1st Infantry Division
68-455: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Apache Snow was a joint U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military operation (10 May – 7 June 1969) during
136-439: A PAVN entering their night defensive position and captured an AK-47. Later that day Company B found and destroyed antiaircraft position and four mortar positions. On 5 June Company D, 2/506th engaged two PAVN killing one and capturing an RPG launcher and later found three PAVN graves. Company D, 1/506th found and destroyed five bunkers. On 6 June Company B, 2/506th was attacked by fire losing one killed. On 7 June Company C found
204-451: A PAVN force at 09:45 in an engagement that continued until 14:50, following which the Company found 11 bunkers, a rice cache, several weapons and seven PAVN killed. Company B, 1/506th found three bunkers several weapons and three PAVN graves. Company C, 1/506th found the bodies on five PAVN killed the previous day and engaged a PAVN bunker killing one PAVN. On 24 May 3rd Brigade units discovered
272-419: A PAVN grave and Company C destroyed a 25m long corn field. On 28 May Company C found three AK-47 rifles. On 30 May Company D found an abandoned antiaircraft position comprising five bunkers. On 31 May Company C found a supply cache containing 315 60/82mm mortar rounds and 57 RPG rounds. On 1 June Company C, 2/506th found a 6,500 pound rice cache and at YD349061 the wreckage of a crashed UH-1D helicopter and
340-461: A cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act , banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more grand strategic view than did
408-776: A centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies, while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See the protracted warfare model . Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by
476-503: A conventional, combined-arms conquest against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , and taking and holding land permanently. Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year: Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives: Even with these three approaches, there
544-540: A figurehead. COL Bùi Tín led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964. In February and March 1964, confirming
612-462: A graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or
680-592: A guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command . Today, officers from
748-523: A land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam. Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN II Corps Tactical Zone ), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over Highway 19 , splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation,
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#1732916792741816-543: A matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from
884-547: A maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh Tho government was overthrown. Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time,
952-406: A not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup: They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in
1020-564: A political dau tranh argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in
1088-587: A report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics putting Lê Duẩn in charge and Ho becoming
1156-452: A small supply cache and engaged three PAVN, killing one and following that skirmish located another munitions cache. Company D located another small munitions cache. The 2/506th was withdrawn from the operation at the end of the day. On 7 June the 1/506th was withdrawn from the operation and the operation concluded at midnight. The operation met its limited objective of pressuring the PAVN forces in
1224-675: A strategic victory for US and ARVN troops, but the abandonment of Hill 937 was a moral defeat that caused widespread outrage from US forces and the US public. Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963%E2%80%931969 Anti-Communist forces: Communist forces: United States : 409,111 (1969) During the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as
1292-451: A sweep of the perimeter at dawn found 14 dead PAVN. On 18 May at 07:15, units of the 3rd Brigade engaged a PAVN force occupying fortified positions 2 miles east of the Laotian border. Heavy fighting continued with tactical airstrikes and helicopter gunships supporting the 3rd Brigade until contact was lost at 21:00. PAVN losses were 125 killed while US losses were 12 killed. On 19 May units of
1360-519: A weapons cache containing 47 individual weapons. On 26 May the 2/506th killed one PAVN and discovered the graves of a further five PAVN. Company B, 1/506th search a bunker complex finding small munitions caches. Company C, 1/506th found 23 bunkers and several small munitions caches. On 27 May a mortar attack on Firebase Airborne killed four soldiers of the 2/506th. Company C, 2/506th found a supply cache containing 1,400 60/82mm mortar rounds and 200 Rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Company B, 1/506th found
1428-469: The " Americanization " of joint warfare in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War . At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to the end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in
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#17329167927411496-573: The 187th , 501st , and 506th Infantry Regiments of the 101st Airborne Division , the 9th Marine Regiment , and the ARVN 1st Division . The plan was to block escape routes into Laos and assault enemy formations and strongholds. The operation began on 10 May 1969. The PAVN mostly conducted a fighting retreat in the valley. The 29th Regiment eventually made a stand in elaborate previously prepared bunker positions on Hill 937. After ten days of fighting, which involved 11 infantry assaults up Hill 937 primarily by
1564-620: The Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive-General Uprising ) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it? Douglas Pike believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: Pike used Dien Bien Phu as an analogy for
1632-468: The Vietnam War designed to keep pressure on the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units in the A Sầu Valley and prevent them from mounting any attacks on the neighboring coastal provinces. The A Sầu Valley was an important corridor for the PAVN and Viet Cong (VC), who frequently used it to transport supplies from Laos into South Vietnam as well as employed it as staging area for attacks. Previous sweeps of
1700-522: The armed struggle ( dau trinh ) theory espoused by Võ Nguyên Giáp but opposed by the politically oriented Trường Chinh . Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been
1768-512: The center of gravity of the opposition. Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara , in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took
1836-400: The 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to
1904-509: The 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry (resulting in heavy US losses), US forces managed to destroy the PAVN fortifications and capture the hill. The resulting battle became known to the soldiers as Hamburger Hill , an up-to-date reference to the Korean War Battle of Pork Chop Hill . As the hill had no military significance aside from the presence of the PAVN, it was abandoned by US forces within a few weeks of its being taken. On 14 May units of
1972-500: The 3rd Brigade engaged a PAVN force occupying fortified positions 2 miles east of the Laotian border. Contact was lost at darkness. PAVN losses were 28 killed and 5 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured, US losses were 2 killed. On 20 May units of the 3rd Brigade engaged a PAVN force occupying fortified positions 2 miles east of the Laotian border. The PAVN positions were overrun at 15:30 with PAVN losses of 91 killed and 1 captured US losses of 1 killed. On 21 May Brigade units found
2040-493: The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne found 53 PAVN bodies about 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Laotian border. In the same area on 15 May at 13:15, an element of the 3rd Brigade engaged a PAVN force in a battle that continued until 15:10 when the PAVN broke contact leaving 74 dead while US casualties were 1 killed. On 16 May at 01:10, units of the 3rd Brigade, while in night defensive positions 13 miles (21 km) northwest of A Sầu received sporadic small arms and RPG fire until 05:30,
