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Operation Coronado IX

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146-723: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Coronado IX was a riverine military operation conducted by the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) of the United States and elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) from November 1967 to January 1968 in an attempt to destroy Viet Cong (VC) strongholds in

292-614: A flame thrower aboard one of the ATCs. A vehicle with a flame thrower had been driven aboard an ATC and fired on targets as required. The Americans believed that the flame thrower had a psychological effect on the entrenched VC. On 6 December the MRF moved to an anchorage on the Mekong River north of Vinh Long . After three days of local operations and maintenance work during which new fire support bases were established to support of forthcoming operations,

438-453: A Full Combat Status Division, and from 1972 to 1991 as an active-duty infantry division at Fort Lewis , Washington. The division was inactivated in December 1991. The shoulder sleeve insignia is an octofoil resembling a heraldic design given to the ninth son of a family. This represents the son as a circle in the middle with eight brothers around him. The blue represents the infantry, the red

584-478: A Mk 19 grenade launcher. Each combined arms battalion also fielded a combat support company equipped with mortars, scouts, and an anti-armor platoon slated to be equipped with Humvees mounting a ground version of the Hellfire missile. As this Hellfire version never entered service, the platoons were later also equipped with Humvees with TOW missiles. The division's first and third brigade were to field one of each of

730-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between

876-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of

1022-696: A cache. The evacuated materials were delivered to Dinh Tuong Province Headquarters for distribution within South Vietnamese government programs. On 5 and 6 November, the two American battalions operated in Cam Son Secret Zone. Barge-mounted artillery supported infantry from a position on the north shore of the Mỹ Tho River. During this operation the MRF destroyed 34 bunkers, captured 360 kg (790 lb) of rice and 55 kg (121 lb) of salt, and killed five communists. The Americans were joined by

1168-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want

1314-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break

1460-537: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down

1606-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that

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1752-607: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected

1898-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against

2044-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised

2190-592: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,

2336-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating

2482-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive

2628-528: Is an inactive infantry division of the United States Army . It was formed as the 9th Division during World War I , but never deployed overseas. In later years it was an important unit of the U.S. Army during World War II and the Vietnam War . It was also activated as a peacetime readiness unit from 1947 to 1962 at Fort Dix , New Jersey as a Training Division, West Germany , and Fort Carson , Colorado as

2774-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in

2920-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after

3066-856: The 2nd Armored Divisions.) The 9th saw its first combat on 8 November 1942, when its elements landed at Algiers , Safi , and Port Lyautey , with the taking of Safi by the 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment standing as the first liberation of a city from Axis control in World War II. With the collapse of French resistance on 11 November 1942, the division patrolled the Spanish Moroccan border. The 9th returned to Tunisia in February and engaged in small defensive actions and patrol activity. On 28 March 1943 it launched an attack in southern Tunisia and fought its way north into Bizerte , 7 May. In August, the 9th landed at Palermo , Sicily , and took part in

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3212-555: The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and elements of both the ARVN 7th and 9th Divisions along the border of Kien Phong and Dinh Tuong Provinces. The Allied force targeted the VC 502nd Local Force and 267th Main Force Battalions, which IV Corps and II Field Force intelligence predicted were in Base Area 470. Troops of the 3rd Brigade were landed by helicopter in the northern part of

3358-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked

3504-416: The I Corps . Camp Devens , Massachusetts , was designated as the mobilization and training station for the division upon reactivation. The 18th Infantry Brigade and additional active and inactive elements were assigned to the division on 24 March 1923. The division’s inactive units were assigned to active associate units for mobilization purposes. During the period 1923–39, the 9th Division was represented in

3650-493: The Mekong Delta . In the middle of November, clashes resulted in the capture of VC supplies and hideouts. During this period, the VC lost 178 men but killed only 26. For the next few weeks there was little contact, although some abandoned VC bunkers were destroyed and supplies captured. On 4 December, a large engagement occurred when a VC battalion encountered the South Vietnamese 5th Marine Battalion . 266 VC were killed, mostly by

