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59-714: In Buddhist tradition, they were defeated by Buddha in the miracle contest known as the Twin Miracle . The six heretics and their views on Indian philosophy are described in detail in the Samaññaphala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya in the Pali Tipitaka . According to the sutra , King Ajātasattu visited Gautama Buddha, who, at the time, was living in the mango grove of Jīvaka in Rajagaha among 1250 bhikkhus . The king posed

118-434: A critique of epistemology. In the same passage, Silanka further continues: Knowledge cannot completely comprehend the nature of the object of knowledge, for it is said, "whatever is apprehended should have the parts, near, middle and outer but here only the near part is apprehended and not the others since it is determined by it (i.e. the nature of the object)"; as for the exhausting the atom ( paramanu-paryavasanata? ) with

177-449: A description of Jain teachings, which, unlike the previous teachers recognized morality and consequences in the afterlife. The philosophy of Nāṭaputta, however, varied from that of Buddha in its belief that involuntary actions, like voluntary actions, carry karmic weight; Buddhism holds that only actions with intention have the potential to generate karma. Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta was the sixth and final teacher referenced by Ajātasattu . He

236-488: A moral danger. While these three schools seem to have valued mental equanimity, it appears that the fourth school of Sceptics, associated with the philosopher Sanjaya Belatthiputta , did not share this value. A notable commonality among all these schools is the arrangement of propositions according to five-fold logic, alongside the usual two-fold mode and the four-fold mode ( catuṣkoṭi ) common in Pali Nikayas. The fifth mode

295-468: A question is put to them on this or that matter, they resort to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling on four grounds." Brahmajala Sutta describes four schools of Scepticism, the first three of whom advocated Scepticism on the basis of fear of falsehood ( musavadabhaya ), fear of involvement ( upadanabhaya ), and fear of interrogation in debate ( anuyogabhaya ), respectively, which all of them considered undesirable since it led to remorse or worry, and which led to

354-446: Is any fruit, any result, of good or bad actions...whether a man who has won the truth continues to be after death ... (The same answer is repeated after each of these problems as in the answer of the first question) Belaṭṭhaputta did not provide Ajātasattu with a clear answer to his question one way or another, leading some scholars to align him with Ajñana , an agnostic school of Indian philosophy which held that metaphysical knowledge

413-460: Is bound to contradict existing theories, and hence cannot be true. Hence nothing can be known to be true. Thus the Sceptics conclude that the contradictions of metaphysics and the impossibility of omniscience leads them to accept Scepticism. In a similar vein, the Sceptics held that Scepticism is the best since it is difficult to gauge the thought process of another. This may also be the reason why

472-432: Is built up of the four elements', when he dies, earth returns to the aggregate of earth, water to water, fire to fire, air to air, and the senses vanish into space." Pakudha Kaccāyana, the fourth teacher referred to by Ajātasattu, was an atomist who posited that all things were made up of earth, fire, air, water, pleasure, pain, and the soul, which were unchangeable and eternal. Thus objects, like living beings, composed of

531-563: Is described in Brahmajala Sutta in similar terms as the first, except that for them to be led to believe in a proposition by one's likes, desires, aversions, and resentments would be entanglement ( upadanam ), and such entanglement would be a source of worry ( vighato ) and as such a moral danger ( antarayo ). According to Jayatilleke, this group adopted Scepticism mainly due to morality, since to do so otherwise would lead to worry and mental disquietude ( vighata ), and not necessarily due to

590-408: Is dull, stupid. And by reason of his dullness and stupidity, when questioned on this or that matter, he resorts to verbal jugglery or eel-wriggling: "If you ask me whether there is a next world, then if it were to occur to me ( iti ce me assa ) that there is a next world, I would pronounce that there is a next world. Yet, I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny

649-611: Is evident". Apart from the specific technical meaning, Silanka also uses the word ajñānikah in a more general sense to mean anyone who is ignorant. The traces of scepticism can be found in Vedic sources such as in the Nasadiya hymn and hymn to sraddha (faith) in Rigveda . In Brahmanas and Early Upanishads doubt regarding a person's existence after death is cast, while the Yajñavalkya argued for

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708-481: Is given as the denial of denials, that is, the rejection of the dialectician's view. The first school is described in the Brahmajala Sutta : Herein a certain recluse or brahmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good or this is evil. And it occurs to him: I do not understand what is good or evil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this

767-616: Is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions, or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry ( vighato ) and worry would be a moral danger to me ( antarayo ). Thus, through fear of being wrong ( musavadabhaya ) and the abhorrence of being wrong, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying: I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny

