Apsan Park ( Korean : 앞산공원 ) is a large wilderness park located in the south of Daegu , South Korea . It covers a series of valleys and peaks of Apsan mountain.
159-779: Inside the park is a museum dedicated to the Korean War , the Nakdong River Battle Museum . The museum also contains an anti- communism hall. Nearby is a small amusement park and restaurants. A gondola leads to one of the peaks, and a series of trails also lead to the various peaks. Ansil-sa and a couple of other Buddhist temples are located within the park. The area of Apsan park is 1.653 km. 35°49′12″N 128°34′44″E / 35.820°N 128.579°E / 35.820; 128.579 Korean War Korean Demilitarized Zone established Together: 1,742,000 The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)
318-468: A battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment , coming out of division reserve, following to clear the PVA out of the pass and join the task force in town. Though not the operation Hoge had in mind, Hazel's foray on 24 May had accomplished more than simply run some PVA out of town: Hazel's reinforced column returned to Chuncheon early on 25 May without encountering PVA along the road or in town. Air observers scanning
477-477: A bridgehead over the Soyang, throwing a treadway bridge over the river, then was to seize Inje to block large enemy groups that air observers had sighted withdrawing up the P'ungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road. Behind these groups, the 38th Infantry was to continue its pursuit. In getting within 10 miles (16 km) of Hyon-ni on the 24th, that regiment had had as much trouble with the roadbed giving way under its tanks and with
636-506: A division of the PVA 20th Army blocked the regiment's attempts to advance north of town and east toward the reservoir. The ROK 6th Division moving up on the right out of the Chuncheon area met no opposition, but advanced only a few miles through the rough ground below the western reaches of the reservoir. Much of the PVA/KPA's gateway to safety thus remained open. On 28 May air observers reported
795-474: A further remodeling, Almond dissolved Task Force Able , as previously planned, and reassigned its zone to the 3rd Division, which, with the ROK 9th and 8th Divisions still attached, was to continue clearing its wide east flank zone. On X Corps' opposite flank, the 1st Marine Division was to continue its drive along the west side of Route 24, a drive which again on 24 May had amounted to a plodding short advance, to capture
954-501: A general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change. While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by
1113-492: A hillside to the east. A division psychological warfare team en route to Chuncheon to broadcast a surrender appeal came on the scene three hours later and turned back to the lines of the 32nd Infantry, where they reported the ambush to 1st Lt. Ivan G. Stanaway, a platoon leader of the regimental tank company then lining up his platoon on the road to join Task Force Hazel . Taking his tanks forward immediately, Stanaway picked up
1272-751: A sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the fighting was beyond the Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council, some legal scholars posited that deciding upon this type of action required the unanimous vote of all five permanent members. UN May%E2%80%93June 1951 counteroffensive UN victory [REDACTED] United Nations The UN May–June 1951 counteroffensive
1431-465: A skirmish line, Newman's tank crews opened fire with all weapons as PVA broke for the hills on both sides of the road or fled north across the Soyang, leaving behind a litter of dead, supplies, pack animals, and vehicles. By 16:30 Newman's tankers entered Umyang-ni and took up positions to continue firing on enemy groups scurrying for safety both below and above the river. By the time the main body of Task Force Gerhart arrived two hours later, Newman's unit
1590-572: A task force northeast up Route 17 to seize Kap'yong while the remainder of his division followed astride the road. The ROK 2nd Division, shifting to the Corps' left flank after Bryan's forces passed through it en route to Kap'yong, was to attack northwest along secondary Route 15 toward Taebo-ri . Still trying to animate his forces, Hoge again directed pursuit tactics and authorized them to bypass enemy groups up to company in size. His divisions advanced easily on 23 May against an accelerating withdrawal by
1749-598: A telegram. Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention. Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy
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#17330846897901908-411: A way out. While the 17th and 21st Regiments turned north to join the general Corps' advance, mop-up operations by the 5th Infantry and ROK 19th Regiment, 6th Division raised the prisoner toll to around 2,000. During a final sweep of the area by the 5th Infantry on 28 May, PVA taken captive, many of whom surrendered in large groups, brought the total to nearly 38,000. Action in the general Corps' advance
