S/KEY is a one-time password system developed for authentication to Unix-like operating systems , especially from dumb terminals or untrusted public computers on which one does not want to type a long-term password. A user's real password is combined in an offline device with a short set of characters and a decrementing counter to form a single-use password. Because each password is only used once, they are useless to password sniffers .
77-416: Because the short set of characters does not change until the counter reaches zero, it is possible to prepare a list of single-use passwords, in order, that can be carried by the user. Alternatively, the user can present the password, characters, and desired counter value to a local calculator to generate the appropriate one-time password that can then be transmitted over the network in the clear. The latter form
154-411: A key derivation function , the challenge value and the secret may be combined to generate an unpredictable encryption key for the session. This is particularly effective against a man-in-the-middle attack, because the attacker will not be able to derive the session key from the challenge without knowing the secret, and therefore will not be able to decrypt the data stream. where This particular example
231-406: A malicious adversary cannot replace or modify the input data without changing its digest. Thus, if two strings have the same digest, one can be very confident that they are identical. Second pre-image resistance prevents an attacker from crafting a document with the same hash as a document the attacker cannot control. Collision resistance prevents an attacker from creating two distinct documents with
308-444: A CRC was used for message integrity in the WEP encryption standard, but an attack was readily discovered, which exploited the linearity of the checksum. In cryptographic practice, "difficult" generally means "almost certainly beyond the reach of any adversary who must be prevented from breaking the system for as long as the security of the system is deemed important". The meaning of the term
385-661: A block cipher. A hash function built with the Merkle–Damgård construction is as resistant to collisions as is its compression function; any collision for the full hash function can be traced back to a collision in the compression function. The last block processed should also be unambiguously length padded ; this is crucial to the security of this construction. This construction is called the Merkle–Damgård construction . Most common classical hash functions, including SHA-1 and MD5 , take this form. A straightforward application of
462-450: A complexity of 2. While they wouldn't get the original password, they would be able to find valid credentials for each user. In this regard, it is similar to storing unsalted 64-bit hashes of strong, unique passwords. The S/KEY protocol can loop. If such a loop were created in the S/KEY chain, an attacker could use user's key without finding the original value, and possibly without tipping off
539-501: A conventional mode of operation, without the same security guarantees; for example, SHACAL , BEAR and LION . Pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) can be built using hash functions. This is done by combining a (secret) random seed with a counter and hashing it. Some hash functions, such as Skein , Keccak , and RadioGatún , output an arbitrarily long stream and can be used as a stream cipher , and stream ciphers can also be built from fixed-length digest hash functions. Often this
616-432: A cryptographic hash is as follows: Alice poses a tough math problem to Bob and claims that she has solved it. Bob would like to try it himself, but would yet like to be sure that Alice is not bluffing. Therefore, Alice writes down her solution, computes its hash, and tells Bob the hash value (whilst keeping the solution secret). Then, when Bob comes up with the solution himself a few days later, Alice can prove that she had
693-553: A cryptographic hash to be calculated over the message. This allows the signature calculation to be performed on the relatively small, statically sized hash digest. The message is considered authentic if the signature verification succeeds given the signature and recalculated hash digest over the message. So the message integrity property of the cryptographic hash is used to create secure and efficient digital signature schemes. Password verification commonly relies on cryptographic hashes. Storing all user passwords as cleartext can result in
770-525: A cryptographic hash to increase the time (and in some cases computer memory) required to perform brute-force attacks on stored password hash digests. For details, see § Attacks on hashed passwords . A password hash also requires the use of a large random, non-secret salt value that can be stored with the password hash. The salt is hashed with the password, altering the password hash mapping for each password, thereby making it infeasible for an adversary to store tables of precomputed hash values to which
