The Battle of Brown's Ferry was an engagement of the American Civil War which took place on October 27, 1863, in Hamilton County, Tennessee . During the battle, two Union brigades drove Confederate sharpshooters from the Tennessee River, which allowed supplies to start arriving to the Union army at Chattanooga via the "Cracker Line" . Although a minor engagement, the battle proved to have significant results in paving the way for the Union victory at Chattanooga a month later.
104-714: Following the defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga the Union Army of the Cumberland was trapped in Chattanooga, Tennessee , by the Confederate Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg . Lacking the strength to capture the city by direct assault, Bragg settled into a siege, intending to starve the Union forces into surrender or retreat. To do so, he sent the brigade of Evander Law to a point on
208-433: A 200-foot (61 m) high hill that dominated the road from Brown's Ferry. Smith veered to the east and began climbing the hill. Meanwhile, Hooker mistakenly deployed units from both XI Corps divisions against Law and Benning, leaving no one to go to Geary's aid. Though Law's 2,000 men were greatly outnumbered by Hooker's force, the hilltop position was naturally strong. In the darkness, the only unit in direct contact with Law
312-560: A corps under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet from the Army of Northern Virginia . Only five brigades (about 5,000 effectives) from two of Longstreet's divisions arrived in time for the second day of the Battle of Chickamauga on September 20. The three infantry corps of Rosecrans's army advanced by separate routes, on the only three roads that were suitable for such movements. On the right flank, McCook's XX Corps moved southwest to Valley Head, Alabama ; in
416-418: A defensive position just east of the crossroads. The two Union divisions then withdrew to Stevens Gap. Hindman's men skirmished with Baird's rear guard, but could not prevent the withdrawal of the Union force. Realizing that part of his force had narrowly escaped a Confederate trap, Rosecrans abandoned his plans for a pursuit and began to concentrate his scattered forces. As he wrote in his official report, it
520-438: A defensive position several hundred yards northwest of Jay's Mill, about equally distant from where the 1st Georgia Cavalry waited through the night south of the mill. At about the time that McCook sent a regiment to destroy Reed's Bridge (which would survive the second attempt in two days to destroy it), Brig. Gen. Henry Davidson of Forrest's Cavalry Corps sent the 1st Georgia forward and they encountered some of McCook's men near
624-644: A name that "has no meaning in their language" and is possibly "derived from an Algonquian word referring to a fishing or fish-spearing place... if not Shawano it is probably from the Creek or Chickasaw ." The most plausible etymology for Chickamauga is that it is from the Chickasaw word chokma "be good" plus the verb ending -k a . The Chickasaw town of Chickamauga was located at the foot of Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans faced significant logistical challenges if he chose to move forward. The Cumberland Plateau that separated
728-596: A new right wing for the line of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas , who assumed overall command of remaining forces. Although the Confederates launched costly and determined assaults, Thomas and his men held until twilight. Union forces then retired to Chattanooga while the Confederates occupied the surrounding heights, besieging the city. In his successful Tullahoma Campaign in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans moved southeast from Murfreesboro, Tennessee , outmaneuvering Bragg and forcing him to abandon Middle Tennessee and withdraw to
832-460: A note to retreat since Union reinforcements were arriving at his rear. Bratton withdrew to Lookout Mountain , successfully covered by Benning's brigade. In the Wauhatchie fight, Bratton lost 356 men, while Geary's casualties numbered 216. A rumor circulated through the Union camps that Union mules stampeded by the fight had made the Confederates believe they were being attacked by cavalry, causing
936-533: A position on Moccasin Bend across from Brown's Ferry. Upon landing, Hazen secured the bridgehead and then positioned a pontoon bridge across the river, allowing Turchin to cross and take position on his right. Col. William C. Oates of the Confederate 15th Alabama guarded the valley with his regiment plus elements of other units. Due to a command mixup, Oates did not know where three reserve regiments were positioned. After
1040-494: A stop on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad , to protect the line of communications to the southwest as well as the road west to Kelley's Ferry. Once he reached his goal, "Hooker's dispositions were deplorable," with Howard's understrength XI Corps "bivouacked haphazardly" at Brown's Ferry. Worse, Geary's division, only 1,500-strong after detaching railroad guards, was posted in isolation. Bragg ordered Longstreet to drive away
1144-467: A strategic reversal in the West by sending Bragg reinforcements from Virginia—Lt. Gen. James Longstreet with two divisions from his First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia —in addition to the reinforcements from Mississippi. Chickamauga was the first large scale Confederate movement of troops from one theater to another with the aim of achieving a period of numerical superiority and gaining decisive results. Bragg
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#17330851281591248-468: A total of 69,800 men, but also extended his command responsibilities northward to the Knoxville area. This brought a third subordinate into Bragg's command who had little or no respect for him. Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk and Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee had already made their animosity well known. Buckner's attitude was colored by Bragg's unsuccessful invasion of Buckner's native Kentucky in 1862, as well as by
