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105-509: Its membership reached hundreds by the late 1930s. In May 1941, after the German invasion , DeVlag started receiving financial backing from the SS , and was reorganized into a Nazi organization. This was first done in secrecy. German SS- Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger was later appointed as DeVlag's president, and the bond between the two organizations was thus made official. DeVlag's orientation towards

210-738: A German dialect and the Flemish people a part of the German race. DeVlag saw Dutch or Flemish nationalism as provincialism , and supported the outright annexation of Flanders into the Greater German Reich . The VNV also had partly clerical roots, while the SS ideology endorsed by DeVlag held anti-Christian notions. While DeVlag was supported by the SS and worked closely with the Germaansche SS in Vlaanderen ,

315-608: A French strike at Germany's Ruhr area using Belgium as a spring-board in October 1930 and again in January 1933. Belgium feared it would be drawn into a war regardless, and sought to avoid that eventuality. The Belgians also feared being drawn into a war as a result of the French–Soviet pact of May 1935 . The Franco-Belgian agreement stipulated Belgium was to mobilise if the Germans did, but what

420-567: A German attack on the country. The Belgians, recognising the danger posed by the Germans, secretly made their own defence policies, troop movement information, communications, fixed defence dispositions, intelligence and air reconnaissance arrangements available to the French military attaché in Brussels . Officially, the Belgian government retained a suspicious posture towards France, considering them as equal

525-489: A German invasion as inevitable and were determined that if an invasion did take place it would be effectively resisted by new fortifications such as Eben Emael . The Belgians had taken measures to reconstruct their defences along their border with Germany upon Adolf Hitler 's rise to power in January 1933. The Belgian government had watched with increasing alarm the German withdrawal from the League of Nations , its repudiation of

630-552: A Soldier 1950, published in English as Panzer Leader ) according to the second hypothesis, posing as a lone voice against the reactionary German officer corps. In 2006, Adam Tooze wrote that the quick victory in France was not the consequence of a logical strategic synthesis but a "risky improvisation" to cope with strategic dilemmas that Hitler and the German military leaders had been unable to overcome before February 1940. Tooze wrote that

735-499: A bill to require longer military service and training was rejected on the basis that it would increase Belgium's military commitments, perhaps in conflicts far from home. King Leopold III made a speech on 14 October 1936 before the Council of Ministers to persuade the people and their government that Belgium's defences needed strengthening. He outlined three main military points for Belgium's increased rearmament: a) German rearmament and

840-614: A danger to Belgian sovereignty as the Third Reich. French forces were not allowed to enter Belgium, even when the German plans to invade became imminent. The Allied plan to aid Belgium was the Dyle Plan ; the cream of the Allied forces, including French armoured divisions , would advance to the Dyle river in response to a German invasion. The choice of an established Allied line lay in either reinforcing

945-465: A decisive victory over France. Manstein first thought to follow annihilation theory ( Vernichtungsgedanke ), envisaging a swing from Sedan to the north, rapidly to destroy the Allied armies in a cauldron battle ( Kesselschlacht ). When discussing his intentions with Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Heinz Guderian , the commander of the XIX Panzer Corps , Guderian proposed to avoid

1050-753: A force totaling some 600,000 men. Belgian reserves may have been able to field 900,000 men. The Army lacked armour and anti-aircraft guns. After the completion of the Belgian Army's mobilisation, it could muster five regular corps and two reserve army corps consisting of 12 regular infantry divisions, two divisions of Chasseurs Ardennais , six reserve infantry divisions, one brigade of cyclist Frontier Guards, one cavalry corps of two divisions, and one brigade of motorised cavalry. The Army contained two anti-aircraft artillery and four artillery regiments, and an unknown number of fortress, engineer, and signals force personnel. The Belgian Naval Corps ( Corps de Marine )

1155-409: A gradual adoption during the thirties of technologically-advanced military equipment and integration into existing Bewegungskrieg thought, familiar to all the great powers prior to 1940, differences being variations on a theme. The invasion of Poland was not "Blitzkrieg but an annihilation battle fought according to Vernichtungsgedanke " (annihilation theory). The lack of Blitzkrieg elements in

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1260-500: A longer campaign. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority but suffered far greater losses than the army. Operations on 10 May cost the Luftwaffe 347 aircraft and by the end of the month 30 per cent of its aircraft had been written off and 13 per cent badly damaged. The concentration of units in the Ardennes was an extraordinary gamble and had the Allied air forces bombed the columns,

1365-410: A quick victory, there is little evidence to support Fuller and that if the military theory later labelled Blitzkrieg was influential in the German officer corps, only those like Manstein and Guderian had fully accepted it. The disagreement between Kleist and Guderian that led Guderian to resign on 17 May, showed the apprehensions of the German high command about the speed of movement and vulnerability of

