American intervention 1965
159-456: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Jefferson Glenn ran from 5 September 1970 to 8 October 1971 and was the last major operation in which U.S. ground forces participated during the Vietnam War and
318-588: A PAVN assault supported by at least 20 tanks hit the Song Bo corridor defended by the 147th Brigade consisting of five battalions - the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th Marines and the 130th RF Battalion. The attacks continued for two days and one marine position was lost but the 4th Marine Battalion recovered it on 11 March. In two days of heavy fighting, with moderate casualties, the 147th Brigade killed more than 200 PAVN, destroyed 2 tanks and damaged 7, and captured many weapons. On 12 March, I Corps commander General Trưởng received
477-505: A PAVN truck killing the driver. From 14–29 May Troop A patrolled Route 616 killing 5 PAVN and destroying a truck. On 23 May Troop B gunships killed 3 PAVN. On 28 May a Troop B LOH on a reconnaissance mission over the A Sầu Valley was hit by a Rocket-propelled grenade and exploded with both crewmen missing. On 1 June Troop A teams attacked PAVN Base Area 611 in Laos, where they encountered heavy 37mm and 57mm antiaircraft fire, but killed 16 PAVN. On
636-464: A Troop B LOH was shot down by 0.51 cal fire in the A Sầu Valley with the 2-man crew missing. On 11–14 February Troop B gunships destroyed 1 truck and a bulldozer in the A Sầu Valley. On 18 February the Troop B aero-rifle platoon was inserted to recover the bodies of US Marine helicopter crewmen. Throughout February and into April 2/17th supported Operation Lam Son 719 . On 1 April Troop B's aero-rifle platoon
795-480: A Troop C LOH was shot down by .51 cal fire. On 19 December a Troop C FLIR team killed 10 PAVN. On 6 January while searching for a downed Troop C AH-1G , Troop B found an AH-1G lost since 1969 near Firebase Veghel and the crew remains were recovered. From 11–25 January Troop A, 2/17th killed 7 PAVN. On 14 January a Troop B LOH was shot down. On 16 January another Troop B LOH was shot down by .51 cal fire. Troop C killed 3 PAVN near Firebase Currahee . On 10 February
954-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
1113-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
1272-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
1431-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
1590-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
1749-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
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#17329171472041908-481: A defensive line along the Mỹ Chánh River 13 km to the south. The 147th Marine Brigade which was the only unit maintaining any cohesiveness departed the city in an armored convoy and regrouped that evening at Camp Evans . On 3 May I Corps commander General Hoàng Xuân Lãm was replaced by Lieutenant general Ngô Quang Trưởng , commander of IV Corps, and this change of command and reinforcement by forces of
2067-432: A downed AH-1G. On 30 June a Troop A unit destroyed a .51 cal machine gun. On 1 July Troop A helicopters received .51 fire over Route 616, engaged the position killing 4 PAVN and destroying the machine gun. On 4 July a Troop C LOH received antiaircraft fire and crash-landed north of the A Sầu airstrip, a UH-1H chase ship rescued the crew but also received fire and made a forced landing at Firebase Blaze and an AH-1G supporting
2226-447: A further 5 PAVN observed killed from previous helicopter attacks. On the same day Troop C gunships destroyed 1 PAVN truck in the A Sầu Valley and follow-up airstrikes destroyed another truck, a .51 calibre machine gun and several bunkers. On 21 September Troop C gunships killed 4 PAVN. From 24–26 September Troop A gunships killed 3 PAVN and US airstrikes killed a further 5. On 28–29 September Troop C gunships killed 2 PAVN. On 5 October
2385-509: A government decree formally creating within the naval establishment a section of infantry, then of brigade strength, later to be designated as the Marine Corps (VNMC). During late December 1964 in the Battle of Binh Gia the 4th Marine Battalion suffered 60% casualties as it attempted to rescue a trapped Ranger force. On 30 May 1965 in the Battle of Ba Gia the 3rd Marine Battalion was part of
2544-625: A large PAVN weapons and supply cache. From 22–29 September in operations over Route 616 and the Đa Krông Valley Troop A destroyed 8 trucks and killed 1 PAVN with one LOH shot down. On 1 October Troop A gunships killed 1 PAVN. On 2 October after taking heavy fire Troop A gunships killed 4 PAVN. On the same day Troop B gunships killed 2 PAVN. On 4 October Troop C gunships killed 1 PAVN. The 2/17th Cavalry claimed 1339 PAVN killed and 2 captured and 96 weapons destroyed and 27 individual and 9 crew-served weapons captured for US losses of 31 killed. President Richard Nixon had begun his Vietnamization program in
2703-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
2862-468: A nebulous "special assistant" post under General Cao Văn Viên on the JGS and replacing him with General Bui The Lan. In December 1974 the 147th Marine Brigade replaced the 2nd Airborne Brigade west of Huế. The Marine Division itself pulled two battalions out of forward positions northwest of Huế to constitute a heavier reserve and further thinning the force, sent one company from each battalion to Saigon to form
3021-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
3180-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
3339-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