847-454: A deliberate attack. For example, a denial-of-service attack on hash tables is possible if the collisions are easy to find, as in the case of linear cyclic redundancy check (CRC) functions. Most cryptographic hash functions are designed to take a string of any length as input and produce a fixed-length hash value. A cryptographic hash function must be able to withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack . In theoretical cryptography,
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#1733084920766924-473: A different time. For example, when other communications security methods are unavailable, the U.S. military uses the AKAC-1553 TRIAD numeral cipher to authenticate and encrypt some communications. TRIAD includes a list of three-letter challenge codes, which the verifier is supposed to choose randomly from, and random three-letter responses to them. For added security, each set of codes is only valid for
1001-477: A hash by trying all possible messages in the set. Because cryptographic hash functions are typically designed to be computed quickly, special key derivation functions that require greater computing resources have been developed that make such brute-force attacks more difficult. In some theoretical analyses "difficult" has a specific mathematical meaning, such as "not solvable in asymptotic polynomial time ". Such interpretations of difficulty are important in
1078-791: A larger internal state size – which range from tweaks of the Merkle–Damgård construction to new constructions such as the sponge construction and HAIFA construction . None of the entrants in the NIST hash function competition use a classical Merkle–Damgård construction. Meanwhile, truncating the output of a longer hash, such as used in SHA-512/256, also defeats many of these attacks. Hash functions can be used to build other cryptographic primitives . For these other primitives to be cryptographically secure, care must be taken to build them correctly. Message authentication codes (MACs) (also called keyed hash functions) are often built from hash functions. HMAC
1155-454: A massive security breach if the password file is compromised. One way to reduce this danger is to only store the hash digest of each password. To authenticate a user, the password presented by the user is hashed and compared with the stored hash. A password reset method is required when password hashing is performed; original passwords cannot be recalculated from the stored hash value. However, use of standard cryptographic hash functions, such as
1232-511: A number of zero bits. The average work that the sender needs to perform in order to find a valid message is exponential in the number of zero bits required in the hash value, while the recipient can verify the validity of the message by executing a single hash function. For instance, in Hashcash, a sender is asked to generate a header whose 160-bit SHA-1 hash value has the first 20 bits as zeros. The sender will, on average, have to try 2 times to find
1309-405: A particular kind, cryptographic hash functions lend themselves well to this application too. However, compared with standard hash functions, cryptographic hash functions tend to be much more expensive computationally. For this reason, they tend to be used in contexts where it is necessary for users to protect themselves against the possibility of forgery (the creation of data with the same digest as
1386-469: A particular time period which is ordinarily 24 hours. Another basic challenge-response technique works as follows. Bob is controlling access to some resource, and Alice is seeking entry. Bob issues the challenge "52w72y". Alice must respond with the one string of characters which "fits" the challenge Bob issued. The "fit" is determined by an algorithm defined in advance, and known by both Bob and Alice. The correct response might be as simple as "63x83z", with
1463-410: A strong cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator and cryptographic hash function can generate challenges that are highly unlikely to occur more than once. It is sometimes important not to use time-based nonces, as these can weaken servers in different time zones and servers with inaccurate clocks. It can also be important to use time-based nonces and synchronized clocks if the application
1540-442: A valid header. A message digest can also serve as a means of reliably identifying a file; several source code management systems, including Git , Mercurial and Monotone , use the sha1sum of various types of content (file content, directory trees, ancestry information, etc.) to uniquely identify them. Hashes are used to identify files on peer-to-peer filesharing networks. For example, in an ed2k link , an MD4 -variant hash
1617-1043: Is a hash algorithm (a map of an arbitrary binary string to a binary string with a fixed size of n {\displaystyle n} bits) that has special properties desirable for a cryptographic application: Cryptographic hash functions have many information-security applications, notably in digital signatures , message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication . They can also be used as ordinary hash functions , to index data in hash tables , for fingerprinting , to detect duplicate data or uniquely identify files, and as checksums to detect accidental data corruption. Indeed, in information-security contexts, cryptographic hash values are sometimes called ( digital ) fingerprints , checksums , or just hash values , even though all these terms stand for more general functions with rather different properties and purposes. Non-cryptographic hash functions are used in hash tables and to detect accidental errors; their constructions frequently provide no resistance to