1470-534: A transliteration of the English Operation Sickle Cut ), was the war plan of the German armed forces ( Wehrmacht ) for the Battle of France in 1940. The original invasion plan was an awkward compromise devised by General Franz Halder , the chief of staff of Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, Army High Command) that satisfied no one. Documents with details of the plan fell into Belgian hands during

1575-582: A truck or by a fully tracked armoured utilitie B-tractor. One report states that a round from a 47 mm gun went straight through a Sd kfz 231 and penetrated the armour of the Panzer IV behind it. These Belgian guns were better than the 25 mm and 37 mm guns of, respectively, the French and the Germans. The Belgians began mobilisation on 25 August 1939 and by May 1940 mounted a field army of 18 infantry divisions, two divisions of partly motorised Chasseurs Ardennais and two motorised cavalry divisions,

1680-507: The Blitzkrieg elements provided and executed by Guderian. The influence of Fuller and Liddell Hart in Germany was limited and exaggerated by them after the war; no explicit Blitzkrieg doctrine can be found in pre-war German army records. German tank production had no priority and plans for the German war economy were based on the premise of a long war, not a swift victory. The hypothesis allows for

1785-735: The Luftwaffe bases to engage in strategic offensive operations against the United Kingdom in the coming conflict. However, the British government paid little attention to the concerns of the Belgians. The lack of this commitment ensured the Belgian withdrawal from the Western Alliance , the day before the remilitarisation of the Rhineland . The lack of opposition to the remilitarisation served to convince

1890-646: The 18 Days' Campaign ( French : Campagne des 18 jours ; Dutch : Achttiendaagse Veldtocht ), formed part of the larger Battle of France , an offensive campaign by Germany during the Second World War . It took place over 18 days in May 1940 and ended with the German occupation of Belgium following the surrender of the Belgian Army . On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded Luxembourg , the Netherlands , and Belgium under

1995-460: The 1er with 60 aircraft, the 2ème with 53 aircraft, and the 3ème with 79 aircraft. The Belgians were afforded substantial support by the French Army. The French 1st Army included General René Prioux 's Cavalry Corps. The corps was given the 2nd Light Mechanized Division (2 Division Légère Mécanique, or 2 DLM) and the 3rd Light Mechanized Division (3 DLM), which were allocated to defend

2100-502: The 25th Motorised Infantry Division (25 Division d'Infanterie Motorisée, or 25 DIM) and the 9th Motorised Infantry Division (9 DIM). This force would advance to Breda in the Netherlands. Manstein Plan Asia-Pacific Mediterranean and Middle East Other campaigns Coups The Manstein plan or Case Yellow ( German : Fall Gelb ; also known after the war as Unternehmen Sichelschnitt

2205-581: The Battle of Boulogne and the Siege of Calais , only temporarily being halted by orders from Hitler on 17, 22 and 24 May. After the halt orders the panzer forces advanced to the North Sea coast and fought the Battle of Dunkirk . The Manstein plan devastated the Allies , whose armies were cut in two, those in the north being encircled by Army Groups A and B, leading to the surrender of the Belgian Army and Operation Dynamo ,

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2310-448: The Belgian combat vehicles included 200 T-13 tank destroyers . These had excellent 47 mm antitank guns and coaxial FN30 machine guns in turrets. The Belgians also possessed 42 T-15s . They were officially described as armoured cars but were actually fully tracked tanks with 13.2 mm turret machine guns . The standard Belgian anti-tank gun was the 47 mm FRC , towed either by

2415-623: The British Expeditionary Force (BEF), along with many Belgian and French soldiers, to escape capture and continue military operations. France reached its own armistice with Germany in June 1940. Belgium was occupied by the Germans until the autumn of 1944, when it was liberated by the Western Allies. The Belgian strategy for a defence against German aggression faced political as well as military problems. In terms of military strategy ,

2520-460: The Gembloux gap . The armoured forces consisted of 176 of the formidable SOMUA S35s and 239 Hotchkiss H35 light tanks. Both of these types, in armour and firepower, were superior to most German types. The 3 DLM contained 90 S35s and some 140 H35s alone. The French 7th Army was assigned to protect the northernmost part of the Allied front. It contained the 1st Light Mechanized Division (1 DLM),

2625-571: The Mechelen incident on 10 January 1940 and the plan was revised several times, each giving more emphasis to an attack by Army Group A through the Ardennes , which progressively reduced the offensive by Army Group B through the Low Countries to a diversion. In the final version of the plan, the main effort of the German invasion was made against the Ardennes, the weakest part of the Allied line, where

2730-656: The North African Campaign and the Eastern Front . The battle also included the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael , the first strategic airborne operation using paratroopers ever attempted. The German official history stated that in the 18 days of bitter fighting, the Belgian Army were tough opponents, and spoke of the "extraordinary bravery" of its soldiers. The Belgian collapse forced the Allied withdrawal from continental Europe. The British Royal Navy subsequently evacuated Belgian ports during Operation Dynamo , allowing