1352-716: A wide front through the mountains. The XXI Corps under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden would advance against the city from the west, the XIV Corps under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas would cross over Lookout Mountain 20 miles south of the city, while the XX Corps under Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook and the Cavalry Corps under Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley would advance even farther to the southeast toward Bragg's railroad supply line leading from Atlanta. If executed correctly, this plan would cause Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga or be trapped in
1456-415: Is ours without a struggle and East Tennessee is free." Bragg was aware of Rosecrans's dispositions and planned to defeat him by attacking his isolated corps individually. The corps were spread out over 40 miles (65 km), too far apart to support each other. Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was demoralized and fleeing to either Dalton , Rome , or Atlanta , Georgia. Instead, Bragg's Army of Tennessee
1560-733: The American Civil War . A Union force had seized Brown's Ferry on the Tennessee River, opening a supply line to the Union army in Chattanooga . Confederate forces attempted to dislodge the Union force defending the ferry and again close this supply line but were defeated. Wauhatchie was one of the few night battles of the Civil War. After their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga , Union forces under Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, Tennessee . Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg 's Army of Tennessee besieged
1664-601: The Battle of Wauhatchie , but this attack failed. Battle of Chickamauga The Battle of Chickamauga , fought on September 18–20, 1863, between the United States Army and Confederate forces in the American Civil War , marked the end of a U.S. Army offensive, the Chickamauga Campaign , in southeastern Tennessee and northwestern Georgia . It was the first major battle of the war fought in Georgia and
1768-546: The Military Division of the Mississippi . On October 26 Grant initiated operations to open a supply route from Brown's Ferry to Chattanooga. The plan was conceived and to be executed by Grant's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith . Hardtack , an army food staple, was usually despised by the men who were forced to eat it on a constant basis. However, with food running low the soldiers began to cry out even for
1872-590: The Army of Tennessee into Wings was ordered the night of September 19 upon the arrival of Longstreet from Virginia. Prior to this, the corps commanders reported directly to Bragg. Bushrod Johnson's division took the wrong road from Ringgold, but eventually headed west on the Reed's Bridge Road. At 7 a.m. his men encountered cavalry pickets from Col. Robert Minty's brigade, guarding the approach to Reed's Bridge. Being outnumbered five to one, Minty's men eventually withdrew across
1976-492: The Confederate advance with a concentrated volley at close range. Liddell's exhausted men began to withdraw and Croxton's brigade, returning to the action, pushed them back beyond the Winfrey field. Believing that Rosecrans was attempting to move the center of the battle farther north than Bragg planned, Bragg began rushing heavy reinforcements from all parts of his line to his right, starting with Cheatham's division of Polk's Corps,
2080-506: The Confederate brigades of Wright and Smith. Smith's brigade bore the brunt of the attack in the Brock field and was replaced by Strahl's brigade, which also had to withdraw under the pressure. Two more Union brigades followed Palmer's division, from Brig. Gen. Horatio Van Cleve 's division of the XXI corps, who formed on the left flank of Wright's brigade. The attack of Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty 's brigade
2184-488: The Confederates outnumbered Negley's division 3 to 1, but failed to attack. Infuriated that his orders were being defied and a golden opportunity was being lost, Bragg issued new orders for Hindman to attack early September 11. Cleburne, who was not sick as Hill had claimed, cleared the felled timber from Dug Gap and prepared to advance when he heard the sound of Hindman's guns. By this time, however, Baird's division had reached Negley's, and Negley had withdrawn his division to
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#17330851281592288-646: The Confederates retreated to the woods east of the road, Harker realized he was isolated and quickly withdrew. At the Viniard house, Buell's men were attacked by part of Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law 's division of Hood's corps. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Jerome B. Robertson and Henry L. Benning pushed southwest toward the Viniard field, pushing back Brig. Gen. William Carlin 's brigade (Davis's division) and fiercely struck Buell's brigade, pushing them back behind Wilder's line. Hood's and Johnson's men, pushing strongly forward, approached so close to Rosecrans's new headquarters at
2392-511: The Confederates tried to cross the West Chickamauga Creek. Fighting began in earnest on the morning of September 19. Bragg's men strongly assaulted but could not break the US line. The next day, Bragg resumed his assault. In late morning, Rosecrans was misinformed that he had a gap in his line. In moving units to shore up the supposed gap, Rosecrans accidentally created an actual gap directly in
2496-660: The Confederates were crossing the creek, Thomas began to arrive in Crittenden's rear area. The land between Chickamauga Creek and the LaFayette Road was gently rolling but almost completely wooded. ... In the woods no officer above brigadier could see all his command at once, and even the brigadiers often could see nobody's troops but their own and perhaps the enemy's. Chickamauga would be a classic "soldiers battle," but it would test officers at every level of command in ways they had not previously been tested. An additional complication
2600-531: The Lincoln administration's priorities. The plan for the Union advance was to cross the Cumberland Plateau into the valley of the Tennessee River, pause briefly to accumulate some supplies, and then cross the river itself. An opposed crossing of the wide river was not feasible and so Rosecrans devised a deception to distract Bragg above Chattanooga while the army crossed downstream. Then the Army would advance on
