American intervention 1965
96-499: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Texas Star was a military operation of the Vietnam War that took place in Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên Provinces from 1 April to 5 September 1970. This
192-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
288-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
384-406: A battalion of the 3rd Regiment while in a night defensive position was attacked by an estimated PAVN battalion. The attackers sustained 38 killed while the ARVN had one wounded. On 22 August elements of the 1st Regiment found 20 PAVN bodies which had been killed by airstrikes the previous day. At 05:10 on 23 August the 2/1/1st while in a night defensive position 5 km southwest of O'Reilly received
480-512: A combined U.S./ARVN operation near Firebase Robin ( 16°34′44″N 106°47′10″E / 16.579°N 106.786°E / 16.579; 106.786 ) resulted in 70 PAVN killed and 2 captured and a field hospital destroyed. Captured documents indicated that the PAVN 66th Regiment had two battalions combat ineffective and was in need of supplies. During July the operation had shifted to defensive actions in and around Firebase Ripcord which ended with
576-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
672-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
768-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
864-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
960-403: A ground attack. The battalion, supported by a flareship and airstrikes, returned the fire with organic weapons. ARVN losses were one killed and six wounded; 24 PAVN were killed. On the same day elements of the 4/1st engaged a PAVN force killing 10, while one ARVN was wounded. In the same area on 26 August, elements of the 3/1st supported by aerial rocket artillery engaged a PAVN force killing 42 for
1056-441: A loss of one and two wounded; the PAVN left 12 dead. The base was closed down on the morning of 7 October due to weather and resupply difficulties. The cumulative totals of casualties in the O'Reilly area from 6 August to 7 October were 570 PAVN killed and 61 ARVN and two U.S. killed. Units of the ARVN 1st Regiment received 115 attacks by fire which consisted of more than 2,700 rounds of mixed 60, 82 and 120 mm mortar fire. It
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#17329160710751152-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
1248-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
1344-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
1440-410: A reconnaissance platoon from the battalion ambushed an enemy force. Bringing in helicopter gunships, the U.S. killed 19 PAVN. Also on 27 May at 17:30 Firebase O'Reilly 40 km west of Huế was attacked by the reinforced PAVN 5th Battalion, 812th Regiment. The defending ARVN 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, plus one battery of ARVN artillery. fought for two hours before the PAVN withdrew without penetrating
1536-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
1632-460: A tactical emergency at O'Reilly. The base was considered subject to an all-out PAVN attack at any moment. The weather, meanwhile, was so poor that the use of airstrikes had to be abandoned. On 13 September O'Reilly was again attacked with 100 rounds of 82 mm followed by a PAVN ground probe. The one-hour mid-morning unsuccessful attack cost the PAVN ten killed while the defenders incurred two killed and five wounded. The next day ARVN elements outside
1728-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
1824-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
1920-528: Is located approximately 26 km south of Quảng Trị and 41 km west of Huế. On 28 June 1969 during Operation Montgomery Rendezvous the ARVN 4th Battalion, 1st Regiment, 1st Division (1/1st) observed a large People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) force moving south in the open near the base and called in airstrikes which killed 37 PAVN. At 17:30 on 27 May 1970 O'Reilly was attacked by the reinforced PAVN 5th Battalion, 812th Regiment. The defending 1/1st, plus one battery of artillery fought for two hours before
2016-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
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#17329160710752112-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
2208-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
2304-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
2400-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
2496-587: The 1st Regiment. The 4/1st lost one killed and nine wounded the next day in a six-round 60 mm mortar attack on the base. That afternoon the tactical emergency condition of the base was lifted. From 10–15 September 137 airstrikes were flown in support of the base and the adjacent areas. Nineteen B-52 Arc Light missions were delivered south and west of O'Reilly. Artillery support was provided from Firebases Barnett ( 16°33′58″N 107°03′18″E / 16.566°N 107.055°E / 16.566; 107.055 ) and Barbara, as well as from O'Reilly itself. On
2592-417: The 2/1/1st engaged elements of the 6th and 29th Regiments entrenched in four or five bunkers. The ARVN were supported by airstrikes, helicopter gunships and artillery. The ARVN unsuccessfully assaulted the bunkers and then withdrew to their night defensive position. The 2/1/1st sustained 21 wounded and eight missing in the attack. On 12 September following a 150-round mortar attack, I Corps command declared
2688-451: The 4/1/1st battled other elements of the 29th Regiment, no PAVN casualties were ascertained but the ARVN had 12 wounded. Nearby on 22 September, the 29th Regiment attacked the 1/1/1st killing two and wounding at a cost of three PAVN killed. On the early morning of 24 September the 4/1/1st ambushed a PAVN force and killed 26 in the general vicinity of the base. In mid-September, due to anticipated bad weather which would affect air operations,