2835-732: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation of the Locarno Treaties . The government modernised fortifications at Namur and Liège , and established new lines of defence along the Maastricht – 's-Hertogenbosch canal, joining the Meuse, the Scheldt and the Albert Canal. Protection of the eastern frontier, based mainly on destroying a number of roads, was entrusted to new formations (frontier cyclist units and

2940-478: The geostrategic position of Germany seemed so hopeless. Two of the most prominent were Hitler and Halder; Hitler had not liked Halder's original plans and had suggested many alternatives, some of them bearing a resemblance to the Manstein plan, the closest being a proposal made by him on 25 October 1939. Soon, Nazi propaganda began to claim that the victory was a result of Hitler's military genius; Hitler said, Of all

3045-502: The Albert Canal from Antwerp to Liège and the Meuse from Liège to Namur, which was to be held long enough to allow French and British troops to occupy the line Antwerp–Namur– Givet . It was anticipated that the forces of the guarantor Powers would be in action on the third day of an invasion. (b) Withdrawal to the Antwerp–Namur position. (c) The Belgian Army was to hold the sector–excluding Leuven , but including Antwerp–as part of

3150-605: The Allied First Army Group into central Belgium, while Army Group A conducted the surprise assault through the Ardennes. Belgium was to act as a secondary front. Army Group B was given only limited numbers of armoured and mobile units, while the vast majority of the army group comprised infantry divisions. After the English Channel was reached, all Panzer division units and most motorised infantry were removed from Army Group B and given to Army Group A, to strengthen

3255-468: The Allies and the Germans had no interest in acknowledging the importance of improvisation and chance in the sensational victory of 1940. The fabrication of a Blitzkrieg Myth was convenient for the Allies to hide the incompetence that had led to their defeat. Rather than resort to technological determinism , German propaganda emphasised the machinery of the German army and that of the Allies, juxtaposing it with

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3360-583: The Belgians in defending Belgium's eastern borders, which would allow it to stop a German attack well forward of the French border. The French were dependent on cooperation from the Belgians. Such a situation deprived the French of any prepared defences in Belgium to forestall an attack, a situation which the French had wanted to avoid as it meant engaging the German Panzer divisions in a mobile battle. The French considered invading Belgium immediately in response to

3465-512: The Belgians in the east of the country, at the Meuse – Albert Canal line, and holding the Scheldt Estuary , thus linking the French defences in the south with the Belgian forces protecting Ghent and Antwerp , seemed to be the soundest defensive strategy. The weakness of the plan was that it abandoned most of eastern Belgium to the Germans. Militarily it would put the Allied rear at right angles to

3570-426: The Belgians that France and Britain were unwilling to fight for their own strategic interests, let alone Belgium's. The Belgian General Staff was determined to fight for its own interests, alone if necessary. The French government was infuriated at King Leopold III 's open declaration of neutrality in October 1936. The French Army saw its strategic assumptions undermined; it could no longer expect cooperation from

3675-577: The Belgians were unwilling to stake everything on a linear defence of the Belgian–German border, in an extension of the Maginot Line . Such a move would leave the Belgians vulnerable to a German assault in their rear, through an attack on the Netherlands . Such a strategy would also rely on the French to move quickly into Belgium and support the garrison there. Belgium was wary of continuing its alliance with France. Marshal Philippe Pétain had suggested

3780-559: The Brussels–Ghent gap supporting the Belgian Army, holding the main defensive positions, some 20 kilometres (12 mi) east of Brussels. The main defensive position ringing Antwerp would be protected by the Belgians, barely 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the city. The French 7th Army was to reach the Zeeland or Breda, just inside the Dutch border. The French would then be in a position to protect

3885-452: The Channel after five days, encircling the Allied armies. The Germans gradually reduced the pocket of Allied forces, forcing them back to the sea. The Belgian Army surrendered on 28 May 1940, ending the battle. The Battle of Belgium included the first tank battle of the war, the Battle of Hannut . It was the largest tank battle in history at the time but was later surpassed by the battles of

3990-543: The Dutch Army to the north, in the Breda variant of Plan D , the Allied deployment plan. The Manstein plan has often been called Operation Sichelschnitt, a transliteration of "sickle cut", a catchy expression used after the events by Winston Churchill . After the war, German generals adopted the term, which led to a misunderstanding that this was the official name of the plan or at least of the attack by Army Group A. The German name

4095-470: The Dutch border were the targets. Failure to capture the bridges would leave Walter von Reichenau 's German 6th Army , the southernmost army of Group B, trapped in the Maastricht-Albert Canal enclave and subject to the fire of Eben-Emael. The fort had to be captured or destroyed. Adolf Hitler summoned Lieutenant-General Kurt Student of the 7. Flieger-Division (7th Air Division) to discuss

