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111-792: The citadel is mostly remembered as the site of the Second Battle of Quang Tri in the country's resistance against the United States during the Vietnam War . Today, the citadel, along with seven other historical sites commemorating the Second Battle of Quang Tri is recognized as one of the Special National Sites of Vietnam in the fourth round of rating proposed by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of Vietnam. According to documents, at

222-461: A cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act , banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more grand strategic view than did

333-776: A centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies, while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See the protracted warfare model . Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by

444-554: A conventional, combined-arms conquest against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , and taking and holding land permanently. Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year: Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives: Even with these three approaches, there

555-603: A feint amphibious assault against the mouth of the Thạch Hãn River in Cửa Việt . On the morning of 27 June the 9th MAB launched their amphibious feint against Cửa Việt, reversing course when 7 km from shore. On 28 June the South Vietnamese advance began and quickly ran into strong PAVN resistance and helicopter assaults were launched to land troops behind PAVN positions. On 29 June, following preparatory airstrikes

666-540: A figurehead. COL Bùi Tín led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964. In February and March 1964, confirming

777-462: A graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or

888-592: A guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command . Today, officers from

999-523: A land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam. Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN II Corps Tactical Zone ), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over Highway 19 , splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation,

1110-577: A line that ran generally from the bend in Route 555 as it turned west toward Quảng Trị, eastward to the coast. With the Airborne Division stalled on the outskirts of the city, VNMC commander General Bùi Thế Lân was reluctant to expose an unprotected flank as his division continued northward. To break the impasse, Lân decided to move one battalion by helicopter across the Vĩnh Định River to a position just northeast of

1221-559: A major PAVN supply line. On 7 October, prior to H-Hour, the Marine Division's fire support coordination center arranged for heavy artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support. At H-hour the 8th Battalion the attack under difficult circumstances along Route 560. The highway ran through a marshland between the Thạch Hãn River and the Vĩnh Đinh River, where thick groves of bamboo and hedgerows permitted PAVN snipers to fire point-blank at

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1332-543: A matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from

1443-547: A maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh Tho government was overthrown. Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time,

1554-406: A not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup: They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in

1665-477: A platoon moved over this section of the wall, and in spite of stubborn enemy resistance, expanded to occupy a company-sized position within a few hours. While the fighting for the Citadel was going on, the 1st Battalion had secured the bridgehead where Highway 1 crossed the Thạch Hãn River and held it despite several fierce PAVN counterattacks. From 11 to 15 September, the 2nd Battalion reached the Thạch Hãn River, closing

1776-416: A policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and the allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while

1887-564: A political dau tranh argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in

1998-587: A report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics putting Lê Duẩn in charge and Ho becoming

2109-557: A unit from the 312th Division raised the PAVN presence to six divisions in Quảng Trị Province, as reported by the 1st Regional Assistance Command. PAVN artillery fire from the northwest which daily showered VNMC positions occasionally was followed by nighttime probing attacks. Heavy monsoon rains began to fall in October and would continue until the end of December. The area to the east of

2220-516: Is the largest park in Quang Tri Town. Because of the brutality and high casualty of the battle, the Ancient Citadel is considered by the locals as a "Spiritual Land", because it is believed that every inch of land in the area contains ordnance, but more significantly blood and bones of soldiers on both sides. The Museum of the Ancient Citadel of Quảng Trị preserves and display many memorabilia of

2331-628: The Medal of Honor . By the end of June the Allies had killed 1,515 PAVN, destroyed 18 armored vehicles and the Marines had taken 15 PAVN prisoners. By 7 July the Airborne Division had reached the southern outskirts of Quảng Trị City, but then Thiệu intervened in the operation. Trưởng had planned to bypass the city and push on quickly to the Thạch Hãn River, thereby isolating any PAVN defenders. Thiệu, however, now demanded that Quảng Trị be taken immediately, seeing