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#17329171472043498-454: A task force with 2nd Battalion, 51st Infantry Regiment, 25th Division , the 39th Ranger Battalion and one squadron of M113 armored personnel carriers to recapture Ba Gia which had been captured the previous day by the VC. The VC first attacked the 2nd Battalion, 51st Infantry and then ambushed the 3rd Marine Battalion as it attempted to support the 2/51st forcing both units to retreat to Phuoc Loc. On
3657-459: A truck in the "Vietnam Salient" south of Route 9 where Vietnam protrudes into Laos. On 15 April Troop D was inserted into the A Sầu Valley for ground reconnaissance. From 19–23 April Troop A supported the ARVN 54th Regiment and 258th Marine Brigade operating near Firebase Holcomb ( 16°39′50″N 106°58′55″E / 16.664°N 106.982°E / 16.664; 106.982 ) resulting in 1 PAVN tank and 1 APC destroyed. On 20 April Troop D
3816-421: A truck in the A Sầu Valley. On 25 July Troop A and tactical air support killed 7 PAVN and destroyed two .51 cal machine guns and 4 bunkers in the Đa Krông Valley . On 30 July Troop A gunships killed 8 PAVN and destroyed a .30 cal machine gun. From 1–9 August Troop A reconnaissance flights encountered heavy antiaircraft fire with one AH-1G shot down while 5 PAVN were killed. On 6 August Troop B's aero-rifle platoon
3975-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
4134-640: A vicious, three-day battle the 48th Regiment, 320B Division broke and withdrew to the west. By 20 July the Marine Division had consolidated its position north of Quảng Trị City, while the Airborne continued trying to break in. On 22 July the Marines launched a three battalion operation against PAVN supply lines south of the Cua Viet River. The 5th Battalion would be landed by HMM-164 helicopters 4 km north of
4293-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
4452-511: A withdrawal of the Division south of the Cửa Việt River in order for his troops to reorganize a new defensive line. Extending the line south the 147th Marine Brigade would hold Mai Loc and secure the high ground along Route 9 between Cam Lộ and Mai Loc. By 11:00 on 2 April the ARVN 20th Tank Battalion moved forward to Đông Hà to support the 258th Marine Brigade in and around the town and defend
4611-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
4770-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
4929-469: The 1st Division in the northeast corner of the Citadel of Huế to replace the 1st Airborne Task Force. However, due to poor weather this deployment would not be completed until 13 February. On 14 February Marine Task Force A joined the battle. The operational plan was for the Marines to move west from Tây Lộc Airfield and then turn south, however they were soon stopped by strong PAVN defenses; after two days
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5088-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
5247-651: The Hải Lăng District southeast of Quảng Trị, sweeping the area before returning to the My Chanh line. On 21 May the PAVN hit the Marine defenses in an attempt to regain the initiative. After achieving an initial breakthrough the PAVN were forced back by the 3rd and 6th Battalions which regained their original positions by the evening of 22 May. On 24 May with support from the US 9th MAB
5406-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
5565-739: The Vietnamese Armed Forces were to include naval forces whose organization and training would be provided by the French Navy. In March 1952, the Navy of Vietnam was established. In 1953, the French and Vietnamese governments agreed to increase the size of Vietnamese National Army, so an increase in the size of the Vietnamese Navy was also deemed necessary. As they debated whether the Army or Navy would control
5724-527: The 147th Brigade conducted an amphibious assault at Wunder Beach 10 km north of the My Chanh Line and a heliborne assault 6 km inland at Co Luy. The Brigade swept the area for several days and then returned to the My Chanh Line. On 28 May President Thiệu promoted Division commander Colonel Bui The Lan to Brigadier general at the Imperial City, Huế . From 11 to 18 June the Marine Division and
5883-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
6042-584: The 14th Ranger Group was to begin the relief of the 369th Marine Brigade in Quang Tri Province. While the 147th Marine Brigade would remain in the Song Bo Valley for the defense of Huế, the 369th Marine Brigade would deploy to Đại Lộc District in Quang Nam Province and relieve the 3rd Airborne Brigade for movement to Saigon. Trưởng and Thi anticipated a mass civilian exodus from Quảng Trị as soon as
6201-469: The 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron. The four Marine battalions of the 147th Brigade were in the vital Bo Corridor, within light artillery range of the Citadel, while the 78th and 79th Ranger Battalions were on outposts 10 km west of the Marines. South of the Marines, on the high ground at Fire Support Base Lion (also called Nui Gio) was the 51st Regiment, 1st Division, with two of its battalions. Diem's responsibility began southwest of his 51st Regiment, which
6360-423: The 1st ARVN Armored Brigade, 20th Tank Battalion and the 4th and 5th Ranger Groups . At dawn on 9 April the PAVN launched an attack, led by tanks, against Firebase Pedro southwest of Quảng Trị. The PAVN tanks had outrun their infantry support and nine tanks were lost in a minefield around Pedro. An armored task force of eight M48s and 12 M113s from the ARVN 20th Tank Battalion were despatched from Ái Tử to support
6519-466: The 1st Marine Battalion joined Operation Goodwood with the 1st Australian Task Force replacing the 2nd Airborne Brigade. On 20 January they were replaced by Headquarters ARVN 52nd Regiment augmented by the ARVN 3/52nd Regiment and the 5th Marine Battalion. During Operation Lam Son 719 on 21 March 1971 the Marines at Fire Support Base Delta, south of Route 9 in Laos, came under intense ground and artillery attacks. During an attempted extraction of