3796-584: The My Tho River near Đồng Tâm Base Camp . The series of actions in the operation was primarily conducted north of the Mỹ Tho River and directed against VC bases in Dinh Tuong Province . The MRF arrived off Đồng Tâm on 1 November 1967 and during early November concentrated on equipment maintenance and preparations for coming operations. The 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment disembarked and assumed

3942-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for

4088-477: The Philippines and USS  Benewah moved to Vung Tau on the coast near Saigon to refit. At this time, the 3/60th Infantry replaced the 4/47th Infantry, as part of the MRF, and the 4th Battalion assumed the Đồng Tâm defense mission. On 19 December a two-battalion operation was initiated in northern Cai Lay District while a third battalion operated near Đồng Tâm. On the night of 19 December, two companies of

4234-557: The United States Army Center of Military History 's lineage scheme due to its numerous accolades and long history. All of the division's flags and heraldic items were moved to the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning , Georgia following its inactivation. Should the U.S. Army decide to activate more divisions in the future, the center stated its activation recommendations would be the 9th Infantry Division, then

4380-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command

4526-549: The 15th Engineer Battalion. With the switch from Combat Arms Regimental System to the United States Army Regimental System the division saw a few of its units reflagged or inactivated: During fiscal year 1987 the army decided to inactivate the division's 2nd brigade, which would be replaced by the 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Washington Army National Guard . The 2nd brigade

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4672-796: The 1950s, the division was stationed in West Germany . It later relocated to Fort Carson, Colorado where it was inactivated on 31 January 1962. The 9th Division was reactivated on 1 February 1966, and arrived in South Vietnam on 16 December 1966 from Fort Riley , Kansas. On deployment the division was assigned to the III Corps Tactical Zone of Vietnam where it commenced operations in Dinh Tuong and Long An Provinces (6 January-31 May 1967) in Operation Palm Beach . Its area of operations

4818-481: The 24th, one MRF battalion moved to each of the two areas where saturation patrols were to be conducted. The 3/47th Infantry, moved to Long Dinh District, while to the southeast the 3/60th Infantry, moved into northern Kien Hoa Province. During the truce period there was occasional sniper and harassing fire from the communists. The MRF's next operation was in Cai Lay District of Dinh Tuong Province. On 28 December

4964-559: The 3/47th Infantry, landed along the Kinh Xang Canal to set up ambushes. The other two battalions of the MRF were landed by assault craft in the northern Ap Bac area. Effective artillery coverage was provided by the barge-mounted artillery and Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery (155 mm self-propelled). This operation covered most of the north-central part of Dinh Tuong Province and used both helicopters and boats to bring in troops. The Americans found few VC, killing 11. Navigability of

5110-421: The 3/60th Infantry landed by aircraft and ATC approximately 11 km (6.8 mi) west of Đồng Tâm. It conducted operations directed westward toward Cai Be , with supporting fire from barge artillery batteries located to its south along the north shore of the Mỹ Tho River. Few VC were seen during the operation; Monitors and Assault Support Patrol Boats provided surveillance of inland waterways. On 29 December

5256-540: The 3/60th Infantry, continued operations to the west toward Cai Be, while the 4/47th Infantry, remained in the same area and destroyed 85 bunkers and captured 2 VC. During the day the 3/60th Infantry, found only a few VC and concluded its operations in Cai Lay District. On 30 December the 4/47th Infantry, was moved from Kien Hoa north and across the Mỹ Tho River to assist the 3/60th Infantry to continue operations in Cai Be and Cai Lay Districts. Although troops were shifted by boat,

5402-431: The 4/47th Infantry and 3/60th Infantry, and by mid-afternoon Company A, 3/60th Infantry, was in heavy combat, sustaining moderate casualties after being landed in a VC base area. Company E was flown in to support Company A as heavy fighting continued. The following day fighting was sporadic. Over the two days, the Americans killed 47 while losing 18 and suffering 50 wounded, most during the landing when they were caught out by