2704-574: The Reed's Bridge Road, with Col. John Croxton 's brigade on his right. Col. John Connell's brigade came up behind in reserve. Croxton's men drove back Davidson's advanced cavalrymen and Forrest formed a defensive line of dismounted troopers to stem the tide. Croxton halted his advance because he was unsure of Forrest's strength. Forrest requested reinforcements from Bragg and Walker near Alexander's Bridge and Walker ordered Col. Claudius Wilson 's brigade forward about 9 a.m., hitting Croxton's right flank. Forrest protected his own right flank by deploying
2808-639: The Reserve Corps kept behind to guard the railroad, had safely crossed the river by September 4. They faced more mountainous terrain and road networks that were just as treacherous as the ones they had already traversed. The Confederate high command was concerned about this development and took steps to reinforce the Army of Tennessee. General Joseph E. Johnston 's army dispatched on loan two weak divisions (about 9,000 men) from Mississippi under Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge and Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker by September 4, and General Robert E. Lee dispatched
2912-576: The Running Water Creek gorge. On October 28, after a rapid march, Hooker's column entered Lookout Valley to the astonishment of Confederate Generals Braxton Bragg and James Longstreet , who were having a conference on Lookout Mountain. Longstreet, obsessed with the possibility of a Union attack further to the southwest, had failed to properly scout Hooker's advance. Hooker, while his force passed through Lookout Valley on October 28, detached Brig. Gen. John W. Geary 's division at Wauhatchie Station,
3016-716: The Southern retreat; the Union soldiers joked that the mules be " breveted as horses". In truth, the Hampton Legion was disordered by the mules for only a short time. However, this lull allowed the 137th New York to plug a gap in the Federal line. Union losses in the battle were 78 killed, 327 wounded, and 15 missing. The Confederates reported their losses as 34 killed, 305 wounded, and 69 missing. One account says Bratton lost 408 men while Law lost only 52. Geary reported burying 153 Confederates and capturing over one hundred prisoners, so
3120-417: The Tennessee River and therefore thought it necessary to accumulate enough supplies and transport wagons that he could cross long distances without a reliable line of communications. His subordinate generals were supportive of this line of reasoning and counseled delay, all except for Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield , Rosecrans's chief of staff, a politician who understood the value of being on the record endorsing
3224-488: The Tennessee River downstream from Chattanooga, ordering it to fire on any Union wagon train which passed along the opposite shore. Law spread the 4th and 15th Alabama Infantry regiments along a 5-mile (8.0 km) front, keeping the other three regiments of his brigade in reserve. When the Union army began using other routes to supply Chattanooga, Law's corps commander James Longstreet ordered three regiments to be pulled back to Lookout Mountain, leaving two regiments along
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3328-465: The Union surprise landing, Oates attempted a counterattack with his scratch force, but it failed after he was seriously wounded. By the time Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law turned up with those reserve regiments, it was too late; the Federals were too numerous and well entrenched. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker marched with three Union divisions from Bridgeport by following the railroad via Shellmound and
3432-463: The Viniard house. Col. Heg was mortally wounded during one of these advances. Late in the day, Rosecrans deployed almost his last reserve, Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan 's division of McCook's corps. Marching north from Lee and Gordon's Mill, Sheridan took the brigades of Cols. Luther Bradley and Bernard Laiboldt . Bradley's brigade was in the lead and it was able to push the heavily outnumbered brigades of Robertson and Benning out of Viniard field. Bradley
3536-411: The Winfrey field and Johnson and Baird had been driven back inside Thomas's new defensive line. Casualties for the first day of battle are difficult to calculate because losses are usually reported for the entire battle. Historian Peter Cozzens wrote that "an estimate of between 6,000 and 9,000 Confederates and perhaps 7,000 Federals seems reasonable." At Braxton Bragg's headquarters at Thedford Ford,
3640-523: The XXI Corps. The fourth crossing site was at the mouth of Battle Creek, Tennessee, where the rest of the XIV Corps crossed on August 31. Without permanent bridges, the Army of the Cumberland could not be supplied reliably, so another bridge was constructed at Bridgeport by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan 's division, spanning 2,700 feet (820 m) in three days. Virtually all of the Union army, other than elements of
3744-457: The armies was a rugged, barren country over 30 miles long with poor roads and little opportunity for foraging. If Bragg attacked him during the advance, Rosecrans would be forced to fight with his back against the mountains and tenuous supply lines. He did not have the luxury of staying put, however, because he was under intense pressure from Washington to move forward in conjunction with Burnside's advance into East Tennessee. By early August, Halleck
3848-426: The army's left flank and the cavalry under Forrest and Wheeler would cover Bragg's right and left flanks, respectively. The U.S. Forces Army of the Cumberland , commanded by Rosecrans, consisted of about 60,000 men, composed of the following major organizations: The Confederate Army of Tennessee , commanded by Bragg, with about 65,000 men, was composed of the following major organizations: The organization of
3952-538: The attack by crossing the LaFayette Road with two brigades in line and one in reserve. The two brigades drifted apart during the attack. On the right, Col. John Fulton's brigade routed King's brigade and linked up with Bate at Brotherton field. On the left, Brig. Gen. John Gregg 's brigade attacked Wilder's Union brigade in its reserve position at the Viniard Farm. Gregg was seriously wounded and his brigade advance halted. Brig. Gen. Evander McNair 's brigade, called up from