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6678-582: The 2nd Marine Battalion advanced to the southern bank of the Thạch Hãn River, where they halted, exhausted and depleted by heavy casualties and unable to push on to Đông Hà. During the operation, the Marines suffered 3,658 casualties. In late October 1972 the ARVN and Marines began attacks north of Quảng Trị to try to regain positions along the south bank of the Cam Lộ/Cửa Việt River. The attacks were met with stiff PAVN resistance and were stopped at
6837-768: The 44th Ranger Battalion and the US Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) against VC units in the Mekong Delta. From 15 to 19 November 1967 the 5th Marine Battalion participated in Operation Kien Giang 9-1 with the ARVN 7th and 9th Divisions and the MRF against the VC 263rd Battalion's Base Area 470 in western Định Tường Province . The operation rendered the 263rd Battalion combat ineffective. On 4 December 1967 while participating in Operation Coronado IX with
6996-466: The 51st Regiment, a company of M48 tanks and a troop of armored personnel carriers. The 15th Ranger Group, with its three battalions and one battalion of the 3rd Regiment, dug in on the hills above Highway 1 west of Phú Lộc District Town. The 258th Marine Brigade, with two battalions, was also near Phú Lộc, while the 914th RF Group of three battalions guarded the Hải Vân Pass. On the morning of 21 March
7155-472: The ARVN 20th Tank's M48s . At approximately 13:00 Captain John Ripley , an adviser to the Marines, swung under the road bridge and spent 3 hours installing demolition charges to destroy the bridge. The bridge was blown up at 16:30 and the damaged railway bridge was destroyed around the same time temporarily halting the PAVN advance. Naval gunfire and a B-52 strike were soon directed at PAVN forces gathered on
7314-679: The ARVN 2nd and 4th Battalions, 2nd Division and elements of the US 1st Marine Division against the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 2nd Division in the Hiệp Đức District . From 6–15 January 1967 the 3rd and 4th Marine Battalions participated in Operation Deckhouse Five with the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines in Kiến Hòa Province . From 27 to 31 July 1967 the 3rd Marine Battalion participated in Operation Coronado II with
7473-469: The Airborne Division conducted probing attacks to test PAVN strength ahead of the launch of Trưởng's Operation Lam Son 72 to recapture Quảng Trị Province. The operational plan called for the Airborne and Marine Divisions to advance abreast to the northwest to the Thạch Hãn River. The Airborne Division would deploy to the west from the foothills to Highway 1 , while the Marine Division would deploy to
7632-415: The Airborne advance had reached the southern outskirts of Quảng Trị, but became bogged down as the PAVN defended tenaciously. On 11 July, following preparatory B-52 strikes, the 1st Marine Battalion was deployed by HMM-164 and HMM-165 helicopters to two landing zones 2 km northeast of the city to cut Route 560, the main PAVN supply line. This move would force the PAVN to reinforce and resupply across
7791-551: The Allied troops established multiple firebases throughout Thừa Thiên Province and regularly encountered People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) troops. On 7 September Troop B, 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment gunships killed 6 PAVN. On 15 September a bomb damage assessment mission by Troop B found 5 PAVN trucks destroyed. On 18 September 1970 Troop A, 2/17th inserted the ARVN 1st Division's Hac Bao Reconnaissance Company resulting in 1 PAVN killed and 1 AK-47 captured and
7950-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
8109-617: The Americans suffered 9 dead and 89 wounded. During the Tet Offensive attack on Joint General Staff Compound the 2nd Marine Battalion, together with the 6th Airborne Battalion and elements of the 8th Airborne Battalion, fought the VC 2nd Go Mon Battalion attacking the compound. On 11 February 1968 during the Battle of Hue the Vietnamese Marines Task Force A comprising the 1st and 5th Battalions, began to be lifted by helicopter into Mang Ca Garrison , headquarters of
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#17329171472048268-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
8427-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
8586-519: The Cua Viet, reversing course when 7 km from shore. On 28 June the South Vietnamese advance began and quickly ran into strong PAVN resistance and helicopter assaults were launched to land troops behind PAVN positions. On 29 June, following preparatory airstrikes the 1st and 4th Marine Battalions were landed by Marine helicopter squadrons HMM-164 and HMM-165 near the Wunder Beach area. By 7 July
8745-478: The Division commander, to explain his concept for the final defense of Da Nang. He would pull all combat forces into Quang Nam and defend Da Nang with the 1st, 3rd and Marine Divisions on line and the 2nd Division in reserve, but this deployment would be approached gradually as divisional troops were relieved in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and terrain in the southern part of the region was abandoned. On 15 March,
8904-409: The JGS order to pull the Airborne Division out of the line and start it moving to Saigon. The deployment was to begin on 17 March. Trưởng immediately called General Viên to protest the decision but learned that President Thieu had personally directed the deployment so that the Airborne Division could participate in the offensive to retake Ban Me Thuot. Viên told Trưởng that, if possible, two battalions of
