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105-578: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Hue–Da Nang Campaign was a series of military actions conducted by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during

210-461: A cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act , banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more grand strategic view than did

315-776: A centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies, while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See the protracted warfare model . Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by

420-457: A conventional, combined-arms conquest against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , and taking and holding land permanently. Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year: Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives: Even with these three approaches, there

525-540: A figurehead. COL Bùi Tín led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964. In February and March 1964, confirming

630-462: A graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or

735-592: A guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command . Today, officers from

840-523: A land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam. Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN II Corps Tactical Zone ), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over Highway 19 , splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation,

945-543: A matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from

1050-547: A maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh Tho government was overthrown. Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time,

1155-523: A meeting with President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu . In this meeting, Thiệu outlined his decision to abandon most of the provinces in I Corps, and ordered Trưởng to withdraw his forces towards the coastal regions of central Vietnam instead. In addition, the Airborne Division would be redeployed to the Mekong Delta region, where it could protect the nation's capital. Unwilling to concede the northern provinces to

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1260-681: A new defensive line from Qui Nhơn to cover the retreat of the ARVN 22nd Infantry Division , but they too were destroyed by the PAVN. By April 2, South Vietnam had lost control of the northern provinces, as well as two army corps. During the Huế–Da Nang Campaign of 1975, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (VC) forces were organised into three formations; the PAVN 2nd Corps , Tri Thien Military Zone, and Military Region 5 Command. The 2nd Corps fielded three infantry divisions ( 304th , 324B and 325C Divisions),

1365-406: A not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup: They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in

1470-417: A perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after the original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in 1963 , January 1964 , September 1964 , December 1964 , and 1965 all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the [North Vietnamese] Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it

1575-564: A political dau tranh argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in

1680-587: A report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics putting Lê Duẩn in charge and Ho becoming

1785-729: A response to PAVN attacks in his area of control. Meanwhile, the PAVN 2nd Army Corps continued their onslaught, with the 324th Division launching attacks on South Vietnamese positions on Núi Bong ( 16°17′10″N 107°44′31″E  /  16.286°N 107.742°E  / 16.286; 107.742 ) and Núi Mô Tau ( 16°18′25″N 107°39′36″E  /  16.307°N 107.66°E  / 16.307; 107.66 ) and on Hills 75, 76, 224 ( 16°16′30″N 107°44′49″E  /  16.275°N 107.747°E  / 16.275; 107.747 ), 273 ( 16°16′N 107°44′E  /  16.26°N 107.73°E  / 16.26; 107.73 ) and 303 all located near Phú Lộc , south of Huế and north of

1890-575: A section of Highway 1 north of Huế, and General Nguyen Huu An's 2nd Army Corps must secure Highway 1 south of the city, with the aim of isolating both Huế and Da Nang from the rest of the country. On the following day, Đồng's forces staged their attacks from two main directions, from Thanh Hoi and Tich Tuong-Nhu Le, moving along Route 68 and National Highway 1 respectively. The 2nd Corps, on the other hand, assaulted South Vietnamese positions in Phu Loc and Phu Gia. By 20:30 on March 18, most of northern Quảng Trị

1995-675: The Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the " Americanization " of joint warfare in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War . At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to

2100-489: The Marine Division (led by Major General Bui The Lan ) and the 11th, 12th, 14th and 15th Ranger Groups . The Airborne and Marine Divisions each had an assigned strength of four brigades. In addition to the infantry units, there were also the 5th Armoured Brigade, five squadrons of armored vehicles (4th, 7th, 11th, 17th and 20th Armored Squadrons), 13 armored companies, and 21 artillery battalions. Local defense in I Corps

2205-620: The Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive-General Uprising ) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it? Douglas Pike believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: Pike used Dien Bien Phu as an analogy for

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2310-618: The Vietnam War , also known in Vietnam as the American War. The campaign was centred on the cities of Huế ( Thừa Thiên-Huế Province ) and Da Nang ( Quảng Nam Province ), with secondary fronts in the provinces of Quảng Trị and Quảng Ngãi . The campaign began on March 5 and concluded on April 2, 1975. During the spring season of 1975, the PAVN High Command in Hanoi made the decision to seize

