen in compensation. Their suit charged that the Japanese government invited the raid by failing to end the war earlier, and then failed to help the civilian victims of the raids while providing considerable support to former military personnel and their families. The plaintiffs' case
5715-737: The Toyama Library, and the Tokorozawa Library. Additionally, there are several departmental and special institute libraries that are integrated into the library system. The Waseda University Library owns a large number of materials of eminent cultural value. Alongside the two items designated as National Treasures and five sets (187 items) as Important Cultural Assets, are manuscripts, rare books, calligraphy, handwritten strips of poems, archival materials related to Japanese history , and several special collections named after their donors, among others. Because of their rarity, access to such materials
5842-511: The U.S. military on the night of 9–10 March 1945, codenamed Operation Meetinghouse , are the single most destructive bombing raid in human history. 16 square miles (41 km ; 10,000 acres) of central Tokyo was destroyed, leaving an estimated 100,000 civilians dead and over one million homeless. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima in August 1945, by comparison, resulted in the immediate death of an estimated 70,000 to 150,000 people. The U.S. mounted
5969-508: The USAAF's B-29s until the end of the war. There has been a long-running debate over the morality of the 10 March firebombing of Tokyo. The raid is often cited as a key example in criticism of the Allies' strategic bombing campaigns . Many historians and commentators argue that it was not acceptable for the USAAF to deliberately target civilians, and other historians believe that the USAAF had no choice but to change to area bombing tactics given that
6096-475: The Waseda Library website. For example, on May 30, 2002, Professor Michitaro Urukawa, director of Waseda University Library, and Columbia University librarian James G. Neal signed such a memorandum that outlines an agreement between the two libraries to cooperate in the exchange of materials, information access, Interlibrary loan and staff exchanges. Waseda University has also signed a similar agreement with
6223-512: The air, had been lost, and Japan's aircraft works had been badly hit. The Americans lost eighty planes." 18 August 1945: The last U.S. air combat casualty of the Pacific War occurred during mission 230 A-8, when two Consolidated B-32 Dominators of the 386th Bomb Squadron , 312th Bomb Group , launched from Yontan Airfield , Okinawa, for a photo reconnaissance run over Tokyo, Japan . Both bombers were attacked by several Japanese fighters of both
6350-428: The airmen involved and the extensive damage shown in photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft on 10 March. Arnold sent LeMay a congratulatory message which stated that "this mission shows your crews have the guts for anything". The aircrew who conducted the attack were also pleased with its results. A post-strike assessment by XXI Bomber Command attributed the scale of damage to the firebombing being concentrated on
6477-423: The anti-aircraft guns stationed in the central region of Honshu, including Tokyo. It was made up of eight regiments with a total of 780 anti-aircraft guns, as well as a regiment equipped with searchlights . American military intelligence estimated that 331 heavy and 307 light anti-aircraft guns were allocated to Tokyo's defenses at the time of the raid. A network of picket boats , radar stations and lookout posts
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#17328701393266604-402: The attack on Tokyo. At a meeting on 7 March, LeMay agreed to conduct an intense series of raids against targets on the island of Honshu between 9 and 22 March as part of the preparations for the invasion of Okinawa on 1 April. LeMay decided to adopt radically different tactics for this campaign. Analysis by XXI Bomber Command staff of the 25 February raid concluded that
6731-466: The best of the wing commanding officers. The new tactics which were to be used in the operation were not well received by many airmen, who believed that it was safer to bomb from high altitudes and preferred to retain their defensive guns. Leaving behind the unneeded gunners also troubled many of the airmen, as bomber crews typically had a very close relationship. In preparation for the attack, XXI Bomber Command's maintenance staff worked intensively over
6858-412: The bomb struck the ground, a fuse ignited a charge which first sprayed napalm from the weapon, and then ignited it. Prior to March 1945, stockpiles of incendiary bombs were built up in the Mariana Islands. These were accumulated on the basis of XXI Bomber Command plans which specified that the B-29s would each carry 4 short tons (3.6 t) of the weapons on 40 percent of their monthly sorties. Arnold and