4200-506: The Fiats, Hurricanes, and Battles had been delivered. The shortage of modern types meant single-seat versions of the Fairey Fox light bomber were being used as fighters. The AéMI possessed 250 combat aircraft. At least 90 were fighters, 12 were bombers and 12 were reconnaissance aircraft. Only 50 were of reasonably modern standard. When liaison and transport aircraft from all services are included,

4305-674: The Flemish wing of the Hitler Youth . DeVlag reached a peak of 50,000 members in 1943. In late 1944, the Nazi leadership answered the demands of DeVlag by annexing Flanders and Wallonia into the German Reich, but this was more theoretical than actual, as Belgium had already been liberated by the advancing Allied forces. Van de Wiele was, however, given the title " National Leader of the Flemish people" ( Landsleider van het Vlaamsche volk ) and DeVlag

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4410-630: The French Ninth Army (General André Corap ). XV Corps moved through the upper Ardennes towards Dinant, with two panzer divisions, as a flank guard against a counter-attack from the north. From 10 to 11 May, XIX Panzer Corps engaged the two cavalry divisions of the Second Army, surprised them with a far larger force than expected and forced them back. The Ninth Army, to the north, had also sent its two cavalry divisions forward, which were withdrawn on 12 May, before they met German troops. Corap needed

4515-586: The French and British of their concerns. They feared that the Dyle plan would put not just the Belgian strategic position in danger, but also the entire left wing of the Allied front. King Leopold and General Raoul Van Overstraeten , the King's aide de camp , warned Gamelin and the French Army command of their concerns on 8 March and 14 April. They were ignored. The Belgian plan, in the event of German aggression [italics in original] provided for: (a) A delaying position along

4620-410: The French failure was caused by an inadequate military system and that this had much to do with the success of the German invasion. The French had prepared to fight a methodical battle based on massed firepower, against an opponent that emphasised surprise and speed. French training for a centralised and slow-moving battle left the army incapable of hasty counter-attacks or bold moves. The French army lost

4725-445: The French frontier defences; while for the British, with their communications located at the channel ports, would be parallel to their front. Despite the risk of committing forces to central Belgium and an advance to the Scheldt or Dyle lines, which would be vulnerable to an outflanking move, Maurice Gamelin , the French commander, approved the plan and it remained the Allied strategy at the outbreak of war. The British, with no army in

4830-503: The French with a simultaneous attack to the south to occupy the assembly areas that the French would use for a counter-offensive. Five panzer divisions of Panzergruppe von Kleist advanced through the Ardennes; XIX Panzer Corps with three panzer divisions on the southern flank towards Sedan, against the French Second Army. The XLI Panzer Corps with two panzer divisions on the northern flank, advanced towards Monthermé, against

4935-536: The German advance, while the First Army moved up but attacks on the bridges at Maastricht had been costly failures (the 135 day bombers of the RAF Advanced Air Striking Force were reduced to 72 operational aircraft by 12 May). Against the plan, Guderian and the other panzer generals disobeyed their orders and quickly advanced to the Channel. The panzer forces captured Abbeville and then fought

5040-463: The German lines of communication and to prevent an Allied breakout. This plan would still fail if sufficient ground could not be quickly taken in Belgium to squeeze the allies against two fronts. Preventing this from happening were the defences of Fort Eben-Emael and the Albert Canal. The three bridges over the canal were the key to allowing Army Group B to move at high speed. The bridges at Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven and Kanne in Belgium, and Maastricht on

5145-545: The Germans would not commence the invasion with this plan. It suggested that the Germans would try an attack through the Belgian Ardennes and advance to Calais to encircle the Allied armies in Belgium. The Belgians correctly predicted that the Germans would attempt a Kesselschlacht (literally "cauldron battle", meaning encirclement ), to destroy its enemies. The Belgians had predicted the exact German plan as offered by Erich von Manstein . The Belgian high command warned

5250-712: The Low Countries, devised by Franz Halder . The original Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb (Campaign Instruction No 1, Case Yellow), was a plan to push the Allied forces back through central Belgium to the Somme river in northern France , with similarities to the 1914 campaign of the First World War . On 10 January 1940, a German aircraft carrying documents with parts of the plan for Fall Gelb crashed in Belgium (the Mechelen Incident ) prompting another review of

5355-467: The Manstein concept. Reformulating it in a more radical sense did not help. Manstein and Halder were rivals; in 1938 Manstein had been the successor of the chief of staff Ludwig Beck but had been ousted when the latter was disgraced over the Blomberg–Fritsch affair . On 1 September 1938, Halder rather than Manstein had replaced Beck. In late January, Halder got rid of Manstein by having him promoted to

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5460-400: The Napoleonic principle of the concentration of superior force at the decisive point was impossible for the Germans to achieve. In the 2014 edition of Breaking Point , Doughty described how in a 1956 publication, Fuller wrote that the Battle of Sedan was an "attack by paralyzation" that he had devised in 1918 and incorporated into Plan 1919 . Doughty wrote that although the Germans hoped for