826-444: Is located in the forehead ( lalatavyavasthitam ), etc. -- in respect of every category there is no uniformity in their assertion. The conflicting theories of atman can be traced to Early Upanisads. The idea of atman "made of everything" ( sarvamayah , idammayah adomayah ) would be omnipresent ( sarvagatam ) (Brhadaranyaka 4.4.5) while the transcendent atman defined negatively (Brhadaranyaka 3.9.26) would not be so. Again at Katha 2.3.17

885-451: Is no one with an outstanding intellect whose statements may be regarded as authoritative; even if such a person existed, he cannot be discovered by one with a limited vision according to the maxim that "one who is not omniscient does not know everything" for it is said "how can one desiring to know that a certain person is omniscient at a certain time do so if he is devoid of that person's intellect, his knowledge and his consciousness"; owing to

944-469: Is no result or consequence of good or evil actions", "the Perfect One (Tathagato) exists after death", "the Perfect One does not exist after death", "the Perfect One both exists and does not exist after death", "the Perfect One neither exists nor does not exist after death"" A similar account is given in the Samaññaphala Sutta . In both the accounts, the stupidity of this school is emphasised, highlighting

1003-553: Is on another's mind, saying "the inner mind of another can be apprehended by his external features, gestures, movements, gait, speech and the changes in his eyes and face." Although criticised by the Buddhists as amarāvikkhepikā (eel-wrigglers) in the Pali canon, the Buddha is depicted negating various the four-fold logical alternatives or catuṣkoṭi when posed with metaphysical questions, which

1062-478: Is probable that "they would have seen no point in debate since one was nowhere nearer the truth at the end of it and at the same time feared debate because it could result in loss of their mental equanimity with they valued." The fourth school of Scepticism described in Brahmajala Sutta is associated with Sanjaya Belatthiputta, whose views are also recorded in the Samaññaphala Sutta , since identical language

1121-483: Is said to have replied to King Ajātasattu as follows: If you ask me whether there is another world, and if I thought there were, I would tell you so. But I do not say so. I do not say that it is thus or thus; I do not say that it is otherwise; I do not say that I deny it; I do not say that I do not deny it; I do not say that there is, there is not, is and is not, neither is nor is not, another world. If you ask me whether there are beings of spontaneous birth...whether there

1180-567: Is similar to the logic employed by the Ajñānins. However, all four schools of Ajñānins arrange their logic as five-fold formula, which seems to be based on the acceptance of the four-fold formula. This may mean that such logical schema was a common feature of the pre-Buddhist era. Alternatively, since there is no known school of Indian thinkers apart from the Buddhist who adopted a four-fold logical schema, and since all Sceptical schools are depicted to have

1239-399: Is used to describe them. Sanjaya is described as a contemporary of the Buddha, as a well-known and celebrated teacher, and as a leader of a sect who was held in high esteem by the common folk. He is said to have taught Sariputta and Moggallana, before their conversion to Buddhism. In Brahmajala Sutta, this fourth school of Sceptics is described as thus: Herein a certain recluse or brahmin

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1298-571: The Brahmajala Sutta and Samaññaphala Sutta and in the Sūyagaḍaṃga of Jainism . Along with these texts, the sayings and opinions of the Sceptics ( ajñānikāḥ , ajñānināḥ ) has been preserved by Jain writer Silanka, from the ninth century, commenting on the Sutrakritanga . Silanka considers sceptics "those who claim that scepticism is best" or as "those in whom no knowledge, i.e. scepticism,

1357-413: The (knowledge of) the near portion, considering the unrepresented parts out of the three parts, it is not possible to apprehend the atom by those with a limited vision owing to the excellence of its nature; therefore, since there is no omniscient person and since one who is not omniscient cannot comprehend the nature of an object as it is constituted, since all the theorists ( sarvavadinam ) have conceived of

1416-402: The Buddha the question of whether or not it was possible that the life of a śramaṇa could bear fruit in the same way as the lives of craftsmen bear fruit, declaring that he had previously asked six teachers ( Pūraṇa Kassapa , Makkhali Gosāla , Ajita Kesakambala , Pakudha Kaccāyana , Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta and Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta ) the same question, yet had not found a satisfactory answer. At

1475-569: The Buddha's request, King Ajātasattu describes, the answers given to him by the six other teachers. The names below are provided in Sanskrit , with the equivalent Pali names given in parentheses. The first spiritual teacher to whom Ajātasattu posed his question was Pūraṇa Kassapa. Kassapa posited the theory of akiriyāvāda (non-doing): actions considered good and evil carried no inherent morality and thus there exists no future consequence from committing either "good" or "evil" deeds. Makkhali Gosala,

