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46-753: Rezang La is a mountain pass on the Line of Actual Control between Indian-administered Ladakh and the Chinese-administered Spanggur Lake basin. The pass is located on the watershed ridge of the Chushul Valley , on its east. China claims that the ridge is the boundary between the two countries, while India's claim line is further east. About 3 km southeast of Rechin La ( 33°24′52″N 78°52′29″E  /  33.4144°N 78.8748°E  / 33.4144; 78.8748  ( Rèzàng Shānkǒu ) ) on

92-585: A certain sanctity in Chinese nomenclature. But there was no line defined in 1959. Scholars state that Chinese maps had shown a steadily advancing line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, each of which was identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959". On 24 October 1962, after the initial thrust of the Chinese forces in the Sino-Indian War , the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai wrote to

138-483: A number of times. Former Army officers have said that patrolling points provide a better on-the-ground picture of India's limits of control. Based on location, the periodicity of visiting patrolling points can vary greatly from a few weeks to a couple of months. In some cases, the patrolling points are well-known landmarks such as mountain peaks or passes. In other cases, the pattrolling points are numbered, PP-1, PP-2 etc. There are over 65 patrolling points stretching from

184-589: A starting point to clarify the LAC was that it gave both sides an "incentive to exaggerate their claims of where the LAC lay". On 30 July 2020, the Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Weidong stated that China was not in favour of clarifying the LAC anymore as it would create new disputes. Similar viewpoints have been aired in India that China will keep the boundary dispute alive for as long as it can be used against India. On

230-480: Is 170 km. It meets to Miru , where proposed Bhanupli–Leh line will connect. Line of Actual Control The Line of Actual Control ( LAC ), in the context of the Sino-Indian border dispute , is a notional demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. The concept was introduced by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in a 1959 letter to Jawaharlal Nehru as

276-487: Is generally accepted 114 Indian soldiers out of a total of 120 lost their lives. However, Indian sources claim upwards of 1,300 Chinese troops were killed in Rezang La alone, while Chinese sources claim only 722 died in the entire war. This reflects the disagreement over the Sino-Indian War as a whole, as Chinese sources claim upwards of 4,500 Indians died, whereas Indian sources claim only 1,383. Upon successfully overrunning

322-405: The 1962 Sino-Indian War . In 1993, India and China agreed to respect of the 'Line of Actual Control' in a bilateral agreement, without demarcating the line itself. In a letter dated 7 November 1959, Zhou proposed to Nehru that the armed forces of the two sides should withdraw 20 kilometres from the so-called McMahon Line in the east and "the line up to which each side exercises actual control in

368-880: The Karakoram to Chumar . The patrolling points within the LAC and the patrol routes that join them are known as ' limits of patrolling '. Some army officers call this the "LAC within the LAC" or the actual LAC . The various patrol routes to the limits of patrolling are called the ' lines of patrolling '. During the 2020 China–India skirmishes , the patrolling points under dispute included PPs 10 to 13, 14, 15, 17, and 17A. On 18 September 2020, an article in The Hindu wrote that "since April, Indian troops have been denied access to PPs numbered 9, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 13, 14, 15, 17, 17A." India has 65 patrolling points in Eastern Ladakh , from Karakoram Pass to Chumar . Patrolling points are not

414-524: The Narendra Modi -ruled government of India is covering up "territorial setbacks" in this area, while the ruling government has denied the charges as "politically motivated" . Listed by the mountain ranges. Glossary of border related terms: Spanggur Gap According to Indian sources, India was in control of the Spanggur Gap during the war of 1962 and there were Indian posts there, but it

460-527: The Sino-Indian War in 1962, Rechin La (then called Rezang La) was the site of the last stand of the Charlie "C" Ahir company of 13 Kumaon , consisting of 124 Indian soldiers. According to the official Indian history of the war, the Rezang La picket of Charlie company was located at an elevation of 5,500 metres (18,000 ft), 11 km south of the Spanggur Gap , on the same ridge line as Rezang La. Rezang La had

506-694: The Spanggur Lake ). The inscription on the War Memorial at Chushul , Ladakh raised by the Indian Army in memory of the soldiers who died in the Battle of Rezang La, reads as below. The first four lines are quoted from Horatius , a poem by Thomas Babington Macaulay , member of the Governor-General of India's Supreme Council from 1834 to 1838 How can a man die better, Than facing fearful odds, For