2415-522: The armed struggle ( dau trinh ) theory espoused by Võ Nguyên Giáp but opposed by the politically oriented Trường Chinh . Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been

2520-512: The center of gravity of the opposition. Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara , in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took

2625-400: The 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to

2730-476: The 2nd Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment, with support from the 27th and 37th Tank Squadrons, to mount a counter-attack on Hill 224. Over the period of one week, both sides fired over 8,000 rounds of artillery shells on Hill 224, and the RVNAF conducted over 60 bombing sorties in an attempt to halt the advances of the PAVN 2nd Corps. On March 13, amidst heavy fighting in the northern provinces, Trưởng flew to Saigon for

2835-493: The 2nd Division, the 141st Regiment, the 52nd Brigade, along with two artillery regiments (368th and 572nd Artillery Regiments) would coordinate their efforts with the VC 94th and 96th Local Force Regiments, and the 70th and 72nd Local Force Battalions. As part of their overall objective, they would tie down the ARVN 2nd Division , the 11th Armoured Squadron and the 912th Regional Force Company in Quảng Ngãi Province, and, if

2940-569: The 325th Division and 9th Regiment. In order to fool South Vietnamese intelligence agencies, the North Vietnamese moved tank and artillery units to Cua Viet, Thanh Hoi and Ai Tu to cover their main thrust. Between March 6 and 7, the VC 4th Local Force Battalion assaulted and overran Mai Linh and 11 other surrounding military sub-sectors in Quảng Trị Province. On the following day, General Lâm requested reinforcements from General Trưởng in Da Nang, as

3045-512: The 3rd Infantry Division, and all other units in Quảng Nam and Quảng Ngãi. On March 5, 1975, the PAVN 2nd Army Corps officially commenced its campaign against South Vietnamese forces of I Corps. The opening shots of the campaign was marked by an attack on South Vietnamese military convoys on the Hai Van Pass and the destruction of An Lo Bridge on Highway 1 , located north of Huế. Positions held by

3150-440: The 673rd Air-Defence Division, the 164th Artillery Brigade, the 203rd Armoured Regiment, the 219th Combat Engineers Brigade, and the 463rd Communications Regiment. The 2nd Corps was led by Major-General Nguyễn Hữu An , with Major-General Le Linh as Political Commissar. Colonel Hoang Dan was the deputy commander, and Colonel Nguyen Cong Trang was the deputy political commissar. Led by Major-General Lê Tự Đồng  [ vi ] ,

3255-542: The ARVN 12th Ranger Group were captured after four hours of fighting. At 09:00 on March 10, PAVN soldiers of the 368th Artillery Regiment dragged 12 pieces of artillery which included 85mm, 105mm and 122mm guns onto the top of Nui Vu and Han Thon, and aimed their guns directly on Hill 211 and the administrative centre of Tien Phuoc , to support the 31st Regiment attacking those areas. At 13:30, following two failed counter-attacks, South Vietnamese units in Phuoc Lam deserted from

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3360-525: The ARVN 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments were destroyed after two hours of heavy fighting, while the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalions (from the ARVN 12th Ranger Group) in the outskirts of the city simply fled from the battlefield. At 10:00 on March 24, PAVN and VC soldiers of the 2nd Division, the ‘Ba Gia’ Regiment, and the 31st Regiment successfully captured Tam Kỳ. Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963%E2%80%931969 Anti-Communist forces: Communist forces: United States : 409,111 (1969) During

3465-496: The ARVN 913th Regional Force at Dong Ong Do and Hill 368 also came under attack, as Phu Bai Airbase was subjected to intense artillery bombardment. While the South Vietnamese were busy dealing with those attacks, General Nguyen Huu An secretly redeployed the 325th Division and the 9th Regiment of the 304th Division, from Quảng Trị towards Huế in the south. The 46th and 271st Regiments then moved into positions previously held by