5565-430: The SS brought it into a conflict with the Flemish National League ( Vlaams Nationaal Verbond , VNV), the primary collaborationist organization in German-occupied Flanders, which had initially supported the "cultural" activities of DeVlag. The VNV was a Flemish nationalist movement, which envisioned an independent Flanders, or perhaps Dietsland , in a German-dominated Europe, while Van de Wiele considered Dutch merely

5670-487: The VNV received support from the Wehrmacht military occupation ( Militärverwaltung ) and from the head of the military government, Alexander von Falkenhausen . Both groups competed to recruit members for the Waffen-SS although the VNV rapidly secured dominance within the Flemish Legion established in 1941. In 1943, when the VNV started its youth wing De Nationaal-Socialistische Jeugd in Vlaanderen ("National-Socialist Youth in Flanders"), DeVlag responded by setting up

5775-556: The XIX Panzer Corps. Doughty suggested that the development of the Manstein plan showed that the force sent through the Ardennes was intended to follow a familiar strategy of Vernichtungsgedanke intended to encircle and annihilate the Allied armies in Kesselschlachten (cauldron battles). Twentieth-century weapons were different but the methods were little changed from those of Ulm (1805), Sedan (1870) and Tannenberg (1914). When German forces broke through on 16 May, they did not attack French headquarters but advanced westwards in

5880-425: The advance could have been reduced to chaos. The "audacious" manoeuvre of Army Group A comprised only about twelve armoured and motorised divisions; most of the rest of the German army invaded on foot, supplied from railheads. The Channel coast was a natural obstacle, only a few hundred kilometres from the German border and over such a distance, motorised supply from railheads over the dense west European road network

5985-399: The assault. It was first suggested that a conventional parachute drop be made by airborne forces to seize and destroy the forts' guns before the land units approached. Such a suggestion was rejected as the Junkers Ju 52 transports were too slow and were likely to be vulnerable to Dutch and Belgian anti-aircraft guns. Other factors for its refusal were the weather conditions, which might blow

6090-447: The basis of the plan for the Invasion of Poland ; the Manstein plan would have been its most spectacular implementation. Blitzkrieg theory would have been reflected in the organisation and equipment of the army and Luftwaffe and would have been radically different from those of France, Britain and the Soviet Union, except for the contributions of individuals like Mikhail Tukhachevsky , Charles de Gaulle , Fuller and Liddell Hart. That

6195-442: The border fortifications along the Albert Canal and the Meuse, without withdrawing, until the French Army arrived to support them. Gamelin was not keen on pushing his Dyle plan that far. He was concerned that the Belgians would be driven out of their defences and would retreat to Antwerp, as in 1914. In fact, the Belgian divisions protecting the border were to withdraw and retreat southward to link up with French forces. This information

6300-538: The breakthrough of massed panzer forces. Tactically, the Germans were often able to overcome French defences that usually were inadequate. French military intelligence failed to predict the main German attack, expecting it in central Belgium as late as 13 May. Military intelligence had made the elementary mistake of noting information that fitted with their assumptions of German intentions and paid insufficient attention to German capability or information suggesting that they were not conforming to expectations. Doughty wrote that

6405-405: The cavalry divisions to reinforce the defences on the Meuse, because some of the Ninth Army infantry had not arrived. The most advanced German units reached the Meuse in the afternoon; local French commanders thought that the German parties were far ahead of the main body and would wait for it before trying to cross the river. From 10 May, Allied bombers had been sent to raid northern Belgium to delay

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6510-430: The city's northern flank, the tank country lying in the strategic depths of the Belgian forces occupying the city and the axis of advance into the west of the country. Further lines of defence ran south-west, covering the Liège–Namur axis. The Belgian Army also had the added benefit of the French 1st Army , advancing toward Gembloux and Hannut , on the southern flank of the BEF covering the Sambre sector. This covered

6615-406: The command of XXXVIII Corps in east Germany. In late January, Lieutenant-Colonel Günther Blumentritt and Major Henning von Tresckow , on Manstein's staff, contacted Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolf Schmundt (an old acquaintance of Tresckow) the army attaché of Adolf Hitler, when he was visiting Koblenz, who informed Hitler of the affair on 2 February. Having found the Halder plan unsatisfactory from

6720-406: The complete re-militarisation of Italy and Russia had caused most other states, even pacifists like Switzerland and the Netherlands, to take exceptional precautions. b) Vast changes in military methods, particularly in aviation and mechanization, meant that initial operations could now be of alarming force, speed and magnitude. c) The lightning reoccupation of the Rhineland came with bases for

6825-413: The decisive point, a synthesis of "materialism and military art". The German army committed all its armoured units to the offensive and had it failed, would have had none left to resist an Allied counter-offensive. Casualties were high but the swift end to the campaign made them bearable. The Luftwaffe was also fully committed but the Allied air forces held back a substantial reserve, in anticipation of