6985-607: The bomber crews seeking to visually identify their targets. This proved difficult to achieve in practice. During the last 20 months of the war in Europe, non-visual attacks accounted for about half of the American strategic bombing campaign against Germany. These included major area bombing raids on Berlin and Dresden , as well as attacks on several towns and cities conducted as part of Operation Clarion . The American attacks on Germany mainly used high-explosive bombs, with incendiary bombs accounting for only 14 percent of those dropped by
7112-431: The bombers and reduced in intensity over time as gun positions were overwhelmed by fires. Nevertheless, the Japanese gunners shot down 12 B-29s. A further 42 were damaged, of which two had to be written off. The Japanese fighters were ineffective; their pilots received no guidance from radar stations and the efforts of the anti-aircraft gunners and fighter units were not coordinated. No B-29s were shot down by fighters, and
7239-584: The campaign, which was forecast to be in March 1945. Preparations for firebombing raids against Japan began well before March 1945. In 1943, the USAAF tested the effectiveness of incendiary bombs on adjoining German and Japanese -style domestic building complexes at the Dugway Proving Ground . These trials demonstrated that M69 incendiaries were particularly effective at starting uncontrollable fires. These weapons were dropped from B-29s in clusters , and used napalm as their incendiary filler. After
7366-555: The capital. From April, the Japanese reduced their attempts to intercept Allied air raids to preserve aircraft to contest the expected invasion of Japan . The 1st Anti-Aircraft Division remained active until the end of the war in August 1945. The Japanese military never developed adequate defenses against night air raids, with the night fighter force remaining ineffective and many cities not being protected by anti-aircraft guns. Between April and mid-May XXI Bomber Command mainly focused on attacking airfields in southern Japan in support of
7493-497: The cities. The number of people killed in Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe were much lower than those in 10 March attack on Tokyo with fewer than 10,000 fatalities in each operation. The lower casualties were, in part, the result of better preparations by the Japanese authorities which had resulted from a realization that they had greatly under-estimated the threat posed by firebombing. The Japanese government initially attempted to suppress news of
7620-431: The city in an attempt to stop the spread of fire; over 200,000 houses were destroyed as part of this effort. Rubble was often not cleared from the firebreaks, which provided a source of fuel. The Japanese Government also encouraged children and civilians with non-essential jobs to evacuate Tokyo , and 1.7 million had departed by March 1945. However, many other civilians had moved into Tokyo from impoverished rural areas over
7747-554: The city were destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died. A grand total of 282 of the 339 B-29s launched for "Meetinghouse" made it to the target, 27 of which were lost due to being shot down by Japanese air defenses, mechanical failure, or being caught in updrafts caused by the fires. The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945 was the single deadliest air raid of World War II, greater than Dresden , Hamburg , Hiroshima, or Nagasaki as single events. Damage to Tokyo's heavy industry
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#17328701393267874-595: The city's director of health estimated that 83,600 people were killed and another 40,918 wounded. The Tokyo fire department put the casualties at 97,000 killed and 125,000 wounded, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department believed that 124,711 people had been killed or wounded. After the war, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated the casualties as 87,793 killed and 40,918 injured. The survey also stated that
8001-425: The content of USAAF communiques and reports rather than censorship . The attack considerably damaged the morale of Japanese civilians, with it and the other firebombing raids in March convincing most that the war situation was worse than their government had admitted. The Japanese Government responded with a combination of repression, including heavy penalties for people accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and
8128-560: The country. There were on average only seven days of clear skies each month, and an intense jet stream made it difficult to aim bombs from high altitudes. Due to these constraints, LeMay decided to focus XXI Bomber Command's attacks on Japanese cities. While he made this decision on his own initiative, the general directions issued to LeMay permitted such operations. On 5 March XXI Bomber Command's personnel were advised that no further major attacks would be scheduled until 9 March. During this period LeMay's staff finalized plans for