2067-612: Is most used in Taiwan (Republic of China), Hong Kong and Macau . In the US, the war was initially described by President Harry S. Truman as a " police action " as the US never formally declared war and the operation was conducted under the auspices of the UN. It has been sometimes referred to in the English-speaking world as "The Forgotten War" or "The Unknown War" because of the lack of public attention it received relative to World War II and
2226-412: Is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war." While there was hesitance by some in the US government to get involved, considerations about Japan fed into the decision to engage on behalf of South Korea. After the fall of China to the communists, US experts saw Japan as the region's counterweight to the Soviet Union and China. While there
2385-486: The 27th Division around Inje, the 2nd Division next to the east, and the 13th Division, currently covering X Corps' rear, on the east flank. Other than this jam of KPA troops between Hyon-ni and Inje, the only PVA/KPA forces still below Route 24 were stragglers and isolated groups that had become separated from their units in the confusion of the withdrawal. Urging speedy attacks to bag the PVA/KPA forces remaining below Route 24, Almond directed Task Force Baker to lead
2544-611: The 32nd Infantry Regiment operating in the area straddling the road send a strong tank-infantry patrol to develop enemy defenses in Chuncheon and check the Soyang River above town for crossing sites, the commander of the 32nd shaped a small task force from the attached 7th Reconnaissance Company, a platoon of the regimental tank company, and a squad of engineers to be led by the reconnaissance company commander, Captain Charles E. Hazel. Task Force Hazel set out under orders simply to reconnoiter
2703-506: The 38th Parallel from which they had withdrawn at the start of the spring offensive and in some areas advanced to Line Wyoming further north. With the discussions for the start of ceasefire negotiations underway, the UN advance stopped on the Kansas - Wyoming Line which was fortified as the Main line of resistance and despite some limited attacks this would essentially remain the frontline throughout
2862-516: The Able force had taken Habaejae and the 3rd Division coming up from the south had captured the road junction 4 miles (6.4 km) to the east, the task force was to be dissolved and the 15th Infantry was to join the operations of its own division. In what amounted to the beginning of one of two major spearheads of the corps counterattack, Almond on the afternoon of 22 May had sent the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (187th RCT) up Route 24 to take
3021-631: The Bukhan River dammed on the west to form the Chongpyong Reservoir and along the upper bank of the Hongch'on River emptying into the reservoir from the east. A rapid advance to Line Georgia , Hoge had believed, would allow his four divisions (the US 24th Infantry Division and the ROK 2nd and 6th Divisions and the US 7th Infantry Division , arrayed west to east) to reach the PVA/KPA reserves. I Corps' forces had gained ground rapidly, especially
3180-907: The Burma campaign (1941-45). The communists, led by, among others, Kim Il Sung , fought the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria . At the Cairo Conference in 1943, China, the UK, and the US decided that "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent". At the Tehran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviet Union promised to join its allies in the Pacific War within three months of
3339-476: The Cold War . Fighting ended in 1953 with an armistice but no peace treaty , leading to the ongoing Korean conflict . After the end of World War II in 1945, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for 35 years, was divided by the Soviet Union and the US into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel , with plans for a future independent state. Due to political disagreements and influence from their backers,
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#17330846897903498-534: The Imjin River in the west. The IX Corps' objective on 24 May was Line Topeka , which in the 7th Division's new zone on the east wing lay just above Chuncheon. Aiming to ease the division's attack and thus accelerate its coming move on the Hwacheon road center, Hoge ordered General Claude Ferenbaugh to lead with a 15 miles (24 km) armored drive up Route 29 into Chuncheon. Following Ferenbaugh's instructions that
3657-529: The Iron Triangle . Ridgway recommended a two-division attack moving on the Route 33 axis towards Ch'orwon . He thought such an attack would have a good chance of succeeding since intelligence indicated that only four PVA armies occupied the 40 miles (64 km) sector of the front west of Chuncheon and since PVA commander Peng Dehuai would need at least a week or ten days to shift any material part of his mass from
3816-447: The People's Volunteer Army is commonly and officially known as the "Resisting America and Assisting Korea War" ( Chinese : 抗美援朝战争 ; pinyin : Kàngměi Yuáncháo Zhànzhēng ), although the term " Chosŏn War" ( Chinese : 朝鮮戰爭 ; pinyin : Cháoxiǎn Zhànzhēng ) is sometimes used unofficially. The term " Hán (Korean) War" ( Chinese : 韓戰 ; pinyin : Hán Zhàn )