1534-508: The Jain Sutrakrtanga lists sixty-seven "schools" of Sceptics among three hundred and sixty-three different schools of thought. While the list is artificially constructed according to Jain categories, the four main schools of thought, Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ajnanikavada, and Vainayikavada, and their subgroups must have existed. Thus, philosophical Scepticism is thought to have appeared around this historic time frame. The Ajñāna claimed that

1593-514: The Jain leaders and Purana Kassapa, and maybe later to Makkhali Gosala and the Buddha, on the basis of which they claimed to speak with authority. The dictum, that with a limited knowledge no one can know that any person is omniscient, may possibly be an old saying of the Sceptics; and they may have extended the idea to say that since human intellect was limited, no one could claim to know everything with such limited intellect. The passage may also be seen as

1652-401: The Sceptics held to another dictum that All teachings are like the utterances of barbarians since they have no (epistemic) basis. Likewise, Silanka comments, "owing to the difficulty of knowing another's mind, they do not grasp what is intended by the words of their teacher and thus repeat the other's words like a barbarian without understanding the real meaning." Regarding this passage and

1711-508: The absence of the knowledge of the means, it cannot properly be accomplished; it cannot be accomplished because of the mutual dependence (of the two); for it is said "without a super-knowledge ( visistaparijñana ) the knowledge of the means is not attained and as a result there is no attainment of the super-knowledge of the object". This criticism of omniscience seems to be directed at those teachers who claimed omniscience, or to their followers who later claimed them to be omniscient, specifically

1770-427: The antipathy that the Buddhists felt about this school. In the Brahmajala Sutta , out of sixty-two philosophical schools mentioned, this school is singled out as being "a product of sheer stupidity;" whereas in the Samaññaphala Sutta , Ajatasattu singles out Sanjaya as "the most foolish and stupid." Notable in this account of the fourth school of Scepticism is the lack of concern for good life and peace of mind, which

1829-418: The atman is of "the size of a digit", while at Chandogya 3.14.3, the atman is "smaller than a kernel of a grain of millet". Again at Brhadaranyaka 2.3.1, Brahman which is identical with the atman is said "both to have form and also be formless." Likewise at Katha 2.3.17 the atman "resides in the heart" while at Aitareya Aranyaka 2.1.4.6 it is located in the head. In the same passage, Silanka continues: There

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1888-428: The category of the soul, some assert that the soul is omnipresent ( sarvagatam ) and other that it is not omnipresent ( asarvagatam ), some (say) it is of the size of a digit ( angustaparvamatram ) others that it is of the size of a kernel of a grain of millet ( syamakatandulamatram ) some say it both has form and is formless ( murtamamurtam ), some that it resides in the heart ( hrdayamadhyavartinam ) and (others) that it

1947-409: The conflicting theories of atman and the requirement of omniscience, and hence the criticism of omniscience, to obtain true knowledge. A proliferation of view points existed during the period immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, as attested in the Buddhist and Jain texts. The Buddhist Brahmajal Sutta lists four types (or schools) of Sceptics along with fifty-eight other schools of thought, while

2006-555: The considerations of rebirth, as understood according to the Buddhist connotation of the word "entanglement". In Brahmajala Sutta, the third school of Scepticism is shown to put forward such arguments in support for their view point: I do not know, as it really is, what is good and what is evil and not knowing, if I were to pronounce that this is good or this is evil, then I would have to join issue, argue and debate with recluses and brahmins, learned, subtle, hair-splitters, skilled in controversy, who go about debunking with their intellect

2065-430: The denials. (literally, I do not say "no, no"). In the absence of adequate information, the Sceptics prudently recommend suspension of judgement. The Sceptics felt that it was not just intellectually dishonest, but also morally dangerous not to do so. However, according to Jayatilleke, this was probably not a temporary suspension of judgement, until new information could come by to make a better evaluation; but rather it

2124-407: The denials. Similarly with regard to the propositions, "there is no next world", "there is and is not a next world", "there neither is nor is not a next world", "there are beings who survive (death)", "there are no beings who survive", "there are and are no beings who survive", "there neither are nor are there no beings who survive", "there is a result and a consequence of good and evil actions", "there

2183-409: The elements are subject to change, while the elements themselves are absolutely fixed in their existences. Thus by this dualism view, actions are defined solely by the physical interaction between these substances, rather than the moral value ascribed to them. Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, the 24th Jain tirthankara Mahavira , was the fifth teacher who Ajātasattu questioned. Nāṭaputta answered Ajātasattu with