9063-661: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
9222-482: The MRF, a flotilla of ATCs carrying the 5th Marine Battalion came under fire 12 km east of Mỹ Tho from the VC 502nd Local Force Battalion in a fortified base on the west bank of the Rach Ruong Canal . The VC attacked the boats with rockets and automatic weapons and the Marines were landed north of the VC position and proceeded to overrun the position killing over 100 VC and scattering the rest. Shortly afterward
9381-767: The Marine Brigade participated in Operation Quyet Thang in Gia Định Province with the Airborne Division and the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade to reestablish South Vietnamese control over the areas immediately around Saigon in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. After midnight on 20 September during the Phase III Offensive , the VC 1st Battalion, 272nd Regiment, attacked a Regional Forces outpost in Phước Tân hamlet, 20 km west of Tay Ninh City , losing 35 killed in
9540-488: The Marines at Pedro. At the same time a flight of RVNAF A-1 Skyraiders arrived overhead and destroyed 5 tanks. When the ARVN armor arrived they destroyed five T-54s for no losses and drove one captured T-54 back to Ái Tử. On 10 and 11 April further PAVN attacks on Pedro were repulsed at a cost of over 200 PAVN estimated killed. On 23 April the 147th Marine Brigade returned to Ái Tử and the 258th Marine Brigade redeployed to Huế leaving its 1st Battalion at Firebase Pedro under
9699-429: The Marines had only advanced 400 metres. On 17 February the Marines and 3rd Regiment resumed their attacks south, while the 1st Division's Black Panther Company was moved to support the right flank of the US 1st Battalion, 5th Marines , over the next 3 days these forces would slowly reduce the PAVN's perimeter. On 22 February after a barrage of 122mm rockets the PAVN counterattacked the Marines who pushed them back with
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#17329171472049858-468: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
10017-480: The PAVN 18th Regiment, 325th Division, supported by the 98th Artillery Regiment, took Hill 350 and drove on to assault Nui Bong. Although the mountain changed hands three times that afternoon, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, controlled it on 22 March. Other formations of the 325th, notably the 101st Regiment, forced the 60th Ranger Battalion, 15th Group, from Hill 500 west of Phú Lộc, and supporting artillery interdicted Highway 1. A stream of refugees began piling up along
10176-419: The PAVN attacked the ARVN positions north and south of the base and the ARVN defenses began to crumble, by midday on 30 April Giai ordered a withdrawal from Ái Tử to a defensive line along the south of the Thạch Hãn River and the withdrawal was completed late that day. On 1 May with his forces disintegrating Giai decided that any further defense of Quảng Trị city was pointless and that the ARVN should withdraw to
10335-486: The PAVN lines to recapture the base. At 08:00 in accordance with the Paris Peace Accords the ceasefire came into effect and the US stopped all support for Task Force Tango . On the evening of 29 January, the PAVN launched a counterattack against Task Force Tango , and by the next day had succeeded in cutting off its lines of communication and began bombarding the encircled Marines. A Republic of Vietnam Navy LCM
10494-476: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
10653-438: The South Vietnamese flag on the Citadel flag tower and proceeded to secure the southern wall by 10:25. The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment and the Black Panther Company recaptured the Imperial City against minimal resistance by late afternoon. The last remaining pocket of PAVN at the southwest corner of the Citadel was eliminated in an attack by the 4th Marine Battalion in the early hours of 25 February. From 11 March to 7 April 1968
10812-402: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
10971-473: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
11130-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
11289-443: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
11448-420: The Thạch Hãn River, making them vulnerable to air strikes. The helicopters were met by heavy anti-aircraft fire with one CH-53 hit by an SA-7 and crashing with two U.S. Marine crewmen and 45 Vietnamese Marines killed. Two CH-46s were shot down while another 25 helicopters were damaged. Despite these loses the Marines deployed successfully and consolidated their positions with air and artillery support. After
11607-537: The Thạch Hãn River. A further attack from the coast by the Marines in November made limited gains. By the end of 1972 the Marines and ARVN occupied positions 5 km south of the river. As the ongoing peace negotiations would soon lead to a ceasefire, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) sought the most advantageous battlefield positions possible and so ordered a further effort to regain
11766-406: The Troop A, 2/17th aero-rifle platoon was landed to recover two PAVN packs, they engaged and killed 2 PAVN and a mortar position was destroyed by artillery fire killing a further 3 PAVN. On 24 October Troop A, 2/17th found and destroyed 50 boxes of 122mm rocket warheads. On 11 December the Troop C, 2/17th aero-rifle platoon was inserted at A Lưới Camp to destroy bridges on Route 548. On 16 December
11925-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
12084-561: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
12243-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