6930-406: The defence was left to second-rate French divisions in the Second Army and the Ninth Army , on the assumption that the difficulty of moving masses of men and equipment would give the French plenty of time to send reinforcements if the area was attacked. The Seventh Army , which had been the most powerful part of the French strategic reserve, had been committed to a rush through Belgium to join with

7035-451: The earliest plans by Halder or Manstein and the final plan by Halder did not conform to this doctrine is an anomaly, to be explained by circumstances. In the latter hypothesis, favoured by Robert A. Doughty and Karl-Heinz Frieser , the Manstein plan was a return to the principles of 19th century Bewegungskrieg (war of manoeuvre), adapted to modern technology by a sudden and unexpected departure from established German thinking, through

7140-410: The eastern industrial regions. It also had the advantage of absorbing Dutch and Belgian Army formations (including some 20 Belgian divisions). Gamelin justified the Dyle Plan after the defeat using these arguments. On 10 January 1940, in an episode known as the Mechelen Incident , German Army major, Hellmuth Reinberger , crash-landed in a Messerschmitt Bf 108 near Mechelen-aan-de-Maas . Reinberger

7245-479: The evacuation of the BEF and French forces from Dunkirk. Defeat in the north and the lack of mobile reserves led to the defeat of the remaining French and British forces in Fall Rot and the Armistice of 22 June 1940 . The success of the German invasion surprised everyone; the Germans had hardly dared hope for such a result. Most generals had vehemently opposed the plan as being much too risky; even those supporting it had mainly done so out of desperation because

7350-455: The event of German aggression toward Poland, while the British and French maintained their military obligations to Belgium. Militarily, the Belgians considered the Wehrmacht stronger than the Allies, and that engaging in overtures to the Allies would make Belgium a battleground without adequate allies. The Belgians and French remained confused about what was expected of whom if or when hostilities commenced. The Belgians were determined to hold

7455-445: The familiar principles of Bewegungskrieg . The German army managed to concentrate a hugely powerful force at the decisive point but took a gamble of great magnitude that could not be repeated if the attack failed. When the Germans attempted to emulate the success of 1940 against the Soviet Union in 1941, little was left in reserve. The Red Army had a greater margin of numerical superiority, better leadership and more room for manoeuvre;

7560-638: The field and behind in rearmament, were in no position to challenge French strategy, which had assumed the prominent role of the Western Alliance. Having little ability to overrule the French, the British strategy for military action came in the form of strategic bombing of the Ruhr industry. On the official Belgian withdrawal from the Western Alliance, the Belgians refused to engage in any official staff meetings with French or British military staff for fear of compromising their neutrality. The Belgians did not regard

7665-534: The fields of northern France; the toughness and training of the German infantry should be recognised, along with the efforts of the engineers and artillery, which got the XIX Panzer Corps across the Meuse. Doughty also wrote that the success of the German army could not adequately be explained without reference to French mistakes. French strategy was unusually vulnerable to an attack through the Ardennes; operationally, French commanders failed adequately to react to

7770-695: The gap in the Belgian defences between the main Belgian positions on the Dyle line and Namur to the south. Further south still, the French 9th Army advanced to the Givet–Dinant axis on the Meuse river. The French 2nd Army was responsible for the last 100 kilometres (62 mi) of front, covering Sedan, the lower Meuse, the Belgian–Luxembourg border and the northern flank of the Maginot line. The German plan of attack required that Army Group B would advance and draw

7875-463: The generals with whom I spoke about the new attack plan in the West, Manstein was the only one who understood me! After the war, Halder claimed he was the main instigator of the German plan, supporting this with the fact that he had begun to consider changing the main axis to Sedan as early as September 1939 and that Manstein's original proposal was too traditional. The Manstein plan is often seen as either

7980-437: The heroic individualism of German soldiers, notably in the film Sieg im Westen (1941). OKW explained the victory as a consequence of the "...revolutionary dynamic of the Third Reich and its National socialist leadership". Tooze wrote that a debunking of the technological interpretation of the German victory should not lead to the conclusion that it was the genius of Manstein or the superiority of German soldiers that caused

8085-720: The invasion plan. Halder revised Fall Gelb to an extent in Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb and Manstein was able to convince Hitler in a meeting on 17 February, that the Wehrmacht should attack through the Ardennes , followed by an advance to the coast. Manstein, chief of staff of Army Group A , had originally formulated his plan in October 1939 in Koblenz on the instigation of his commander, General Gerd von Rundstedt , who rejected Halder's plan, partly through professional rivalry and part because it could not inflict

8190-400: The left flank of the Belgian Army forces protecting Antwerp and threaten the German northern flank. Further east, delaying positions were constructed in the immediate tactical zones along the Albert Canal, which joined with the defences of the Meuse west of Maastricht. The line deviated southward, and continued to Liège. The Maastricht–Liège gap was heavily protected. Fort Eben-Emael guarded