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#17330849207661694-446: Is a family of protocols in which one party presents a question ("challenge") and another party must provide a valid answer ("response") to be authenticated . The simplest example of a challenge-response protocol is password authentication, where the challenge is asking for the password and the valid response is the correct password. An adversary who can eavesdrop on a password authentication can authenticate themselves by reusing
1771-498: Is a trademark of Telcordia Technologies , formerly known as Bell Communications Research (Bellcore). S/KEY is also sometimes referred to as Lamport's scheme , after its author, Leslie Lamport . It was developed by Neil Haller, Phil Karn and John Walden at Bellcore in the late 1980s. With the expiration of the basic patents on public-key cryptography and the widespread use of laptop computers running SSH and other cryptographic protocols that can secure an entire session, not just
1848-498: Is also vulnerable to certain race conditions , such as where an attacker's software sniffs the network to learn the first N − 1 characters in the password (where N equals the password length), establishes its own TCP session to the server, and in rapid succession tries all valid characters in the N -th position until one succeeds. These types of vulnerabilities can be avoided by using ssh , SSL , SPKM, or other encrypted transport layer. Since each iteration of S/KEY doesn't include
1925-564: Is based on a substantially modified version of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Whirlpool produces a hash digest of 512 bits (64 bytes). SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2) is a set of cryptographic hash functions designed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), first published in 2001. They are built using the Merkle–Damgård structure, from a one-way compression function itself built using
2002-422: Is combined with the file size, providing sufficient information for locating file sources, downloading the file, and verifying its contents. Magnet links are another example. Such file hashes are often the top hash of a hash list or a hash tree , which allows for additional benefits. One of the main applications of a hash function is to allow the fast look-up of data in a hash table . Being hash functions of
2079-504: Is done by first building a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator and then using its stream of random bytes as keystream . SEAL is a stream cipher that uses SHA-1 to generate internal tables, which are then used in a keystream generator more or less unrelated to the hash algorithm. SEAL is not guaranteed to be as strong (or weak) as SHA-1. Similarly, the key expansion of the HC-128 and HC-256 stream ciphers makes heavy use of
2156-416: Is given by the extension to the "SHA" name, so SHA-224 has an output size of 224 bits (28 bytes); SHA-256, 32 bytes; SHA-384, 48 bytes; and SHA-512, 64 bytes. SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm 3) was released by NIST on August 5, 2015. SHA-3 is a subset of the broader cryptographic primitive family Keccak. The Keccak algorithm is the work of Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michael Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. Keccak
2233-484: Is insufficient for many practical uses. In addition to collision resistance, it should be impossible for an adversary to find two messages with substantially similar digests; or to infer any useful information about the data, given only its digest. In particular, a hash function should behave as much as possible like a random function (often called a random oracle in proofs of security) while still being deterministic and efficiently computable. This rules out functions like
2310-469: Is more common and practically amounts to challenge–response authentication . S/KEY is supported in Linux (via pluggable authentication modules ), OpenBSD , NetBSD , and FreeBSD , and a generic open-source implementation can be used to enable its use on other systems. OpenSSH also implements S/KEY since version OpenSSH 1.2.2 was released on December 1, 1999. One common implementation is called OPIE . S/KEY
2387-449: Is not stored, and it is very difficult to determine a password that matches a given hash. However, this presents a problem for many (but not all) challenge-response algorithms, which require both the client and the server to have a shared secret. Since the password itself is not stored, a challenge-response algorithm will usually have to use the hash of the password as the secret instead of the password itself. In this case, an intruder can use