3570-452: The December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S. action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which

3675-463: The Hai Van Pass. By March 10, the 1st Battalion, 54th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division was destroyed on Hills 224 and 273; the ARVN 47th Armoured Squadron was overrun by the PAVN 1st Regiment, 324th Division, on Mount Nghe; and the ARVN 113th Regional Force Battalion conceded Pho Lai to the PAVN 4th Regiment, which was supported by the 223rd Artillery Regiment. Thi then ordered the 15th Ranger Group and

3780-505: The Huế–Da Nang Campaign, the PAVN 2nd Army Corps had successfully captured several important base areas that surrounded South Vietnamese units in Quảng Trị Province and Thừa Thiên Province. Those areas included Đông Hà – Ái Tử to the north, Khe Sanh -Ba Long to the west, and A Lưới -Nam Dong in southern Huế. The main body of the 304th Division and the 3rd Regiment, 324th Division, had assembled in Nong Son and Thường Đức to attack Da Nang from

3885-510: The Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents . An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency , Agency for International Development , and United States Army Special Forces . Roughly until mid-1965,

3990-420: The North Vietnamese were building up for offensive operations in the tri-border region and numerous B-52 strikes had been conducted in the area in hopes of slowing the build-up. ARVN forces had also been deployed forward toward the border in order to slow the PAVN advance and allow the application of airpower to deplete North Vietnamese manpower and logistics. The Bình Định offensive, however, threw General Du into

4095-485: The PAVN 325th Division captured Mui Ne, Phuoc Tuong , and encircled Tu Hien located south of Huế. In the north, the VC 4th, 46th and 271st Regiments pursued a retreating South Vietnamese formation consisted of the 147th Marine Brigade, the 14th Ranger Group, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division and the 17th Armoured Squadron, heading towards Thuận An. At 16:30 on March 23, the PAVN 101st Regiment, 325th Division overran Luong Dien and surrounded Phu Bai Airbase, to close

4200-505: The PAVN 6th Regiment launched several attacks on Chuc Meo, La Son, Hill 300 and Hill 511 located west of Huế, forcing elements of the ARVN 1st Infantry Division to pull back towards Dong Tranh and Binh Dien. On March 17, the PAVN High Command predicted that South Vietnamese units could withdraw into the cities of Huế and Da Nang, so the following orders were issued to PAVN field commanders: General Lê Tự Đồng 's forces were to capture Phu Bai Air Base to prevent aerial transportation, and cut off

4305-605: The PAVN claimed to have captured large numbers of South Vietnamese prisoners and military hardware. In all, a total of 58,722 South Vietnamese soldiers became prisoners of war, with one colonel and 18 lieutenant-colonels amongst the ranks, as well as about 14,000 South Vietnamese government officials and employees, who reported to the PAVN authorities. The South Vietnamese military in Huế also surrendered vast quantities of weaponry, which included 140 tanks and armoured vehicles. Beginning at 04:30 on March 10, PAVN and VC forces proceeded to capture

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4410-497: The PAVN created its first division headquarters, under then-brigadier general Chu Huy Man . This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the United States Marine Corps at Da Nang , and then the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) , the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the air assault capability of

4515-560: The PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN. It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called

4620-519: The PAVN. However, between March 14 and 15, the ARVN 2nd Infantry Regiment was forced to turn back from Tam Kỳ to deal with an attack on Thang Binh, by the VC 70th and 72nd Local Force Battalions. In southern Quảng Ngãi, the VC 94th Local Force Regiment attacked Binh Son , cut off a section of Highway 1 near Chau O, and the ARVN 4th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division was pinned down trying to deal with VC attacks. Thus, South Vietnamese attempts to stage an effective counter-attack were quickly blunted by

4725-476: The President that most South Vietnamese units were still intact and that they still had the time to recapture lost territories, and secondly, Trưởng did not want to create confusion amongst his subordinates, when the military situation in I Corps was still under control. Thus, Trưởng reorganised his defences in order to deal with the threat posed by PAVN formations located south of I Corps; he designated Da Nang to be