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552-459: The "line up to which each side exercises actual control", but rejected by Nehru as being incoherent. Subsequently, the term came to refer to the line formed after the 1962 Sino-Indian War . The LAC is different from the borders claimed by each country in the Sino-Indian border dispute. The Indian claims include the entire Aksai Chin region and the Chinese claims include Zangnan ( South Tibet )/ Arunachal Pradesh . These claims are not included in

598-548: The (mortar) section was overrun. General T.N. Raina lauded: You rarely come across such example in the annals of world military history when braving such heavy odds, the men fought till the last bullet and the last man. Certainly, the Battle of Rezang La is such a shining example. General K S Thimayya wished for a memorial to be built in Ahirwal region of Haryana in the memory of soldiers who were mostly from this area. He felt generations to come would seek inspiration from

644-536: The 1962 war only saw signs of improvement towards the later 1970s and 80s. Ties had remained strained until then also because of Chinese attraction to Pakistan during India Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971. Restored ambassadorial relations in 1976, a visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988, a visit of the Chinese Premier to India in 1992 and then a visit of Indian President to China in 1992 preceded

690-411: The 1970s to optimize patrolling effectiveness and resource utilization along the disputed and non-demarcarted China-India border at a time when border infrastructure was weak. Instead of patrolling the entire border which was more than 3000 km long, troops would just be required to patrol up to the patrolling points. Over time, as infrastructure, resources and troop capability improved and increased,

736-640: The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas mentions, "The two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question". The Indian government claims that Chinese troops continue to illegally enter the area hundreds of times every year, including aerial sightings and intrusions. In 2013, there

782-436: The 1993 agreement. Prior to the 1993 agreement, a trade agreement was signed in 1984, followed by a cultural cooperation agreement in 1988. The 1993 agreement, signed on 7 September, was the first bilateral agreement between China and India to contain the phrase Line of Actual Control. The agreement covered force level, consultations as a way forward and the role of a Joint Working Group. The agreement made it clear that there

828-569: The Chinese pledge of 20-kilometre withdrawal and the same line was used, labelled as "the line from which the Chinese forces will withdraw 20 km." This line was essentially forgotten by both sides till 2013, when the Chinese PLA revived it during its Depsang incursion as a new border claim. At the end of the 1962 war, India demanded that the Chinese withdraw to their positions on 8 September 1962 (the blue line in Map 2). Political relations following

874-667: The Chinese-claimed line was not acceptable to India as the depiction of an actual position, it was apparently acceptable as the line from which the Chinese would undertake to withdraw 20 kilometres. Despite the non-acceptance by India of the Chinese proposals, the Chinese did withdraw 20 kilometres from this line, and henceforth continued to depict it as the "line of actual control of 1959". In December 1962, representatives of six African and Asian nations met in Colombo to develop peace proposals for India and China. Their proposals formalised

920-552: The Indian position was overrun, and Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. After the conclusion of battle, their valor was recognized by the Chinese, who had covered the bodies of the Indian soldiers with blankets and even placed bayonets over them so that the make-shift covers do not fly off. This mark of respect is exceptional and atypical of practices of that time. Both sides took overwhelming casualties, though both countries disagree over how many were killed. It

966-438: The LAC does not escalate into armed conflict. In October 2024, India announced that it had reached an agreement over patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border area, which would lead to disengagement and resolution of the long-running conflict that began in 2020. The date of 7 November 1959, on which the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai alluded to the concept of "line of actual control", achieved

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1012-402: The LAC. It was only in 2001 when the first in-depth discussion would take place with regard to the central/middle sectors. Maps of Sikkim were exchanged, resulting in the "Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade". However the process of exchange of maps soon collapsed in 2002–2003 when other sectors were brought up. Shivshankar Menon writes that a drawback of the process of exchanging maps as

1058-498: The ashes of his fathers, And the temples of his gods. To the sacred memory of the heroes of Rezang-La 114 martyrs of 13 Kumaon who fought to the last man last round against hordes of Chinese on 18 November 1962. Built by all ranks 13th Battalion the Kumaon Regiment. Major-General Ian Cardozo writes in his book Param Vir, Our Heroes in Battle : When Rezang La was later revisited dead jawans were found in

