Chilean victory
57-577: Loa Line and Altiplano campaign Tarapacá campaign Tacna and Arica campaign Lynch Expedition Lima campaign Chilean occupation of Peru Breña campaign 1881 1882 1883 Arequipa-Puno Line The Tarapacá campaign was a short stage of the War of the Pacific in the last months of 1879, after the Chileans won definitive naval superiority at Angamos . It took its name from
114-564: A 7,400 men Allied attack on November 19 at Dolores dwell , near San Francisco. The string of victories made the Chilean commanders too confident, and with poor information recklessly attacked the outnumbering Peruvian army at Tarapacá on November 27, suffering a heavy defeat. Nevertheless, the Allies withdrew from Tarapacá department, leaving it in Chilean hands. Once they had gained the Tarapacá department,
171-499: A Chilean column forced some Peruvian forces under Gregorio Albarracin to retreat. Sotomayor resolved to move the entire army to Tacna, leaving Moquegua alone, not considering the Arequipa garrison at all. The Chilean army converged over the Sama river valley, set as a starting point to march across the desert towards Tacna, but the artillery was shipped to Ite. On May 20, Rafael Sotomayor died of
228-619: A beach head despite the resistance of the Bolivian defenders deployed behind improvised trenches. The second echelon pushed back the Allies and drove them off the port. Two more regiments were unshipped over a near beach at Junín but failed in reaching on time to battle. The victory allowed the Chileans to establish a starting point from where to scout the region and repel the Allies. Immediately, cavalry scouts were sent to seek for water supplies and enemy troops. One of them encountered and crushed some Allied cavalry at Germania on November 6. Following
285-509: A captured muleteer, who reported only 1,500 men at the town. Vergara asked Arteaga for instructions, and his request created great anxiety among Chilean High Command and troops. At this point, the Chilean commanders soundly underestimated the battle capabilities of the Allies. Arteaga did not properly prepare the Chilean forces dispatched for battle, meaning they did not carry enough supplies, which would have consequences later. Arteaga gathered with his men at Isluga on 26 November. The march across
342-457: A cavalry charge stopped the Allied charge on the left flank. Afterwards, Barbosa's division forwarded to the weakened Allied right flank, putting pressure on the entire Allied line. Barbosa's men assailed and took the artillery placed on this area, meanwhile the combined attack of the three divisions progressed with intense volleys. Several battalions were surrounded and vanquished in the advance. When
399-470: A challenge strategy against his enemy -including the capture of an entire cavalry regiment and an attempt to attack Valparaíso -, while all efforts to capture him were useless. The lack of results and the poor management ended with Williams’ resignation, on August 5. At this point, the poor shape of the Chilean navy emerged as the undergoing reparations took an entire month. So, the new admiral, Galvarino Riveros, could sail from Valparaíso only by October 1, with
456-729: A highly symbolic event in Spanish history, being considered the beginning of the Reconquista . She was commissioned by Royal Command on 8 October 1858. Her first commander was Lieutenant Evaristo Casariego y García . She was originally intended as a mail boat between Manila and Hong Kong , with her berth at the Naval Base of Manila, in the Philippine Islands. During the Chincha Islands War , Covadonga served as an auxiliary ship to
513-419: A stroke at Las Yaras, and Jose Francisco Vergara was designed as his replacement. With Sotomayor's death, the army command was put under Gen. Baquedano. The Allies didn't molested the Chilean march through the desert, due to internal disputes between Campero and Camacho and the lack of supplies and transportation lines. A last attempt to ambush the Chileans on the night of May 25 at Quebrada Honda failed, because
570-961: Is known as the stage of the War of the Pacific after the Chilean conquest of the Peruvian department of Tarapacá, ending with Chilean domination of the Moquegua department in southern Peru. During this campaign Bolivia retired from the war after the Battle of Tacna , and Peru lost the port of Arica. Also, Manuel Baquedano assumed command as the new Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, and the Allied Presidents were thrown out of office and replaced by Nicolas de Pierola in Peru and General Narciso Campero in Bolivia. After Chile secured
627-621: The Blanco Encalada and the Cochrane were bought in England. However, the Chileans had an advantage with the Belgian Comblain rifle, which was rear loaded allowing a superior rate of fire, and the cavalry had Winchester carbines. The condition of the Allies wasn't much better. However both armies combined had more soldiers and artillery, their weapons were old compared to their enemy. Almost