3975-628: The Pusan Perimeter in the peninsula's southeast. On 15 September, UN forces landed at Inchon near Seoul, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines. UN forces broke out from the perimeter on 18 September, re-captured Seoul, and invaded North Korea in October, capturing Pyongyang and advancing towards the Yalu River —the border with China. On 19 October, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) crossed
4134-517: The Republic of Korea Army (ROK) 1st Division toward Munsan , the US 1st Cavalry Division north through Uijongbu and up Route 33, and the US 25th Infantry Division north along Route 3 toward the road hub in the Yongp'yong River valley. To the east IX Corps commander Lieutenant general William M. Hoge had established an intermediate line, Georgia , whose central trace lay just above the lateral stretch of
4293-836: The Topeka segment was occupied, strikes to start closing the bag were to be made toward the Iron Triangle, one up Route 3 to secure a road center in the Yongp'yong River valley some 20 miles (32 km) above Uijongbu , another up Route 17 beyond Chuncheon to seize the complex of road junctions at the west end of the Hwacheon Reservoir . On 20 May, with the objective of reaching the main bodies of PVA/KPA forces, including reserves, before they could organize for defensive action, I Corps commander Lieutenant general Frank W. Milburn set his three divisions on courses for Line Topeka some 15 miles (24 km) above his Seoul defenses, aiming
4452-773: The Vietnam War . Imperial Japan diminished the influence of China over Korea in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). A decade later, after defeating Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War , Japan made the Korean Empire its protectorate with the Eulsa Treaty in 1905, then annexed it with the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910 . Many Korean nationalists fled the country. The Provisional Government of
4611-415: The mass killing of suspected communists by Seoul and the torture and starvation of prisoners of war by Pyongyang. North Korea became one of the most heavily bombed countries in history, and virtually all of Korea's major cities were destroyed. No peace treaty has been signed, making the war a frozen conflict . In South Korea, the war is usually referred to as the "625 War" ( 6·25 전쟁 ; 六二五戰爭 ),
4770-557: The victory in Europe . The USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria on 8 August 1945. By 10 August, the Red Army had begun to occupy the north of Korea. On 10 August in Washington , US Colonels Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel III were assigned to divide Korea into Soviet and US occupation zones and proposed the 38th parallel as the dividing line. This was incorporated into
4929-515: The "625 Upheaval" ( 6·25 동란 ; 六二五動亂 ; yugio dongnan ), or simply "625", reflecting the date of its commencement on 25 June. In North Korea, the war is officially referred to as the Fatherland Liberation War ( Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng ) or the Chosŏn [Korean] War ( 조선전쟁 ; Chosŏn chŏnjaeng ). In mainland China, the segment of the war after the intervention of
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5088-556: The 12th and 15th Armies coming out of the X Corps' zone. The observers reported some 10–12,000 troops and numerous vehicles and artillery pieces moving in long columns through the ground below the Hwacheon Reservoir and heading northwest toward Hwacheon town. Artillery and an entire fighter group attacked these columns while Hoge moved to strengthen his attack to seize the Hwacheon town-Hwacheon Reservoir road center and block their escape. Hoge's orders, issued early on 26 May, called for
5247-522: The 15th RCT, the bulk of the ROK 3rd Regiment, and a battery of the 300th Field Artillery Battalion, the last two units coming from the disbanded Task Force Yoke . With characteristic attention to custom-making assault forces, Almond reshaped the force late on 22 May, passing the South Koreans back to the ROK 7th Division, which was to go into Corps' reserve, pulling the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment and returning it to 3rd Division control, and adding
5406-401: The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, occupied the remainder of the pass north of Soksa-ri on 23 May while Soule maneuvered other units of his "corps" forward for the advance toward the road junction east of Habaejae. The 65th Infantry Regiment took position west of the 7th Infantry while the ROK 9th Division brought up the rear in reserve. All contacts during the day were with KPA rearguards covering
5565-414: The 1st Marine Division along the west side of Route 24 carried the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments into the extremely rough ground rising toward Hill 1051 ( 37°52′16″N 127°57′22″E / 37.871°N 127.956°E / 37.871; 127.956 ) (Kari-san). In a gain of about 4 miles (6.4 km), exhausting climbs and descents felled more Marines than did encounters with rearguard forces of
5724-416: The 1st Marine Division's advance on Yanggu and pressed Ruffner to bridge the Soyang and seize Inje so that Task Force Baker could form and open its drive on Kansong. Almond also added a shallower swing to his attempt to cut off enemy forces ahead of ROK I Corps, ordering the 3rd Division to organize a reinforced regimental combat team as Task Force Charlie and send it over the road leading northeastward from