8255-399: The death toll, seems to be arguably low in light of population density, wind conditions, and survivors' accounts. With an average of 103,000 inhabitants per square mile (400 inhabitants/ha) and peak levels as high as 135,000 inhabitants per square mile (520 inhabitants/ha), the highest density of any industrial city in the world, and with firefighting measures ludicrously inadequate to
8382-399: The decision to shift to firebombing. The operation during the early hours of 10 March was the first major firebombing raid against a Japanese city. The USAAF units employed significantly different tactics from those used in precision raids, including bombing by night with the aircraft flying at low altitudes. The extensive destruction caused by the raid led to these tactics becoming standard for
8509-466: The defense commands, little action was taken on the scattered reports which came in from the boats. At around midnight on 9 March a small number of B-29s were detected near Katsuura , but were thought to be conducting reconnaissance flights. Subsequent sightings of B-29s flying at low levels were not taken seriously, and the Japanese radar stations focused on searching for American aircraft operating at their usual high altitudes. The first alarm that
8636-399: The division's flying regiments (the 53rd Air Regiment) was also converted to a specialized night fighter unit. On the night of 3/4 March, the Japanese military intercepted American radio signals which indicated that the XXI Bomber Command was conducting a major night flying exercise. This was interpreted to mean that the force was preparing to start large-scale night raids on Japan. However,
8763-551: The eastern areas of the city. The districts bombed were home to 1.2 million people. Tokyo police recorded 267,171 buildings destroyed, which left more than one million people homeless. Emperor Hirohito 's tour of the destroyed areas of Tokyo in March 1945 was the beginning of his involvement in the peace process, culminating in Japan's surrender six months later. The US Strategic Bombing Survey later estimated that nearly 88,000 people died in this one raid, 41,000 were injured, and over
8890-628: The emphasis from precision bombing to area bombing was the most promising option to turn the XXI Bomber Command's performance around. USAAF planners began assessing the feasibility of a firebombing campaign against Japanese cities in 1943. Japan's main industrial facilities were vulnerable to such attacks as they were concentrated in several large cities, and a high proportion of production took place in homes and small factories in urban areas. The planners estimated that incendiary bomb attacks on Japan's six largest cities could cause physical damage to almost 40 percent of industrial facilities and result in
9017-415: The end of the period in which XXI Bomber Command primarily conducted such raids. Civilian casualties during these operations had been relatively low; for instance, all the raids against Tokyo prior to 10 March caused 1,292 deaths in the city. In early March, LeMay judged that further precision bombing of Japanese industrial targets was unlikely to be successful due to the prevailing weather conditions over
9144-453: The extensive scale of the destruction in an attempt to motivate anger against the United States. Stories about the attack were on the front page of all Japanese newspapers on 11 March. Reporting focused on the perceived immorality of the attack and the number of B-29s which had been destroyed. Subsequent newspaper reports made little reference to the scale of casualties, and the few photos which were published showed little physical damage. When
9271-480: The extent of the 10 March raid, but later used it for propaganda purposes. A communique issued by the Imperial Headquarters on 10 March stated that only "various places within the city were set afire". However, rumors of the devastation rapidly spread across the country. In a break from the usual practice of downplaying the damage caused by air attacks, the Japanese Government encouraged the media to emphasize
9398-547: The fighter defenses were ineffective at night. LeMay ordered all defensive guns but the tail gun removed from the B-29s so that the aircraft would be lighter and use less fuel. On the night of 9–10 March 1945, 334 B-29s took off to raid with 279 of them dropping 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo. The bombs were mostly the 500-pound (230 kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38 napalm -carrying M-69 incendiary bomblets at an altitude of 2,000–2,500 ft (610–760 m). The M-69s punched through thin roofing material or landed on
