American intervention 1965
103-564: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The McNamara Line , an operational strategy employed by the United States in 1966–1968 during the Vietnam War , aimed to prevent infiltration of South Vietnam by NVA forces from North Vietnam and Laos . Physically,
206-669: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
309-555: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
412-446: A broadly northeastwards direction out to the Gulf of Tonkin . Either side of the line was a Demilitarized Zone, forming a buffer of about 6.4–9.7 kilometers (4–6 mi) in width. Although it was nominally described as being at "the 17th parallel ," the border never actually followed that line, only straddling the general area of that line of latitude. The First Indochina War (also called
515-446: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
618-605: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
721-596: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
824-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
927-658: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
1030-567: A major proponent of the barrier strategy, left the Defense Department on February 29, 1968. In July 1968, General Abrams , the US commander in South Vietnam, ordered Khe Sanh and the surrounding area to be abandoned. The base was dismantled and all the infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including roads and bridges, was systematically destroyed. On October 29, 1968, all construction work on
1133-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
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#17328836035751236-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
1339-484: A reluctant military to implement it, opted for technology over experience, launched the project quickly and with minimum coordination, rejected informed criticism, insisted available forces sufficed for the effort, and poured millions of dollars into a system that proceeded by fits and starts. The strategic intention of the Dye Marker plan, as well as the whole McNamara Line, was to curb the infiltration of South Vietnam by
1442-536: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
1545-642: A summer study program in Cambridge for the group of 47 prominent scientists and academics that made up the JASON advisory division of the Institute for Defense Analysis . The subject of the study was to find alternatives to the majorly unsuccessful gradual aerial bombing campaign in North Vietnam advocated by McNamara. As Kaysen and the others involved in the Cambridge group were all members of JASON scientific advisory group,
1648-520: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
1751-445: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
1854-590: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
1957-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
2060-510: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
2163-508: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
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#17328836035752266-548: The Secretaries of Defense Historical Series , stated that the interdiction significance of the barrier remained contentious. At the same time, it reserved harsh words for McNamara's inability to listen to the opponents and called the so-called McNamara Line : ...a metaphor for the secretary's arbitrary, highly personal, and aggressive management style that bypassed normal procedures and sometimes ignored experts to get things done. He had adopted an idea from civilian academics, forced
2369-595: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
2472-568: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
2575-539: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
2678-499: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
2781-744: The French Indochina War) was fought in French Indochina where was usually and shortly called "Indochina" from 1946 to 1954 between the French Union (including the anti-communist State of Vietnam ) on the one side, and the communist -dominated Viet Minh / Democratic Republic of Vietnam and allies (aided by China and the Soviet Union ) on the other. The Viet Minh won the war after their victory in Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. On 22 July 1954,
2884-669: The French Union gave up its control of Vietnam when the agreement between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Geneva took effect, Vietnam was de facto divided into two countries: North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, capital Hanoi ) and South (State of Vietnam, capital Saigon ). The postcolonial conditions of Vietnam were set at the Geneva Conference of 1954 , and an agreement about Vietnam (as parts of
2987-661: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
3090-723: The McNamara Line ran across South Vietnam from Cửa Việt port to Route 9 and to the Laotian border along the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) till Mường Phìn, Laos . The eastern part included fortified field segments, with Khe Sanh as linchpin, along with stretches where roads and trails were guarded by high-tech acoustic and heat-detecting sensors on the ground and interdicted from the air. Assorted types of mines, including so-called gravel mines , and troops at choke points backed sophisticated electronic surveillance. Named
3193-564: The NVA forces. This would have potentially in McNamara's opinion enabled the scaling back of the American bombing of North Vietnam and potentially created an opportunity for negotiations with Hanoi. The defensive barrier system was also criticized at the time of its inception for keeping American troops in static positions while facing mobile enemy forces. After the Tet Offensive, the criticism intensified, and Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) called
McNamara Line - Misplaced Pages Continue
3296-468: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
3399-526: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
3502-452: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
3605-537: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
3708-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
3811-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
3914-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
4017-608: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
4120-580: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
4223-454: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
McNamara Line - Misplaced Pages Continue
4326-567: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
4429-485: The Vietnamese to deploy their forces deeper into Laotian territory. In December 1965, Robert McNamara met twice with Carl Kaysen , a former Kennedy-era National Security Council staff member. Kaysen proposed an electronic barrier to limit infiltration from North Vietnam . McNamara embraced the idea and asked Kaysen to create a proposal. Starting in January, John McNaughton and a group of scientists in Cambridge, Massachusetts, including Kaysen and Roger Fisher created