5548-560: The 4/47th Infantry to land by helicopter west of the VC position. To the south the 3/47th Infantry, encountered resistance from scattered VC bunkers that prevented it from linking with the Vietnamese Marines. There were 266 VC killed in total, mostly by Marines. The Marines lost 40 killed and 107 wounded, while the Americans suffered 9 dead and 89 wounded. The MRF was able to land the Marines with light casualties on 4 December mainly due to

5694-472: The 5th Battalion of the Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps at a shore camp near Mỹ Tho on 6 November. The Marine battalion had four rifle companies and a heavy weapons company, a strength equal to that of the two embarked American battalions. The Americans said that the South Vietnamese marines "brought a special esprit to the Mobile Riverine Force and fought extremely well throughout" the operation, under

5840-399: The 5th Marine Battalion made beach assaults early on 9 November, the 4/47th Infantry, which had been moved by Armored Troop Carriers (ATCs) to the Đồng Tâm airstrip, and then in a series of helicopter lifts entered the area of operations. All landings were unopposed and they saw few VC. On the second day the search for the VC shifted to the east; troops were moved by boat and helicopter into

5986-538: The 5th Marine Battalion, began operations to find and destroy elements of the 267th Main Force and 502nd Local Force VC Battalions in western Dinh Tuong and eastern Kien Phong Provinces. The battle that ensued on 4–5 December was one of the biggest during the Operation Coronado series. Early on 4 December a flotilla of ATCs carrying the 5th Marine Battalion came under fire 12 km (7.5 mi) east of Mỹ Tho from

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6132-693: The 9th Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) was testing motorcycles for reconnaissance work in its reconnaissance squadron, the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment . And the 9th Infantry Division (MTZ) tested motorized infantry doctrine at the Yakima Firing Center in Eastern Washington, at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California and in Korea during the annual Team Spirit exercise. While

6278-418: The 9th Field Artillery Brigade ( 25th Field Artillery (75 mm Gun) ; 26th Field Artillery (75 mm Gun) ; 27th Field Artillery (155 mm Howitzer) ; Ninth Trench Mortar Battery); 25th Machine Gun Battalion; 209th Engineer Regiment; 209th Field Signal Battalion; Division Trains (HQ Train and Military Police Company; 9th Sanitary Train; 9th Motor Supply Train, and Ninth Ammunition Train). The division

6424-534: The 9th ID from 1967 to 1968 as a sergeant (E-5), serving as an infantry squad leader . Hagel served in the same infantry squad as his younger brother Tom; they are believed to be the only American siblings to serve together during the Vietnam War. The Division's major units departed from South Vietnam on 27 August 1969 (HHC & 1st Brigade) to Hawaii; 27 August 1969 (2nd Brigade) to Fort Lewis , Washington ; 12 October 1970 (3rd Brigade) to Fort Lewis. Following

6570-553: The 9th crossed the Marne , 28 August, swept through Saarlautern , and in November and December held defensive positions from Monschau to Losheim . Moving north to Bergrath , Germany, it launched an attack toward the Roer river, 10 December, taking Echtz and Schlich . From mid-December through January 1945, the division held defensive positions from Kalterherberg to Elsenborn . On 30 January

6716-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for

6862-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in

7008-638: The Ban Long and the Ap Bac base areas. Only the South Vietnamese Marine battalion, which remained in its original location, saw action, killing 7 VC. On 14 November, to increase security for Highway 4 and the Đồng Tâm Base area, a new operation began, with support from American artillery at Đồng Tâm. While the 3/47th Infantry, remained at the MRF Base, the other battalions were transported by boat and helicopter to

7154-480: The Carolina Maneuvers from September–November 1941. One asterisk following the unit name indicates it was partially active and the headquarters location shown was the mobilization post. Two asterisks following the unit name indicates it was organized with Reserve personnel as an RAI unit. Three asterisks following the unit name indicates it was wholly inactive or not organized and the headquarters location shown

