American intervention 1965
116-421: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Scotland II was a U.S. Marine Corps security operation that took place in northwest Quảng Trị Province from 15 April 1968 to 28 February 1969. At 08:00 on 15 April, following
232-458: A "force in readiness." A MEF is the largest of all MAGTFs. III Marine Expeditionary Force was activated as I Amphibious Corps 1 October 1942 in Camp Elliott, San Diego, California. Later that month, they were deployed to Noumea , New Caledonia . The unit was redesignated as III Amphibious Corps 15 April 1944. III Amphibious Corps was deactivated on 10 June 1946. III Marine Expeditionary Force
348-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
464-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
580-512: A battalion sized attack on Company F's positions. The PAVN forced the 1st Platoon from its position and overran the company's 60 mm mortar position. At 03:30 Company F was hit by PAVN 130 mm artillery fire from across the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). At 04:15 an AC-47 Spooky gunship and a flareship arrived over the battle and were engaged by PAVN antiaircraft fire. The PAVN made repeated attacks to try to overrun
696-427: A bunker complex killing 52 PAVN for the loss of six Marines. From 17 to 19 May, the 3/4 Marines patrolling the ridgeline between Hills 552 ( 16°38′13″N 106°42′29″E / 16.637°N 106.708°E / 16.637; 106.708 ) and 689 killed 84 PAVN and captured five. At 04:00 on 19 May, a PAVN platoon attacked Company H 2/3 Marines position on Route 9 southeast of Khe Sanh killing three Marines for
812-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
928-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
1044-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
1160-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
1276-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
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#17329023358631392-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
1508-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
1624-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
1740-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
1856-756: A vital role in Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh from May–June 1991; Operation Fiery Vigil in the Philippines June 1991; Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continue Hope in Somalia from December 1992 to March 1994. III MEF elements have also had a significant impact on the Iraq War's Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as the Global War on Terrorism's Enduring Freedom . One of the biggest roles III MEF plays in
1972-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
2088-639: Is a formation of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force of the United States Marine Corps . It is forward-deployed and able to rapidly conduct operations across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) to amphibious assault and high-intensity combat. It maintains a forward presence in Japan and Asia to support the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
2204-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
2320-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
2436-662: The Cửa Việt Base . On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of the former Khe Sanh base to commence Operation Dawson River West. On 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and the 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the Khe Sanh plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger ( 16°40′26″N 106°38′10″E / 16.674°N 106.636°E / 16.674; 106.636 ) and Smith ( 16°37′12″N 106°40′37″E / 16.62°N 106.677°E / 16.62; 106.677 );
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#17329023358632552-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
2668-803: The Japanese Empire in the Pacific theater during World War II. It fought in some of the bloodiest battles, including the Solomon Islands campaign , the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign and the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign (namely the Battle of Okinawa ). III Amphibious Corps redeployed to Tianjin, China , in September 1945, where it participated in the occupation of Northern China until June 1946. III Amphibious Corps
2784-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
2900-460: The Philippines , and Australia . These exercises build partner capacity, develop and maintain strong regional alliances and military-to-military contacts. These exercises prepare III MEF to conduct operations ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. III MEF has played a significant role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions throughout
3016-804: The Vietnam War from May 1965 – April 1971 operating from Quang Tri , Thua Thien , Quang Nam , Quang Tin , and Quang Ngai . III MAF deployed to Camp Courtney, Okinawa in April 1971. Since III MAF was redesignated to III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) 5 February 1988, they have participated in many different operations. These operations include the Persian Gulf War's Operation Desert Shield , Operation Desert Storm , as well as Operation Provide Comfort in Southwest Asia and Iraq from Sept. 1990 – April 1991 and May–June 1991. III MEF elements have also played
3132-561: The "Vietnam Salient" 15 km south of Route 9 resulting in 65 Marines killed and 635 PAVN killed and 48 captured. From 19 June Task Force Hotel conducted Operation Charlie , the evacuation and destruction of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed. At 03:25 on 1 July, the PAVN attacked a position held by 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines 3 km southeast of the base. The battle continued until late afternoon when