9525-512: The fire department were ineffective against incendiary bombs. Civilians had been organized into more than 140,000 neighborhood firefighting associations with a nominal strength of 2.75 million people, but these were also ill-equipped. The basic equipment issued to the firefighting associations was incapable of extinguishing fires started by M69s. Few air raid shelters had been constructed, though most households dug crude foxholes to shelter in near their homes. Firebreaks had been created across
9652-478: The fire. It also caused glass in windows to liquify, and the superheated air and cyclonic winds from the firestorm blew the hot liquified glass into the air, causing it to rain down and melt into people's skin. Families often sought to remain with their local neighborhood associations, but it was easy to become separated in the conditions. Few families managed to stay together throughout the night. Escape frequently proved impossible, as smoke reduced visibility to just
9779-468: The fires expanded, the American bombers spread out to attack unaffected parts of the target area. Power's B-29 circled Tokyo for 90 minutes, with a team of cartographers who were assigned to him mapping the spread of the fires. The raid lasted for approximately two hours and forty minutes. Visibility over Tokyo decreased over the course of the raid due to the extensive smoke over the city. This led some American aircraft to bomb parts of Tokyo well outside
9906-433: The firestorm, and civilians who sheltered in them were burned to death or died from suffocation. As the firestorm spread, civilians fled through the streets, desperate to escape the firestorm. Thousands of the evacuating civilians were killed by fire and by asphyxiation after the firestorm sucked oxygen out of the air. The heat was so intense that it caused people's clothes to burst into flames without actually having touched
10033-564: The government of Tokyo to have names of victims added to the list. After the war, Japanese author Katsumoto Saotome , a survivor of the 10 March 1945 firebombing, helped start a library about the raid in Koto Ward called the Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage . The library contains documents and literature about the raid plus survivor accounts collected by Saotome and the Association to Record
10160-484: The ground; in either case they ignited 3–5 seconds later, throwing out a jet of flaming napalm globs. A lesser number of M-47 incendiaries were also dropped: the M-47 was a 100-pound (45 kg) jelled-gasoline and white phosphorus bomb which ignited upon impact. In the first two hours of the raid, 226 of the attacking aircraft unloaded their bombs to overwhelm the city's fire defenses. The first B-29s to arrive dropped bombs in
10287-455: The grounds of the Sensō-ji temple in Asakusa died. Others sheltered in solid buildings, such as schools or theatres, and in canals. These were not proof against the firestorm, with smoke inhalation and heat killing large numbers of people in schools. In one instance, over a thousand people were killed after they took refuge in a school's massive swimming pool and were subsequently boiled alive as
10414-412: The grounds that he had wanted to protect Arnold from blame had the attack been a failure. LeMay notified the Twentieth Air Force headquarters of his intended tactics on 8 March, a day he knew Arnold and Norstad would be absent. There is no evidence that LeMay expected that the Twentieth Air Force would object to firebombing civilian areas, but he may have been concerned that it would have judged that
10541-400: The incendiary bombs had been dropped from too high an altitude, and attacking at lower levels would both improve accuracy and enable the B-29s to carry more bombs. This would also expose them to the Japanese air defenses, but LeMay judged that poor Japanese fire control tactics meant that the additional risk was moderate. As weather conditions over Japan tended to be more favorable at night and
10668-399: The informally defined Shitamachi district of Tokyo, which was mainly populated by working-class people and artisans. With a population of around 1.1 million, it was one of the most densely populated urban areas in the world. Zone I contained few militarily significant industrial facilities, though there were a large number of small factories which supplied Japan's war industries. The area
10795-521: The invasion of Okinawa. From 11 May until the end of the war the B-29s conducted day precision bombing attacks when weather conditions were favorable, and night firebombing raids against cities at all other times. Further incendiary attacks were conducted against Tokyo, with the final taking place on the night of 25/26 May. By this time, 50.8 percent of the city had been destroyed and more than 4 million people left homeless. Further heavy bomber raids against Tokyo were judged to not be worthwhile, and it