12402-407: The US 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment landed south of the VC. The fighting was intense and the 4/47th Infantry was landed by helicopter west of the VC position. To the south the 3/47th Infantry, encountered resistance from scattered VC bunkers that prevented it from linking with the Marines. There were 266 VC killed in total, mostly by Marines. The Marines lost 40 killed and 107 wounded, while
12561-620: The US Air Force and naval gunfire of the United States Seventh Fleet was used to soften the PAVN-occupied Cửa Việt Base and hinder PAVN reinforcements. The PAVN put up fierce resistance to the attack, destroying 26 M-48s and M-113s with AT-3 missiles and shooting down two Republic of Vietnam Air Force planes with SA-7 missiles. At 01:45 on 28 January the Marines made a final assault and by 07:00 had broken through
12720-409: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
12879-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
13038-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
13197-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
13356-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
13515-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
13674-473: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
13833-490: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
13992-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
14151-421: The brief assault. The 1st Marine Battalion was deployed to Phước Tân later that day to defend against any renewed assault. That evening the 271st Regiment attacked, the assault was repelled with air and artillery support, killing 128 VC with 6 captured. The 8th Airborne Battalion was also deployed to Phước Tân and on the night of 27 September the 272nd Regiment attacked again losing 150 killed. On 15 January 1969
14310-400: The city, while the other two battalions, supported by tanks would attack north, the combined force would then move southeast. The helicopter landing proceeded smoothly, while the ground assault met heavy resistance and could only break through PAVN defenses with air and artillery support. After two days the Marines had killed 133 PAVN and destroyed three tanks. On 27 July, the Marine Division
14469-666: The command of the French Navy but officially incorporated in 1960. From 1970 onwards, the South Vietnamese Marines and Airborne Division grew significantly, supplanting the independent, Central Highlands based Vietnamese Rangers as the most popular elite units for volunteers. Along with the Airborne, the Marine Division formed the General Reserve with the strategic transformation under Vietnamization , with elite and highly-mobile units meant to be deployed in People's Army of Vietnam attacking points and incursions. By then,
14628-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
14787-415: The control of the 147th Brigade. On 28 April the commander of the 20th Tank Battalion withdrew from Đông Hà to deal with a PAVN force threatening Ái Tử Combat Base ; seeing the tanks leaving, the soldiers of the 57th Regiment panicked and abandoned their positions leading to the collapse of the ARVN defensive line. The 7th Marine Battalion was sent to Ái Tử to help defend the base. At 02:00 on 29 April
14946-439: The crucial road and rail bridges across the Cua Viet River. Marine ANGLICO units called in naval gunfire to hit PAVN forces near the bridges on the north bank of the river and destroyed 4 PT-76 amphibious tanks east of Đông Hà. More tanks were hit by a Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) A-1 Skyraider before it was shot down. At midday PAVN tanks attempted to force the road bridge, but 6 tanks were destroyed by fire from
15105-498: The deputy commander of the Marine Division, Colonel Tri, who was responsible north of Hue, and the 1st Division commander. Brigadier general Nguyen Van Diem, south of the city. Tri's outposts were just inside the Thua Thien-Quang Tri boundary, nearly 30 km northwest of Huế. Here, under the direct command of the 14th Ranger Group, were the 77th Ranger Battalion, seven RF battalions, and a troop of armored personnel carriers of
15264-403: The displacing 175mm. batteries moving to Da Nang and stopped the evacuation of ammunition from Huế. The Imperial City would be defended despite the fact that PAVN artillery had, on 19 March, already struck inside the Citadel and Highway 1 was clogged with the southbound traffic of thousands of refugees. The contracted organization for the defense of Huế, under the command of Thi, was divided between
15423-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
15582-462: The east from Highway 1 to the coast. Quảng Trị City would be in the Airborne Division's operational area, but the plan called for the city to be bypassed so as to concentrate on the destruction of PAVN forces. As a diversion the US 9th MAB would conduct a feint amphibious assault against the mouth of the Cua Viet River . On the morning of 27 June the 9th MAB launched their amphibious feint against
15741-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
15900-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
16059-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
16218-423: The extraction was hit by ground fire and crashed. From 10–16 July Troop A killed 11 PAVN, while losing an LOH to ground fire. On the same day Troops B's aero-rifle platoon extracted a downed LOH from Firebase Zon. On 3 July Troop B gunships destroyed a truck south of the A Sầu airfield. On 8 July Troop B gunships killed 3 PAVN and destroyed a .51 cal machine gun. On 15 July Troop A gunships killed 10 PAVN and an AH-1G