2242-476: The five-fold formula of denial, which seems to be based on the acceptance of a four-fold form of predication, this may suggest the four-fold schema to be the Buddhist invention. Indeed, two of the foremost disciples of Buddha, Sariputta and Moggallāna , were initially the students of Sanjaya; and a strong element of skepticism is found in early Buddhism, most particularly in the Aṭṭhakavagga sutra. The catuṣkoṭi

2301-516: The four logical alternatives mentioned in Timon's account (i.e. is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not) are identical with that of Sanjaya, the Buddhists, and perhaps also of the three schools of Sceptics... Lastly (4) the value of the sceptical attitude is said by Pyrrho to lie in the fact that it promotes speechlessness (aphasia) and mental imperturbability (ataraxia). Scholars including Barua, Jayatilleke , and Flintoff, contend that Pyrrho

2360-430: The impossibility of knowing the ultimate reality or the atman. However the flourishing of sceptical thoughts seems to have occurred in a period with diverse, conflicting, and irreconcilable theories, regarding morality, metaphysics, and religious beliefs. It is natural, in the absence of a commonly accepted criterion of truth, for some people to wonder if any theory could be true at all. The Sceptics specifically pointed to

2419-635: The list of sixty-seven types. However, according to Jayatilleke, these last four "types" may represent the kind of questions the Sceptics themselves might have asked. The last four questions are: Such psychological speculations seem to be rife during this era, as evinced in Pali Nikayas, especially the Potthapada Sutta. In the Pali texts, the Sceptics are nicknamed Amarāvikkhepika s, which translates as "eel-wrigglers," probably in reference to their "verbal jugglery." They are collectively spoken of as "some recluse and brahmins who wriggle like eels. For when

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2478-559: The maxims on knowledge, Jayatilleke compares the Sceptic's views with that of the Greek sophist Gorgias , as given in his book "Nature or the Non-existent," and proposes that the Sceptics may have arrived at their position using similar lines of reasoning. According to Jayatilleke's interpretation of the passage given by Silanka, perception is divided into near, middle, and outer, and we perceive only

2537-426: The nature of the categories in a mutually contradictory manner and those who have claimed super-knowledge ( uttarapari-jñaninam ) are at fault ( paramdavatam ) Scepticism is best owing to the magnitude of the mistakes that arise (from claims of knowledge). To the Sceptics, none of the contending theories, proposed by limited intellect, can be known to be true, since they are mutually contradictory. Also, any new theory

2596-475: The near; so each person's view of what they see of an object will be different according their perspective. Since our knowledge depends on our individual perspective, the knowledge would be subjective since different person will have differing perspectives. In the absence of objectivity, there is no knowledge and all private experiences of impressions of different individuals would be incommunicable. According to Silanka, The Sceptics... conceive that even if there

2655-585: The possibility of knowledge is doubtful since the claims to knowledge were mutually contradictory. Silanka quotes, "They posit the theory that since those who claim knowledge make mutually contradictory assertions, they cannot be stating the truth." Regarding Sceptic's point of view, Silanka in his commentary writes, as translated by Jayatilleke: For they (i.e. the Sceptics) say that those who claim knowledge ( jñaninah ) cannot be stating actual facts since their statements are mutually contradictory, for even with regard to

2714-400: The possibility of their truth, while denying the possibility of knowing this. The Jains criticised the Sceptics by pointing out that their scepticism should lead them to the conclusion that they know nothing whatsoever, yet they assert the knowledge of their scepticism and claim to know such propositions as "ignorance is best". Silanka criticises the Sceptics' belief that one cannot know what

2773-507: The previous three schools regarded as desirable, and hence their advocacy of scepticism. Jayatilleke states that Sanjaya may have been a more thorough-going sceptic, to the point of being sceptical about a sceptic's way of life, and as such might have been a more vocal critic of his opponents and their regard for mental tranquillity, valued by the Buddhists as well. Judging by the propositions listed, Sanjaya's scepticism seems to have encompassed both metaphysics and morality. Sanjaya seems to grant

2832-420: The second teacher visited by Ajātasattu, subscribed to the doctrine of non-causality; the attainment of any condition is dependent on circumstance, fate, or nature rather than human will and events lack in root cause. Like Kassapa, Gosāla denied the existence of karma and vipaka . This doctrine has been likened to fatalism and determinism . His theory is also called the theory of causelessness ( Ahetukavāda ),