5883-399: The 23rd Infantry to move forward at daylight to clear the roadblock. At each position of the deep block, forces of the PVA 106th Regiment fought a dogged defense until virtually annihilated. Regimental tanks broke through on the road and reached Task Force Gerhart in the afternoon, but darkness fell before the 23rd Infantry eliminated the 106th Regiment and reached the intersection to stop for
6042-518: The 2nd Division to seize the Umyang-ni bridge site on the Soyang. Almond directed Ruffner to assemble a task force of two tank companies, an infantry battalion, and engineers at Han'gye and start up the road at noon. He instructed Ruffner to place the task force under the commander of the division's 72nd Tank Battalion, Brubaker, then in the P'ungam-ni area where his headquarters and one company had been with Task Force Yoke and Task Force Able . Ruffner
6201-495: The 32nd Infantry's lines around 21:00. Amid, and perhaps because of, the anxiety caused by the disappearance of Ferenbaugh, Task Force Hazel shortly before dark received withdrawal orders relayed from division headquarters. With the Sinjom-ni-Wonch'ang pass stretch of the road bordered by PVA, the prudent move was to pull the force below the PVA blocking position for resupply. Hazel again worked his column through PVA fire in
6360-433: The 38th Infantry was far enough forward to fire on the road up to 2 miles (3.2 km) beyond Hyon-ni, and during the remaining hours of daylight fighter-bombers attacked enemy groups in and around Inje while B-26s laced the forces between Inje and Hyon-ni with 13 tons of bombs, all producing a high score of casualties. The pursuit of the 38th Infantry, however, came to an abrupt halt 3 miles (4.8 km) short of Hyon-ni in
6519-423: The 7th Infantry Division below Chuncheon and the 24th at Kap'yong, whence a secondary valley road left Route 17 and ran northeast to rejoin it near the village of Chiam-ni ( 37°58′48″N 127°36′22″E / 37.98°N 127.606°E / 37.98; 127.606 ). General Edward Almond 's plan for the X Corps' counterattack commencing on 23 May amounted to an enlargement of limited attacks launched
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6678-737: The Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea. By spring 1950, he believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under Mao Zedong had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb , breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance. The Soviets had cracked
6837-399: The Chuncheon area and return to regimental lines. 8 miles (13 km) below Chuncheon Task Force Hazel came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire from hills around the village of Sinjom-ni ( 37°45′25″N 127°46′48″E / 37.757°N 127.78°E / 37.757; 127.78 ), where Route 29 began climbing to Wonch'ang pass cutting through the southern rim of
6996-414: The Chuncheon area in preparation for a move up on the side of the 7th Division on 27 May. The spearhead 17th and 21st Regiments joined forces near Chiam-ni early on 26 May while in the general IX Corps' advance the ROK 19th Regiment, 6th Division pushed north through scattered resistance and reached positions within 3 miles (4.8 km) of Chiam-ni. Three regiments thus penned the PVA between Route 17 and
7155-425: The Chuncheon basin. The PVA 60th Army had set a regiment in blocking positions along with winding stretch of road from Sinjom-ni through the pass, but had not employed antitank weapons. His battalion not yet displaced far enough forward to be within range, the artillery observer with Hazel was unable to adjust fire onto the hills. After return fire on the hillsides by Hazel's gunners found few marks, Hazel ordered back
7314-481: The Habaejae area on the morning of 26 May to take Yangyang on the coast. There was still one opportunity to intercept a sizable enemy force. After the rain lightened enough to allow aircraft aloft in the afternoon of the 26th, observers scanned the X Corps' zone. The Hyon-ni-Inje stretch of road and connecting roads running north and west beyond Inje remained swarming with PVA/KPA troops and vehicles. Artillery supporting
7473-552: The Habaejae road junction. A combination of difficult terrain, heavy, if spotty, resistance, and a foot-dragging performance by the South Korean troops had stopped Ladue 3 miles (4.8 km) short of his objective. For the general attack, Almond elected to replace the Yoke forces with Task Force Able , built around the 15th Regimental Combat Team (15th RCT), which was to be detached from the 3rd Division and operate under Corps' control. Once
7632-529: The Inje road center was to be blocked and any substantial part of the PVA/KPA throng on the Hyon-ni-Inje road rolled up from the south. The PVA 27th Army was already above Route 24 en route through the area above the Hwacheon Reservoir to take position behind the 20th Army along Route 17, and KPA V Corps was beginning to organize defenses between the reservoir and the outskirts of Inje. The latter's 6th Division entering