10922-655: The lack of public reaction in the United States to the firebombing of Tokyo, he permitted these operations to continue until the end of the war. The raid was followed by similar attacks against Nagoya on the night of 11/12 March, Osaka in the early hours of 14 March, Kobe on 17/18 March and Nagoya again on 18/19 March. An unsuccessful night precision raid was also conducted against an aircraft engine factory in Nagoya on 23/24 March. The firebombing attacks ended only because XXI Bomber Command's stocks of incendiaries were exhausted. The attacks on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe during March burned out over 31 square miles (80 km ) of
11049-495: The last air combat of the Pacific war. The following day, propellers were removed from Japanese aircraft as part of the surrender agreement. Marchione was buried on Okinawa on 19 August, his body being returned to his Pottstown, Pennsylvania home on 18 March 1949. He was interred in St. Aloysius Old Cemetery with full military honors. "Hobo Queen II" was dismantled at Yonton Airfield following
11176-454: The light Japanese anti-aircraft guns to reach, and below the effective range of the heavy anti-aircraft guns. LeMay was unable to lead the raid in person as he had been prohibited from placing himself in a situation where he could be captured after being briefed on the development of atomic bombs . Instead, the attack was led by the 314th Bombardment Wing's commanding officer, Brigadier General Thomas S. Power . LeMay considered Power to be
11303-408: The limited options to end the war which were available at the time. For instance, both Arnold and LeMay regarded the 10 March raid and subsequent firebombing operations as being necessary to save American lives by bringing the war to a rapid conclusion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt probably also held this view. While Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was aware of LeMay's tactics and troubled by
11430-427: The loss of 7.6 million man-months of labor. It was also estimated that these attacks would kill over 500,000 people, render about 7.75 million homeless and force almost 3.5 million to be evacuated. The plans for the strategic bombing offensive against Japan developed in 1943 specified that it would transition from a focus on the precision bombing of industrial targets to area bombing from around halfway in
11557-554: The main mission because they were afraid of being killed. Tokyo's defenders were expecting an attack, but did not detect the American force until it arrived over the city. The air defense units in the Kanto Plain area had been placed on alert, but the night fighter units were instructed not to sortie any aircraft until an incoming raid was detected. While picket boats spotted the attack force, poor radio reception meant that most of their reports were not received. Due to disorganization in
11684-437: The main target was Japanese aircraft and aviation engine factories. These targets were to be attacked by precision bombing. Japanese cities were specified as the secondary target, with area bombing being authorized for use against them. The directive also indicated that firebombing raids were likely to be ordered against cities to test the effectiveness of this tactic. The Twentieth Air Force had an unusual command structure, as it
11811-430: The majority of the casualties were women, children and elderly people. Frank wrote in 1999 that historians generally believe that there were between 90,000 and 100,000 fatalities, but some argue that the number was much higher. For instance, Edwin P. Hoyt stated in 1987 that 200,000 people had been killed and in 2009 Mark Selden wrote that the number of deaths may have been several times the estimate of 100,000 used by
11938-603: The most combustible districts in Tokyo. The orders for the raid issued to the B-29 crews stated that the main purpose of the attack was to destroy the many small factories located within the target area, but also noted that it was intended to cause civilian casualties as a means of disrupting production at major industrial facilities. Each of XXI Bomber Command's three wings was allocated a different altitude to bomb from, in bands between 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and 7,000 feet (2,100 m). These altitudes were calculated to be too high for
12065-502: The most destructive single air attack in human history. The Japanese air and civil defenses proved largely inadequate; 14 American aircraft and 96 airmen were lost. The attack on Tokyo was an intensification of the air raids on Japan which had begun in June 1944. Prior to this operation, the USAAF had focused on a precision bombing campaign against Japanese industrial facilities. These attacks were generally unsuccessful, which contributed to