3248-562: The 1/1 Marines recovered the dead and withdrew from the area on 11 July. The abandonment of Khe Sanh base was part of a change in U.S. strategy following the replacement of General William Westmoreland as COMUSMACV by General Creighton Abrams and the increased availability of helicopters saw the Marines move away from being tied to defending large bases along the DMZ and refocussing on mobile operations to engage PAVN units and their logistics network. August–September 1968 saw little activity in
3364-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
3480-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
3596-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
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3712-1577: The Asia-Pacific region is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). III MEF elements participated in Operation Unified Assistance in response to the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia from December 2004 to February 2005. III MEF has also assisted with the 2005 Kashmir earthquake response from October 2005 to March 2006; Philippine mudslide response in March and April 2006; 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake response in May and June 2006; Legazpi typhoon recovery in March 2007; 2007 Solomon Islands earthquake and tsunami response in April 2007; Operation Sea Angel II in Bangladesh from November to December 2007; Operation Caring Response in Burma from May and June 2008; Taiwan typhoon relief in August 2009; Philippine typhoon and Indonesian earthquake relief in October 2009; Philippine typhoon relief in October 2010; Operation Tomodachi in May 2011; Thailand flood relief from October through November 2011; and Philippine typhoon relief in December 2012 and again in November 2013. III Marine Expeditionary Force, together with I Marine Expeditionary Force , makes up Marine Forces, Pacific . As
3828-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
3944-419: The DMZ and Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines deployed there. On 14 December Firebases Alpine, Argonne and Gurkha were closed. On 7 December 2/4 Marines was landed on ridgelines east of LZ Mack and 3 km north of Dong Ha Mountain . On 8 December as a patrol from Company E approached Hill 208 ( 16°51′14″N 106°54′58″E / 16.854°N 106.916°E / 16.854; 106.916 ) it
4060-660: The Eastern Hemisphere’s sole musical representative of the United States Marine Corps, the III MEF Band enjoys a busy schedule filled with performances across Okinawa and the Indo-Pacific region each year. The band capitalizes on this unique position by making it a priority to present community outreach performances and by participating in bi-lateral engagements with partner and allied nations throughout Asia and
4176-566: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
4292-757: The Khe Xa Bai and Song Rao Quan Valleys; and 2/4 Marines was deployed to Hill 1308 to construct Firebase Argonne approximately 10 km northwest of Khe Sanh and 2 km east of the Laotian border. On 11 November following the completion of the construction of Firebase Argonne, 1/4 Marines rotated with 2/4 Marines who then closed Firebase Shepherd. On 21 November 3/4 Marines deployed by helicopter to reopen Landing Zone Mack and establish Landing Zone Sierra and Firebase Winchester ( 16°48′14″N 106°47′15″E / 16.804°N 106.7876°E / 16.804; 106.7876 ). On 23 November Operation Lancaster II
4408-456: The Marine positions supported by continuous RPG-2 fire. At 07:00 a napalm strike against PAVN reinforcements killed over 30 PAVN and started a wildfire that forced Company F from its fighting positions. Company F regained its positions as the fire died down and the PAVN began to disengage. At 11:50 Company E arrived to reinforce Company F and overran a PAVN RPG position. The Marines lost 13 dead while
4524-456: The Marines to capture the position by 20:15 for the loss of 15 Marines killed, while the PAVN had lost 58 dead. Company G was reinforced by Companies E and F and dug into positions 700m apart along the ridgeline. At 02:45 on 28 May Company F detected PAVN movement outside their perimeter and artillery strikes were called in. Three PAVN armed with Satchel charges then attacked a listening post killing themselves and three Marines, this action started
4640-468: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
4756-502: The PAVN 246th Regiment attacked Firebase Neville killing 12 Marines from Company H, 2/4 Marines and Battery G, 3/12 Marines and two Navy corpsmen for the loss of 36 PAVN dead. On the same morning the PAVN 27 Regiment attacked Firebase Russell 10 km east of Firebase Neville killing 29 Marines and Corpsmen for the loss of 25 PAVN. The PAVN remained deployed around Firebase Neville and continued to hit it with mortar fire for several more days despite air and artillery support, until swept from
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4872-445: The PAVN disengaged leaving over 200 dead, while the defending Marines lost two men. The PAVN kept up artillery and mortar fire on Marine positions around the base. At 20:00 on 5 July Khe Sanh Combat Base was officially closed and on 6 July Operation Charlie concluded. The 1/1 Marines remained around Hill 689 to recover the remains of seven Marines killed in the earlier fighting and another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers were killed, before