4056-443: The attack was scheduled for 10:00 p.m. on the night of October 28, confusion delayed it until midnight. Though Geary and his officers expected an attack and had thrown out pickets, its suddenness took them by surprise. Enveloped from the north by Bratton, the Union defenders formed into a V-shaped battle line, facing north and east. Geary's son, an artillery lieutenant, was killed in the battle, dying in his father's arms. Hearing
4160-566: The battle on September 19, citing his lack of specific orders to his subordinates, and his series of "sporadic attacks which only sapped Bragg's strength and enabled Rosecrans to locate the Rebel position." He wrote that Bragg bypassed two opportunities to win the battle on September 19: Battle of Wauhatchie The Battle of Wauhatchie was fought October 28–29, 1863, in Hamilton and Marion counties, Tennessee , and Dade County, Georgia , in
4264-556: The bridge after being pressured by elements of Forrest's cavalry, but could not destroy the bridge and prevent Johnson's men from crossing. At 4:30 p.m., when Johnson had reached Jay's Mill, Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood of Longstreet's Corps arrived from the railroad station at Catoosa and took command of the column. He ordered Johnson to use the Jay's Mill Road instead of the Brotherton Road, as Johnson had planned. At Alexander's Bridge to
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4368-491: The brigade of Col. George Dibrell , which ran into Van Derveer's brigade and came to a halt under fire. Forrest sent in Brig. Gen. Matthew Ector 's brigade, part of Walker's Reserve Corps, but without Walker's knowledge. Ector's men replaced Dibrell's in line, but they were also unable to drive Van Derveer from his position. Brannan's division was holding its ground against Forrest and his infantry reinforcements, but their ammunition
4472-457: The center, Thomas's XIV Corps moved just across the border to Trenton, Georgia ; and on the left, Crittenden's XXI Corps moved directly toward Chattanooga around Lookout Mountain. On September 8, after learning that Rosecrans had crossed into his rear, Bragg evacuated Chattanooga and moved his army south along the LaFayette Road toward LaFayette, Georgia . The Union army occupied Chattanooga on September 9. Rosecrans telegraphed Halleck, "Chattanooga
4576-539: The city of Chattanooga, suffering only 569 Union casualties along the way. General-in-chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck and President Abraham Lincoln were insistent that Rosecrans move quickly to take Chattanooga. Seizing the city would open the door for the Union to advance toward Atlanta and the heartland of the South . Chattanooga was a vital rail hub (with lines going north toward Nashville and Knoxville and south toward Atlanta), and an important manufacturing center for
4680-581: The city without supplies. Rosecrans ordered his army to move on August 16. The difficult road conditions meant a full week passed before they reached the Tennessee River Valley. They encamped while engineers made preparations for crossing the river. Meanwhile, Rosecrans's deception plan was underway. Col. John T. Wilder of the XIV Corps moved his mounted infantry brigade (the Lightning Brigade, which first saw prominence at Hoover's Gap ) to
4784-543: The city, threatening to starve the Union forces into surrender. Bragg's troops occupied Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain , both of which had excellent views of the city, the river, and the Union's supply lines. Confederate troops launched raids on all supply wagons heading toward Chattanooga, which made it necessary for the Union to find another way to feed their men. Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant relieved Rosecrans of his command and replaced him with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas . Grant's first priority upon reaching Chattanooga
4888-433: The commanding general was officially pleased with the day's events. He reported that "Night found us masters of the ground, after a series of very obstinate contests with largely superior numbers." However, his attacks had been launched in a disjointed fashion, failing to achieve a concentration of mass to defeat Rosecrans or cut him off from Chattanooga. Army of Tennessee historian Thomas Connelly criticized Bragg's conduct of
4992-424: The cove from the northeast, forcing the Union division to its destruction at the cul-de-sac at the southwest end of the valley. Early on the morning of September 10, Bragg ordered Polk's division under Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman to march 13 miles southwest into the cove and strike Negley's flank. He also ordered D.H. Hill to send Cleburne's division from LaFayette through Dug Gap to strike Negley's front, making sure
5096-414: The creek at Thedford's Ford. Polk's troops were facing Crittenden's at Lee and Gordon's Mill and D.H. Hill's corps guarded crossing sites to the south. Although Bragg had achieved some degree of surprise, he failed to exploit it strongly. Rosecrans, observing the dust raised by the marching Confederates in the morning, anticipated Bragg's plan. He ordered Thomas and McCook to Crittenden's support, and while
5200-618: The daunting geographical obstacles and logistical challenges, preferring to wait for Rosecrans to solve those same problems and attack him. He was also concerned about a sizable Union force under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside that was threatening Knoxville. Bragg withdrew his forces from advanced positions around Bridgeport, which left Rosecrans free to maneuver on the northern side of the Tennessee River. He concentrated his two infantry corps around Chattanooga and relied upon cavalry to cover his flanks, extending from northern Alabama to near Knoxville. The Confederate government decided to attempt
5304-444: The direction of Chattanooga offered their best option. By September 17, McCook's corps had reached Stevens Gap and the three Union corps were now much less vulnerable to individual defeat. Yet Bragg decided that he still had an opportunity. Reinforced with two divisions arriving from Virginia under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet , and a division from Mississippi under Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson , he decided to move his army northward on