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#1732902103706684-663: The Covadonga ; and the heroic death of Captain Arturo Prat and the loss of his old corvette, the Esmeralda , lifted the troops morale and ignited a nationalism among the Chileans which led a massive civilian enrolment. Only by the beginning of November, the Chilean Army grew from 2,995 men to 10,000. After all of this, the Chileans resumed the blockade of Iquique, whilst the Peruvian Captain Miguel Grau brilliantly conducted
741-465: The Naval Battle of Abtao . During the War of the Pacific , Covadonga and Esmeralda , as the oldest and slowest ships of the Chilean navy, were left behind to blockade the port of Iquique . There they participated in one of the most important naval battles of the war. Esmeralda faced the ironclad Huáscar at the Naval Battle of Iquique , and Covadonga managed to escape from the attacks of
798-508: The Allies trying to decide who should lead the army. Finally Gen. Campero was appointed as the commander of the Allied forces, which totaled about 11,000 men. The Allies ceded the initiative to Chile, allowing her to choose the ensuing course of the campaign. With the Chilean domination of the sea so complete after the earlier battles, the Allies had no manoeuvre space for transporting huge contingents from north to south and vice versa. This also created extreme difficulties in terms of reinforcing
855-560: The Atacama Desert. On December 31, the Chilean troops disembarked and quickly took the port of Ilo, isolating Moquegua garrison of 1,300 soldiers and letting Martinez to move freely in the area, fulfilling the task commended. The expedition returned to Ilo the very next day and was re-embarked to Pisagua. Between February 18 and 25, a twenty ship convoy unshipped 9,500 men divided into three divisions, while another one stood in Pisagua waiting
912-741: The Camarones River on the 14, he had already lost 200 men. He was 50 km. away from Tana, and used the poor condition of his troops as an excuse to turn back north, action known as the Camarones betrayal . The loss of Pisagua left Gen. Buendía in a difficult position. Pisagua and Iquique were his communications lines, and since May, Iquique was under blockade. Therefore, the liberation of Pisagua became his main objective. Buendía left Iquique on November 5 moving to Agua Santa where his forces were to reunite. From here he marched to Porvenir, prior to move north to join with Daza. However, on his way he encountered
969-612: The Chilean blockade resumed, and Belisario Suárez -Buendía's Chief of Staff- soldiers. In total, the Allied added up about 4,500 men. On the Chilean side, Lt. Col. José Francisco Vergara asked Gen. Escala to make a reconnaissance to find out the enemy's condition. So, on 24 November Vergara was dispatched with a party of roughly 400 men to Tarapacá. Later on, Arteaga knew that the Peruvians were more than expected. He sent another column made of two regiments, one battalion, 30 more riders and another artillery battery. Based on false information from
1026-412: The Chilean strategy was accomplished and the land in dispute was in Chilean hands. Also, the saltpeter trade changed hands and from now on it went to Chile's treasury, meaning an economic boon. On the Allies perspective, this campaign was disastrous. Perú lost almost 200,000 population and an income of £30 million in nitrate exports. Bolivia had to bear the humiliation of Daza's retreat from Camarones, and
1083-476: The Chileans began the planning of the Tarapacá Department. Sotomayor wanted to attack in a spot between the Allied strongholds of Arica and Iquique, cutting their communications lines and enabling the army to take them out one at the time. After reviewing the terrain and weeks of preparations, it was decided to strike at Pisagua , a small port with a suitable bay for unloading troops and supplies. The landing
1140-515: The Chileans came very close, rushed the Allied centre and the left wing in a melee, and chased the retiring soldiers to Tacna. The Bolivian army were so crippled that retired to the mountains and never fought in the war again, breaking the Peru-Bolivian Alliance forever. Since the port of Arica was necessary to establish a secure supply line in the area, on May 28, Baquedano sent the "Buin" 1st Line, 3rd Line and 4th Line regiments, along with
1197-499: The Chileans over San Francisco hill near Dolores. Since outnumbered, Colonel Emilio Sotomayor deployed his troops over the San Francisco and Sazón hills watching the Allied movements over the plain. Buendía wanted to attack immediately, but was convinced otherwise by Col. Suárez, making him notice of the troops fatigue after a long march across the desert. So, both armies spent the rest of the morning only observing each other. However,
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#17329021037061254-503: The Chileans to the sea. But, Daza wasn't sure of his officers' loyalty, and deliberately wore down his army. The Bolivians left Tacna and gathered around Arica by November 8, where the soldiers got drunk and lost all discipline. Finally, on the 11, Daza departed from Arica to Chaca, about 50 km south-southeast. However, his drunken soldiers collapsed about halfway, since Daza allowed his men to carry wine instead of water, with fatal consequences for many of them. Finally, when Daza reached