12192-509: The national reconstruction budget roughly proportional to its amount of bombing damage (26.6%), but in successive years Tokyo saw its share dwindle. By 1949, Tokyo was given only 10.9% of the budget; at the same time there was runaway inflation devaluing the money. Occupation authorities such as Joseph Dodge stepped in and drastically cut back on Japanese government rebuilding programs, focusing instead on simply improving roads and transportation. Tokyo did not experience fast economic growth until
12319-475: The neutral Soviet Union where the crew was interned, but then smuggled over the border into Iran on 11 May 1943. Two crews were captured by the Japanese in occupied China. Three crewmen from these groups were later executed. The key development for the bombing of Japan was the B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber , which had an operational range of 3,250 nautical miles (3,740 mi; 6,020 km) and
12446-564: The new tactics were too risky. The Japanese military anticipated that the USAAF would make major night attacks on the Tokyo region. After several small night raids were conducted on the region during December 1944 and January 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force's 10th Air Division , which was responsible for intercepting attacks on the Kantō region , placed a greater emphasis on training its pilots to operate at night. One of
12573-431: The new tactics, but there were fears that they could result in heavy American casualties. These concerns were shared by some of LeMay's staff. XXI Bomber Command's intelligence officers predicted that 70 percent of the bombers could be destroyed. LeMay consulted Arnold's chief of staff Brigadier General Lauris Norstad about the new tactics, but did not formally seek approval to adopt them. He later justified this action on
12700-487: The others in. These Superfortresses arrived over the city shortly before midnight on 9 March. They carried extra fuel, additional radios and XXI Bomber Command's best radio operators instead of bombs, and circled Tokyo at an altitude of 25,000 feet (7,600 m) throughout the raid. This tactic proved unsuccessful, and was later judged to have been unnecessary. The attack on Tokyo commenced at 12:08 am local time on 10 March. Pathfinder bombers simultaneously approached
12827-493: The precision bombing campaign had failed. It is generally acknowledged that the tactics used against Tokyo and in similar subsequent raids were militarily successful. The attack is commemorated in Japan at two official memorials, several neighborhood memorials, and a privately owned museum. Pre-war USAAF doctrine emphasized the precision bombing of key industrial facilities over area bombing of cities. Early American strategic bombing attacks on Germany used precision tactics, with
12954-496: The raid died over the following days. After the raid, civilians across Tokyo offered assistance to the refugees. Firemen, police officers and soldiers also tried to rescue survivors trapped under collapsed buildings. Many refugees who had previously lived in slums were accommodated in prosperous parts of the city. Some of these refugees resented the differences in living conditions, prompting riots and looting. Refugee centers were also established in parks and other open areas. Over
13081-401: The raid led the Japanese authorities to become over-confident about their ability to protect cities against incendiary attacks. The next firebombing raid was directed against Kobe on 4 February, and bombs dropped from 69 B-29s started fires which destroyed or damaged 1,039 buildings. On 19 February, the Twentieth Air Force issued a new targeting directive for XXI Bomber Command. While
13208-470: The same period. On 8 March, LeMay issued orders for a major firebombing attack on Tokyo the next night. The raid was to target a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo designated Zone I by the USAAF, which measured approximately 4 miles (6.4 km) by 3 miles (4.8 km). This area was divided by the Sumida River , and included most of Asakusa , Honjo and Fukagawa Wards. These wards formed part of
13335-426: The strong wind, the large numbers of small fires started by the American incendiaries rapidly merged into major blazes. These formed firestorms which quickly advanced in a northwesterly direction and destroyed or damaged almost all the buildings in their path. The only buildings which survived the fire were constructed of stone. By an hour after the start of the attack most of eastern Tokyo either had been destroyed or
13462-436: The target area at right angles to each other. These bombers were manned by the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings' best crews. Their M47 bombs rapidly started fires in an X shape, which was used to direct the attacks for the remainder of the force. Each of XXI Bomber Command's wings and their subordinate groups had been briefed to attack different areas within the X shape to ensure that the raid caused widespread damage. As