4830-620: The Regional and Popular Forces. Those forces were equipped with 449 tanks and armored vehicles, 418 artillery pieces, 64 M42 Duster light air-defense weapons, 373 aircraft of different types, and 165 naval vessels of different sizes. In combination with the ‘Ly Thuong Kiet Military Plan’ and experiences gained during the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive , Trưởng organised the defenses of I Corps into three phases, to be staged from three different areas. The first phase, known as

4935-552: The Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis. Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging

5040-453: The SVN-US strategy still focused around pacification in South Vietnam , but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of pacification . The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take

5145-464: The South Vietnamese 2nd Infantry Division and the 12th Ranger Group was overstretched between Quảng Ngãi and Hội An , with Tam Kỳ only defended by the ARVN 5th Infantry Regiment and one battalion from the ARVN 4th Infantry Regiment, PAVN General Chu Huy Mân decided to utilise the advantage to capture Tam Kỳ. Beginning at 05:30 on March 21, the PAVN 2nd Division attacked Suoi Da, the last South Vietnamese outpost outside Tam Kỳ. At around midday, Nhựt ordered

5250-420: The South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until the election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization , or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with

5355-435: The South Vietnamese to regroup in order to stage a counter-attack, in the scenario that enemy forces managed to overcome the ‘orange phase’. In the final phase, or the ‘blue phases’, require South Vietnamese units to secure their areas of defence, then destroy and push enemy forces out of I Corps. Trưởng's areas of defence were centred on Tri Thien-Huế, Da Nang, and Quảng Nam-Quảng Ngãi. The task of holding Tri Thien and Huế

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5460-463: The South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position. It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment." The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of

5565-667: The Tri Thien Military Zone had three infantry regiments (4th, 46th and 271st Regiments), and two battalions (the 21st Independent Battalion and the 6th Local Force Battalion). Military Region 5 had one infantry division ( 2nd Division ), which was supported by the 141st Regiment (from the 3rd Division ), the 52nd Independent Brigade, two artillery regiments (368th and 572nd Artillery Regiments), two local battalions (70th and 72nd Local Force Battalions), and two local regiments (94th and 96th Local Force Regiments). North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units of Military Region 5 were placed under

5670-476: The U.S. and South Vietnam with a protracted warfare model , in their concept of dau tranh , or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. Following the Tet Offensive and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to

5775-475: The U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG , under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on

5880-623: The U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from the people, but from the United States. The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem

5985-595: The VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only

6090-465: The VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it

6195-412: The allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while the anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive , a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of

6300-470: The battlefield. In the meantime, however, South Vietnamese troops in Tien Phuoc held their ground with support from two A-37 bombers, after South Vietnamese commanders on the ground had called for reinforcement from Chu Lai . By 16:00, Tien Phuoc was captured by the PAVN 2nd Division. Due to the loss of Tien Phuoc and Phouc Lam, the ARVN 916th Regional Force Battalion retreated from the area. Thus, Tam Kỳ ,

6405-523: The capital of Quảng Tin Province, was threatened to be overrun by the PAVN. On March 11, Trưởng ordered Nhựt to mobilise the 2nd Division, the 12th Ranger Group, elements of the 11th Armoured Squadron and one regional force battalion to mount a counter-attack from Tuan Duong to Cam Khe and Duong Con. Trưởng also ordered the ARVN 2nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division to depart from Da Nang, and protect Tam Kỳ, so that Nhựt's forces could be freed up to fight

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6510-476: The city. South Vietnamese military forces in Huế and Da Nang belonged to the ARVN I Corps Tactical Zone. Commanded by Lieutenant General Ngô Quang Trưởng , the South Vietnamese I Corps was considered to be the strongest amongst all the military formations of South Vietnam. It had three infantry divisions ( 1st , 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions), the Airborne Division (led by Major General Le Quang Luong ),