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2442-620: The Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive-General Uprising ) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it? Douglas Pike believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: Pike used Dien Bien Phu as an analogy for

2553-437: The Thạch Hãn River . The Airborne Division would deploy to the west from the foothills to Highway 1 , while the Marine Division would deploy to the east from Highway 1 to the coast. Quảng Trị City would be in the Airborne Division's operational area, but the plan called for the city to be bypassed so as to concentrate on the destruction of PAVN forces. As a diversion the U.S. 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB) would conduct

2664-579: The United States Marine Corps . Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963%E2%80%931969 Anti-Communist forces: Communist forces: United States : 409,111 (1969) During the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the " Americanization " of joint warfare in South Vietnam during

2775-470: The Vietnam War . At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to the end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in the South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made

2886-522: The armed struggle ( dau trinh ) theory espoused by Võ Nguyên Giáp but opposed by the politically oriented Trường Chinh . Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been

2997-512: The center of gravity of the opposition. Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara , in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took

3108-492: The 147th Brigade attacked from the northeast with the 3rd and 7th Battalions. Trưởng and Lân also requested an amphibious diversion by the U.S. Seventh Fleet to draw the enemy away from the Marines attacking the Citadel. The U.S. amphibious forces agreed to carry out the feint, except for an actual landing. On 9 September, the final assault to capture the citadel was launched by the 147th and 258th Brigades. The amphibious diversion succeeded in drawing away PAVN artillery fire from

3219-400: The 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to

3330-408: The 369th Brigade opened a new command post at Hải Lăng district and assumed operational control of the battalions at Quảng Trị and the 147th Brigade assumed defensive positions along the coast and on the division's right flank. The 258th Brigade reverted to division reserve. Lân was anxious to reoccupy all of the territory lost during the PAVN invasion prior to any kind of ceasefire negotiations. Since

3441-605: The 6th Battalion withdrew east of the Thạch Hãn River, leaving only a reconnaissance team on the west bank. The 6th Battalion operation was the Marines' last effort to cross the Thạch Hãn River prior to the ceasefire in January 1973. On 11 November the VNMC began an operation to extend its control to the northwest. As Lieutenant Colonel Trần Xuân Quang's 4th Battalion attacked, it was stopped by intense artillery and mortar fire and localized ground counterattacks. The PAVN appeared determined that

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3552-443: The 7th Battalion deployed to its north. Near the southeast corner of the Citadel, Lieutenant Colonel Đỗ Hữu Tùng, commanding officer of the 6th Battalion with the 258th Brigade, set up a forward command post and moved within striking distance of the walls of the Citadel, which were 30 inches (760 mm) thick and 15 feet (4.6 m) high. A lot of this wall had already been reduced to rubble, but much of it still stood. Progress toward

3663-609: The 9th Battalion supported by armor, was designed to extend the friendly lines north toward the Thạch Hãn River. The river was critical to the defense of Quảng Trị; whoever controlled the Thạch Hãn controlled the economic lifeline of the province. The river also was sufficiently deep and wide to accommodate landing craft inland all the way to Đông Hà and into Quảng Trị itself. It was essential that this artery be in South Vietnamese hands prior to any settlement. The 9th Battalion encountered stiff resistance as it moved north. The eastern portion of

3774-399: The Citadel enabling the Marines to advance rapidly. An imaginary line drawn across the middle of the Citadel became the boundary between the two Marine brigades. The 258th Brigade continued its attack in the southern portion while the 147th Brigade attacked in the northern half, the 3rd Battalion, now attached to the 147th Brigade and closest to the northern wall of the Citadel, stood fast while

3885-452: The December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S. action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which

3996-592: The Highway 1 bridge over the Thạch Hãn River. On 5 September the PAVN attacked the 5th Battalion's command post at dusk and were met by artillery fire and directing air strikes. At 21:30 the PAVN withdrew in confusion having left behind more than 50 individual and crew-served weapons. A battalion from the 147th Brigade had taken up positions at the An Tiêm Bridge where Route 560 crossed the Vĩnh Định River. All PAVN supply and infiltration routes and lines of communication to