2784-479: The ARVN Joint General Staff considered the evacuation of O'Reilly. Firebase Barnett (10 km northwest of O'Reilly) was closed 18 September as part of the preplanned monsoon season relocation of units. On 2 October O'Reilly was attacked again, the defending 3rd Company, 4/1st, received 50 rounds of 60 mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from two PAVN platoons. The attack was stopped with
2880-440: The ARVN 2nd Battalion, 54th Regiment received small arms fire and RPGs while on a search operation. Organic weapons fire supported by aerial rocket artillery and ground fire was returned. U.S. losses were one killed while the PAVN lost 27 killed. On 12 May at 03:30 the ARVN 3rd Regiment engaged a platoon from the PAVN 812th Regiment 44 km west northwest of Huế, 21 PAVN were killed while the ARVN lost one killed. On 16 May at 21:50
2976-412: The ARVN killed 18 PAVN. Helicopter gunships from the 2nd Battalion, 17th Cavalry Regiment , supported by airstrikes, engaged several small groups of PAVN the same afternoon killing 13; meanwhile the 4/1st engaged elements from the PAVN 6th Regiment and 324B Division to close the day's engagements. One ARVN was killed and 10 wounded. On 12 August, an element of the 1/1st, in a night defensive position near
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3072-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
3168-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
3264-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
3360-661: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
3456-468: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
3552-411: The PAVN 803rd Regiment, 324B Division . Artillery and gunships supported the engagement. U.S. casualties were seven killed. At 00:50 on 7 April, Company D, 1/506th Infantry, occupying a night defensive position 30 km southwest of Huế, was attacked by Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms fire. Supported by artillery, Company D returned fire and the PAVN failed to press the attack. A sweep of
3648-463: The PAVN 812th Regiment struck the night defensive position of the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment 45 km northwest of Huế. In a coordinated attack-by-fire, followed by a ground attack, the PAVN lost 19 killed to the ARVN artillery supporting the position, while the defenders lost six killed. On 23 May at 10:00 the 1/506th Infantry received an attack-by-fire of 26 mortar rounds on its command post 24 km southwest of Huế killing three U.S.. On 27 May
3744-449: The PAVN withdrew without penetrating the base. The defenders killed 74 PAVN for the loss of three killed. On 9 August during Operation Chicago Peak elements of the 1/1st at O'Reilly received two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds killing one and wounding 14. On the same day nearby, other elements of the 1/1st were engaged by a PAVN force and suffered 13 wounded. On 10 August the PAVN fired 40 rounds of 82 mm mortar, wounding four ARVN, but
3840-526: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
3936-452: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
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4032-537: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
4128-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
4224-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
4320-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
4416-561: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
4512-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
4608-454: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
4704-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
4800-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
4896-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
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#17329160710754992-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
5088-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
5184-803: The area was conducted at first light with negative results. US losses were one killed. Also on 7 April at 01:05 in the Phu Bai area the ARVN 54th Regiment command post received 70-100 rounds of mixed RPG and mortar followed by a ground attack by elements of the PAVN 804th Regiment, the 4th Battalion, 54th Regiment moved into the vicinity of contact to reinforce the command post and engage the attackers killing 33. On 15 April 506th Infantry elements operating approximately 27 km southwest of Huế found 20 PAVN killed by artillery fire. On 28 April at 05:00 Company B, 502nd Infantry Regiment , operating 37 km southwest of Phu Bai, received an attack preceded by small arms and grenade fire. Company B, with artillery support, repelled
5280-500: The attack killing 12 PAVN while losing one killed. After the contact while conducting a sweep, the unit discovered 75 bunkers and 50 PAVN killed three days prior by airstrikes and artillery. On 1 May at 08:00 while conducting a search operation 46 km northwest of Huế, the ARVN 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment made contact with elements of the PAVN 812th Regiment. Supported by artillery and aerial rocket artillery, ARVN killed 15 PAVN without loss. On 3 May at 11:30 27 km southwest of Huế
5376-521: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
5472-474: The base leaving 74 dead while the ARVN lost three killed. On 9 June 5 km west of Phú Lộc District , elements of the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at Firebase Tomahawk sustained a coordinated mortar and ground attack by elements of the PAVN 4th Regiment. Nearby on the same day, other elements of the 2/327the Infantry were hit by an unreported number of mortar and rocket rounds. Cumulative results of
5568-411: The base sustained 100 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire and 20 CS gas rounds of unknown caliber; ARVN losses were one killed and seven wounded. On 15 September the ARVN 4th Battalion, 1st Regiment was moved by helicopter from Firebase Barbara ( 16°34′16″N 107°10′16″E / 16.571°N 107.171°E / 16.571; 107.171 ) to O'Reilly to reinforce the other three battalions of