7791-633: The Iron Triangle. Although IX Corps had gained its road center objective too late to trap the PVA coming from the X Corps' zone, the overall estimate of enemy casualties during the Corps' counterattack, including the last three days of May, exceeded 62,000. Smaller losses during the Chinese offensive raised the Corps' estimate to more than 73,000, of which 44,705 were reported killed, 19,753 wounded and 8,749 captured. During all of May, IX Corps' units themselves suffered 341 killed, 2,011 wounded and 195 missing. On 24 May Almond ordered an armored attack up Route 24 by
7950-558: The Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel. Appointed as military governor, Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK 1945–48). In December 1945, Korea was administered by a US–Soviet Union Joint Commission , as agreed at the Moscow Conference , to grant independence after a five-year trusteeship. Waiting five years for independence
8109-449: The Kap'yong-Chiam-ni road in a rough triangle formed by the two roads and the South Korean line. Heavy, low-hanging clouds held aircraft on the ground all day, but artillery fire pummeled the PVA continuously. While concentrating on trapping the PVA group, the 17th Infantry sent a tank-infantry patrol up Route 17 toward Hwacheon. 4 miles (6.4 km) below the town the patrol discovered the rear of
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#17330846897908268-724: The North Korean government with matériel and manpower. According to Chinese sources, the North Koreans donated 2,000 railway cars worth of supplies while thousands of Koreans served in the Chinese PLA during the war. North Korea also provided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with a safe refuge for non-combatants and communications with the rest of China. As a token of gratitude, between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean veterans who served in
8427-474: The North. On 28 June, Rhee ordered the massacre of suspected political opponents in his own country. In five days, the ROK, which had 95,000 troops on 25 June, was down to less than 22,000 troops. In early July, when US forces arrived, what was left of the ROK was placed under US operational command of the United Nations Command . The Truman administration was unprepared for the invasion. Korea
8586-513: The P'ungam-ni-Hyon-ni road, 2nd Division forces advancing in that area on 23 May encountered only feeble delaying actions. Somewhat stouter, but not immovable blocking positions confronted the 38th Infantry on the right, where the PVA 80th Division of the 27th Army apparently was trying to hold open the Habaejae- Sangam-ni ( 37°52′30″N 128°15′25″E / 37.875°N 128.257°E / 37.875; 128.257 ) segment of
8745-566: The PLA were sent back along with their weapons, and they later played a significant role in the initial invasion of South Korea. China promised to support the North Koreans in the event of a war against South Korea. By 1948, a North Korea-backed insurgency had broken out in the southern half of the peninsula. This was exacerbated by the undeclared border war between the Koreas, which saw division-level engagements and thousands of deaths on both sides. The ROK
8904-432: The PVA 81st Division and 93rd Regiment, 31st Division, as they withdrew to Habaejae. It was obvious, especially in the I and IX Corps' zones, that a head start and fast marches so far had allowed the main enemy bodies to withdraw well out of the reach of the counterattack. Van Fleet was nevertheless confident that his forces, because of the light opposition to their advance, still had a better than even chance of blocking
9063-407: The PVA 63rd and 64th Armies , but few units gained more than 5 miles (8.0 km). In the deepest move, Bryan's task force of tanks and the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment captured Kap'yong after meeting only a smattering of opposition along Route 17. Hoge nevertheless now had two American divisions positioned for advances over roads converging near the lower edge of his road center objective,
9222-526: The PVA cramming Route 17 and as the right arm of an encircling move to bottle the PVA sighted to the west and northwest of town. Reaching around these forces on the west was the 21st Infantry Regiment moving up the Kap'yong-Chiam-ni road in the 24th Division zone. The juncture of the two regiments in the Chiam-ni area would block the PVA retreat, and by dark the two forces were within 6 miles (9.7 km) of doing so. Earlier, at midday, air observers located forces of
9381-437: The PVA force observed passing through that area the day before. The score for the day was thus one PVA force cornered and another, somewhat larger, lost. As the 21st Infantry completed its advance to Chiam-ni, the regimental headquarters company and the medical company set up a joint perimeter away from any of the rifle companies 3 miles (4.8 km) southwest of Chiam-ni. Some 300 PVA attacking northwest after midnight against
9540-490: The ROK 1st Division, which entered Munsan-ni at midmorning on 21 May, and all three divisions were on or near Line Topeka by evening of 23 May. But the attack had amounted to a futile chase as the KPA I Corps and PVA 63rd Army retreated faster than the I Corps advanced. Tank and tank-infantry forces probing well to the front of the main body of the 25th Infantry Division consistently failed to make solid contact and raised doubt that