8295-509: The main Allied defensive position. In an agreement with the British and French armies, the French 7th Army under the command of Henri Giraud was to advance into Belgium, past the Scheldt Estuary in Zeeland if possible, to Breda , in the Netherlands. The British Army's British Expeditionary Force or BEF, commanded by General John Vereker, Lord Gort , was to occupy the central position in

8400-408: The main body of the Allied armies and swiftly advance with the armoured divisions to the English Channel , taking the Allies by surprise and cutting their supply routes from the south. Manstein had many reservations about the proposal, fearing the long open flank to the south that would be created by such a bold advance. Guderian managed to convince him that the danger of a French counter-offensive from

8505-486: The main thrust of the invasion through the Ardennes in southern Belgium. After crossing the Meuse River between Namur and Sedan, Army Group A would turn north-west towards Amiens , as Army Group B executed a feint attack in the north, to lure the Allied armies forward into Belgium and pin them down. The revision was a substantial change in emphasis, in which Halder no longer envisaged a simultaneous secondary attack to

8610-408: The manner of a cavalry raid. Doughty wrote that Fuller had called the advanced forces of the German army an armoured battering-ram, covered by Luftwaffe fighters and dive-bombers acting as flying field artillery, to break through a continuous front at several points. The XIX, XLI and XV panzer corps had operated as the leading force through the Ardennes but the most effective Allied resistance to

8715-412: The newly formed Chasseurs Ardennais ). By 1935, the Belgian defences were completed. Even so, it was felt that the defences were no longer adequate. A significant mobile reserve was needed to guard the rear areas, and as a result it was considered that the protection against a sudden assault by German forces was not sufficient. Significant manpower reserves would also be needed, but the public rejected

8820-554: The operational plan Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). The Allied armies attempted to halt the German Army in Belgium , believing it to be the main German thrust. After the French had fully committed the best of the Allied armies to Belgium between 10 and 12 May, the Germans enacted the second phase of their operation, a break-through, or sickle cut, through the Ardennes , and advanced toward the English Channel . The German Army ( Heer ) reached

8925-518: The paratroopers away from the fort and disperse them too widely. A seven-second drop from a Ju 52 at minimum operational height led to a dispersion over 300 metres alone. Hitler had noticed one potential flaw in the defences. The roofs were flat and unprotected; he demanded to know if a glider , such as the DFS 230 , could land on them. Student replied that it could be done, but only by 12 aircraft and in daylight; this would deliver 80–90 paratroopers onto

9030-524: The plans for Fall Gelb is seen as unremarkable; only after the crossings of the Meuse, the sudden success of the break-out and the insubordination of Guderian and other tank commanders during the rush down the Somme valley, would "Blitzkrieg" have been adopted as an explicit theory, in this view making Operation Barbarossa the first and only Blitzkrieg campaign. Guderian presented the situation in his postwar book Erinnerungen eines Soldaten ( Memories of

9135-533: The result of or the cause of a mid-20th century Revolution in military affairs . In the former hypothesis, expounded by J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart immediately after the events, the Manstein plan is presented as a result of the evolution of German military thinking since the First World War by Hans von Seeckt and Guderian, adopting the ideas of Fuller or Liddell Hart. If true, an explicit Blitzkrieg doctrine would have been established by 1939 and been

9240-450: The skill and determination of German infantry, sometimes helped by anti-tank guns, accompanying guns and a few tanks. Fuller's writing was in the vein of much of the early reports of the Battle of France but since then new studies had added nuance, dwelling on the complications and chaos of the military operations. The Manstein plan led to much more than a simple tank rush through the Ardennes and

9345-422: The south and south-west of Sedan was reduced by the combined operations of infantry, tanks and artillery, a fact overlooked for long after 1940. Luftwaffe bombers had not acted as flying artillery and their main effect occurred on 13 May, when bombing collapsed the morale of the French 55th Division . Air attacks helped the ground forces to advance but destroyed few tanks and bunkers, most of which were taken by

9450-519: The south could be averted by a simultaneous secondary spoiling offensive southwards, in the general direction of Reims . When Manstein first presented his ideas to OKH, he did not mention Guderian and made the attack to the north the main effort, with a few armoured divisions protecting the left flank of the manoeuvre. The changes were included because the original conception was too bold to be acceptable to many generals, who also considered Guderian too radical; Halder and Walther von Brauchitsch rejected

9555-462: The start of a possible German invasion moving close to the Belgian frontier. On 24 April 1937, the French and British publicly declared that Belgium's security was paramount to the Western Allies and that they would defend their borders against aggression of any sort, whether directed solely at Belgium, or to obtain bases to wage war against "other states". The British and French released Belgium from her Locarno obligations to render mutual assistance in