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#17330851281595408-466: The division of Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell to the fight, countering Thomas's reinforcements. The brigades of Col. Daniel Govan and Brig. Gen. Edward Walthall advanced along the Alexander's Bridge Road, smashing Baird's right flank. Both Scribner's and Starkweather's brigades retreated in panic, followed by King's regulars, who dashed for the rear through Van Derveer's brigade. Van Derveer's men halted
5512-564: The figurative fog of confusion that bedeviled men on both sides. In retrospect, victory for either side would look simple when unit positions were reviewed on a neat map, but in Chickamauga's torn and smoky woodlands, nothing was simple. Rosecrans's movement of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas 's XIV Corps the previous day put the left flank of the Army of the Cumberland farther north than Bragg expected when he formulated his plans for an attack on September 20. Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden 's XXI Corps
5616-753: The hardtack crackers. Thus the proposed supply line was dubbed the "Cracker Line". Chief Engineer, Military Division of the Mississippi: BG William F. Smith 3rd Division (from the IV Corps ) BG William B. Hazen 3rd Division (from the XIV Corps ) BG John B. Turchin Engineers Col Timothy Robbins Stanley Maj. John Mendenhall Longstreet's Corps : Lt. Gen. James Longstreet Hood's Division BG Micah Jenkins BG Evander M. Law Baldy Smith
5720-415: The landing points were gained allowing the Union troops to come ashore, drive off the Confederate pickets, and immediately begin entrenching. Upon hearing the news of the landing, Oates immediately formed a counterattack—using two companies in a diversionary frontal attack and leading the other three in an attempt to cut off the Union force from the ferry. However, the 6th Indiana Infantry had just landed and
5824-474: The largest in the Army of Tennessee with five brigades. At 11 a.m., Cheatham's men approached Liddell's halted division and formed on its left. Three brigades under Brig. Gens. Marcus Wright , Preston Smith , and John Jackson formed the front line and Brig. Gens. Otho Strahl and George Maney commanded the brigades in the second line. Their advance greatly overlapped Croxton's brigade and had no difficulty pushing it back. As Croxton withdrew, his brigade
5928-443: The lid off the cracker box!" By mid afternoon on October 27 the pontoon bridge across the river was completed by the 1st Michigan Engineers. Hooker's Federal reinforcements were on their way toward Brown's Ferry. Fearing that this attack was merely a diversion while the real Union attack would come from the south, Longstreet failed to counterattack immediately. Under pressure from Bragg, Longstreet would launch an attack two days later in
6032-541: The loss of his command through the merger. A positive aspect for Bragg was Hardee's request to be transferred to Mississippi in July, but he was replaced by Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill , a general who did not get along with Robert E. Lee in Virginia. The Confederate War Department asked Bragg in early August whether he could assume the offensive against Rosecrans if he were given reinforcements from Mississippi. He demurred, concerned about
6136-523: The mill. McCook was ordered by Granger to withdraw back to Rossville, and his men were pursued by Davidson's troopers. McCook encountered Thomas at the LaFayette Road, having finished an all-night march from Crawfish Springs. McCook reported to Thomas that a single Confederate infantry brigade was trapped on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. Thomas told Brannan's division to attack and destroy it. Brannan sent three brigades in response to Thomas's order: Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer 's brigade moved southeast on
6240-547: The morning of September 18 and advance toward Chattanooga, forcing Rosecrans's army out to fight or to withdraw. If Rosecrans fought, he risked being driven back into McLemore's Cove. The Confederate army was to move beyond the Federal left flank at Lee and Gordon's Mill and then cross West Chickamauga Creek. He specified four crossing points, from north to south: Johnson's division at Reed's Bridge, Walker's Reserve Corps at Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's corps at Thedford's Ford, and Polk's corps at Dalton's Ford. Hill's corps would anchor
6344-585: The most significant US defeat in the Western Theater , and it involved the second-highest number of casualties after the Battle of Gettysburg . The battle was fought between the US Army Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans and the Confederate Army of Tennessee under Gen. Braxton Bragg , and was named for Chickamauga Creek . The West Chickamauga Creek meanders near and forms
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#17330851281596448-486: The movement across the Confederate front and Bragg saw another offensive opportunity. He ordered Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk to attack Crittenden's lead division, under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood , at dawn on September 13, with Polk's corps and Walker's corps. Bragg rode to the scene after hearing no sound of battle and found that there were no preparations being made to attack. Once again, Bragg was angry that one of his subordinates did not attack as ordered, but by that morning it
6552-484: The movement was coordinated with Hindman's. Entering the cove with 4,600 men, Negley's division encountered Confederate skirmishers, but pressed forward to Davis's Cross Roads . Informed that there was a large Confederate force approaching on his left, Negley took up a position in the mouth of the cove and remained there until 3 a.m. on September 11. Hill claimed that Bragg's orders reached him very late and began offering excuses for why he could not advance—Cleburne
6656-547: The new Union force. Noting that a wagon train had stopped near Wauhatchie, Longstreet determined to crush Geary's force. He ordered Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins 's division to mount a night attack on the Union forces. While Law took his own and Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson 's brigades to block Hooker from reinforcing Geary, Jenkins's own 1,800-man South Carolina brigade, led by Col. John Bratton , would assault Wauhatchie Station. Law had Brig. Gen. Henry Benning 's brigade remain in support for both Law's and Bratton's efforts. Although