6615-470: The coastal areas of I Corps. The South Vietnamese withdrawal quickly turned into a rout, as the PAVN 2nd Army Corps picked off one South Vietnamese unit after another, until Huế and Da Nang were completely surrounded. By March 29, 1975, PAVN troops had full control of Huế and Da Nang, while South Vietnam lost all territories and most of the units belonging to I Corps. On March 31, ARVN General Phạm Văn Phú —commander of II Corps Tactical Zone —attempted to form

6720-447: The combined PAVN/VC forces in Quảng Ngãi Province. Recognising that he no longer had the manpower to mount a counter-attack, Nhựt ordered his troops to abandon Tra Bong and Son Ha, and concentrate his units in Tam Kỳ and Chu Lai instead. Following the failed counter-attack, South Vietnamese forces in I Corps were further weakened when Thiệu pulled the Airborne Division back to Saigon. Now that

6825-575: The command of Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao, commander of the B-3 Front. The Front included the 320th and 2nd PAVN Divisions in the highlands and the 3rd PAVN Division in the lowlands – approximately 50,000 men. Arrayed against them in II Corps were the South Vietnamese 22nd and 23rd Divisions , two armored cavalry squadrons, and the 2nd Airborne Brigade, all under the command of Lieutenant General Ngo Du . It had become evident as early as January that

6930-488: The department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here. William Westmoreland , and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor , rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by

7035-561: The end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in the South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and

7140-455: The enemy, Trưởng tried unsuccessfully to convince Thiệu to reverse his decision in the belief that he could hold onto I Corps, and recapture lost territories by using the Airborne and Marine Corps Divisions. After he returned to his headquarters that afternoon, Trưởng decided to redeploy his forces instead of carrying out Thiệu's order straightaway, for several reasons. Firstly, he wanted to convince

7245-547: The following targets: the PAVN 38th Regiment overran the highpoints of Nui Vu, Nui Ngoc, Duong Con, Soui Da and Nui Vy; the 36th Regiment destroyed South Vietnamese strong points at Trung Lien, Mount Da, Mount Khong ten, Ho Bach and Hill-215; the VC ‘Ba Gia’ Regiment held their positions on Hill-269 and Hill-310, to stop South Vietnamese counter-attacks from Tuan Duong ; while the 52nd Independent Brigade captured Go Han, Phuoc Tien, Duong Ong Luu, Duong Huế, Nui My, Hon Nhon, Deo Lieu, and Mount Đất Đỏ. Thus, 23 positions held by units of

7350-666: The incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these. Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the United States Intelligence Community in late May, on the assumption The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on

7455-496: The lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse

7560-496: The main centre of South Vietnamese defence in I Corps, with Tri Thien in the north, and with Quảng Nam and Quảng Ngãi in the south. To make up for the loss of the Airborne Division, Trưởng ordered the 369th Marine Brigade to replace the 3rd Airborne Brigade in Quảng Nam Province, and the 258th Marine Brigade to take over from the 2nd Airborne Brigade on Mount Phu Gia, located north of Hai Van. Meanwhile, between March 13 and 15,

7665-407: The main corridor leading into Huế from the south. Simultaneously, the VC 46th Regiment destroyed South Vietnamese defences on Bo River, captured the districts of Quang Dien, Quang Loi and Hương Can and secured the main roads on the outskirts of northern Huế. Between March 24 and 25, the PAVN 3rd and 101st Regiments continued their drive towards Huế, after they successfully captured Phu Bai Airbase. At

7770-530: The major South Vietnamese cities of Huế and Da Nang, and also destroy the various South Vietnamese units in I Corps Tactical Zone , led by ARVN General Ngô Quang Trưởng . Originally, the campaign was planned to take place over two phases; during the seasons of spring-summer and autumn. However, as the North Vietnamese forces rolled over South Vietnamese defences on the outskirts of Huế and Da Nang, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ordered General Trưởng to abandon all territories under his control, and pull his forces back to

7875-640: The next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing 50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem. After Diem's fall in November 1963 , INR saw the priority during this period as more