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2464-442: Is similar to content-addressable memory . CAS systems work by passing the content of the file through a cryptographic hash function to generate a unique key, the "content address". The file system 's directory stores these addresses and a pointer to the physical storage of the content. Because an attempt to store the same file will generate the same key, CAS systems ensure that the files within them are unique, and because changing
2541-430: Is such a MAC. Just as block ciphers can be used to build hash functions, hash functions can be used to build block ciphers. Luby-Rackoff constructions using hash functions can be provably secure if the underlying hash function is secure. Also, many hash functions (including SHA-1 and SHA-2 ) are built by using a special-purpose block cipher in a Davies–Meyer or other construction. That cipher can also be used in
2618-399: Is the one that will be used for the next authentication. However, this would require inverting the hash function that produced password i −1 using password i ( H ( password i −1 ) = password i ), which is extremely difficult to do with current cryptographic hash functions . Nevertheless, S/KEY is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack if used by itself. It
2695-478: Is therefore somewhat dependent on the application since the effort that a malicious agent may put into the task is usually proportional to their expected gain. However, since the needed effort usually multiplies with the digest length, even a thousand-fold advantage in processing power can be neutralized by adding a dozen bits to the latter. For messages selected from a limited set of messages, for example passwords or other short messages, it can be feasible to invert
2772-418: Is vulnerable to a reflection attack . To avoid storage of passwords, some operating systems (e.g. Unix -type) store a hash of the password rather than storing the password itself. During authentication, the system need only verify that the hash of the password entered matches the hash stored in the password database. This makes it more difficult for an intruder to get the passwords, since the password itself
2849-459: Is vulnerable to a delayed message attack. This attack occurs where an attacker copies a transmission whilst blocking it from reaching the destination, allowing them to replay the captured transmission after a delay of their choosing. This is easily accomplished on wireless channels. The time-based nonce can be used to limit the attacker to resending the message but restricted by an expiry time of perhaps less than one second, likely having no effect upon
2926-565: The SHA-256 hash function. Concatenating outputs from multiple hash functions provide collision resistance as good as the strongest of the algorithms included in the concatenated result. For example, older versions of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) used concatenated MD5 and SHA-1 sums. This ensures that a method to find collisions in one of the hash functions does not defeat data protected by both hash functions. For Merkle–Damgård construction hash functions,
3003-479: The SWIFFT function, which can be rigorously proven to be collision-resistant assuming that certain problems on ideal lattices are computationally difficult, but, as a linear function, does not satisfy these additional properties. Checksum algorithms, such as CRC32 and other cyclic redundancy checks , are designed to meet much weaker requirements and are generally unsuitable as cryptographic hash functions. For example,
3080-448: The shared secret (the password), without the secret ever being transmitted in the clear over the communication channel. One way this is done involves using the password as the encryption key to transmit some randomly generated information as the challenge , whereupon the other end must return as its response a similarly encrypted value which is some predetermined function of the originally offered information, thus proving that it
3157-517: The shattered attack and the hash function should be considered broken. SHA-1 produces a hash digest of 160 bits (20 bytes). Documents may refer to SHA-1 as just "SHA", even though this may conflict with the other Secure Hash Algorithms such as SHA-0, SHA-2, and SHA-3. RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest) is a family of cryptographic hash functions developed in Leuven, Belgium, by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart Preneel at
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3234-636: The COSIC research group at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, and first published in 1996. RIPEMD was based upon the design principles used in MD4 and is similar in performance to the more popular SHA-1. RIPEMD-160 has, however, not been broken. As the name implies, RIPEMD-160 produces a hash digest of 160 bits (20 bytes). Whirlpool is a cryptographic hash function designed by Vincent Rijmen and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, who first described it in 2000. Whirlpool
3311-504: The Davies–Meyer structure from a (classified) specialized block cipher. SHA-2 basically consists of two hash algorithms: SHA-256 and SHA-512. SHA-224 is a variant of SHA-256 with different starting values and truncated output. SHA-384 and the lesser-known SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 are all variants of SHA-512. SHA-512 is more secure than SHA-256 and is commonly faster than SHA-256 on 64-bit machines such as AMD64 . The output size in bits