9660-574: The start, Hitler ordered a change of strategy on 13 February in accordance with Manstein's thinking, after having heard only a rough outline. Manstein was invited to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin to meet Hitler on 17 February, in the presence of Alfred Jodl and Erwin Rommel . Though Hitler felt an immediate antipathy against Manstein for being arrogant and aloof, he listened silently to his exposition and

9765-515: The target. Hitler then revealed the tactical weapon that would make this strategic operation work, introducing the Hohlladungwaffe (hollow-charge) – a 50 kilograms (110 lb) explosive weapon which would destroy the Belgian gun emplacements. This tactical unit spearheaded the first strategic airborne operation in history. The Belgian Army could muster 22 divisions, which contained 1,338 artillery pieces but just 10 AMC 35 tanks. However,

9870-418: The total strength was 377; however only 118 of these were serviceable on 10 May 1940. Of this number around 78 were fighters and 40 were bombers. The AéMI was commanded by Paul Hiernaux, who had received his pilot's license just before the outbreak of World War I , and had risen to the position of commander-in-chief in 1938. Hiernaux organised the service into three Régiments d'Aéronautique (air regiments):

9975-416: The victory. There was no German grand-strategic synthesis; the course of the 1940 campaign depended on the economic mobilisation of 1939 and the geography of western Europe. During the winter of 1939–1940, the quality of German armoured forces was substantially improved. The plan attributed to Manstein was not a revolutionary departure from traditional military thinking but the concentration of superior force at

10080-419: The west but made it the main effort ( Schwerpunkt ). The dash for Abbeville was removed, river crossings were to be forced by infantry and there would be a long period of consolidation by a large number of infantry divisions crossing into the bridgeheads. The armoured divisions would then advance together with the infantry, not in an independent operational penetration. Halder rejected the idea of forestalling

10185-464: Was Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 4, Fall Gelb (Campaign Instruction No. 4, Case Yellow) issued on 24 February 1940 and the manoeuvre through the Ardennes had no name. The Manstein plan was a counterpart to the French Dyle plan for the Battle of France . Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein dissented from the 1939 versions of Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), a plan for an invasion of France and

10290-499: Was based at Ostend, while the Second and Third divisions were based at Zeebrugge and Antwerp. The Aéronautique Militaire Belge (Belgian Air Force - AéMI) had barely begun to modernise their aircraft technology. The AéMI had ordered Brewster Buffalo , Fiat CR.42 , and Hawker Hurricane fighters, Koolhoven F.K.56 trainers, Fairey Battle and Caproni Ca.312 light bombers, and Caproni Ca.335 fighter-reconnaissance aircraft, but only

10395-573: Was carrying the first plans for the German invasion of western Europe which, as Gamelin had expected, entailed a repeat of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan and a German thrust through Belgium (which was expanded by the Wehrmacht to include the Netherlands) and into France. The Belgians suspected a ruse, but the plans were taken seriously. Belgian intelligence and the military attaché in Cologne correctly suggested

10500-522: Was deemed by the Germans as the sole party representing the Nazi unity in Flanders. Battle of Belgium German victory German occupation of Belgium Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns The invasion of Belgium or Belgian campaign (10–28 May 1940), often referred to within Belgium as

10605-432: Was impressed by Manstein's thinking. Hitler remarked after Manstein had left, "Certainly an exceptionally clever fellow, with great operational gifts, but I don't trust him". Manstein took no more part in the planning and returned to eastern Germany. Halder had to revise the plan again, which became Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb . The new plan conformed to Manstein's thinking in that Army Group A would provide

10710-602: Was not clear was whether Belgium would have to mobilise in the event of a German invasion of Poland. The Belgians much preferred an alliance with the United Kingdom . The British had entered the First World War in response to the German violation of Belgian neutrality. The Belgian Channel ports had offered the German Imperial Navy valuable bases, and such an attack would offer the German Kriegsmarine and

10815-537: Was not given to Gamelin. As far as the Belgians were concerned, the Dyle Plan had advantages. Instead of the limited Allied advance to the Scheldt, or meeting the Germans on the Franco-Belgian border, the move to the Dyle river would reduce the Allied front in central Belgium by 70 kilometres (43 mi), freeing more forces for use as a strategic reserve. Belgium felt this would save more Belgian territory, in particular

10920-608: Was possible. The Germans could live off the land, amidst the highly developed agriculture of western Europe, unlike in Poland where it had been much harder to maintain momentum. Tooze concluded that although the German victory of 1940 was not determined by brute force, the Wehrmacht did not rewrite the rules of war or succeed because of the ardour of German soldiers and French pacifism. The odds against Germany were not so extreme as to be insurmountable by better planning for an offensive based on

11025-462: Was resurrected in 1939. Most of the Belgian merchant fleet, some 100 ships, evaded capture by the Germans. Under the terms of a Belgian–Royal Navy agreement, these ships and their 3,350 crewmen were placed under British control for the duration of hostilities. The general headquarters of the Belgian Admiralty was at Ostend under the command of Major Henry Decarpentrie. The First Naval Division

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