4988-530: The PAVN lost 230 killed. In response to the renewed PAVN artillery fire, on 30 May, four M107s and four M110s were deployed to Khe Sanh base from Camp Carroll and these engaged in a 48-hour artillery barrage named Operation Drumfire II against suspected PAVN artillery positions in the Co Roc mountain range ( 16°33′40″N 106°37′55″E / 16.561°N 106.632°E / 16.561; 106.632 ), with little noticeable effect. At 04:00 on 31 May
5104-436: The PAVN positions. Company H moved in to attack the PAVN position from the north and also became heavily engaged but their fire eventually forced the PAVN to withdraw. Marine losses were 13 dead. On 12 December the Marines scoured the area but were denied permission to pursue the PAVN into the DMZ. Over the next two weeks 2/4 Marine searched the ridgeline but without engaging any more PAVN and on 26 December they were redeployed to
5220-420: The PAVN supported by artillery fire attacked Company E 2/3 Marines on Foxtrot Ridge but were beaten back. At 08:50 Company B 1/1 Marines was ambushed as it moved to support Company E, they were then reinforced by Company G 2/3 Marines and Company E 2/1 Marines who overran the PAVN positions. The Marines lost 32 dead while the PAVN lost 136 killed. From 2 to 19 June Task Force Hotel conducted Operation Robin in
5336-526: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
5452-642: The Pacific. Consisting of musicians trained in a variety of musical styles, the III MEF Band is able to provide a number of small ensembles for civilian events, including brass and woodwind quintets, jazz combo, rock band, and brass band. The band was awarded the title of 2018 Marine Corps Band of the Year in February 2018. The III MEF Band was most recently award the 2023 Colonel George S. Howard Citation of Musical Excellence for Military Concert Bands . The following comprises
5568-560: The Philippine government. More than 2,495 tons of relief supplies were delivered, and over 21,000 people were evacuated. Commanded by a lieutenant general with its headquarters at Camp Courtney , III MEF's mission is to provide forward based and deployed forces to the commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command , to conduct Phase 0 engagement and theater security cooperation events, support contingencies and emergent requirements, and prepare to rapidly execute existing operations plans in support of
5684-617: The Scotland II area as the PAVN concentrated their activity further east in the Lancaster II and Kentucky area of operations and poor weather limited activities. PAVN units observed in the area were engaged by fire on numerous occasions but with unclear results. On 17 September PAVN units were observed near the site of the abandoned Khe Sanh base and air and artillery strikes were ordered in with negligible results. On 5 October Task Force Hotel commander BG Frank E. Garretson (who had assumed
5800-452: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
5916-537: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
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#17329023358636032-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
6148-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
6264-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
6380-511: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
6496-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
6612-609: The United States and Japan (1960) and other alliance relationships of the United States. III MEF also conducts combined operations and training throughout the region in support of the National Security Strategy for Theater Security Cooperation. The Marines and sailors of III MEF engage in more than 65 combined, bilateral and multilateral training exercises annually throughout the Asia-Pacific region, in countries including treaty allies Japan , Thailand , South Korea ,
6728-454: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
6844-454: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
6960-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
7076-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
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#17329023358637192-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
7308-425: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
7424-450: The area and on 1 February elements of the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and 2/4 Marines swept the southern half of the DMZ north of Neville discovering further caches but without gaining any useful intelligence on PAVN plans. In mid-January the 9th Marine Regiment began Operation Dawson River South (later renamed Operation Dewey Canyon) against the Đa Krông and A Sầu valleys . In the early foggy morning of 25 February 1969 200 sappers from
7540-1278: The area by Company G, 2/4 Marines. Operation Scotland II concluded on 28 February 1969 with the subordinate units remaining in place. In early April outgoing 3rd Marine Division commander MG Raymond G. Davis stated that "we totally control Quảng Trị Province." [REDACTED] This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Marine Corps . Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
7656-423: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
7772-436: The base, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines occupied Hills 558, 861, 881 South and 950 , the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines provided security along Route 9 and the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines was deployed to secure Hill 689 ( 16°38′35″N 106°41′20″E / 16.643°N 106.689°E / 16.643; 106.689 ). On 16 April 1968, Company A 1st Battalion, 9th Marines began a patrol southwest of Hill 689, when it