3388-428: The Merkle–Damgård construction, where the size of hash output is equal to the internal state size (between each compression step), results in a narrow-pipe hash design. This design causes many inherent flaws, including length-extension , multicollisions, long message attacks, generate-and-paste attacks, and also cannot be parallelized. As a result, modern hash functions are built on wide-pipe constructions that have
3465-485: The SHA series, is no longer considered safe for password storage. These algorithms are designed to be computed quickly, so if the hashed values are compromised, it is possible to try guessed passwords at high rates. Common graphics processing units can try billions of possible passwords each second. Password hash functions that perform key stretching – such as PBKDF2 , scrypt or Argon2 – commonly use repeated invocations of
3542-437: The actual hash, rather than the password, which makes the stored hashes just as sensitive as the actual passwords. SCRAM is a challenge-response algorithm that avoids this problem. Examples of more sophisticated challenge-response algorithms are: Some people consider a CAPTCHA a kind of challenge-response authentication that blocks spambots . Cryptographic hash functions A cryptographic hash function ( CHF )
3619-540: The algorithm changing each character of the challenge using a Caesar cipher . In reality, the algorithm would be much more complex. Bob issues a different challenge each time, and thus knowing a previous correct response (even if it is not obfuscated by the means of communication) does not allow an adversary to determine the current correct response. Challenge-response protocols are also used in non-cryptographic applications. CAPTCHAs , for example, are meant to allow websites and applications to determine whether an interaction
3696-517: The algorithm was published in 1993 under the title Secure Hash Standard, FIPS PUB 180, by U.S. government standards agency NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). It was withdrawn by the NSA shortly after publication and was superseded by the revised version, published in 1995 in FIPS ; PUB 180-1 and commonly designated SHA-1. Collisions against the full SHA-1 algorithm can be produced using
3773-439: The application and so mitigating the attack. Mutual authentication is performed using a challenge-response handshake in both directions; the server ensures that the client knows the secret, and the client also ensures that the server knows the secret, which protects against a rogue server impersonating the real server. Challenge-response authentication can help solve the problem of exchanging session keys for encryption. Using
3850-409: The concatenated function is as collision-resistant as its strongest component, but not more collision-resistant. Antoine Joux observed that 2-collisions lead to n -collisions: if it is feasible for an attacker to find two messages with the same MD5 hash, then they can find as many additional messages with that same MD5 hash as they desire, with no greater difficulty. Among those n messages with
3927-482: The days before the Internet , when the user could be sure that the system asking for the password was really the system they were trying to access, and that nobody was likely to be eavesdropping on the communication channel . To address the insecure channel problem, a more sophisticated approach is necessary. Many cryptographic solutions involve two-way authentication; both the user and the system must verify that they know
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#17330849207664004-409: The exchanged data and retransmits it at a later time to fool one end into thinking it has authenticated a new connection attempt from the other. Authentication protocols usually employ a cryptographic nonce as the challenge to ensure that every challenge-response sequence is unique. This protects against Eavesdropping with a subsequent replay attack . If it is impractical to implement a true nonce,
4081-442: The expected data) by potentially malicious participants. Content-addressable storage (CAS), also referred to as content-addressed storage or fixed-content storage, is a way to store information so it can be retrieved based on its content, not its name or location. It has been used for high-speed storage and retrieval of fixed content, such as documents stored for compliance with government regulations . Content-addressable storage
4158-455: The file will result in a new key, CAS systems provide assurance that the file is unchanged. There are several methods to use a block cipher to build a cryptographic hash function, specifically a one-way compression function . The methods resemble the block cipher modes of operation usually used for encryption. Many well-known hash functions, including MD4 , MD5 , SHA-1 and SHA-2 , are built from block-cipher-like components designed for