7980-431: The northern regions of I Corps. Subsequently, Trưởng sent out the following orders: the 480th Marine Brigade to leave Da Nang and to guard the north-western flank of Huế; the 1st Infantry Division, the 15th Ranger Group and the 7th Tank Squadron to protect south-western Huế; and the 258th Marine Brigade and the 914th Regional Force Battalion were to secure a section of Highway 1 which connected Huế with Da Nang. While Trưởng

8085-439: The opportunity arose, they would also capture Bình Định Province and the city of Qui Nhơn . In the final phase of their operation, the PAVN and VC would cut off Da Nang from the surrounding regions which made up I Corps Tactical Zone, and prevent reinforcements from retaking the city. Then, depending on the situation, the PAVN would organize an attack to capture the major South Vietnamese army, navy and air force installations in

8190-547: The organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , who had been

8295-479: The responsibility of Major-General Chu Huy Mân, with Vo Chi Cong as political commissar. On February 21, 1975, PAVN field commanders from Tri-Thien Military Zone and the 2nd Army Corps held a conference to establish their objectives, which were planned to occur in two phases; the spring-summer phase that would begin in March and probably conclude in May, and the autumn phase to last from July to August 1975. The PAVN objective

8400-411: The rest of the 4th Infantry Regiment out from Quảng Ngãi in an attempt to hold Tam Kỳ, so South Vietnamese defences in that province was further weakened. Again, taking advantage of the situation, Mân ordered the 52nd Independent Brigade and the 94th Local Force Regiment to attack Quảng Ngãi. By 07:00 on March 24, the cities of Tam Kỳ and Quảng Ngãi were simultaneously attacked by PAVN/VC forces. In Tam Kỳ,

8505-469: The same time, elements of the K5 Special Forces Battalion destroyed Thua Luu Bridge, which connected a stretch of road on Highway 1 between Huế and Da Nang, forcing thousands of South Vietnamese civilian and military vehicles heading towards Da Nang to turn back. The ARVN 20th Tank Squadron was then sent out to reopen Highway 1, but was defeated by the PAVN 203rd Armoured Regiment. In light of

8610-471: The same time, the 1st Regiment, 324th Division along with the VC 4th and 271st Regiments were able to destroy the last elements of the 147th Marine Brigade and the 15th Ranger Group, before they could board navy vessels anchored off the shores of Hương Thuy, Luong Thien and Ke Sung and Cu Lai. By the evening of March 25, the PAVN had secured all major points surrounding Huế, and South Vietnamese units that failed to escape were completely surrounded. Consequently,

8715-500: The south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by Trần Văn Trà . Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. Pike described it as consistent with

8820-578: The southern part of our country." II Corps (South Vietnam) II Corps became operational in April 1958. One notable ARVN unit of II Corps, the 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron , earned the Presidential Unit Citation (United States) . The 21st Tank Regiment was formed at Pleiku in 1972. The objective of the North Vietnamese forces during the third phase of the Nguyen Hue Offensive

8925-578: The special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before

9030-429: The successful PAVN maneuver in 1975. The resulting campaign is called the Battle of Ia Drang , with a followup at the Battle of Bong Son , but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to air assault , and used obvious helicopters to cause

9135-441: The third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the Tet Offensive never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of Nguyễn Chí Thanh , who commanded forces in

9240-528: The use of nuclear weapons. Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to

9345-689: The west. In Military Region 5, the 2nd Division had established its positions in Tiên Phước , Tra My and Trà Bồng in Quảng Ngãi Province , and Đắk Tô and Tân Cảnh in Kon Tum Province . Once Huế had been isolated, Military Region 5 Command would initiate the Tin-Ngai Campaign from the provinces of Quảng Tin and Quảng Ngãi, to isolate Da Nang from the Central Highlands . PAVN units such as

9450-476: The worsening military situation on the evening of March 22, Trưởng authorised Thi to pull his forces back to Da Nang. However, as the main roads were blocked by the PAVN, Thi's only option was to use a coastal corridor between Thuận An and Tu Hien, and board transport vessels belonging to the 106th Navy Squadron and head back to Da Nang. On the morning of March 23, the PAVN 324th Division advanced through Hill-303 and Núi Mô Tau, and assaulted northern Phu Loc, while