4107-510: The Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents . An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency , Agency for International Development , and United States Army Special Forces . Roughly until mid-1965,

4218-544: The Marine Division had consolidated its position north of Quảng Trị City, while the Airborne continued trying to break in. On 22 July the Marines launched a three battalion operation against PAVN supply lines south of the Thạch Hãn River. The 5th Battalion would be landed by HMM-164 helicopters 4 km north of the city, while the other two battalions, supported by tanks would attack north, the combined force would then move southeast. The helicopter landing proceeded smoothly, while

4329-408: The Marine lines. As September began, Marine units had been in constant street fighting inside the city for 35 days under some of the heaviest enemy artillery shelling since the invasion in March. The forward maneuver battalions had been under daily counterattacks by units of the 308th Division. In the city, the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 8th Battalions attacked through the rubble to reach the Citadel and

4440-537: The Marine positions and thus hopefully to make tactical air and naval gunfire support impossible. On one occasion, however, the tactic did not work. A B-52 strike was conducted in support of the 4th Battalion which was operating just south of the Thạch Hãn River mouth in Cửa Việt near the beach. Six prominent hill masses were the only logical positions for the PAVN to occupy, above the flooded lowlands. Previously, B-52s had dropped their bombs with such devastating effect that it

4551-409: The Marines in place. There was very light contact between the two forces as 1973 began. Both sides made probes and counterprobes. On 14 January, the frontline battalions of 147th and 258th Brigades had heavy contact with the PAVN all along the front. On 15 January, under orders from Saigon, Lân began planning for a final effort to gain the Thạch Hãn River prior to the now-certain ceasefire. The attack

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4662-502: The Marines to cross the Thạch Hãn River west of Quảng Trị in an effort to expand the division's area of control. Under the cover of early morning darkness, the 369th Brigade sent 600 Marines led by the 6th Battalion across the Thạch Hãn River directly opposite the Citadel. The crossing, using sampans, small boats, and barges, was not without difficulties. Some of the Marines drowned as sampans overturned and guide ropes broke. By dawn on 2 November, however, nearly 200 Marines were established on

4773-468: The Marines would not reach the Thạch Hãn River. In spite of severe resupply problems, the PAVN expended five times more ordnance during November than it had in October. The monsoon rains curtailed both PAVN and Marine movement. Transporting supplies was difficult for both sides, and living conditions were equally oppressive. Route 555 itself was nearly obliterated by rising water and rendered unusable. The PAVN expended every effort to keep forward units close to

4884-429: The PAVN created its first division headquarters, under then-brigadier general Chu Huy Man . This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the United States Marine Corps at Da Nang , and then the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) , the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the air assault capability of

4995-406: The PAVN launched a battalion-sized attack on the 7th Battalion, located west of the Vĩnh Định Canal. The PAVN, in two separate attacks, lost 37 dead on 18 December and 132 killed the next day and gained no ground. Documents found on PAVN dead and on prisoners revealed that at least three regiments opposed the VNMC efforts to move north. The 27th, 48th and 101st Regiments were making every effort to fix

5106-437: The PAVN lost more than 1,880 dead, 51 armored vehicles captured or destroyed and seven antiaircraft guns, four artillery pieces, a 20-ton ammunition dump and 1,200 individual weapons captured. During July, U.S. aircraft flew 5,461 tactical sorties and 2,054 B-52 strikes and operated five aircraft carriers to support the counteroffensive. As August began, most of Quảng Trị remained in PAVN hands. The territory north and west of

5217-440: The PAVN to reinforce and resupply across the Thạch Hãn River, making them vulnerable to air strikes. The helicopters were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire with one CH-53 being hit by an SA-7 and crashing with 2 U.S. Marine crewmen and 45 Vietnamese Marines killed. Two CH-46s were shot down and their crews rescued by helicopters from the U.S. Army Troop F, 4th Cavalry while another 25 helicopters were damaged. Despite these loses