4235-461: The hashes are posted on a trusted site – usually the originating site – authenticated by HTTPS . Using a cryptographic hash and a chain of trust detects malicious changes to the file. Non-cryptographic error-detecting codes such as cyclic redundancy checks only prevent against non-malicious alterations of the file, since an intentional spoof can readily be crafted to have the colliding code value. Almost all digital signature schemes require
4312-400: The intercepted password. One solution is to issue multiple passwords, each of them marked with an identifier. The verifier can then present an identifier, and the prover must respond with the correct password for that identifier. Assuming that the passwords are chosen independently, an adversary who intercepts one challenge-response message pair has no clues to help with a different challenge at
4389-475: The key changes each block; and related-key attacks make it potentially less secure for use in a hash function than for encryption. A hash function must be able to process an arbitrary-length message into a fixed-length output. This can be achieved by breaking the input up into a series of equally sized blocks, and operating on them in sequence using a one-way compression function . The compression function can either be specially designed for hashing or be built from
4466-400: The message) calculated before, and after, transmission can determine whether any changes have been made to the message or file . MD5 , SHA-1 , or SHA-2 hash digests are sometimes published on websites or forums to allow verification of integrity for downloaded files, including files retrieved using file sharing such as mirroring . This practice establishes a chain of trust as long as
4543-416: The password hash digest can be compared or to test a large number of purloined hash values in parallel. A proof-of-work system (or protocol, or function) is an economic measure to deter denial-of-service attacks and other service abuses such as spam on a network by requiring some work from the service requester, usually meaning processing time by a computer. A key feature of these schemes is their asymmetry:
4620-410: The password to an eavesdropper. However, they may supply enough information to allow an eavesdropper to deduce what the password is, using a dictionary attack or brute-force attack . The use of information which is randomly generated on each exchange (and where the response is different from the challenge) guards against the possibility of a replay attack , where a malicious intermediary simply records
4697-449: The password, S/KEY is falling into disuse. Schemes that implement two-factor authentication , by comparison, are growing in use. The server is the computer that will perform the authentication. After password generation, the user has a sheet of paper with n passwords on it. If n is very large, either storing all n passwords or calculate the given password from H ( W ) become inefficient. There are methods to efficiently calculate
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#17330849207664774-420: The passwords in the required order, using only ⌈ log n 2 ⌉ {\displaystyle \left\lceil {\frac {\log n}{2}}\right\rceil } hash calculations per step and storing ⌈ log n ⌉ {\displaystyle \lceil \log n\rceil } passwords. More ideally, though perhaps less commonly in practice,
4851-976: The purpose, with feedback to ensure that the resulting function is not invertible. SHA-3 finalists included functions with block-cipher-like components (e.g., Skein , BLAKE ) though the function finally selected, Keccak , was built on a cryptographic sponge instead. A standard block cipher such as AES can be used in place of these custom block ciphers; that might be useful when an embedded system needs to implement both encryption and hashing with minimal code size or hardware area. However, that approach can have costs in efficiency and security. The ciphers in hash functions are built for hashing: they use large keys and blocks, can efficiently change keys every block, and have been designed and vetted for resistance to related-key attacks . General-purpose ciphers tend to have different design goals. In particular, AES has key and block sizes that make it nontrivial to use to generate long hash values; AES encryption becomes less efficient when
4928-428: The salt or count, it is feasible to find collisions directly without breaking the initial password. This has a complexity of 2, which can be pre-calculated with the same amount of space. The space complexity can be optimized by storing chains of values, although collisions might reduce the coverage of this method, especially for long chains. Someone with access to an S/KEY database can break all of them in parallel with
5005-475: The same MD5 hash, there is likely to be a collision in SHA-1. The additional work needed to find the SHA-1 collision (beyond the exponential birthday search) requires only polynomial time . There are many cryptographic hash algorithms; this section lists a few algorithms that are referenced relatively often. A more extensive list can be found on the page containing a comparison of cryptographic hash functions . MD5