9699-501: The ROK had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-plane air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT-6 advanced-trainer airplanes. Large U.S. garrisons and air forces were in Japan, but only 200–300 U.S. troops were in Korea. At dawn on 25 June 1950, the KPA crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. It justified its assault with
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#17330846897909858-524: The ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports. On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in Haeju on 15–17 June. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright. On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve
10017-519: The ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in South Cholla and Taegu . By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, North Korea made final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion
10176-523: The Red Army halted at the 38th parallel for three weeks to await the arrival of US forces. On 7 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur issued Proclamation No. 1 to the people of Korea, announcing US military control over Korea south of the 38th parallel and establishing English as the official language during military control. On 8 September, US Lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived in Incheon to accept
10335-627: The Republic of Korea was founded in 1919 in Nationalist China . It failed to achieve international recognition, failed to unite the nationalist groups, and had a fractious relationship with its US-based founding president, Syngman Rhee . In China, the nationalist National Revolutionary Army and the communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) helped organize Korean refugees against the Japanese military, which had also occupied parts of China. The Nationalist-backed Koreans, led by Yi Pom-Sok , fought in
10494-402: The Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help. On 4 July the Soviet deputy foreign minister accused the U.S. of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea. The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from US Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as
10653-426: The South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather, denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with insurgents and build more partisan cadres; North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA. On 1 October 1949,
10812-422: The South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him. Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea. PLA forces were still embroiled in
10971-435: The South, armed by the U.S. military with mostly small arms, but no heavy weaponry. Several generals, such as Lee Kwon-mu , were PLA veterans born to ethnic Koreans in China. While older histories of the conflict often referred to these ethnic Korean PLA veterans as being sent from northern Korea to fight in the Chinese Civil War before being sent back, recent Chinese archival sources studied by Kim Donggill indicate that this
11130-617: The South. The ROK was being trained by the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June. Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened. The Central Intelligence Agency noted
11289-592: The Soviet Union would not move against US forces in Korea. The Truman administration believed it could intervene in Korea without undermining its commitments elsewhere. On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea with Resolution 82 . The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power , had boycotted Council meetings since January 1950, protesting Taiwan 's occupation of China's permanent seat . The Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to
11448-725: The Soviets agreed to the establishment of a communist government led by Kim Il Sung. The 1948 North Korean parliamentary elections took place in August. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1948 and the US in 1949. With the end of the war with Japan , the Chinese Civil War resumed in earnest between the Communists and the Nationalist -led government. While the Communists were struggling for supremacy in Manchuria, they were supported by
11607-402: The Soyang, killing, capturing, or routing about 100 PVA and punishing a large force discovered running off the back side of Hill 302 hugging Chuncheon on the northeast. In a scramble to get away from the probing tanks, the PVA made no attempt to return fire. As his tank crews cleared Chuncheon, Hazel received orders from his regimental commander to remain in town for the night. Two platoons of
11766-425: The UN forces, supply difficulties and mounting losses from UN air and artillery strikes. On 20 May the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) and Korean People's Army (KPA) began to withdraw after suffering heavy losses, simultaneously the UN launched their counteroffensive in the west and central portions of the front. On 24 May, once the PVA/KPA advance had been halted, the UN began a counteroffensive there also. In
11925-593: The US General Order No. 1 , which responded to the Japanese surrender on 15 August. Explaining the choice of the 38th parallel, Rusk observed, "Even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by U. S. [ sic ] forces in the event of Soviet disagreement ... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops". Joseph Stalin , however, maintained his wartime policy of cooperation, and on 16 August,