5328-560: The PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN. It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called

5439-448: The PAVN's intentions. The 258th Brigade, with Colonel Ngô Văn Định in command, remained the division reserve. By October's end, the Marine front lines had stabilized along a line that could permit subsequent efforts to establish a foothold on the Cửa Việt outlet to the sea. Morale and discipline remained high for all VNMC units as they improved positions and replacements filled the depleted ranks. On 1 November, orders came from Saigon for

5550-700: The Republic of Vietnam defeated the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) at the ancient citadel of Quảng Trị ( Vietnamese : Thành cổ Quảng Trị ) and recaptured part of Quảng Trị Province (below the 17th parallel), especially the Quảng Trị Citadel . During the initial phase of the Easter Offensive the PAVN quickly captured Quảng Trị in the First Battle of Quảng Trị (30 March – 2 May 1972) and overran all of Quảng Trị Province and

5661-552: The Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis. Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging

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5772-453: The SVN-US strategy still focused around pacification in South Vietnam , but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of pacification . The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take

5883-463: The South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position. It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment." The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of

5994-418: The Thạch Hãn River, particularly around Ái Tử Combat Base , was dotted with PAVN artillery units which maintained a seemingly ceaseless artillery and mortar barrage on the South Vietnamese. The Marine brigades were well placed to deny PAVN resupply and to make a final lunge into the heart of the city, the Citadel, but were held off by the well-concealed defenders. PAVN fire and the congestion of friendly units in

6105-507: The Thạch Hãn River. To the south, the 258th Brigade, with four maneuver battalions under its operational control, was in heavy house-to-house fighting around the Citadel. The 3rd Battalion attacked from the northeast, with the 6th and 9th Battalions closing in from the southwest. Each day, the 258th Brigade moved slowly forward, tightening its grasp on the PAVN forces still in the Citadel. This slow progress made Lân realize that he would have to reinforce his maneuver forces if they were to overpower

6216-476: The U.S. and South Vietnam with a protracted warfare model , in their concept of dau tranh , or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. Following the Tet Offensive and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to

6327-475: The U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG , under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on

6438-595: The VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only

6549-465: The VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it

6660-507: The VNMC 1st and 4th Battalions were landed by U.S. Marine helicopter squadrons HMM-164 and HMM-165 near the Wunder Beach area. That day a 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron OV-10 Bronco that was operating as a forward air controller in support of the VNMC was hit by an SA-7 missile and crashed into the sea, killing its pilot, Captain Steven L. Bennett , who would be posthumously awarded

6771-896: The Vietnam War between the People's Army of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam against the United States Armed Forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam . After 80 days, the Allies and South Vietnam successfully recaptured the citadel and the majority of Quảng Trị Province, while the North Vietnam retained the Northern half of the province. In the battle, the US and South Vietnam expended an exceptionally high amount of ordnance. Up to 20,000 artillery shell per day

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6882-525: The Vietnamese Marines deployed successfully and consolidated their positions with air and artillery support against the opposing PAVN 48th Regiment, 320B Division . The Marines killed 126 PAVN, captured six, secured large quantities of material, and flanked the PAVN position. Fighting continued in the area for three days before the PAVN retreated to the west. During the same period the 7th Battalion overran an armored regiment's command post. By 20 July

6993-431: The advancing Marines. The attack continued for three days against heavy resistance. On 10 October, with the front lines extended the desired distance, Bảo moved his other three battalions on line and awaited further orders. The operation had resulted in 111 PAVN killed and 55 weapons captured. On 20 October, Lân ordered Bảo to conduct a second operation along the eastern flank of the brigade front. The attack, conducted by

7104-399: The anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive , a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of the South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until

7215-419: The area severely hampered maneuver by the Marines. 147th Brigade, operating northeast of Quảng Trị, began receiving heavy pressure from the PAVN, but had thwarted several attempts by the numerically superior PAVN to reopen Route 560 northeast of the city. The Marines' supply blockade began to take its toll on the PAVN's ammunition stockpiles. All PAVN supplies making their way into the city had to be ferried across