1311-562: The Ironclad Independencia . A Royal Order of 10 June 1857, led to Covadonga ' s keel being laid at the Arsenal de la Carraca in Cádiz , Spain, on 13 February 1858. She was a wooden schooner that was also fitted with steam propulsion. She was launched on 28 November 1859, and her construction cost a total of 5 million Reales de Vellón . She was named for the Battle of Covadonga -
1368-514: The Lautaro and Bulnes battalions by train to Arica, totalizing 5,379 soldiers. With the Allied defeat at Tacna, Arica was completely isolated from the rest of the Peruvian territory; with no chance of being reinforced or resupplied, leaving the Peruvian garrison at the port with no other option but to wait for the Chileans. Hence, the encirclement of Arica was completed by June 5 without major troubles. Two divisions were posted at Arica with 1,901 men, under
1425-430: The Peruvian ironclad Independencia when the latter collided with a submerged rock, the Covadonga turned around and came up aft of Independencia ' s stern and raked her, forcing her surrender. On 13 September 1880, while enforcing a blockade in the port of Chancay, Peru , the sailors of Covadonga saw an unmanned boat loaded with fresh fruit and produce being carried by the currents. When they tried to lift
1482-528: The Spanish fleet. The Chilean corvette Esmeralda , under the command of captain Juan Williams Rebolledo , captured Covadonga during the Naval Battle of Papudo , on 26 November 1865. Her capture led to Spanish Admiral Juan Manuel Pareja committing suicide. Covadonga was commissioned into the Chilean Navy on 4 December 1865, under her original name. During this war, she also participated at
1539-551: The area and to try to take enemy's supplies, with the order of making plans for a possible attack. The Chilean division was put under Lt. Col Arístides Martínez , and was formed by 500 men of the Lautaro Battalion and 12 riders of the Granaderos a Caballo Regiment. The Peruvian forces had been gathered at Tacna and Arica, so in order to make a successful attack the entire Chilean army to a place near both cities, avoiding crossing
1596-480: The artillery, weaponry, and other supplies of war. Pierola did not mobilize the Second Southern Army in Arequipa to aid Montero at Tacna, and also replaced Peruvian officers with loyal civilians, resulting in a virtual crippling of the army command. By the end of December 1879, the Chilean army decided to send a division in a scout expedition to Ilo and Pacocha in order to eliminate the Peruvian resistance in
1653-454: The assault. Castro Pinto's centre line endured the attack too, forcing both Chilean divisions to retreat when their ammunitions ran out. Even more, the Aroma, Zepita, and Alianza battalions persecuted Amengual, causing heavy casualties. The same thing occurred with Barceló, and both divisions mixed in the retreat. Baquedano sent Amunategui's division to strengthen the retiring units, and simultaneously
1710-469: The battle started unexpectedly on the 19. Sotomayor endured three attempts to overrun him which demoralised the Allies who fled from the battlefield in complete confusion, leaving all kinds of material and artillery. Buendía retreated to Tarapacá with the remains of his army and stragglers found on the way. The artillery was lost, and his men were in poor conditions. However, his force grew considerably with Los Ríos' division, that left its post at Iquique when
1767-454: The capabilities of its High Command. The Army Commander in Chief, José Arteaga, and the Navy Admiral, Juan Williams, were veterans with more than forty years in service. Besides, bitter disputes between the older and a younger generation of officers in both branches did nothing but to convince President Pinto to appoint a civilian -War Minister Rafael Sotomayor - to supervise their planning and
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1824-476: The command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi , garrisoned in two forts and a set of cannon batteries. On the 6, the Chileans shelled the Peruvian positions by land and sea. After Bolognesi refused to surrender, on June 7, the 3rd Line and 4th Line regiments assailed the East and North forts, taking the defences with a melee in 55 minutes, vanquishing almost all of its defenders. The victory of Chile in this campaign meant
1881-403: The convoy to return. Simultaneously, the Peruvian port of Arica was put under a naval blockade by the warships Huascar and Magallanes . By the early days of March, another Chilean expedition under Col. Orozimbo Barbosa was sent to Mollendo, where 4,000 men were stationed. While the expedition was at sea, the garrison marched to Arequipa, leaving only 100 soldiers. The Navales Battalion occupied
1938-462: The darkness misled a column led by Campero, tiring his troops in vain. On May 26, after useless artillery cross fire, the divisions on the front line under Amengual and Barceló engaged separately the Allied defensive line at the Intiorko Hill plateau. The poor Chilean coordination allowed Gen. Campero to send the reserve from the centre and the right to help Camacho's left flank, managing to contain