7300-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of

7446-511: The Division established strategies and quantifiable goals for completing their mission. Division commanding generals were: Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt (February 1966 - June 1967), Maj. Gen. George G. O'Connor (June 1967 - February 1968), Maj. Gen. Julian Ewell (February 1968 - April 1969), Maj. Gen. Harris W. Hollis (April 1969 - August 1969) The infantry units that served with the 9th Infantry Division were: Other units included: One of

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7592-553: The Division relieved the 3d Armored Division along the Mulde River , near Dessau , and held that line until VE-day . After the war, the Division moved south to Ingolstadt. The Division assumed control of the Dachau Concentration Camp in early July. Presidential Unit Citations : The 9th Infantry Division was reactivated on 15 July 1947 at Fort Dix, New Jersey and assumed a peacetime readiness and training role. In

7738-661: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,

7884-551: The Kinh Xang Canal was improved during the process when engineers removed a major canal obstruction. The operation was concluded late on 22 December and the MRF returned to base to conduct maintenance and prepare for Christmas truce operations. The MRF was instructed that only defensive actions should be taken during Christmas period and that they could fire on groups of VC who "seemed to be trying to breed contact" or who were more than "platoon-size" in number. The truce ran for 24 hours starting from 18:00 on 24 December. Prior to 18:00 on

8030-453: The MRF undertook operations in the southern part of Cai Be District and in the western part of Dinh Tuong Province against local VC and their installations. Initial landings were made from ATCs but later in the first day of operations, troops were brought in by helicopter. Very few VC were found. On 14 December the MRF again searched for the VC in Cam Son. The Americans made assaults by boat in

8176-481: The Marines. The Marines lost 40 killed, while the Americans suffered 9 dead. Over the next month and the Christmas period, there was only sporadic skirmishes, but at the start of the new year, there were some medium size battles in which the Americans killed a few dozen VC. After this there was little contact. The operation began with the movement of the MRF from its late October anchorage off Vung Tau to an anchorage in

8322-614: The Navy SEAL teams, the South Vietnamese Marines, units of the ARVN 7th Division and River Assault Groups. Following the Tet offensive in 1968, General Westmoreland stated that the Division and the MRF saved the Delta region from falling to the People's Army of Vietnam forces. In 1969, the division also operated throughout IV Corps . Chuck Hagel , later Secretary of Defense , served in

8468-409: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV

8614-476: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in

8760-402: The Reserve units’ conduct of the Citizens Military Training Camps also held at Camp Devens and Fort McKinley. When funds were available, the 18th Infantry Brigade and the division’s other active elements, which included the 9th Tank Company, 9th Ordnance Company, 9th Quartermaster Regiment, and 25th Field Artillery Regiment , held maneuvers and command post exercises at Camp Devens, during which

8906-402: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was

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9052-473: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to

9198-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on

9344-443: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at

9490-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,

9636-451: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of

9782-470: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,

9928-408: The VC 263rd Battalion as they retreated southeast following their attack on Firebase Cudgel. The MRF killed 45 VC, nearly half of these by helicopter gunships, and a large medical cache was uncovered. The MRF, in contrast, had only four injured. Total allied losses were 26 killed and 155 wounded, while the VC suffered 178 killed and 33 captured. Following a period at Đồng Tâm for rest and maintenance,

10074-407: The VC 502nd Local Force Battalion in a fortified base on the west bank of the Rach Ruong Canal. The VC attacked the boats with rockets and automatic weapons and the Marines were landed north of the VC position and proceeded to overrun the position killing over 100 VC and scattering the rest. Shortly afterward the 3/47th Infantry landed south of the VC. The fighting was intense and Colonel David directed

10220-427: The VC attacked one of the brigade's fire support bases. The attack was repulsed several hours before the MRF entered the operational area off the Mỹ Tho River on the Rach Ruong Canal . To allow the MRF to enter the operational area, IV Corps South Vietnamese engineers, who were accompanying the assault forces early on the morning of 18 November, had to remove the center span of the bridge on the Rach Ruong Canal. Before