2891-781: The soul exists? Of what use is this knowledge? Who knows that the soul does not exist? Of what use is this knowledge? The Sutrakrtanga affirms that the Sceptics "teach final beatitude and final deliverance." Thus, the Sceptics may have contended that knowledge is not necessary for salvation but tapas , which seem similar to karmapatha . Silanka in his commentary mentions sixty-seven types of Sceptics. However, these sixty-seven types are obtained combinatorially by taking nine categories ( navapadartha ) of Jainism, each with seven forms of predication ( saptabhangakah ), to give sixty-three (9 × 7) forms of sceptical questions, which were considered to represent sixty-three "types" of Sceptics asking these questions. The last four "types" were added to complete

2950-558: The theories of others. If I were to join issue, argue and debate with them, I would no be able to explain to them. If I were unable to explain to them, that would cause me worry ( vighata ) and be moral danger ( antarayo ). Thus because he fears and detests interrogation ( anuyoga ) he does not "pronounce this to be good nor that to be evil." According to Jayatilleke, it is not clear from this passage if they wished to avoid debate because they were Sceptics or whether they adopted Scepticism because they wanted to avoid debate. According to him, it

3009-421: The theory of natural purity ( Saṃsārasuddhivāda ). Ajita Kesakambala followed Gosāla as the third teacher mentioned by Ajātasattu. He is thought to be a materialist ( Bhautikavādi ), nihilist ( Ucchedavādi ) and an exponent of non-efficacy of kamma ( Akiriyavādi ). Kesakambala held that all in existence was merely the process of natural phenomena and vehemently denied the existence of any life after death; "A man

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3068-611: Was impossible to obtain. The Twin Miracle Too Many Requests If you report this error to the Wikimedia System Administrators, please include the details below. Request from 172.68.168.133 via cp1102 cp1102, Varnish XID 113381781 Upstream caches: cp1102 int Error: 429, Too Many Requests at Fri, 29 Nov 2024 08:27:40 GMT Aj%C3%B1ana Ajñāna ( Sanskrit : अज्ञान , (Vedic) IPA: /ɐd͡ʑ.ɲɑː.nɐ/; (Classical) IPA: /ɐd͡ʑˈɲɑː.n̪ɐ/)

3127-425: Was influenced by, or at the very least agreed with, Indian scepticism rather than Buddhism or Jainism, based on the fact that he valued ataraxia , which can be translated as "freedom from worry". Jayatilleke, in particular, contends that Pyrrho may have been influenced by the first three schools of Ajñāna, since they too valued freedom from worry. If this is true, then the methods of the Ajñānins may be preserved in

3186-486: Was knowledge it is useless ( nisphalam ) since it has many disadvantages ( bahudosavat ). This quotation suggests that the Sceptics preferred scepticism not just on intellectual basis, but also for pragmatic or moral reasons. What these disadvantages are, Silanka does not elaborate, but can be found in the Buddhist sources. Regarding the futility of knowledge, Silanka puts these questions of the Sceptics: Who knows that

3245-496: Was later used as a tool by Nagarjuna to formulate his influential brand of Madhyamaka philosophy. Since skepticism is a philosophical attitude and a style of philosophising rather than a position, the Ajñānins may have influenced other skeptical thinkers of India like Nagarjuna, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa , and Shriharsha . According to Diogenes Laërtius , the Greek philosopher Pyrrho developed his skeptical philosophy in India when Pyrrho

3304-419: Was meant to be a permanent state of affair by outright denying the very possibility of knowledge, and hence of questions regarding morality. Thus, their Scepticism is motivated by both intellectual as well as moral reasoning (i.e. fear of asserting falsehood due to one's prejudices). They seem to have contended that knowledge was not necessary for salvation but for karma-patha . The second school of Sceptics

3363-449: Was one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of ancient Indian philosophy , and the ancient school of radical Indian skepticism . It was a Śramaṇa movement and a major rival of early Buddhism , Jainism and the Ājīvika school. They have been recorded in Buddhist and Jain texts. They held that it was impossible to obtain knowledge of metaphysical nature or ascertain the truth value of philosophical propositions; and even if knowledge

3422-510: Was possible, it was useless and disadvantageous for final salvation. They were specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own. Sanjaya Belatthiputta was one of the major proponents of this school of thought. All of our knowledge of the Ajñāna come from the Buddhists and Jain sources. The Ajñāna view points are recorded in Theravada Buddhism 's Pāli Canon in

3481-538: Was there during the conquest of Alexander the Great . Based on the so-called "Aristocles passage," Jayatilleke draws many similarities between Pyrrhonist philosophy and the Indian philosophies current at the time. In particular, he lists the following: (1) There were no beliefs or opinions which were true or false and therefore (2) we should give no positive answer to any of the logical alternatives. It would also be seen that (3)

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