1995-444: The desert with insufficient food and water wore down his army. To make things worse, Arteaga still thought that in Tarapacá were no more than 2,500. Being at least 60 km. away from Dolores, the nearest supply point, Arteaga had no choice but to attack. Arteaga decided to attack dividing his force into three major columns, under Col. Ricardo Santa Cruz Vargas [ es ] , Lt. Col. Eleuterio Ramírez and himself. The idea
2052-463: The desert. For the Chileans, the goal of the Tarapacá campaign was to secure the department and to hold it as ransom until war reparations were paid once the war ended. Following the outbreak of war in April 1879, both sides focused on gaining naval superiority, since the extremely arid Atacama Desert was a formidable barrier for a land campaign. Therefore, the war first developed in a confrontation between
2109-504: The dissolution of the Alliance between Peru and Bolivia, since the latter country never fought in the war again. Also, Bolivia became a landlocked country, situation which maintains today. On his hand, Peru lost the Tarapacá department and the port of Arica definitively. Besides, Peru lost control over Tacna for almost fifty years, until Chile returned it in 1929. Spanish schooner Virgen de Covadonga The schooner Virgen de Covadonga ,
2166-427: The end, Arteaga lost almost 30% of his soldiers, only because Buendía had no cavalry to pursue him. General Manuel Baquedano sent his riders to collect the stragglers, saving more than 200 men from diying in the desert. For Arteaga, Tarapacá meant the end of his career, and Vergara was pointed out as the responsible and sent to Santiago. In the end, Chile succeeded in controlling the Tarapacá Department. The main goal of
2223-437: The entire Bolivian army was equipped with front-load muskets, with the only exception of Hilarión Daza's praetorian guard, the "Colorados" Battalion. The Peruvians were in better shape. They had a navy in equal footing with the Chileans, with two modern vessels, the ironclad Huáscar and the frigate Independencia , plus a few ships like the corvette Unión . Even before the war broke out, the Chilean government didn't trust in
2280-597: The government to reduce its personnel. Therefore, when the war started, the Chilean army had only 2,995 soldiers divided into four infantry regiments and another two of cavalry, which main experience was to patrol the frontier with the "araucanos", the Indians who held back the Spanish since the 1500s. The navy was about five old wooden corvettes and schooners -among them the Esmeralda and the Covadonga , until during Federico Errázuriz Echaurren 's administration two modern ironclads,
2337-738: The loss of Antofagasta. The First Southern Army ended the campaign crippled. Its commanders, Juan Buendía and Belisario Suárez, were separated from their commands and court martialed. The result of the campaign ended with the governments of Mariano Prado in Perú and Hilarión Daza in Bolivia. Both were replaced by Nicolás de Piérola and Narciso Campero. Tacna and Arica campaign Chilean victory Loa Line and Altiplano campaign Tarapacá campaign Tacna and Arica campaign Lynch Expedition Lima campaign Chilean occupation of Peru Breña campaign 1881 1882 1883 Arequipa-Puno Line The Tacna and Arica campaign
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2394-413: The navies of Chile and Perú. After the Chileans seized the port of Antofagasta on February 14, 1879, and secured it with the following victory at Calama on March 23, the focus was to destroy the Peruvian fleet. To achieve that goal, on April the Chilean government ordered Rear Admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo to sail to El Callao to sink the enemy ships on the docks or at anchor. However, since El Callao
2451-523: The port's hill tops. The Peruvian General Juan Buendía was in command of the Allied Southern Army at Tarapacá, who despite the importance of Pisagua didn't secure it as he should. At 6 am on November 2, a twelve ship convoy appeared on the horizon alerting the Allied defences of Pisagua. The ensuing bombardment silenced the two forts guarding the bay entrance and marked the start of the landing operation. The first wave of boats managed to establish
2508-505: The rail road, the raids found a water dwell at Dolores saltpetre office, which was rapidly reinforced with 6,500 men within the week, under Colonel Emilio Sotomayor. When the Chilean move over Pisagua was known at Tacna, the Allies rapidly decided that General Daza, the Bolivian President, would lead his army to a rendezvous point set at Tana River's den, near Pisagua, where he would meet Buendía. From here both later would counterattack
2565-481: The region where it was fought. After Angamos, the Chilean government began the preparations for an invasion of the Tarapacá Department , a Peruvian territory rich in nitrates and whose exploitation quarrel began the war. On its favour, Chile had the advantage of mobility, since the Allies could only move supplies and troops by land. Along this campaign both armies had to endure the difficulties of fighting across