16377-548: The final major offensive in which the 101st Airborne Division fought. This was a joint military operation combining forces of the 101st Airborne and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Infantry Division . The purpose of this operation was to shield critical installations in Huế and Da Nang by patrolling rocket belts along the edge of the mountains. During the 399 days of operations
16536-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
16695-421: The force, seven helicopters were shot down and another 50 were damaged, ending the evacuation attempt. The Marines finally broke out of the encirclement and marched to the safety of FSB Hotel, which was then hastily abandoned. Following the conclusion of the operation the Marines were kept in I Corps instead of returning to their base in Saigon, presumably to prevent them spreading stories of the losses suffered in
16854-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
17013-515: The fresh 369th Marine Brigade which established a new defensive line at Firebase Nancy. The capture of Camp Carroll and Mai Loc allowed PAVN forces to cross the Cam Lộ bridge, 11 km to the west of Đông Hà. The PAVN then had almost unrestricted access to western Quảng Trị Province north of the Thạch Hãn River . On 7 April the Marines withdrew from Đông Hà leaving the defense to the 57th Regiment,
17172-482: The general reserve stabilized the ARVN position in Thừa Thiên Province. The remainder of the Marine Division was deployed to Huế and was given responsibility for north and northwest Thừa Thiên Province, while the 1st Division was given responsibility for the area southwest and south of Huế blocking any further PAVN advance from the A Sầu Valley . On 8 May the 2nd Airborne Brigade arrived at Huế and came under
17331-562: The lead battalions of the PAVN 324B and 325th Divisions, together with the independent Tri-Thien Regiment, with heavy artillery support, assaulted South Vietnamese positions from the Bo Corridor to Phú Lộc. The attacks against the Marines in the Bo Valley were repulsed with heavy PAVN losses, but the Phú Lộc sector, taking the brunt of the attack, began to crumble. In the area of the ARVN 1st Regiment,
17490-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
17649-475: The level of training had improved considerably and U.S. Army General Creighton Abrams who oversaw Vietnamization stated that South Vietnam's Airborne and Marines had no comparable units to match them in the PAVN. This division had earned a total of 9 U.S. presidential citations, with the 2nd Battalion "Crazy Buffaloes" earning two. The Vietnamese Marine Corps had its origins during French rule of Indochina . The 1949 Franco-Vietnamese Agreement stated that
17808-626: The morning of 31 May the VC renewed their attacks capturing Phuoc Loc and attacking the 39th Rangers inflicting heavy casualties. Total South Vietnamese losses were 392 men killed and missing. From 7 to 10 September 1965 the 3rd Marine Battalion participated in Operation Piranha on the Batangan Peninsula with US Marine forces. From 6–22 August 1966 3 Marine Battalions participated in Operation Colorado/Lien Ket 52 with
17967-403: The new 468th Marine Brigade and a Ranger group would be sent north to replace the Airborne Division. To adjust to the loss of the Airborne Division, Trưởng decided to pull the Marine Division out of Quảng Trị and northern Thua Thien Provinces and shift it south to cover Phú Lộc District and Da Nang. The 14th Ranger Group would move north to relieve the Marines on 13 March. Only one Marine brigade,
18126-506: The new 468th Marine Brigade for the JGS reserve effective 1 January 1975. Later in the month, Marine positions in Quảng Trị were taken over by Regional Force battalions, and three marine battalions were shifted south to Thua Thien Province. In early March the 468th Brigade was deployed to Tân An, Long An Province to stiffen the defenses of the Regional and Popular Forces there. On 9 March
18285-407: The northern bank. On 2 April, after several days of shelling and surrounded by a PAVN regiment, Colonel Pham Van Dinh , commander of the 56th Regiment, surrendered Camp Carroll and his 1,500 troops with barely a shot being fired. With the loss of Camp Carroll the 147th Marine Brigade abandoned Mai Loc, the last western base and fell back to Quang Tri and then to Huế, the brigade was replaced by
18444-576: The northernmost ARVN outposts just south of the DMZ. On 30 March the 258th Marine Brigade was deployed forward to Đông Hà. Early on the morning of 1 April under pressure from the PAVN the 4th Marine Battalion abandoned Firebase Sarge and retreated to Mai Loc Camp. By 1 April the PAVN had broken through the ARVN defensive positions along the DMZ and north of the Cam Lo River and fragmented ARVN units and terrified civilians began withdrawing to Đông Hà. 3rd Division commander General Vũ Văn Giai , ordered
18603-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
18762-534: The one in Phú Lộc, would remain north of the Hải Vân Pass . Trưởng flew to Saigon on 13 March to participate in a secret meeting with Thiệu, Prime Minister Trần Thiện Khiêm and Viên during which Trưởng was told about the evacuation from the Central Highlands and ordered to prepare a plan for the eventual evacuation of I Corps. He also was permitted to delay the first airborne brigade's departure to 18 March and
18921-499: The operation. A US adviser who observed the Marines before and after the operation said that "These were brave men, well led, well supplied who had a certain elan and a certain confidence in themselves when they went in. When they came out, they'd been whipped. They knew they'd been whipped and they acted like they'd been whipped." In early 1972 two Marine brigades of the general reserve were stationed in Quảng Trị Province under