7326-604: The battle, such as unsent letter of soldiers written for their families. The citadel has a square plan, 2,160 meters in circumference, and a total area of 18.56 hectares. The walls are roughly 4m in height, 13.5m thick at the foot, and roughly 70 cm at the parapet surrounded by a flooded defensive moat, and with four protruding bastions at the corners.The citadel was built in conformity with Vietnamese defensive architectural style , with square-shaped curtain walls built from large baked brick, adhered using lime , molasses , and some other additives. It has four main gates opened to

7437-484: The beginning of emperor Gia Long 's reign, Quang Tri citadel was constructed in the Tiền Kiên ward. In 1809, wanting to secure the North of the then capital Phú Xuân , the emperor ordered to move the citadel to Thạch Hãn commune (i.e. the present location), which he deemed a position with strategic advantages in terms of politics, economy, and military. Initially, it was a fort constructed using rammed earth , but in 1887,

7548-461: The beginning of the Easter Offensive, when President Richard Nixon outlined the conditions for such a ceasefire, President Thiệu had been concerned that all lost South Vietnamese ground be regained prior to an in-place settlement. PAVN activity had dropped sharply after the taking of Quảng Trị, but it was evident that the PAVN was still present in strength just outside the city. Identification of

7659-526: The city as "a symbol and a challenge" to his authority. The ARVN assault bogged down in the outskirts and the PAVN, apprised of the plans for the offensive, moved the 304th and 308th Divisions to the west to avoid the U.S. airpower that was about to be unleashed upon Quảng Trị. The defense of the city and its walled citadel was left to PAVN replacement units and militia. One participant recalled: "The new recruits came in at dusk. They were dead by dawn... No one had time to check where they were from, or who

7770-497: The city was low-lying coastal marshlands, threaded with rivers, and was difficult enough to cross in good weather. The torrential rains would make passage impossible in some areas. With growing concern about the peace negotiations in Paris, Lân recommended that an attempt to take the offensive should be made immediately, taking advantage of the lull in PAVN operations and the continued presence of 9th MAB support. Route 560, north of Quảng Trị,

7881-448: The city while two battalions would assault PAVN positions from east to west. The mission of the Marines was to block Route 560 and to prevent the PAVN from resupplying their forces in the city itself. On 11 July, following preparatory B-52 strikes, the VNMC 1st Battalion was deployed by HMM-164 and HMM-165 helicopters to two landing zones 2 km northeast of the city to cut Route 560, the main PAVN supply line. This move would force

7992-488: The department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here. William Westmoreland , and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor , rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by

8103-432: The election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization , or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with a perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after

8214-505: The emperor Minh Mạng had it rebuilt using bricks . Between 1809 and 1945, the Nguyễn dynasty used the citadel as a military base and administrative headquarter. Since 1929, the French colonialists have added prison facilities here and used this site to imprison people the native political opposition. The ancient citadel of Quang Tri is the site of the Second Battle of Quảng Trị, a large battle in

8325-854: The four cardinal directions. The gates are 3.4m wide arched gates at the center of each wall section. Each gate has a gazebo at the top, with tiled hip-and-gable roof . Second Battle of Quang Tri [REDACTED]   South Vietnam Supported by : 320th Division 304th Division 308th Division Quảng Trị Province Command  [ vi ] American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Second Battle of Quang Tri ( Vietnamese : Trận Thành cổ Quảng Trị ; also called Operation Lam Sơn 72 ) began on 28 June 1972 and lasted 81 days until 16 September 1972, when South Vietnam 's Army of

8436-420: The gap between the 1st and 6th Battalions. The 3rd and 7th Battalions fought their way through the northern part of the city and reached the fortress wall on the morning of 15 September. At 10:15 that same day, the 3rd Battalion entered the north side of the Citadel. That afternoon the PAVN stiffened their resistance and called in a massive artillery barrage to stop the 3rd and 6th Battalions as they advanced toward