2622-409: The saltpetre trade earnings went directly to the Chilean government, making the war effort much easier by allowing the purchase of supplies needed for the growing army. Chilean President Anibal Pinto sought to own the saltpetre factories, judging it safer to interpose Bolivia between Chile and Peru, and therefore prepared an invasion to Moquegua department in order to conquer Tacna and Arica , with
2679-419: The sea with the victory at Angamos on October 8, 1879, the Chilean army prepared to assault Tarapacá Province . An amphibious operation was launched at Pisagua on November 2, pushing the Allies inland and obtaining an unshipping point to unload troops and material. Right after Pisagua, two Allied squadrons were slightly outnumbered and crushed at Pampa Germania on November 6, and Col. Emilio Sotomayor held off
2736-491: The sole mission to find and destroy the Huáscar . The chase ended a week later with the decisive clash at Angamos on October 8, where Grau died and his ship was captured and later put under Chilean service. With this victory, the Pacific shores where open to a landing operation anywhere the Chilean high command considered necessary. Chile had a very little army since the beginning of the decade, due to funding shortages that forced
2793-512: The sunrise of March 22, 1880, while the 2nd Line and Santiago regiments attacked the sector of Quilin Quilin, the Atacama Battalion climbed the slope of Guaneros and caught the Peruvians from the rear, bayoneting them off their tactically superior positions. This forced the rest of the Allied soldiers to withdraw as well. On April, the Peruvian port of Callao was put under blockade, and at Locumba,
2850-421: The town on March 8 without any skirmishes. On March 17, the Peruvian vessel Union made through the blockade unloading supplies to the garrison of Arica. The same day Baquedano occupied Moquegua while the first division of Montero's Southern Army under Col. Andres Gamarra withdrew to Los Angeles hill, seeking to assume a position easy to defend. Baquedano with 4,500 men marched over Los Angeles on March 20. Before
2907-552: The ultimate aim of ceding them to Bolivia. In the meantime, Gen. Erasmo Escala resigned his commission as Commander in Chief due to constant and bitter arguments with War Minister Rafael Sotomayor , who then replaced him with Gen. Manuel Baquedano , a Peru-Bolivian Confederacy war veteran. The loss of Tarapacá generated popular discontent in Peru and in Bolivia, resulting in the deposition of Mariano Ignacio Prado and Hilarión Daza , who were replaced by Nicolas de Pierola and General Narciso Campero . Internal disputes arose between
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#17329021037062964-437: The vessels and the crew's morale. The situation tightened the public opinion, which forced Williams to lift the blockade and sail to El Callao. When he arrived, he found that the Peruvian fleet had departed on the 18. All this led to a simultaneous encounter at Punta Gruesa and Iquique on May 21, which proved decisive as the Peruvians lost one of their two modern ships -the ironclad Independencia -, to an old wooden schooner,
3021-491: The war effort development. This made both Arteaga and Williams to resign to their commissions on July and August, 1879. Right after, the army was put under General Erasmo Escala , who fought against the rebellion of 1851, and the Navy under Admiral Galvarino Riveros. Also, another civilian, José Francisco Vergara , was appointed as Chief of Staff's Secretary. However, the real commander was Sotomayor. After Riveros triumphed at Angamos
3078-680: Was a schooner built in Spain and launched in 1859. During the Spanish-South American War (1863-1866) , it was captured by Chilean forces at the end of the Papudo naval action and incorporated into the Chilean Navy. After being assigned to exploration missions, she was later assigned to the Chilean squadron that participated in the Pacific War (1879-1883) . In the Battle of Punta Gruesa she defeated
3135-467: Was heavily defended, Williams decided instead to block the port of Iquique , the most important Allied port in the Tarapacá department, with the idea to force the Peruvians to fight. However, this proved futile, because the Peruvians didn't come in rescue of Iquique, and used that precious time to put its navy fit for combat. Besides, the long wait did all the contrary for the Chilean Fleet, wearing down
3192-501: Was set to carry out on November 2. On the Allied side, since May President Pardo and General Hilarión Daza were reunited at Tacna to plan the course of the war. The crippling of the Peruvian Fleet condemned the Allies to a defensive strategy, due to the harsh conditions of the Atacama Desert. With this difficulty in mind, on May 4 the Bolivian 3rd Division was embarked from El Callao to Pisagua, and established at Alto Hospicio, over
3249-411: Was to surprise the Peruvians at Tarapacá using the fog of the morning. However, Santa Cruz was spotted before he could deploy properly and the battle began. The Chileans were overwhelmed by the thirst and heavily outnumbered and defeated. The 2nd Line Regiment was the most damaged unit in the battle. The unit lost its banner, and the first and second commanders, Eleuterio Ramírez and Bartolomé Vivar. In
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