19080-473: The operational control of the Division on the My Chanh Line. The entire Airborne Division arrived in late May and was given responsibility for a sector between the Division and the 1st Division. The 1st Marine Division then assumed control of the 1st Ranger Group which had just arrived from Da Nang. On 13 May two battalions of the 369th Brigade launched a heliborne assault on helicopters of the US 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB) against PAVN positions in
19239-413: The operational control of the recently formed 3rd Division . The 147th Marine Brigade was headquartered at Mai Loc Camp and the 258th Brigade was at Firebase Nancy . The Marines and 56th Regiment, 3rd Division presented a strong west-facing defense as this was assumed to be the most likely direction of attack. The offensive began at noon on 30 March 1972, when an intense artillery barrage rained down on
19398-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
19557-681: The people saw that the Marines were leaving, and he directed his staff to prepare plans to assist the refugees. The 258th Marine Brigade pulled out of Quang Tri to relieve the Airborne brigade in southern Thua Thien on 17 March. The Marine Division command post was set up at Marble Mountain Air Facility southeast of Da Nang on 18 March while the 2nd Airborne Brigade moved to the Da Nang docks for shipment to Saigon. On 18 March, Khiêm flew to Da Nang to meet with Trưởng and advised him that due to attacks elsewhere no additional troops would be sent to I Corps;
19716-411: The platoon until the PAVN broke contact. On 10 May the Troop C aero-rifle platoon was inserted on Firebase Zon ( 16°16′41″N 107°18′47″E / 16.278°N 107.313°E / 16.278; 107.313 ) to extract a downed UH-1H. From 10–12 May Troop A killed 8 PAVN and destroyed a .30 cal machine gun and a mortar while supporting the 369th Marines. On 12 May a Troop B helicopter destroyed
19875-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
20034-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
20193-472: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
20352-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
20511-421: The promised 468th Marine Brigade would remain in the defense of Saigon. On 19 March at meetings in Saigon with Thiệu Trưởng was directed to stop the evacuation of Hue and to defend enclaves at Huế, Da Nang, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai City. He could, when forced, surrender Chu Lai and Quang Ngai, but he was to defend Huế and Da Nang at all costs. When Trưởng returned to his headquarters on 20 March, he turned around
20670-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
20829-509: The rest of the division until 31 March. Thiệu's reasoning was that Da Nang was most important, but that the rest of the region could be sacrificed. He would send the 468th Marine Brigade north to help defend Da Nang as soon as the Airborne Division arrived in Saigon. This division was vital to the defense of III and IV Corps, without which South Vietnam could no longer survive. On 14 March, Trưởng met with General Thi, commanding I Corps troops in Quảng Trị and Thua Thien Provinces, and General Lan,
20988-479: The river flotillas, French Vice Admiral Philippe Auboyneau proposed for the first time the organisation of a Vietnamese Marine Corps. When the French withdrew from Vietnam in 1954, the Vietnamese Marine Corps was a component of the Vietnamese Navy. The Marine Corps consisted of a headquarters, four river companies, and one battalion landing force. On October 13, 1954, Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem signed
21147-460: The same day Troop B gunships destroyed a truck and Troop D extracted a downed Troop C helicopter. On 6 June Troop B's aero-rifle platoon successfully extracted a downed AH-1G. On 7 June Troop B gunships killed 5 PAVN. On 9 June Troop B gunships destroyed 2 trucks. From 11–28 June Troop A supported Marine units, killing 18 PAVN. On 22 June Troop B gunship s killed 7 PAVN near Firebase Fuller . On 23 June Troop B's aero-rifle platoon successfully extracted
21306-463: The same day at OP Hickory a Troop B UH-1H detonated a mine resulting in 1 US killed and Troop C gunships destroyed a truck. Between 11 and 17 September Troop A units destroyed 6 trucks and an artillery tractor. On 12 September Troop B gunships destroyed an 81mm mortar. On 13 September a Troop C LOH was shot down and destroyed. On 15 September the Hac Bao Company were inserted on Route 608 destroying
21465-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
21624-525: The south bank of the Cam Lộ/Cửa Việt River. On 15 January 1973 planning began for a final assault on Cửa Việt . A special combined unit called Task Force Tango was organized, consisting of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Battalions and elements of the 1st Armored Brigade. The task force was put under the command of Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri, Deputy commander of the Division. The operation began at 06:55 on 26 January with Task Force Tango advancing in two columns. Besides ARVN firepower, twelve B-52 bombers from
21783-1383: The summer of 1969; the objective was to increase the combat capability of the South Vietnamese forces so that they could assume responsibility for the war against the PAVN/VC as U.S. combat units were withdrawn and sent home. Shortly after the completion of Jefferson Glenn, the 101st Airborne began preparations to depart South Vietnam and subsequently began redeployment to the United States in March 1972. Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
21942-472: The support of the Black Panther Company. 23 February saw little progress prompting deputy COMUSMACV General Creighton Abrams to suggest that the Vietnamese Marine Corps should be dissolved. On the night of 23 February the PAVN attempted another counterattack but were forced back by artillery fire and the 3rd Regiment launched a night attack along the southern wall of the Citadel, at 05:00 they raised