10366-409: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,

10512-516: The VC's well-prepared, camouflaged positions. On 12 January an operation was conducted in conjunction with the 3d Brigade in Binh Phuoc District of Long An Province. The 3/60th Infantry and 4/47th Infantry, moved by boat along the Cho Cao Canal to assigned beaches. Upon landing, American troops met heavy VC rocket and automatic weapons fire but killed 7 VC. The rest quickly escaped and there

10658-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of

10804-472: The Vietnam War the division was stationed at Fort Lewis. The formal activation ceremony was held on 26 May 1972. Initially the division was organized under the army's Reorganization Objective Army Division system. Parts of the division between 1972 - 1983 were organized as follows: From 1983 the division served as the High-Technology Test-Bed (HTTB) for the army. This led the division to develop

10950-473: The active Army by the 18th Infantry Brigade and other assorted divisional elements that formed the base force from which the remainder of the division would be reactivated in the event of war. The division headquarters was organized on 28 July 1926 as a Regular Army Inactive (RAI) unit with Organized Reserve personnel at the Army Base , Boston, Massachusetts . The active associate concept was abandoned and many of

11096-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,

11242-451: The afternoon of 2 January. The next major mission of the MRF was an outing in eastern Vinh Long Province . On 7 January the battalions landed by air and water but found no VC until mid-afternoon, when a company of the 3/60th Infantry, came under heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated two platoons of VC. Artillery support and air strikes were called in on the VC, who were firing from well-prepared, concealed positions. By

11388-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend

11534-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from

11680-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of

11826-419: The area along with the 3/47th Infantry, which was initially under the control of the 3rd Brigade. Since Base Area 470 lacked firm ground needed for artillery fire support bases, and artillery positioned along Highway 4 could not reach the area, experimental artillery firing platforms were used. One platform accommodated an M102 , 105 mm artillery piece, ammunition, and space for the crews to operate. The legs of

11972-545: The artillery, with the white completing the colors of the flag of the United States of America. The 9th Infantry Division was created on 18 July 1918 at Camp Sheridan, Alabama but did not serve overseas. Its units included Division Headquarters; the 17th Infantry Brigade (Headquarters and Headquarters Company; 45th Infantry Regiment ; 67th Infantry Regiment ; 26th Machine Gun Battalion); the 18th Infantry Brigade (Headquarters and Headquarters Company; 46th Infantry Regiment ; 68th Infantry Regiment ; 27th Machine Gun Battalion),

12118-571: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive

12264-434: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve

12410-454: The battalions could not find large groups of VC. On the following day both battalions went into positions where they stayed until the end of the New Year's truce at 06:00 on 1 January 1968. In groups of platoon and company size, the battalions were dispersed to prevent the VC from using important communication lines during the truce period. Following the truce period the units arrived in Đồng Tâm on

12556-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among

12702-425: The bridge span was removed, a barge-mounted artillery fire support base was set up so that the artillery could fire on any VC troops encountered by the engineers. A 155mm fire support base was also established on Highway 4, 6 km (3.7 mi) east of the bridge. For better control, the MRF Base was moved upstream from Đồng Tâm to an anchorage near Sa Dec. While the 5th Marine Battalion conducted riverine assaults in

12848-516: The canal while the maneuver battalions searched the Ap Bac Base area. Five VC were killed and two taken prisoner; four major blocks were removed from the canal and 62 bunkers were destroyed. The opening of the upper reaches of the canal permitted the MRF to use assault craft to attack the VC base in Ap Bac . On 4 December the MRF Base moved to Sa Dec and the 3rd and 4th Battalions, 47th Infantry, along with

12994-609: The capture of Randazzo and Messina . Sent to England for further training, the division landed on Utah Beach on 10 June 1944 ( D-day plus 4), cut off the Cotentin Peninsula , drove on to Cherbourg Harbour and penetrated the port's heavy defenses. Following a brief rest in July, the division took part in the St. Lo break-through and in August helped close the Falaise Gap . Turning east,