13589-524: The target area. The heat from the fires also resulted in the final waves of aircraft experiencing heavy turbulence. Some American airmen also needed to use oxygen masks when the odor of burning flesh entered their aircraft. A total of 279 B-29s attacked Tokyo, dropping 1,665 short tons (1,510 t) of bombs. Another 19 Superfortresses which were unable to reach Tokyo struck targets of opportunity or targets of last resort. These aircraft turned back early due to mechanical problems or pilots deciding to abort
13716-401: The task, 15.8 square miles (41 km ) of Tokyo were destroyed on a night when fierce winds whipped the flames and walls of fire blocked tens of thousands fleeing for their lives. An estimated 1.5 million people lived in the burned out areas. In his 1968 book, reprinted in 1990, historian Gabriel Kolko cited a figure of 125,000 deaths. Elise K. Tipton, professor of Japan studies, arrived at
13843-575: The time of the raid the 314th Bombardment Wing was arriving at Guam in the Marianas, and able to provide only 56 B-29s. The B-29s in the squadrons which were scheduled to arrive over Tokyo first were armed with M47 bombs ; these weapons used napalm and were capable of starting fires which required mechanized firefighting equipment to control. The bombers in the other units were loaded with clusters of M69s. The 73rd and 313th Bomb Wings' Superfortresses were each loaded with 7 short tons (6.4 t) of bombs. As
13970-414: The ultimate decision to adopt the new tactics, he acknowledged that his plan combined ideas put forward by many officers. On 7 March, some of the B-29 crews flew training missions in which they practiced using radar to navigate and attack a target from low altitude. The airmen were not told the purpose of this training. The officers who commanded XXI Bomber Command's three flying wings agreed with
14097-400: The war. Few attempts were made to target industrial facilities, with the goal of the campaign being to terrorize civilians and cut the Chinese forces off from their sources of supplies. Chongqing , China's provisional capital, was frequently attacked by aircraft using incendiary and high explosive bombs. These raids destroyed most of the city. The American Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942
14224-468: The water turned to steam. Many of the people who attempted to shelter in canals were killed by smoke or when the passing firestorm sucked oxygen out of the area. However, these bodies of water provided safety to thousands of others. The fire finally burned itself out during mid-morning on 10 March, and came to a stop when it reached large open areas or the Nakagawa Canal. Thousands of people injured in
14351-560: Was against Kobe on 4 February 1945. Tokyo was hit by incendiaries on 25 February 1945 when 174 B-29s flew a high altitude raid during daylight hours and destroyed around 643 acres (260 ha) (2.6 km ) of the snow-covered city, using 453.7 tons of mostly incendiaries with some fragmentation bombs. After this raid, LeMay ordered the B-29 bombers to attack again but at a relatively low altitude of 5,000 to 9,000 ft (1,500 to 2,700 m) and at night, because Japan's anti-aircraft artillery defenses were weakest in this altitude range, and
14478-579: Was being affected by fires. The heat in some areas was reported to have reached a temperature of up to 1,800 degrees. Civilians who stayed at their homes or attempted to fight the fire had virtually no chance of survival. Historian Richard B. Frank has written that "the key to survival was to grasp quickly that the situation was hopeless and flee". Soon after the start of the raid news broadcasts began advising civilians to evacuate as quickly as possible, but not all did so immediately. The foxholes which had been dug near most homes offered no protection against
14605-443: Was capable of attacking at high altitude above 30,000 feet (9,100 m), where enemy defenses were very weak. Almost 90% of the bombs dropped on the home islands of Japan were delivered by the B-29. Once Allied ground forces had captured islands sufficiently close to Japan, airfields were built on those islands (particularly Saipan and Tinian ) and B-29s could reach Japan for bombing missions. The initial raids were carried out by
14732-452: Was conducted in daylight, with the bombers flying in formation at high altitudes. It caused extensive damage, with almost 28,000 buildings being destroyed. This was the most destructive raid to have been conducted against Japan, and LeMay and the Twentieth Air Force judged that it demonstrated that large-scale firebombing was an effective tactic. The failure of a precision bombing attack on an aircraft factory in Tokyo on 4 March marked