7888-434: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
8004-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
8120-465: The command in August) commenced a new operation west of Khe Sanh, landing the 3/4 Marines and 2/4 Marines north and south of the abandoned Lang Vei camp and then sweeping east along Route 9. The operation uncovered various PAVN supply caches and graves but saw only minor skirmishes with the PAVN. 2/4 Marines arrived at Vandegrift Combat Base on 16 October and left the operation, while the 3/4 Marines, joined by 3/9 Marines on 24 October, continued to sweep
8236-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
8352-404: The division deputy commander BG Jacob E. Glick to Khe Sanh base to take control of the forces there comprising the 1st Marine Regiment which was relieving the 26th Marine Regiment , the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division , this force was designated Task Force Glick . The Task Force and Regimental command posts and 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were located at
8468-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
8584-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
8700-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
8816-445: The end of April BG Carl W. Hoffman replaced Glick and the force was briefly designated Task Force Hoffman but subsequently Task Force Hotel based on the radio callsign. On 14 May the PAVN ambushed a supply convoy 1 km north of Route 9, the 2/3 Marines was sent to relieve the convoy and pursued the PAVN into a bunker complex killing 74 PAVN for the loss of seven Marines. On 17 May Company H, 2/1 Marines pursued several PAVN into
8932-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
9048-538: The following forces in the Scotland II operational area: 1/4 Marines defended and patrolled from Firebases Cates ( 16°40′24″N 106°48′22″E / 16.6734°N 106.806°E / 16.6734; 106.806 ) and Shepherd and Hills 691 ( 16°40′23″N 106°48′22″E / 16.673°N 106.806°E / 16.673; 106.806 ) and 950; 3/4 Marines defended Firebase Gurkha ( 16°42′34″N 106°42′45″E / 16.7094°N 106.7126°E / 16.7094; 106.7126 ) and patrolled
9164-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
9280-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
9396-486: The hills north of Route 9 until the end of October with limited results. In late October 2/9 Marines was landed in the Vietnam Salient and after sweeping it they moved north to patrol the Đa Krông valley , in mid-November it was joined by the 3/9 Marines and the two battalions conducted a systematic sweep of the valley and then moving further east and south of Vandegrift. By early November Task Force Hotel controlled
9512-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
9628-529: The leadership of the band: Uniquely, the band used to have its own mascot. The history of the use of a mascot dates back to 1974, when the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing presented a Golden Retriever to the 1st MAW Band. Since then, the 1st MAW and 3D MARDIV Bands combined to form the III MEF Band and five mascots have served the unit. Since November of 2012, Sgt Chopper V continued this unique tradition and retired in 2024 after serving
9744-421: The loss of eight dead. Simultaneously Company I 3/4 Marines on Hill 552 was hit by PAVN mortar fire, at dawn the Marines attacked the PAVN position killing 42 and capturing four. At 07:10 a platoon from Company F 2/1 Marines supported by two tanks on a road sweep operation from Khe Sanh base towards Route 9 was ambushed, the Marines attempted to assault the PAVN positions but were repulsed. The remainder of Company F
9860-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
9976-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
10092-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
10208-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
10324-424: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
10440-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
10556-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
10672-697: The region. The MEF assisted the relief efforts led by the Government of Japan during Operation Tomodachi after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami . III MEF also conducted HA/DR missions in Thailand in October 2011, the Philippines in October 2010, and Indonesia in October 2009. Most recently in response to the resulting humanitarian crisis from Typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines in 2013, III MEF activated as Joint Task Force 505 to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in support of
10788-557: The relief of Khe Sanh Combat Base in Operation Pegasus the 3rd Marine Division resumed responsibility for Khe Sanh Combat Base from the 1st Cavalry Division and Operation Scotland II began with the Marines seeking out the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces on the Khe Sanh plateau and across the operational area which comprised the western third of Quảng Trị Province. 3rd Marine Division commander MG Rathvon M. Tompkins sent
10904-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
11020-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
11136-522: The theater and national military strategies. III MEF is organized as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to provide a rapidly deployable, flexible self-contained fighting force. The Marines combine air, ground, and logistics forces to operate as a coherent, self-sufficient force. Each mission dictates the MAGTF's scale and structure, giving the Marine Corps the flexibility to respond to any crisis and making