5664-471: The base, sustained a mortar and ground attack losing two killed and five wounded while killing 13 PAVN. At 06:15 on 10 September a mortar attack against the base using 200 82mm rounds followed by a ground probe, resulted in one ARVN killed and nine wounded while the PAVN lost eight killed. At 02:00 on 11 September the PAVN again struck the base, but the 2/3/1st killed eight PAVN while losing two killed and five wounded. Later that day 2 km southwest of O'Reilly
5760-436: The base, was attacked by an estimated PAVN company. ARVN casualties were two wounded while the PAVN left 10 dead. Troop B, 2/17 Cavalry and a forward observer on a bomb damage assessment mission counted 33 PAVN bodies, in addition to killing one additional PAVN. On 16 August 2 km southwest of O'Reilly the 3/3/1st with organic weapons killed 26 PAVN at cost of 10 dead and 12 wounded in two separate engagements. On 18 August
5856-490: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
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#17329160710755952-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
6048-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
6144-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
6240-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
6336-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
6432-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
6528-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
6624-1394: The forced evacuation of the base on 23 July 1970. On 1 August the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment operating 31 km north-northwest of A Shau Valley engaged a PAVN force killing 12 for the loss of one ARVN killed. The area around Firebase O'Reilly became the scene of numerous engagements during the month. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam concluded the operation on 5 September 1970. The US claimed 1,782 PAVN killed, while U.S. losses were 386 killed. Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
6720-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
6816-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
6912-424: The loss of three killed and nine wounded. On 31 August the 3/1st, while on a ground reconnaissance near the base, found 20 PAVN bodies killed by air 6 to 12-hours earlier. On 3 September the 1/1st in a night defensive position received a ground attack, 17 PAVN were killed while the ARVN lost six killed and eight wounded in the engagement. On 8 September elements of the 2/1st, while on a search-and-clear mission near
7008-448: The morning of 16 September the 2/1/1st, while on a sweep of the area surrounding O'Reilly, engaged a PAVN element. Supported by helicopter gunships of the 101st Airborne Division , the ARVN killed 46 PAVN. In the vicinity of the base on 20 September, ARVN elements contacted the PAVN units in two separate actions. The 1/1/1st killed 15 PAVN from the 29th Regiment in a noontime sweep, at a cost of one ARVN killed and 21 wounded. One hour later,
7104-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
7200-418: The operation. One brigade retained responsibility for the pacification and development programs while the other two brigades conducted offensive operations in the western portions of the province. On 1 April elements of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment conducted an assault into Firebase Ripcord . Immediately after being inserted, the units received small arms, sniper and mortar fire from elements of
7296-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
7392-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
7488-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
7584-523: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
7680-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
7776-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
7872-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
7968-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
8064-410: The two attacks were one U.S. and 21 PAVN killed. On 16 June at 19:45 21 km north of A Shau Valley, the ARVN 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment in a night defensive position was attacked by elements of the PAVN 29th Regiment, 324B Division. The unit returned fire with organic weapons supported by artillery and helicopter gunships. PAVN losses were 32 killed, there were no ARVN casualties. From 17 to 25 June
8160-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
8256-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
8352-568: Was a follow-on operation to Operation Randolph Glen . The main objective of Texas Star was pacification, rural reconstruction, and development along with offensive operations against the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên Provinces. The United States 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)'s 1st Division were the combined force for
8448-613: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
8544-483: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
8640-528: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
8736-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
8832-505: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. Firebase O%27Reilly Firebase O'Reilly (also known as Hill 542 ) is a former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) firebase located south of Quảng Trị in Quảng Trị Province , Vietnam . The base
8928-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
9024-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
9120-457: Was speculated that the PAVN attacks around O'Reilly were to divert allied attention from the logistical activity along the border and in Laos . Equally, the PAVN might have been attempting to draw allied forces out of the populated lowlands to provide greater freedom of movement for Vietcong forces in a continuing assault on the pacification and Vietnamization programs. Satellite images show that
9216-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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