4532-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
4635-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
4738-658: The air-supported anti-infiltration part of Dye Marker. The Dye Marker defensive line project stretched along the demilitarized zone starting from the South China Sea , and had a total length of 76 kilometers (47 miles). Some parts of the defensive line were manned and equipped with the bunkers, outposts, reinforcing and fire support bases, surrounded by concertina wire. Other segments were under constant radar , motion and acoustic surveillance, and secured by trip wires, mine fields, and barbed-wire entanglements. The airborne receiving equipment carried by EC-121R's relayed
4841-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
4944-478: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
5047-502: The anti-infiltration barrier ideas were included in the JASON agenda. The JASON study group meetings took place June 16–25, 1966 at Dana Hall in Wellesley, Massachusetts. The buildings were guarded day and night and attendees were given top secret security clearances. After the summer meetings, a report was produced over the course of July and August. The JASON report of August 1966 called
5150-521: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
5253-983: The barrier a "billion dollar Maginot line concept". Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
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#17328836035755356-508: The barrier idea was impractical from a manpower and construction point of view. General William Westmoreland , who was commanding officer in Vietnam, was apprehensive of the idea and reportedly was even afraid that the barrier would go into history as Westmoreland's Folly . Despite all disagreements, on September 15, 1966, without waiting for the final judgment of the JCS, Secretary McNamara ordered that
5459-586: The barrier system by Robert McNamara ( United States Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968), it was one of the key elements, along with gradual aerial bombing , of his war strategy in Vietnam. Various schemes had been proposed in the years before 1965 for a defensive line on the northern border of South Vietnam and in southeast Laos. These schemes had generally been rejected because of their requirements for large amounts of military personnel to be deployed in static positions and because any barrier in Laos would encourage
5562-490: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
5665-447: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam a failure, saying that it had "no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South". Instead, advisors proposed as an alternative two defensive barriers. The first barrier would run from the coast some distance inland along the demilitarized zone and would seek to block the NVA infiltration through conventional means. The second barrier would run from
5768-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
5871-560: The combat strength of North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong (a nominally independent militant group aligned with North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese government) in the DMZ area in January 1968 was 40,943 troops. The North was ultimately victorious in the war and the Republic of Vietnam's government collapsed on 30 April 1975 . The DMZ ceased to exist after the reunification of the two Vietnamese countries under communist regimes: First
5974-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
6077-463: The division – the DMZ hardened into a de facto international boundary. The war itself evolved into a proxy conflict of the Cold War and millions of American troops as well as allied soldiers were sent to the country to help the anti-communist government of South Vietnam against communist North Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. Despite the DMZ's supposed status, 3rd Marine Division intelligence estimated that
6180-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
6283-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
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#17328836035756386-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
6489-509: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
6592-477: The flow of North Vietnamese troops and supplies through the demilitarized zone during the decisive years of the Vietnam War . At the beginning of 1968, the western end of the barrier region stretching from Khe Sanh through the special forces camp at Lang Vei was attacked by the multiple North Vietnamese troops. The special forces camp at Lang Vei was overrun and Khe Sanh was placed under a limited siege. The Battle of Khe Sanh lasted for 77 days. Robert McNamara,
6695-544: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
6798-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
6901-649: The independent State of Vietnam under Bảo Đại , the last scion of the old Vietnamese imperial house . The State of Vietnam later became the Republic of Vietnam after the 1955 South Vietnam referendum , ruled by Ngo Dinh Diem . A temporary boundary, running primarily along the Ben Hai River was established pending elections, with the area on either side of the border declared a demilitarized zone. Troops of both governments were barred from that area. After war between North and South Vietnam broke out in 1955 – one year after
7004-525: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
7107-559: The logistics lines between the North and the South he would have been able to press Hanoi into negotiations. In September 1966, McNamara presented the JASON group report to the Joint Chiefs. It split on the proposal with the service chiefs being against it, and general Earle Wheeler , a chairman of JCS, being in support. The JCS then handed the report off to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) Admiral Sharp , who wrote back that
7210-404: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
7313-403: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
7416-475: The physical barrier along the demilitarized zone on South Vietnam's side was ceased. The physical infrastructure created for the barrier was converted into a series of strong-points and support bases for the new strategy of mobile operations. This marked the end of the McNamara Line as an operational strategy. However, the barrier concept was reduced to an aerial, sensor-based electronic interdiction program which
7519-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
7622-594: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
7725-523: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
7828-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
7931-526: The proposal be implemented. Lieutenant General Alfred Starbird , director of the Defense Communications Agency, was appointed head of Task Force 728, which was to implement the project. Two days later, the JCS reported back favorably on the already-decided plan. Starbird had to complete the barrier by September 1967. In November 1966, McNamara officially recommended the barrier system to President Johnson for implementation. The construction budget