11252-412: The three-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. The PAVN generally avoided contact throughout January as the Marines conducted sweeps across the Scotland II area to try to locate the PAVN and disrupt their logistical preparations. On 10 January a large bunker complex was discovered north of Firebase Neville indicating that the PAVN were preparing for operations in
11368-456: The units in the area. On 24 May, Company G 2/3 Marines engaged a PAVN company in bunkers on a ridge overlooking Route 9, 4 km southeast of the base known as "Foxtrot Ridge" ( 16°37′11″N 106°45′24″E / 16.6196°N 106.7568°E / 16.6196; 106.7568 ). Air and artillery strikes were called in on the bunkers but the Marine attack was repulsed so further gunship and artillery strikes were called in which allowed
11484-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
11600-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
11716-664: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
11832-483: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
11948-464: Was activated 6 May 1965 at Da Nang , Republic of Vietnam . III MEF was re-designated to III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) 7 May 1965. III Marine Amphibious Force deployed to Camp Courtney , Okinawa April 1971. III MAF was redesignated to III Marine Expeditionary Force 5 February 1988. During World War II , III MEF was known as I Marine Amphibious Corps . It was renamed III Amphibious Corps on 15 April 1944, and took part in fighting against
12064-480: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
12180-409: Was ambushed by PAVN soldiers in bunkers concealed in the thick vegetation. Two more companies from 1/9 Marines were dispatched to save them, but they became ensnarled in this confusing battle and were unable to disengage until the early morning of 17 April. Casualties amounted to 38 Marines and three Navy Corpsmen killed, three missing and 32 wounded. The battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel John Cahill
12296-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
12412-582: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. III Marine Expeditionary Force#Vietnam War Vietnam War Persian Gulf War Operation Provide Comfort Operation Sea Angel Operation Fiery Vigil Operation Restore Hope Global War on Terrorism Iraq War III Marine Expeditionary Force ( III MEF )
12528-482: Was deactivated on 10 June 1946. III MEF was reactivated 6 May 1965 in Da Nang , Republic of Vietnam under Major General William R. Collins . 7 May 1965, III MEF was re-designated as III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and consisted of the 1st Marine Division , 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing . The III MAF's area of operations was in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone . III MAF participated in
12644-436: Was engaged by PAVN fire. The Marines were reinforced and assaulted into the PAVN position where they were caught in a crossfire and at dusk they were forced to retreat leaving three dead Marines behind. The rest of the battalion was moved to surround the PAVN while it was bombarded throughout the night, but the PAVN escaped the cordon and the Marines only found the bodies of their own dead the next morning. On 11 December Company F
12760-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
12876-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
12992-399: Was relieved of duty. On 19 April the PAVN ambushed a convoy of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines killing three Marines. Following this ambush 1st Marine Regiment commander Col. Stanley S. Hughes restricted traffic on Route 9 and formed a Provisional Mechanized Company combining an anti-tank company, two infantry platoons and elements of the 3rd Tank Battalion to improve road security. At
13108-461: Was searching for PAVN mortar positions on Mutter's Ridge along the southern DMZ when they became pinned down by entrenched PAVN; one of the company's platoon commanders was Lt. Robert Mueller . He earned a Bronze Star for rescuing a fallen Marine under enemy fire as well as a Purple Heart after he was wounded in the leg by enemy fire. The Marines withdrew to evacuate their casualties and following air and artillery strikes resumed their assault on
13224-449: Was sent to reinforce the platoon but the Marines attack was again repulsed, Company G was then sent to reinforce Company F and napalm strikes were called in close to the Marine lines forcing the PAVN to retreat. Marine losses were eight dead while PAVN losses were 113 killed and three captured. Given the increased PAVN activity around the base, in late May III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) ordered 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines to reinforce
13340-803: Was terminated and the Lancaster area of operations was absorbed into the Scotland II and Kentucky operational areas. On 24 November Company E, 2/4 Marines was landed at Firebase Winchester and then moved 1 km east to establish Firebase Russell . On 28 November 1/9 Marines and 3/9 Marines launched Operation Dawson River to sweep the PAVN Base Area 101 and the Ba Long Valley uncovering numerous supply caches and graves but meeting limited resistance. The operation concluded on 25 December. On 3 December 1/4 Marines established Firebase Neville on Hill 1103, approximately 15 km north of Khe Sanh and just south of
13456-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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