13140-416: The concept of "motorized infantry" from 1983. The motorized infantry division was to be equipped with enhanced technology to give it deployability and fire power and fill the gap between light and heavy divisions. The idea was to create a lighter version of the armored and mechanized divisions, which could be deployed easily by aircraft, while providing more firepower than a light infantry division. Initially

13286-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about

13432-443: The defense mission for Đồng Tâm Base. The battalion's waterborne replacement was the 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment , which began tactical operations in the southeastern part of Giao Duc District in western Dinh Tuong Province at 15:00 on 2 November. During the nine-hour operation, the battalion destroyed 141 VC bunkers and evacuated 500 kg (1,100 lb) of rice and an assortment of engineering and medical materials from

13578-545: The delay of the Armored Gun System the division did only activate four of the envisioned five combined arms battalions heavy and retained the 2nd Battalion, 77th Armor instead. Parts of the division were organized at the end of the 1980s as follows: In case of war with Warsaw Pact forces the division would have reinforced the Allied Forces Baltic Approaches Command defending Denmark. By 1984

13724-504: The division began on 28 September 1990 with the inactivation of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, and 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery inactivated on 15 January 1991. As inactivation proceeded, elements and individual soldiers from the division were detached and deployed for service in the Gulf War. On 16 February 1991 the 3rd Brigade was reflagged as 199th Infantry Brigade (Motorized) with

13870-460: The division headquarters was occasionally formed in a provisional status. The division headquarters was also provisionally formed in 1939 for the First Army maneuvers in upstate New York. Under the new “triangular” tables of organization, the 9th Division was reactivated, less Reserve personnel, on 1 August 1940 at Fort Bragg , North Carolina , and assigned to the I Corps. The division participated in

14016-750: The division jumped off from Monschau in a drive across the Roer and to the Rhine , crossing at Remagen , 7 March. After breaking out of the Remagen bridgehead, the 9th assisted in the sealing and clearing of the Ruhr Pocket , then moved 150 miles (240 km) east to Nordhausen , where it assisted in the liberation of the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp , and attacked in the Harz Mountains , 14–20 April. On 21 April

14162-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of

14308-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of

14454-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of

14600-521: The end of the Cold War . Army leadership at first decided that inactivating units would turn in all of their equipment at "10/20" standard, i.e. in ready and reusable condition. The division struggled to meet this standard, which required both extensive work by the division's soldiers and high costs for repair parts. While the remaining 9th ID soldiers were ultimately successful, later inactivating units were not required to attain this goal. The inactivation of

14746-549: The end of the encounter, late on 7 January, two more companies of the 3/60th Infantry, were engaged. The Americans killed 28 VC and captured three weapons. The MRF concluded the operation on 8 January, killing two more VC, and returned to the riverine base late that afternoon. The Americans then targeted the 261st Main Force Battalion in Cai Be District, in western Dinh Tuong Province. On 10 January ATCs and helicopters landed

14892-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming

15038-458: The experimental units serving with the division was the 39th Cavalry Platoon (Air Cushion Vehicle) which used three of the specially designed hovercraft to patrol marshy terrain like the Plain of Reeds along the south Vietnamese/Cambodian border. Other experimental units were the 1st and 2nd Airboat Platoons, which operated Hurricane Aircat airboats . From 1967 on, the 2d Brigade of the division

15184-567: The flanks of heavier mechanized units. Some variants also mounted TOW missiles . All of these weapons systems were attached to the FAV by a mount designed to break away if the vehicle rolled over, which they were prone to do. The FAVs were problematic at best and were eventually replaced by various versions of the Humvee /HMMWV light truck. The combined arms battalions were organized as a mix of assault gun companies and light motorized infantry companies, with

15330-497: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in

15476-402: The following units: The remainder of the division's units inactivated on the following dates: With the support and aviation units also inactivating. The divisional headquarters remained active until 15 December 1991. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery became a General Support battalion of I Corps Artillery. The division was identified as the second-highest priority inactive division in