6760-458: The north of Chattanooga. His men pounded on tubs and sawed boards, sending pieces of wood downstream, to make the Confederates think that rafts were being constructed for a crossing north of the city. His artillery, commanded by Capt. Eli Lilly , bombarded the city from Stringer's Ridge for two weeks, an operation sometimes known as the Second Battle of Chattanooga . The deception worked and Bragg
6864-501: The overall Cracker Line plan, was assigned the task of establishing the Brown's Ferry bridgehead. He was assigned two infantry brigades from the 3rd Division, XIV Corps , to accomplish this: the 1st Brigade under Brig. Gen. John B. Turchin and the 2nd under Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen . At 3:00 a.m. on October 27, portions of Hazen's brigade embarked upon pontoons and floated around Moccasin Bend to Brown's Ferry. Turchin's brigade took
6968-406: The path of an eight-brigade assault on a narrow front by Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet , whose corps had been detached from the Army of Northern Virginia . In the resulting rout, Longstreet's attack drove one-third of the U.S. army, including Rosecrans himself, from the field. U.S. Army units spontaneously rallied to create a defensive line on Horseshoe Ridge (" Snodgrass Hill "), forming
7072-549: The production of iron and coke, located on the navigable Tennessee River. Situated between Lookout Mountain , Missionary Ridge , Raccoon Mountain, and Stringer's Ridge, Chattanooga occupied an important, defensible position. Although Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee had about 52,000 men at the end of July, the Confederate government merged the Department of East Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner , into Bragg's Department of Tennessee, which added 17,800 men to Bragg's army,
7176-446: The rear, also lost their cohesion during the advance. Union Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood 's division was ordered to march north from Lee and Gordon's Mill around 3 p.m. His brigade under Col. George P. Buell was posted north of the Viniard house while Col. Charles Harker 's brigade continued up the LaFayette Road. Harker's brigade arrived in the rear of Fulton's and McNair's Confederate regiments, firing into their backs. Although
7280-524: The river in pontoon boats manned by Stanley's men. A third column under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker would advance from Bridgeport, Alabama , for relief of Hazen's men if necessary. At 3:00 am, Hazen's men boarded the pontoons and quietly rode around Moccasin Point past the Lookout Mountain pickets. Using the river's current for swift movement, an early morning fog helped cover their movements. The landing
7384-501: The river, with Colonel William C. Oates of the 15th Alabama in command. Union commander William S. Rosecrans wired Abraham Lincoln saying "We have no certainty of holding our position here." Lincoln responded by sending reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Tennessee , with the overall command of the force under Ulysses S. Grant , recently promoted to command of
7488-485: The sounds of battle, the XI Corps quickly fell into ranks near Brown's Ferry. Hooker bypassed Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard in the chain of command and ordered Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz to march to Wauhatchie Station as reinforcements. In the confusion, Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr got his division on the road first. Col. Orland Smith 's brigade of Steinwehr's division was fired on by Law's Confederates, who were positioned on
7592-451: The south, Col. John T. Wilder 's mounted infantry brigade defended the crossing against the approach of Walker's Corps. Armed with Spencer repeating rifles and Capt. Lilly's four guns of the 18th Indiana Battery, Wilder was able to hold off a brigade of Brig. Gen. St. John Liddell's division, which suffered 105 casualties against Wilder's superior firepower. Walker moved his men downstream a mile to Lambert's Ford, an unguarded crossing, and
7696-628: The southeast boundary of the battle area and the park in northwest Georgia. (The South Chickamauga ultimately flows into the Tennessee River about 3.5 miles (5.6 km) northeast of downtown Chattanooga ). After his successful Tullahoma Campaign , Rosecrans renewed the offensive, aiming to force the Confederates out of Chattanooga. In early September, Rosecrans consolidated his forces scattered in Tennessee and Georgia and forced Bragg's army out of Chattanooga, heading south. The Union troops followed it and brushed with it at Davis's Cross Roads . Bragg
7800-413: The tiny cabin of Widow Eliza Glenn that the staff officers inside had to shout to make themselves heard over the sounds of battle. There was a significant risk of a Federal rout in this part of the line. Wilder's men eventually held back the Confederate advance, fighting from behind a drainage ditch. The Federals launched several unsuccessful counterattacks late in the afternoon to regain the ground around
7904-575: The translations of "stagnant water" (from the "lower Cherokee tongue"), "good country" (from the Chickasaw ) and "river of death" (dialect of the "upcountry Cherokee"). Tucker claims that the "river of death" came by its name not from early warfare, but from the location that the Cherokee contracted smallpox. James Mooney , in Myths of the Cherokee , wrote that Chickamauga is the more common spelling for Tsïkäma'gï ,
8008-417: The two larger Federal brigades and Maney was forced to withdraw as both of his flanks were crushed. Additional Union reinforcements arrived shortly after Johnson. Maj. Gen. John Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps marched from Lee and Gordon's Mill and advanced into the fight with three brigades in line—the brigades of Brig. Gen. William Hazen , Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft , and Col. William Grose —against
8112-604: The west to what he considered a superior defensive position. Richard Johnson's division and Absalom Baird's brigade were in the rear of Thomas's westward migration, covering the withdrawal. At sunset Cleburne launched an attack with three brigades in line—from left to right, Brig. Gens. James Deshler , Sterling Wood , and Lucius Polk . The attack degenerated into chaos in the limited visibility of twilight and smoke from burning underbrush. Some of Absalom Baird's men advanced to support Baldwin's Union brigade, but mistakenly fired at them and were subjected to return friendly fire . Baldwin