8547-444: The ground assault met heavy resistance and could only break through PAVN defenses with air and artillery support. After two days the Marines had killed 133 PAVN and destroyed three tanks. On 27 July, the Marine Division was ordered to relieve the Airborne units as the lead element in the battle. Progress was slow, consisting of vicious house-to-house fighting and incessant artillery barrages by both sides. During July, ARVN claimed

8658-666: The incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these. Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the United States Intelligence Community in late May, on the assumption The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on

8769-496: The lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse

8880-687: The next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing 50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem. After Diem's fall in November 1963 , INR saw the priority during this period as more

8991-528: The north of Thừa Thiên Province . The ARVN regrouped forming a defensive line along the Mỹ Chánh River northwest of Huế and, together with U.S. airpower, the Battle of the Mỹ Chánh Line halted the PAVN offensive by mid-May. On 14 June, I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Ngô Quang Trưởng briefed President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and MACV on his planned counterattack to retake Quảng Trị Province. Thiệu

9102-441: The north were effectively blocked. The PAVN were feeling the bite of supply and ammunition shortages. On 8 September, the three battalions of the 1st Ranger Group relieved the 147th Brigade of its blocking mission north of the city. Lân now had two brigades he could commit in the pincer movement which would begin the all-out assault on the city. The 258th Brigade continued its attack along the southern front with four battalions while

9213-547: The organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , who had been

9324-438: The original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in 1963 , January 1964 , September 1964 , December 1964 , and 1965 all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the [North Vietnamese] Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." Robert McNamara suggests that

9435-428: The overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh , in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and the U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from

9546-511: The people, but from the United States. The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem

9657-500: The south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by Trần Văn Trà . Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. Pike described it as consistent with

9768-524: The special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before

9879-429: The successful PAVN maneuver in 1975. The resulting campaign is called the Battle of Ia Drang , with a followup at the Battle of Bong Son , but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to air assault , and used obvious helicopters to cause

9990-441: The third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the Tet Offensive never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of Nguyễn Chí Thanh , who commanded forces in

10101-455: The three PAVN regiments holding the Citadel. Lân continued to keep the 369th Brigade in division reserve. On 22 August, after an artillery barrage on the 8th Battalion a sizable PAVN force led by tanks attempted to break out from the Citadel. The Marines, surprised at such an action, quickly rallied and drove the PAVN back into the Citadel. During the remainder of the month, the PAVN increased the number of night attacks in an effort to break through

10212-451: The two-pronged attack reached its objectives, but the western portion was held up by a heavy 122mm rocket attack. U.S. Army armed helicopter "Pink Teams" were called in to suppress the rocket positions. With the fire suppressed, the western prong moved on line with the eastern force on an axis about six kilometers from the Thạch Hãn River, still short of its south bank. The 369th Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyển Thế Lương, held

10323-528: The use of nuclear weapons. Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to

10434-422: The wall was slow because the PAVN had tunnelled an intricate and interlocking defensive system throughout the entire fortress. On the night of 9 September, a squad of Marines from the 6th Battalion managed to slip in and out of the Citadel. At 21:00 on 10 September, Tùng launched a night attack against the PAVN on the southeast corner and was successful in gaining a lodgement on top of the wall. Early on 11 September,

10545-519: The west wall. By 17:00 on 15 September, the Marines had gained complete control of the Citadel. Meanwhile between 11 and 15 September the 2nd Battalion advanced to the southern bank of the Thạch Hãn River, where they halted, exhausted and depleted by heavy casualties and unable to push on to Đông Hà . During the battle, the South Vietnamese sources claim that they lost 977 killed and 4,300 wounded (Marine division only) The ARVN Airborne Division also sustained heavy casualties, its 2nd Airborne Brigade