5082-527: The same hash. A function meeting these criteria may still have undesirable properties. Currently, popular cryptographic hash functions are vulnerable to length-extension attacks : given hash( m ) and len( m ) but not m , by choosing a suitable m ′ an attacker can calculate hash( m ∥ m ′ ) , where ∥ denotes concatenation . This property can be used to break naive authentication schemes based on hash functions. The HMAC construction works around these problems. In practice, collision resistance
5159-465: The security level of a cryptographic hash function has been defined using the following properties: Collision resistance implies second pre-image resistance but does not imply pre-image resistance. The weaker assumption is always preferred in theoretical cryptography, but in practice, a hash-function that is only second pre-image resistant is considered insecure and is therefore not recommended for real applications. Informally, these properties mean that
5236-452: The server. The security of S/KEY relies on the difficulty of reversing cryptographic hash functions . Assume an attacker manages to get hold of a password that was used for a successful authentication. Supposing this is password i , this password is already useless for subsequent authentications, because each password can only be used once. It would be interesting for the attacker to find out password i −1 , because this password
5313-423: The sheet of paper), the second one will be used instead: For subsequent authentications, the user will provide password i . (The last password on the printed list, password n , is the first password generated by the server, H ( W ), where W is the initial secret). The server will compute H ( password i ) and will compare the result to password i −1 , which is stored as reference on
5390-461: The solution earlier by revealing it and having Bob hash it and check that it matches the hash value given to him before. (This is an example of a simple commitment scheme ; in actual practice, Alice and Bob will often be computer programs, and the secret would be something less easily spoofed than a claimed puzzle solution.) An important application of secure hashes is the verification of message integrity . Comparing message digests (hash digests over
5467-414: The study of provably secure cryptographic hash functions but do not usually have a strong connection to practical security. For example, an exponential-time algorithm can sometimes still be fast enough to make a feasible attack. Conversely, a polynomial-time algorithm (e.g., one that requires n steps for n -digit keys) may be too slow for any practical use. An illustration of the potential use of
5544-500: The user may carry a small, portable, secure, non-networked computing device capable of regenerating any needed password given the secret passphrase, the salt , and the number of iterations of the hash required, the latter two of which are conveniently provided by the server requesting authentication for login. In any case, the first password will be the same password that the server has stored. This first password will not be used for authentication (the user should scratch this password on
5621-466: The valid user. The pathological case of this would be an OTP that hashes to itself. Internally, S/KEY uses 64-bit numbers. For human usability purposes, each number is mapped to six short words, of one to four characters each, from a publicly accessible 2048-word dictionary. For example, one 64-bit number maps to "ROY HURT SKI FAIL GRIM KNEE". Challenge%E2%80%93response authentication In computer security , challenge-response authentication
5698-498: The work must be moderately hard (but feasible) on the requester side but easy to check for the service provider. One popular system – used in Bitcoin mining and Hashcash – uses partial hash inversions to prove that work was done, to unlock a mining reward in Bitcoin, and as a good-will token to send an e-mail in Hashcash. The sender is required to find a message whose hash value begins with
5775-547: Was able to decrypt the challenge. For instance, in Kerberos , the challenge is an encrypted integer N , while the response is the encrypted integer N + 1 , proving that the other end was able to decrypt the integer N . A hash function can also be applied to a password and a random challenge value to create a response value. Another variation uses a probabilistic model to provide randomized challenges conditioned on model input. Such encrypted or hashed exchanges do not directly reveal
5852-454: Was designed by Ronald Rivest in 1991 to replace an earlier hash function, MD4, and was specified in 1992 as RFC 1321. Collisions against MD5 can be calculated within seconds, which makes the algorithm unsuitable for most use cases where a cryptographic hash is required. MD5 produces a digest of 128 bits (16 bytes). SHA-1 was developed as part of the U.S. Government's Capstone project. The original specification – now commonly called SHA-0 – of
5929-415: Was performed by a genuine user rather than a web scraper or bot . In early CAPTCHAs, the challenge sent to the user was a distorted image of some text, and the user responded by transcribing the text. The distortion was designed to make automated optical character recognition (OCR) difficult and prevent a computer program from passing as a human. Non-cryptographic authentication was generally adequate in
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