2108-452: The December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S. action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which
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2176-510: The Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents . An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency , Agency for International Development , and United States Army Special Forces . Roughly until mid-1965,
2244-497: The PAVN created its first division headquarters, under then-brigadier general Chu Huy Man . This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the United States Marine Corps at Da Nang , and then the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) , the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the air assault capability of
2312-560: The PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN. It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called
2380-552: The Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis. Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging
2448-512: The SVN-US strategy still focused around pacification in South Vietnam , but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of pacification . The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take
2516-539: The South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and the allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while
2584-463: The South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position. It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment." The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of
2652-476: The U.S. and South Vietnam with a protracted warfare model , in their concept of dau tranh , or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. Following the Tet Offensive and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to
2720-475: The U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG , under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on
2788-595: The VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only
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2856-465: The VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it
2924-399: The anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive , a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of the South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until
2992-442: The bodies of 48 PAVN soldiers killed by airstrikes or artillery the previous day, together with 37 individual and 13 crew-served weapons. On 22 May Brigade units found 53 PAVN bodies in graves or destroyed fighting positions. On 23 May, while patrolling around Firebase Airborne , units of the 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment lost 4 killed in several separate skirmishes. Company A, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment engaged
3060-488: The department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here. William Westmoreland , and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor , rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by
3128-432: The election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization , or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with a perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after
3196-666: The incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these. Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the United States Intelligence Community in late May, on the assumption The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on
3264-496: The lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse
3332-640: The next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing 50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem. After Diem's fall in November 1963 , INR saw the priority during this period as more
3400-547: The organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , who had been
3468-438: The original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in 1963 , January 1964 , September 1964 , December 1964 , and 1965 all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the [North Vietnamese] Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." Robert McNamara suggests that
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#17329167927413536-478: The overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh , in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and the U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from
3604-511: The people, but from the United States. The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem
3672-568: The remains of a crewman. Company D, 1/506th found a 60mm mortar and later found four bunkers and living quarters. On 2 June Company A, 2/506th engaged a group of ten PAVN setting up M18 Claymore mines , two PAVN and one U.S. soldier were killed in the skirmish. Later that day Company C, 2/506th found a 12,900 pound rice cache. On 3 June Company A, 2/506th found two PAVN graves and Company C found two SKS rifles. Company B, 1/506th conducted an air assault finding two bunkers and later killing one PAVN and capturing two K-50s . On 4 June Company B killed
3740-500: The south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by Trần Văn Trà . Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. Pike described it as consistent with
3808-425: The southern part of our country." Firebase Airborne Firebase Airborne was a U.S. Army firebase located west of Huế overlooking the A Shau Valley in central Vietnam. Airborne was constructed on 8 May 1969 by the 101st Airborne Division approximately 42 km west of Huế and 5 km east of Route 547 which ran along the floor of the A Shau Valley as part of Operation Apache Snow . The base
3876-578: The special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before
3944-429: The successful PAVN maneuver in 1975. The resulting campaign is called the Battle of Ia Drang , with a followup at the Battle of Bong Son , but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to air assault , and used obvious helicopters to cause
4012-441: The third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the Tet Offensive never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of Nguyễn Chí Thanh , who commanded forces in
4080-528: The use of nuclear weapons. Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to
4148-485: The valley in Operation Delaware (19 April – 17 May 1968), Operation Dewey Canyon (22 January – 18 March 1969) and Operation Massachusetts Striker (28 February - 8 May 1969) in the preceding year had resulted in over 2,000 enemy casualties, but were unsuccessful at removing the PAVN from the valley. Apache Snow was planned as an operation involving ten battalions. The initial assault force consisted of troops from
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#17329167927414216-456: The valley. However, the valley continued to be used as staging area for attacks in northern South Vietnam. The US claimed that the month‑long operation accounted for 753 PAVN killed, four prisoners, 272 individual and 43 crew‑served weapons captured and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition discovered. US losses were 113 killed. The ARVN killed 224 PAVN and captured one and 337 individual and 100 crew-served weapons. Operation Apache Snow resulted in
4284-617: Was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along. For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near U Minh Forest ), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC. Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In
4352-457: Was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year: Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General Victor Krulak , on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered
4420-535: Was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon . This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the CIA allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. OPPLAN 34A
4488-415: Was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Trường Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in
4556-484: Was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson ; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: To pacify
4624-425: Was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer. There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 10 million. It
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