1104-418: The beginning of September? Advancing forty or sixty kilometers by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw twenty kilometers provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which can fool nobody." Zhou responded that the LAC was "basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on 7 November 1959. To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in

1150-511: The border shown on most British and international maps prior to Indian independence . The Line of Actual Control (LAC) resulting from the 1962 Sino-Indian War coincides with the Chinese claim line in this region. To the north of Rechin La along the LAC are various strategic hill peaks, Mukhpari, Magar Hill, and (after Spanggur Gap ) Gurung Hill . To the south of Rezang La is Mount Sajum . (Map 2) The Chushul village and Indian military post are 27 km northwest of Rezang La. During

1196-529: The concept of "actual control". The LAC is generally divided into three sectors: The term "line of actual control" originally referred only to the boundary in the western sector after the 1962 Sino-Indian War , but during the 1990s came to refer to the entire de facto border. The term "line of actual control" is said to have been used by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in a 1959 note to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru . The boundary existed only as an informal cease-fire line between India and China after

1242-484: The drawback that an intervening feature blocked artillery operation, so that the Indian infantry had to do without artillery cover. The Indian side was led by Major Shaitan Singh , who perished in battle and posthumously won India's highest military decoration, the Param Vir Chakra , for his actions. The Chinese employed human wave tactics, sending up to eight waves against the Indian troop positions. Eventually,

1288-482: The head of the eastern valley ( 33°23′20″N 78°55′44″E  /  33.3888°N 78.9290°E  / 33.3888; 78.9290  ( Rezang La ) ), unlabelled in the survey map, is at a much higher elevation of 20,670 ft (6,300 m). In 1963, the Government of India used the name "Rezang La" for pass marked on the survey map, the one at the head of the western valley. References to "Rezang La" in

1334-505: The heads of ten African and Asian nations outlining his proposals for peace, a fundamental tenet of which was that both sides should undertake not to cross the "line of actual control". This letter was accompanied by certain maps which again identified the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959". Margaret Fisher calls it the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959" as published in November 1962 . Scholar Stephen Hoffmann states that

1380-724: The immense courage and valour of their forefathers. Consequently, another Rezang La war memorial was constructed by Rezangla Shaurya Samiti inside Rezang La Park near Dharuhera Chowk in Rewari city in Ahirwal region. Annual memorial function is held by the Samiti in collaboration with district administration, the Kumaon Regiment and family members of those who died at Rezang La also participate. In every special and cultural events in Delhi-NCR and Rewari

1426-538: The last man in an effort to block the Chinese PLA troops from crossing the ridge into the Chushul Valley. Indian sources state 120 men killed over 1500 PLA troops out of 3000. The battle was the last event of the Sino-Indian War, as the pass was the Chinese claim line and upon overrunning the ridge, a ceasefire was called. During the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes , Rezang La was again the site of conflict between

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1472-1130: The limits of Indian claim, because Indian claim extends beyond these patrolling points. These patrolling points were set by India as the patrolling limits for the Indian Army to patrol and avoid confrontation with the PLA to maintain peace on LAC with China, which had proved to be a superior military power in 1962 border war. According to a 2020 report by an Indian police officer, India lost access to 26 of 65 patrolling points (PP 5–17 in Depsang Plains & Depsang Bulge including Samar Lungpa & Galwan, 24-32 in Changchenmo basin, 37 in Skakjung pasture, 51 & 52 in Demchok & Chardhing Nala, 62 in Chumar) in Ladakh due to being restricted by China. India's opposition party Congress claims that

1518-410: The line represented not any position held by the Chinese on 7 November 1959, but rather incorporated the gains made by the Chinese army before and after the massive attack on 20 October 1962. In some cases, it went beyond the territory the Chinese army had reached. India's understanding of the 1959 line passed through Haji Langar, Shamal Lungpa and Kongka La (the red line shown on Map 2). Even though

1564-478: The literature on Sino-Indian War in English language, presumably refer to this pass. Chinese sources use the name "Rechin La" for the western pass pass, which has also been adopted by the Indian news media in 2020. Rechin La as well as the present Rezang La are mountain passes on the ridge line adjoining the Chushul Valley, which China claims as its border. India's claimed border is further east, and it coincides with