9555-504: The ‘orange phase’, was considered to be the most important because it provided South Vietnamese units in I Corps with a platform to stop enemy attacks, and even attack them if necessary. To accomplish the objectives of the ‘orange phase’, Trưởng placed several elite combat units such as the Ranger groups and armoured forces on constant combat alert. The second phase, known as the ‘green phase’, was designed to delay enemy forces and buy more time for

9660-617: Was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along. For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near U Minh Forest ), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC. Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In

9765-407: Was entrusted to the 1st Division, the 4th and 15th Ranger Groups, the 913th and 914th Regional Forces Companies, the 17th and 20th Armoured Squadrons, 10 artillery battalions, one squadron of helicopters, two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, and one coastal patrol squadron. Those forces were commanded by Lieutenant general Lâm Quang Thi . Da Nang was under the direct responsibility of Trưởng. It

9870-457: Was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year: Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General Victor Krulak , on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered

9975-485: Was home of the 3rd Division, the 4th and 7th Armoured Squadrons, the 11th and 14th Ranger Groups, the 911th Regional Force Company, the 1st Air Force Division, one coastal patrol squadron and two riverine squadrons. Quảng Tin and Quảng Ngãi was held by the 2nd Division, the 12th Ranger Group, the 11th Armoured Squadron, three artillery battalions, the 912th Regional Force Company, one coastal patrol squadron and one riverine squadron. Brigadier-General Trần Văn Nhựt commanded

10080-535: Was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon . This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the CIA allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. OPPLAN 34A

10185-463: Was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." Robert McNamara suggests that the overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh , in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and

10290-415: Was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Trường Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in

10395-552: Was provided by 50 battalions and five companies of Regional and Popular Forces, and six companies of military police. Support for ground forces in the area came in the form of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) 1st Air Force Division (commanded by Brigadier-General Nguyen Van Khanh), with two Republic of Vietnam Navy squadrons operating on the coast and another two along the rivers. Overall, I Corps fielded about 134,000 soldiers; 84,000 were regular soldiers and 50,000 belonged to

10500-546: Was still busy reorganising South Vietnamese units in I Corps, on March 20 the Tri Thien Command finalised their plan to capture Huế, with the objective of preventing South Vietnamese forces from regrouping there. At 14:30 on the same day, Thiệu phoned the ARVN I Corps Headquarters and ordered Trưởng to defend only Da Nang due to the lack of resources. Beginning at 05:40 on March 21, the PAVN 325th and 324th Divisions attacked South Vietnamese units positioned astride Highway 1. At

10605-484: Was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson ; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: To pacify

10710-548: Was to seize the cities of Kon Tum and Pleiku, thereby overrunning the Central Highlands. This would then open the possibility of proceeding east to the coastal plains, splitting South Vietnam in two. The highlands offensive was preceded by NLF diversionary operations that opened on 5 April in coastal Bình Định Province, which aimed at closing Highway 1, seizing several ARVN firebases, and diverting South Vietnamese forces from operations further west. The North Vietnamese were under

10815-477: Was to take control of Quảng Trị Province, isolate the city of Huế and, if the opportunity presented itself, capture the entire Tri Thien-Huế area. To isolate Huế, the PAVN 2nd Army Corps would move against their target from the north-west direction along Route 12 down to the south-west along Highway 14, thereby isolating the region from South Vietnamese forces in II Corps Tactical Zone . In preparation for

10920-500: Was under North Vietnamese control. ARVN Colonel Do Ky , also the provincial chief of Quảng Trị Province, tried to lead what was left of his troops back to Huế but was pursued by the North Vietnamese along National Highway 1 until they reached An Lo . As the fighting in Quảng Trị unfolded, Trưởng flew back from Saigon where he tried to obtain approval from Thiệu for his new defensive plan, and hastily reorganised South Vietnamese defences in

11025-425: Was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer. There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 10 million. It

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