15622-499: The force returned to Cam Son Base area on 23 November. After the first air attack, a B-52 bomber strike in the heavily populated Dinh Tuong Province, the three allied battalions entered the area by riverine assault craft. Few VC were found and eight were killed. Several caches were discovered. During 27–30 November operations were conducted to clear VC from the Kinh Xang Canal, running northwest alongside Đồng Tâm. Company D, 15th Engineer Battalion , removed all water blocks along

15768-677: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What

15914-623: The heavy battalions fielding two assault gun companies and one light motorized infantry company, while the ratio was reversed in the light battalions. The assault gun companies were to be equipped with the Armored Gun System (AGS), but because of delays in the AGS program they were initially equipped with M901 ITVs Improved Tow Vehicles, then M551 Sheridan light tanks and later with Humvees with TOW missiles or Mk 19 grenade launchers. Light motorized infantry companies were equipped with Humvees mounting

16060-606: The inactive elements were organized as RAI units by mid-1927 in the First and Second Corps Areas. The active elements of the division maintained habitual training relationships with divisional RAI units, as well as those of the I Corps, XI Corps , and the 76th , 94th , and 97th Divisions . The RAI and Reserve units often trained with the active elements of the division during summer training camps usually conducted at Camp Devens and Fort McKinley , Maine . The 18th Infantry Brigade's 5th and 13th Infantry Regiments additionally supported

16206-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after

16352-416: The leadership of a Major Nam, who joined the Americans in the planning of the operation. The US Navy assault craft, army artillery and Air Force planes supported three infantry battalions. After a short time used for training and maintenance, the MRF and the South Vietnamese Marines resumed Coronado IX on 9 November, targeting the 263rd and 514th VC Battalions in the Cam Son area. While the 3/47th Infantry and

16498-408: The motorized units performed well, they were vulnerable to heavier mechanized forces, particularly if forced to stand and fight. They were also extremely vulnerable to indirect artillery fire. On 1 April 1984, Echo Company of the 15th Engineer Battalion reorganized to form the 73rd Engineer Company (Assault Ribbon Bridge), which was assigned to I Corps, which in turn attached it as separate company to

16644-414: The north along the Kinh Xang Canal east of Đồng Tâm Base. The 5th Marine Battalion and the 4/47th Infantry destroyed 63 bunkers and seized 900 kg (2,000 lb) of rice and 90 kg (200 lb) of salt. This operation continued through the night; platoon-sized ambush patrols were sent out along Highway 4 north of Đồng Tâm but could not intercept many VC. On 16 November the MRF began operations with

16790-486: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found

16936-507: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that

17082-402: The platform were adjustable to various heights and a large metal "foot" on the bottom of each leg, provided support in the muddy rice paddies. A CH-47 helicopter carried the platform, artillery piece, ammunition, and crew to their operational locations in four lifts. One battery of 105mm artillery was used throughout the operation. On the second night of the 3rd Brigade's operations, 17 November,

17228-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,

17374-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of

17520-472: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi

17666-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue

17812-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,

17958-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled

18104-473: The southern portion of the base, followed by helicopter landings by the 3/47th Infantry. It was not until the last day of the operation that the VC were discovered, and nine of them were killed. On 17 December the MRF Base moved to Đồng Tâm to allow the MRF to land troops from the two barracks ships. By the afternoon of 18 December the American brigade and one battalion had moved ashore to Đồng Tâm. USS  Colleton left South Vietnam to refit at Subic Bay in

18250-483: The southern portions of the area, the 4/47th Infantry landed troops by helicopter in the north. The lack of contact in the two secret zones and new intelligence suggested that two VC battalions were located in Base Area 470 in western Dinh Tuong Province. The MRF and elements of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, together with ARVN units proceeded to launch Operation Kien Giang 9-1 against Base Area 470 on 15 November. On 18 November Colonel David's force intercepted

18396-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for

18542-720: The three new battalions, while the second brigade would field three combined arms battalions heavy. The third brigade was to field one light and one heavy combined arms battalion and the 9th Cavalry Brigade two attack helicopter battalions, one combat support aviation battalion, and one cavalry reconnaissance squadron. The division artillery would consist of three battalions equipped with M198 155 mm towed howitzers , one light artillery rocket battalion with M102 105 mm towed howitzers and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems , and one target acquisition battery. The division support command would field three forward support, one cavalry support and one main support battalion. However, because of