22101-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
22260-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
22419-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
22578-613: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
22737-483: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
22896-563: Was again inserted into the A Sầu Valley for ground reconnaissance. On 23 April a Troop B UH-1H flying in support of Vietnamese Rangers was shot down with 1 US killed. On 24 April Troop D was inserted to reinforce a Ranger team in contact, US losses were 5 killed, while PAVN losses were 12 killed. On 26 April while inserting the Hac Bao Company Troop A gunships killed 7 PAVN. From 27–30 April Troop A destroyed numerous PAVN facilities and killed 3 PAVN. On 1 May Troop C's aero-rifle platoon
23055-480: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
23214-598: Was attached to Tri's command. The 3rd Infantry Regiment, with two battalions, held the high ground around Firebase Birmingham , above the Song Huu Trach, south of Huế. East of the 3rd Infantry, the 54th Regiment with two of its battalions defended the Mo Tau sector, while the reinforced 1st Infantry Regiment extended the line southeast to the Nui Bong area. The 1st Infantry had, in addition to its own three battalions, one battalion of
23373-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
23532-512: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. Republic of Vietnam Marine Division The Republic of Vietnam Marine Division ( RVNMD , Vietnamese : Sư Đoàn Thủy Quân Lục Chiến or TQLC ; French : Division de Marines de la république du Viêt Nam )
23691-417: Was destroyed as it tried to resupply the Marines. The Marines attempted to break out on the early morning of 31 January and the PAVN recaptured the base. South Vietnamese losses were recorded as 40 casualties and 20 armored vehicles destroyed in the battle between 28 and 31 January. In 1972 Thiệu finally moved General Khang out of the Division which he had commanded since February 1964, transferring him to
23850-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
24009-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
24168-404: Was hit by .51 cal fire and attempted to autorotate at Firebase Shepard and crashed in a river resulting in 1 crewman killed and 1 missing. On 16 July a Troop B LOH was shot down. On 19 July Troop A killed 4 PAVN while supporting the 258th Marines and later that day attacked a PAVN position killing 14 PAVN and destroying two .30 cal machine guns. From 19 to 29 July Troop B killed 11 PAVN and destroyed
24327-415: Was inserted to extract a downed aircraft from Firebase Airborne but PAVN fire forced their evacuation without recovering the aircraft. On 3 May Troop A destroyed two .51 cal machine guns near Firebase Patton. On 9 May Troop B's aero-rifle platoon was inserted into the A Sầu Valley to destroy a PAVN communications wire network, they were engaged by PAVN resulting in 1 US killed, Troop D was inserted to support
24486-470: Was inserted to recover a downed AH-1G at Firebase Veghel. On 6 April a Troop B UH-1 on a prisoner capture mission was hit by ground fire resulting in 1 US killed. On 8 April the Troop B aero-rifle platoon was inserted to recover a downed UH-1H. On 10 April the Troop B command and control helicopter was hit by 37mm antiaircraft fire killing the Troop B commander. On 13 April a Troop B LOH was shot down. From 13–15 April Troop A gunships killed 6 PAVN and destroyed
24645-411: Was inserted to successfully extract a downed CH-47 . On 7 August Troop B gunships destroyed a .51 cal machine gun. On 13 August after taking ground fire Troop C directed tactical airstrikes against a PAVN base resulting in 14 secondary explosions. On 16 August a Troop A patrol killed 6 PAVN and destroyed a .51 cal machine gun. On 19 August a Troop B gunship killed 2 PAVN. On 20 August a Troop A helicopter
24804-413: Was ordered to relieve the Airborne units as the lead element in the battle. But progress was slow, consisting of vicious house-to-house fighting and incessant artillery barrages by both sides. On 9 September, the final assault to capture the heavily defended citadel was launched by the 147th and 258th Marine Brigades. The citadel was finally captured on 15 September. Meanwhile, between 11 and 15 September
24963-659: Was part of the armed forces of South Vietnam . It was established by Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 when he was Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam , which became the Republic of Vietnam in 1955. The longest-serving commander was Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang . In 1969, the VNMC had a strength of 9,300, 15,000 by 1973, and 20,000 by 1975. The Marine Division traced their origins to the Corps des Marines vietnamien founded in 1955 as French-trained Commandos Marine divisions recruited and placed under
25122-513: Was shot down but successfully extracted. On 22 August a Troop A LOH was shot down. From 24 to 30 August Troop A killed 22 PAVN and captured 1 along Route 608. On 6 September Troop A killed 13 PAVN and destroyed a .51 cal machine gun. On 8 September Troop C gunships killed 1 PAVN. On 9 September Troop C gunships killed 1 PAVN. On 10 September Troop D successfully extracted a downed medevac helicopter. On 11 September Troop A located 4 PAVN 122mm artillery pieces and these were destroyed with HEAT rockets. On
25281-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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