8216-518: Was "a matter of life and death." On September 12 he ordered McCook and the cavalry to move northeast to Stevens Gap to join with Thomas, intending for this combined force to continue northeast to link up with Crittenden. The message to McCook took a full day to reach him at Alpine and the route he selected to move northeast required three days of marching 57 miles, retracing his steps over Lookout Mountain. Crittenden's corps began moving from Ringgold toward Lee and Gordon's Mill. Forrest's cavalry reported
8320-537: Was Smith's 700-man brigade. Several vigorous assaults by Smith were repulsed. Then, after Law received some erroneous reports, he decided to pull back. Just as his men left their entrenchments, Smith's men spilled over them, capturing some stragglers and scattering a regiment that had failed to get the order to retreat. Meanwhile, Hooker agreed to let Howard proceed to Wauhatchie with some cavalry. Geary's men continued to hold fast, though they began to run low on ammunition. Just as Bratton began to sense victory, he received
8424-526: Was able to cross around 4:30 p.m., considerably behind schedule. Wilder, concerned about his left flank after Minty's loss of Reed's Bridge, withdrew and established a new blocking position east of the Lafayette Road, near the Viniard farm. By dark, Johnson's division had halted in front of Wilder's position. Walker had crossed the creek, but his troops were well scattered along the road behind Johnson. Buckner had been able to push only one brigade across
8528-445: Was able to drive off the Confederates. During the fighting Oates was taken out of action by a gunshot wound to the hip; at this time his men started retreating. Simultaneously, Stanley's oarsmen began to ferry Turchin's men across the river. Hazen and Turchin's combined force now outflanked the Confederates, who retreated to the south toward Wauhatchie. The "Cracker Line" having been opened, General Hazen joyfully exclaimed "We've knocked
8632-497: Was assigned two brigades under Brigadier Generals William B. Hazen and John B. Turchin as well as the Engineer Brigade under Col. Timothy Robbins Stanley . Turchin's men would march overland across a bend in the Tennessee River known as Moccasin Point and hold the east bank at Brown's Ferry. Hazen's men had the more hazardous task. Organized into 50 squads of 21 men each (20 soldiers and 1 officer) Hazen's men would ferry down
8736-513: Was caught up in the retreat as they were replenishing their ammunition. Col. James Sheffield's brigade from Hood's division drove back Grose's and Cruft's brigades. Brig. Gen. John Turchin 's brigade (Reynolds's division) counterattacked and briefly held off Sheffield, but the Confederates had caused a major penetration in the Federal line in the area of the Brotherton and Dyer fields. Stewart did not have sufficient forces to maintain that position, and
8840-516: Was concentrated around Lee and Gordon's Mill, which Bragg assumed was the left flank, but Thomas was arrayed behind him, covering a wide front from Crawfish Springs (division of Maj. Gen. James S. Negley ), the Widow Glenn's house (Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds ), Kelly field (Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird ), to around the McDonald farm (Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan ). Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger 's Reserve Corps
8944-552: Was convinced that the Union crossing would be above the city, in conjunction with Burnside's advancing Army of the Ohio from Knoxville. The first crossing of the Tennessee River was accomplished by the XX Corps at Caperton's Ferry, 4 miles from Stevenson on August 29, where construction began on a 1,250-foot pontoon bridge. The second crossing, of the XIV Corps, was at Shellmound, Tennessee, on August 30. They were quickly followed by most of
9048-439: Was determined to reoccupy Chattanooga and decided to meet a part of Rosecrans's army, defeat it, and then move back into the city. On September 17 he headed north, intending to attack the isolated XXI Corps . As Bragg marched north on September 18, his cavalry and infantry fought with Union cavalry and mounted infantry, which were armed with Spencer repeating rifles . The two armies fought at Alexander's Bridge and Reed's Bridge, as
9152-570: Was encamped at LaFayette, some 20 miles (32 km) south of Chattanooga. Confederate soldiers who posed as deserters deliberately added to this impression. Thomas firmly cautioned Rosecrans that a pursuit of Bragg was unwise because the Army of the Cumberland was too widely dispersed and its supply lines were tenuous. Rosecrans, exultant at his success in capturing Chattanooga, discounted Thomas's advice. He ordered McCook to swing across Lookout Mountain at Winston's Gap and use his cavalry to break Bragg's railroad supply line at Resaca, Georgia . Crittenden
9256-480: Was forced to order Bate to withdraw east of the Lafayette Road. At around 2 p.m., the division of Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson (Hood's corps) encountered the advance of Union Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis 's two brigade division of the XX corps, marching north from Crawfish Springs. Johnson's men attacked Col. Hans Heg 's brigade on Davis's left and forced it across the LaFayette Road. Hood ordered Johnson to continue
9360-492: Was frustrated enough with Rosecrans's delay that he ordered him to move forward immediately and to report daily the movement of each corps until he crossed the Tennessee River. Rosecrans was outraged at the tone of "recklessness, conceit and malice" of Halleck's order and insisted that he would be courting disaster if he were not permitted to delay his advance until at least August 17. Rosecrans knew that he would have difficulty receiving supplies from his base on any advance across
9464-482: Was now more satisfied with the resources provided, and looked to strike the Union Army as soon as he achieved the strength he needed. The campaign and major battle take their name from West Chickamauga Creek. In popular histories, it is often said that Chickamauga is a Cherokee word meaning "river of death". Peter Cozzens, author of This Terrible Sound , wrote that this is a "loose translation". Glenn Tucker presents