18688-545: The vision was to create three motorized brigades with three new types of infantry battalion: The light attack battalions utilized the Fast Attack Vehicles (FAV - later re-designated the Desert Patrol Vehicle ), essentially a Volkswagen -engined dune buggy with either a 40 mm Mk 19 grenade launcher or 12.7 mm M2 Browning machine gun . The FAV was designed to provide highly mobile firepower that could attack

18834-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of

18980-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented

19126-613: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name

19272-429: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of

19418-528: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be

19564-477: Was assigned to the 9th Cavalry Brigade. McGrath writes that the 9th Infantry Division was organized as follows in 1988: In fiscal year 1989 Chief of Staff of the United States Army General Carl E. Vuono approved the conversion of the division's two combined arms battalions light to standard mechanized infantry battalions. The division was the first to undergo full inactivation following

19710-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of

19856-528: Was commanded by Colonel Charles C. Clark (July 1918 - September 1918), Maj. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook (September 1918 - October 1918), Brig. Gen. James A. Ryan (October 1918 - November 1918) acting, Maj. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook (November 1918 - February 1919) The 9th Division was demobilized at Camp Sheridan on 15 February 1919. The division was reconstituted 24 March 1923, allotted to the First Corps Area for mobilization responsibility, and assigned to

20002-407: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. 9th Infantry Division (United States)#Vietnam War The 9th Infantry Division (nicknamed "Old Reliables")

20148-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what

20294-485: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted

20440-450: Was in the rivers and canals of the Mekong Delta from 1967 to 1972. Operating deep within the Viet Cong (VC)–controlled Delta, the Division was charged with protecting the area and its population against VC insurgents and ensuring the success of the South Vietnamese government's pacification program. Faced with unrelenting physical hardships, a tenacious enemy and the region's rugged terrain,

20586-688: Was inactivated on 15 August 1988 along with the following units: On the same date the 1st Battalion, 33rd Armor, which until then had been attached to the division, was assigned to the division. With the inactivation of the 2nd brigade the remaining units were reassigned among the remaining brigades: 1st brigade now consisted of 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 2nd Infantry, 1st Battalion, 33rd Armor, and 4th Combined Arms Battalion Light, 23rd Infantry. 3rd brigade consisted of 2nd Light Attack Battalion, 1st Infantry, 3rd Combined Arms Battalion Light, 47th Infantry, and 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 60th Infantry. The 2nd Combined Arms Battalion Heavy, 23rd Infantry

20732-456: Was no further fighting during the two-day operation. On 14 January the 2nd Brigade embarked on USS Benewah , and was followed aboard on 21–22 January by the rest of the MRF. A cordon was set up around the village of An Quoi, near Dong Tam, by the 3/47th Infantry, which had the day before relieved the 4/47th Infantry in the MRF. The cordon operation was unsuccessful in capturing or kill guerrillas, ending Operation Coronado IX. The operation

20878-1192: Was regarded as a success because the VC 263rd and 502nd Battalions had been rendered combat ineffective. [REDACTED]  This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History . Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive

21024-548: Was the Army contingent of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). This brigade lived on the ships of Navy Task Force 117, and were transported on their infantry missions throughout the Mekong Delta on Tango boats (converted landing craft ) supported by various other armored boats. The MRF was often anchored near the South Vietnamese city of Mỹ Tho , or near the Division's Đồng Tâm Base Camp and they conducted operations in coordination with

21170-629: Was the mobilization post. The 9th Infantry Division was among the first U.S. combat units to engage in offensive ground operations during World War II. (The others were the 32nd and the 41st in the Pacific on New Guinea , Carlson's Raiders on Makin Island , the 1st Marine , and the Americal on Guadalcanal , and, alongside the 9th in North Africa , were the 1st Infantry , 3rd Infantry , 34th Infantry and

21316-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that

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