1610-421: The main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China." The term "LAC" gained legal recognition in Sino-Indian agreements signed in 1993 and 1996. The 1996 agreement states, "No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control." However, clause number 6 of

1656-564: The mountain and reaching their claim line, the Chinese declared a ceasefire. Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area, marking the end of the war in Aksai Chin. During border standoff in summer, the Indian Army deployed troops along the Line of Actual Control south of the Pangong Tso , including at Rezang La and Rechin La. This was said to give them a commanding view of the Spanggur Gap and China's "Moldo sector" (the deployments around

1702-506: The other hand, there have been voices which say that clarifying the LAC would be beneficial for both countries. In the 1970s, India's China Study Group identified patrol points to which Indian forces would patrol. This was a better representation of how far India could patrol towards its perceived LAC and delimited India's limits of actual control. These periodic patrols were performed by both sides, and often crisscrossed. Patrolling Points were identified by India's China Study Group in

1748-462: The patrolling points were revised. The concept of patrol points came about well before India officially accepted the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Patrolling points give a more realistic on–ground guide of India's limits of actual control. Most patrolling points are close to the LAC. However, in the Depsang plains , the patrolling points are said to remain well inside in LAC, despite having been revised

1794-498: The same ridge is a pass leading to an adjacent valley, which China recognizes as Rezang La ( Chinese : 热藏山口 ; pinyin : Rèzàng Shānkǒu ). About 3 km northwest of Rechin La ( 33°26′38″N 78°49′48″E  /  33.4440°N 78.8300°E  / 33.4440; 78.8300  ( Rezang La (1962) ) ) is a pass that was the site of a major battle of the 1962 Sino-Indian War . The "C" Company of India's 13 Kumaon battalion, made of Ahir soldiers, fought to

1840-423: The trenches still holding on to their weapons... every single man of this company was found dead in his trench with several bullets or splinter wounds. The 2-inch mortar man died with a bomb still in his hand. The medical orderly had a syringe and bandage in his hands when the Chinese bullet hit him... Of the thousand mortar bombs with the defenders, all but seven had been fired and the rest were ready to be fired when

1886-443: The two "bravest soldiers", Capt. Ram Chander Singh and Hav Nihal Singh, Sena Medal, will be chief guests as they tell the story of rajangla On 24 February 2023, they were the chief guests on Rao Bal Kishan Shaurya Diwas. They also unveiled the portrait of "Rao Bal Kishan". National Highway 3 is the closest NH for this location. One can reach to via Loma Bridge/Loma ITBP Check Post and Mahe Bridge. Both built over Indus river. Distance

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1932-464: The two nations. The old survey maps of the region label two adjacent valleys leading to the Spaanggur Lake as "Rezang Lungpa". (See Map 1.) The pass at the head of the western valley ( 33°25′08″N 78°50′58″E  /  33.4188°N 78.8494°E  / 33.4188; 78.8494  ( Rechin La ) ) at an elevation of 16,420 ft (5,000 m) is labelled "Rezang La". The pass at

1978-457: The west". Nehru rejected the proposal stating that there was complete disagreement between the two governments over the facts of possession: It is obvious that there is complete disagreement between the two Governments even about the facts of possession. An agreement about the observance of the status quo would, therefore, be meaningless as the facts concerning the status quo are themselves disputed. Scholar Stephen Hoffmann states that Nehru

2024-469: Was a three-week standoff ( 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident ) between Indian and Chinese troops 30 km southeast of Daulat Beg Oldi . It was resolved and both Chinese and Indian troops withdrew in exchange for an Indian agreement to destroy some military structures over 250 km to the south near Chumar that the Chinese perceived as threatening. In October 2013, India and China signed a border defence cooperation agreement to ensure that patrolling along

2070-405: Was an "ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries" which remained pending. It was also agreed that "the two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this Agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question". In article 10 of the 1996 border agreement, both sides agreed to the exchange of maps to help clarify the alignment of

2116-432: Was determined not to grant legitimacy to a concept that had no historical validity nor represented the situation on the ground. During the Sino-Indian War (1962), Nehru again refused to recognise the line of control: "There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometers from what they call 'line of actual control'. What is this 'line of control'? Is this the line they have created by aggression since

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