8034-524: The proposal which was submitted to McNamara in March 1966, who then passed it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for comments. The JCS response was that the proposal would still require an infeasible number of troops to be stationed along the barrier and would present difficult construction/logistical problems. Also in late 1965 or early 1966, Jerry Wiesner and George Kistiakowsky persuaded McNamara to support
8137-539: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
8240-408: The remote western areas of the border into Laos and would be a barrier of air interdiction, mine fields and electronic detection requiring minimal troops. While the JCS report had estimated the construction of a barrier would take up to four years, the JASON report suggested the barrier could be in place with available resources within a year. That was important to McNamara since he hoped that by cutting
8343-524: The reunification of Vietnam in 1976. The border between North and South Vietnam was 76.1 kilometers (47.3 mi) in length and ran from east to west near the middle of present-day Vietnam within Quang Tri province. Beginning in the west at the tripoint with Laos , it ran east in a straight line until reaching the village of Bo Ho Su on the Ben Hai River . The line then followed this river as it flowed in
8446-499: The signals and triggered artillery and bombers responses. The plans that were leaked to the media called for an inexpensive barbed wire fence with watch towers, and they were presented to the public as a trivial measure, while the electronic part was highly classified. In reality, the strong-point part of the anti-infiltration system in Quang Tri Province , Vietnam was reinforced with electronic sensors and gravel mines to stop
8549-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
8652-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
8755-519: The three agreements about French Indochina) was signed between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 21 July 1954. The agreement reflected the military situation on the ground: the northern part of Vietnam, which was almost entirely controlled by the Viet Minh, became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under the communist leader Ho Chi Minh . The southern part of Vietnam, where the Viet Minh controlled only relatively small and remote areas, became
8858-510: The truck routes coming from Laos was a success, but its counterpart for the foot trails was never deployed. Many special munitions ordered for the barrier turned out to be ineffective or simply failed. In 1969, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird testified in Congress that goals set for the anti-infiltration barrier were not met despite high cost. An official account of the Vietnam War, published in
8961-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
9064-509: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
9167-613: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
9270-429: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
9373-480: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
9476-454: Was an enormous multimillion project, which was nicknamed in the media as the Great Wall of Vietnam , McNamara's Wall , McNamara Barrier , Electric Fence , and Alarm Belt . USMC Engineers in early 1967 were ordered to bulldoze a strip to at least 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien . This became known by the Marines as The Trace . Construction began in the summer 1967 and
9579-603: Was announced on September 7, 1967. Construction was carried by the 3rd Marine Division . First, the 11th Engineers started to work on bulldozing the so-called Trace , a path 600 meter wide and 11 kilometers long that was stripped of trees, brush and villages if needed. The backbone of the strong-point system were fortified bases Alpha 2 at Gio Linh on the east, Alpha 4 at Con Thien on the west, and Alpha 3 in between. 7,578 American marines had been deployed in support of Dye Marker strong point/obstacle system by 1 November 1967. In addition, 4,080 American troops have been involved in
9682-451: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
9785-480: Was called Project Dye Marker . Further, it was also referred to as SPOS (Strong-point-obstacle-system), with two different components, Dump Truck (anti-vehicle) and Mud River (anti-personnel), which were collectively referred to as Muscle Shoals . On September 13, 1967, the project's Dye Marker name was switched to Muscle Shoals , and in June 1968 it was changed again, this time to Igloo White . Project Dye Marker
9888-495: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone The Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone was a demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel in Quang Tri province that
9991-497: Was estimated as $ 1.5 billion, and $ 740 million was allocated for the annual operating costs. The Practice Nine was adopted as the barrier project internal communication code name. On January 13, 1967, President Johnson authorized the construction, and it was assigned the highest national priority. In June 1967, an existence of Practice Nine was leaked to the press. The project was then renamed as Illinois City and in September it
10094-483: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
10197-435: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
10300-459: Was partially constructed by the American forces in 1967-1968 along the eastern portion of the demilitarized zone . An effective anti-infiltration barrier, running across South Vietnam deep into Laos , was a grand vision of the US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara , who feared that escalation of bombing can bring greater Chinese involvement, and a vital component of his operational strategy. It
10403-465: Was the dividing line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam from 22 July 1954 to 2 July 1976, when Vietnam was officially divided into the two military gathering areas, which was supposed to be sustained in the short term after the First Indochina War . During the Vietnam War (1955–1975) it became important as the battleground demarcation between communist North Vietnam and anti-communist South Vietnam. The zone de jure ceased to exist with
10506-485: Was then continued as Operation Igloo White . In his memoirs, Robert McNamara insisted that the barrier, or the system , as he chose to call it, was able to cut to a degree an infiltration rate of the NVA to South Vietnam. However, constructed segments turned out to be inefficient in stopping the NVA despite being costly to build and maintain. In March 1969, most of the strong points of the barrier manned by troops were abandoned. A system of sensors to provide surveillance of
10609-551: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
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