10656-508: The western portion of the division front against an PAVN attack the first week in October, but the remainder of the month was relatively quiet with the exception of daily enemy bombardments. The brigade conducted limited patrolling to its front and meanwhile improved defensive positions in Quảng Trị. During the month several reconnaissance patrols crossed the Thạch Hãn River to try to determine

10767-482: The western side, followed shortly by 200 more. As the Marines moved inland they were vigorously opposed by the PAVN. The forward elements bogged down 500 meters from the river line in the face of heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire. The PAVN counterattacked the Marine foothold with a regiment supported by mortars and artillery. The massive counterattack reflected the PAVN's firm intention to maintain positions west of Quảng Trị and to deny South Vietnamese forces access to

10878-433: The Ái Tử area, Later in the day, as the Marines moved north along Highway 1, between a small canal and the Thạch Hãn River, they came under intense small arms fire from concealment in the dense foliage. All of the company commanders were killed and more than 40 Marines were reported missing. Despite the employment of every available supporting arm, the Marines could not make headway. During the hours of darkness of 2–3 November,

10989-617: Was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along. For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near U Minh Forest ), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC. Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In

11100-419: Was annihilated after two weeks: the 5th Battalion (600 men) suffered 98 killed and 400 wounded and the other two battalions were in no better shape, four of six American advisers were wounded. U.S. losses were approximately 20 killed. North Vietnamese sources claim its losses were between 4000 and 10,000 killed. South Vietnamese sources claim that North Vietnamese losses were 8,135 killed. On 25 September,

11211-457: Was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year: Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General Victor Krulak , on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered

11322-497: Was fired at an area of less than 3 square kilometers. It is estimated that the total amount of ordnance used is as high as 328,000 metric tonnes. In the 1990s, the People's Committee of Quảng Trị province restored the citadel as a historical site. Some sections of the city walls were restored and the four main gates were rebuilt. A memorial was erected in the center of the citadel commemorating "the 81 days and nights of 1972". Currently, it

11433-535: Was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon . This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the CIA allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. OPPLAN 34A

11544-454: Was not convinced, preferring a smaller-scale operation. Trưởng finally convinced Thiệu, emphasizing that such an effort would be possible "employing the superior firepower of our American ally." Thiệu finally approved the concept and Operation Lam Sơn 72 was launched on 28 June. The operational plan called for the Airborne and Marine (VNMC) Divisions to advance abreast to the northwest to

11655-415: Was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Trường Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in

11766-484: Was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson ; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: To pacify

11877-474: Was the only improved line of communications east of Highway 1 leading to the Thạch Hãn River, This was the obvious axis of attack and Lân hoped to move north by some other route and to do so before the monsoon restricted his options. He ordered Colonel Nguyễn Năng Bảo's 147th Brigade to attack north along Route 560 to push the PAVN beyond mortar range of Quảng Trị and to capture Triệu Phong District Headquarters. Accomplishment of this mission would also serve to cut

11988-421: Was their commander. Others described the defense as a "senseless sacrifice" and referred to Quảng Trị as "Hamburger City". Nevertheless, the PAVN units stationed within the citadel were well dug in, had the advantage of terrain and mass artillery supports. An early ARVN victory was denied, and the fighting continue unabated. By 10 July, the forward units of the VNMC 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th Battalions were on

12099-500: Was to be made by an infantry and tank force with enough power to reach and cross the Thạch Hãn River. This would result in the Battle of Cửa Việt from 25 to 31 January. [REDACTED]  This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History . [REDACTED]  This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of

12210-491: Was unnecessary to rebomb the same position. On this occasion, however, three of the six hill masses were programmed for additional strikes six minutes after the first, killing PAVN soldiers who had survived the first strike. In December the frontlines generally remained static with the VNMC no closer than 3.5 miles (5.6 km) from the Thạch Hãn River. During the first part of the month the PAVN initiated nothing larger than company-sized attacks. However, at dawn on 17 December,

12321-425: Was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer. There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 10 million. It

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