9568-497: Was replaced by Brig. Gen. Richard Johnson 's division of McCook's XX Corps near the LaFayette Road. Johnson's lead brigades, under Col. Philemon Baldwin and Brig. Gen. August Willich engaged Jackson's brigade, protecting Croxton's withdrawal. Although outnumbered, Jackson held under the pressure until his ammunition ran low and he called for reinforcements. Cheatham sent in Maney's small brigade to replace Jackson, but they were no match for
9672-498: Was running low. Thomas sent Baird's division to assist, which advanced with two brigades forward and one in reserve. Brig. Gen. John King 's brigade of U.S. Army regulars relieved Croxton. The brigade of Col. Benjamin Scribner took up a position on King's right and Col. John Starkweather 's brigade remained in reserve. With superior numbers and firepower, Scribner and King were able to start pushing back Wilson and Ector. Bragg committed
9776-420: Was shot dead from his horse attempting to lead a counterattack. Deshler's brigade missed their objective entirely and Deshler was shot in the chest while examining ammunition boxes. Brig. Gen. Preston Smith led his brigade forward to support Deshler and mistakenly rode into the lines of Col. Joseph B. Dodge's brigade (Johnson's division), where he was shot down. By 9 p.m. Cleburne's men retained possession of
9880-527: Was sick in bed and the road through Dug Gap was obstructed by felled timber. He advised calling off the operation. Hindman, who had executed Bragg's orders promptly and had advanced to within 4 miles (6.4 km) of Negley's division, became overly cautious when he realized that Hill would not be attacking on schedule and ordered his men to stop. Bragg reinforced Hindman with two divisions of Buckner's corps, which were encamped near Lee and Gordon's Mill . When Buckner reached Hindman at 5 p.m. on September 10,
9984-868: Was spread along the northern end of the battlefield from Rossville to McAfee's Church. Bragg's plan called for an attack on the supposed Union left flank by the corps of Maj. Gens. Simon B. Buckner , John Bell Hood , and W.H.T. Walker , screened by Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest 's cavalry to the north, with Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham 's division held in reserve in the center and Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne 's division in reserve at Thedford's Ford. Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman 's division faced Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mill and Breckinridge's faced Negley. The Battle of Chickamauga opened almost by accident, when pickets from Col. Daniel McCook 's brigade of Granger's Reserve Corps moved toward Jay's Mill in search of water. McCook had moved from Rossville on September 18 to aid Col. Robert Minty's brigade. His men established
10088-404: Was that each army would be attempting to fight a shifting battle while shifting its own position. ... Each general would have to conduct a battle while shuffling his own units northward toward an enemy of whose position he could get only the vaguest idea. Strange and wonderful opportunities would loom out of the leaves, vines, and gunsmoke, be touched and vaguely sensed, and then fade away again into
10192-478: Was the first to hit three Federal brigades around the Brotherton Farm. Firing until their ammunition was gone, Clayton's men were replaced with Brig. Gen. John Brown 's brigade. Brown drove Beatty's and Dick's men from the woods east of the LaFayette Road and paused to regroup. Stewart committed his last brigade, under Brig. Gen. William Bate , around 3:30 p.m. and routed Van Cleve's division. Hazen's brigade
10296-507: Was the tipping point that caused Wright's brigade to join the retreat with Cheatham's other units. For a third time, Bragg ordered a fresh division to move in, this time Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart 's (Buckner's corps) from its position at Thedford Ford around noon. Stewart encountered Wright's retreating brigade at the Brock farm and decided to attack Van Cleve's position on his left, a decision he made under his own authority. With his brigades deployed in column, Brig. Gen. Henry Clayton 's
10400-423: Was to be made at ferry landing and at another gorge downriver. On the morning of October 27, there was one company guarding the ferry itself, with five companies nearby in reserve. Hazen's men reached the landing points at 5:00 am amidst relative silence, though some Federal soldiers had broken silence when they were fired upon early on. Some of the storming parties slightly missed their objectives, but ultimately
10504-510: Was to resupply the Union army. Grant and Thomas initiated the "Cracker Line Operation" on October 26, 1863. It was designed to open the road to Chattanooga from Brown's Ferry on the Tennessee River with a simultaneous advance up Lookout Valley, securing the Kelley's Ferry Road. Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith , Chief Engineer of the Military Division of the Mississippi, who conceived
10608-477: Was to take Chattanooga and then turn south in pursuit of Bragg. Thomas was to continue his advance toward LaFayette. Thomas's lead division, under Maj. Gen. James Negley , intended to cross McLemore's Cove and use Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain to reach LaFayette. Negley was 12 hours ahead of Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird 's division, the nearest reinforcements. Braxton Bragg hoped to trap Negley by attacking through
10712-475: Was too late—all of Crittenden's corps had passed by and concentrated at Lee and Gordon's Mill. For the next four days, both armies attempted to improve their dispositions. Rosecrans continued to concentrate his forces, intending to withdraw as a single body to Chattanooga. Bragg, learning of McCook's movement at Alpine, feared the Federals might be planning a double envelopment. At a council of war on September 15, Bragg's corps commanders agreed that an offensive in
10816-490: Was wounded during the attack. By 6 p.m., darkness was falling, and Braxton Bragg had not abandoned his idea of pushing the Federal army to the south. He ordered Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's division (Hill's corps) to join Polk on the army's right flank. This area of the battlefield had been quiet for several hours as the fighting moved progressively southward. George Thomas had been consolidating his lines, withdrawing slightly to
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