14859-512: Was dismissed at the first judgement in December 2009, and their appeal was rejected. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court , which rejected their case in May 2013. In 2013, during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe 's second term, Abe's cabinet stated that the raids were "incompatible with humanitarianism , which is one of the foundations of international law", but also noted that it
14986-467: Was highly vulnerable to firebombing, as most buildings were constructed from wood and bamboo and were closely spaced. Due to this vulnerability, it had suffered extensive damage and heavy casualties from fires caused by the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake . The United States' intelligence services were aware of how vulnerable the region remained to fire, with the Office of Strategic Services rating it as containing
15113-413: Was little cloud cover, and visibility was good for the first bomber crews to arrive over Tokyo; they were able to see clearly for 10 miles (16 km). Conditions on the ground were cold and windy, with the city experiencing gusts of between 45 miles per hour (72 km/h) and 67 miles per hour (108 km/h) blowing from the southeast. The first B-29s over Tokyo were four aircraft tasked with guiding
15240-647: Was opened in 1991, commemorating the university's centennial. All together the university has 29 libraries: the Central Library, four Campus Libraries, and school libraries or reading rooms for students, attached to each school and institute. These libraries are said to hold 5.6 million books. The Waseda University Library also possesses a unique collection which survived the Bombing of Tokyo in World War II unlike many of its counterparts. It possesses some items which even
15367-436: Was personally headed by General Henry H. Arnold , the commanding officer of the USAAF. B-29 raids on Tokyo commenced on 24 November. The first raid targeted an aircraft engine factory on the city's outskirts, and caused little damage. XXI Bomber Command's subsequent raids on Tokyo and other cities mainly used precision bombing tactics and high explosive bombs, and were largely unsuccessful due to adverse weather conditions and
15494-409: Was responsible for detecting incoming raids. Due to shortages of radar and other fire control equipment, Japanese anti-aircraft gunners found it difficult to target aircraft operating at night. The radar stations had a short range, and fire control equipment for the anti-aircraft batteries was unsophisticated. As of March 1945, most of the 10th Air Division's 210 combat aircraft were day fighters, with
15621-404: Was retaliation against the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor . The raid did little damage to Japan's war capability but was a significant propaganda victory for the United States. Launched at longer range than planned when the task force encountered a Japanese picket boat , all of the attacking aircraft either crashed or ditched short of the airfields designated for landing. One aircraft landed in
15748-415: Was slight until firebombing destroyed much of the light industry that was used as an integral source for small machine parts. Firebombing also killed or made homeless many workers. According to the victorious US report, over 50% of Tokyo's industry was spread out among residential and commercial neighborhoods; firebombing cut the whole city's output in half. The destruction and damage were especially severe in
15875-587: Was spread out among residential and commercial neighborhoods; firebombing cut the city's output in half. Some modern post-war analysts have called the raid a war crime due to the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the ensuing mass loss of civilian life. The first raid on Tokyo was the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942. In the raid, sixteen B-25 Mitchells were launched from the USS ; Hornet at Yokohama and Tokyo, and then flew to airfields in China . The raid
16002-515: Was the first air attack on Tokyo , but inflicted little damage on the city. In June 1944, the USAAF's XX Bomber Command began a campaign against Japan using B-29 Superfortress bombers flying from airfields in China . Tokyo was beyond the range of Superfortresses operating from China, and was not attacked. This changed in October 1944, when the B-29s of the XXI Bomber Command began moving into airfields in
16129-410: Was the largest of any single air raid of the whole World War II, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , when each raid is considered by itself. The casualties and damage caused by the raid and absenteeism by workers in Tokyo considerably disrupted the Japanese war economy. LeMay and Arnold considered the operation to have been a significant success on the basis of reports made by
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