12084-642: The Yalu and entered the war on the side of the north. UN forces retreated from North Korea in December, following the PVA's first and second offensive . Communist forces captured Seoul again in January 1951 before losing it to a UN counter-offensive two months later. After an abortive Chinese spring offensive , UN forces retook territory roughly up to the 38th parallel. Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but dragged on as
12243-527: The Yanggu area would oppose the 1st Marine Division, which on 26 May was still moving forces up to the Soyang for its attack on the town. As the 23rd Infantry had discovered, the 12th Division was coming in alongside the 6th to defend the ground reaching east to Inje. Still on the road below Inje, the 32nd Division was to move into a corps reserve position. Farthest south on the road, the KPA II Corps planned to deploy
12402-517: The Yanggu area. As part of the operation to seize the Umyang-ni bridge site and subsequently the Yanggu-Inje area, Almond had directed the 1st Marine Division to have a regiment follow Task Force Gerhart up Route 24 as far as 5 miles (8.0 km) below Umyang-ni where a lateral trail intersected from the east and continued northwest toward the Soyang. Veering off at the intersection, the Marine regiment
12561-425: The Yanggu-Inje area, he was to mount an attack northeast along Route 24 to the coast in concert with a northwestward drive by General Paik Sun-yup 's ROK I Corps forces. Success would depend on the speed of the two-pronged advance, especially on a rapid attack by X Corps to block enemy avenues of escape. Milburn attempted to hurry I Corps with orders for a top-speed move to Line Kansas . Driving up Route 3 ahead of
12720-496: The Yongp'yong River valley road hub more than 10 miles (16 km) ahead of the division could be taken in time to block PVA/KPA movement through it. Despite light resistance, the IX Corps' attack from the outset had been more cautious than aggressive. After a short advance on 20 May, Hoge sharply reprimanded his division commanders for failing to push their attacks, but gains on 21 May were even shorter. Attempting again to accelerate
12879-461: The additional ground assigned to X Corps in the Hajinbu-ri area. About to attack with the approximation of a corps, Soule planned to send his 7th and 65th Regiments toward the pass and road junction, bring the damaged ROK 9th Division back into action in the Hajinbu-ri area, and keep the untried ROK 8th Division in reserve. Task Force Yoke , the mix of: the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment ;
13038-577: The advance, Hoge directed his forces to employ pursuit tactics and move no less than 6 miles (9.7 km) on 22 May, a distance that would carry them 2 miles (3.2 km) to 3 miles (4.8 km) beyond Line Georgia , far enough, if done speedily enough, Hoge believed, to break through covering forces and make contact with the main bodies of withdrawing PVA. The attack on the 22nd, however, took his four divisions no farther than Line Georgia . In new attack orders for 23 May, Hoge made zone adjustments, obliged to do so on his right by Van Fleet's orders moving
13197-425: The arc of the perimeter manned by the medical company were thrown back with heavy casualties. Survivors withdrew to nearby high ground and sprayed the perimeter with machine gun fire, lifting it from time to time through the night as more PVA moved forward to attack. Each assault was turned back in close fighting. The 5th Infantry Regiment , arriving from the south around dawn, broke up the last force of PVA to approach
13356-420: The area to that end. The Truman administration still refrained from committing troops on the ground, because advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone. The Truman administration was uncertain whether the attack was a ploy by the Soviet Union, or just a test of US resolve. The decision to commit ground troops became viable when a communiqué was received on 27 June indicating
13515-516: The border, starting in May 1949. Border clashes between South and North continued on 4 August 1949, when thousands of North Korean troops attacked South Korean troops occupying territory north of the 38th parallel. The 2nd and 18th ROK Infantry Regiments repulsed attacks in Kuksa-bong, and KPA troops were "completely routed". Border incidents decreased by the start of 1950. Meanwhile, counterinsurgencies in
13674-674: The border, these guerrillas launched an offensive in September aimed at undermining the South Korean government and preparing the country for the KPA's arrival in force. This offensive failed. However, the guerrillas were now entrenched in the Taebaek-san region of the North Gyeongsang Province and the border areas of the Gangwon Province . While the insurgency was ongoing, the ROKA and KPA engaged in battalion-sized battles along
13833-496: The bulk of the ROK 3rd Regiment; all but two companies of the 72nd Tank Battalion; a platoon of the 15th Infantry Regiment's tank company; a battery of the 300th Field Artillery Battalion ; and a tactical air control party organized by Almond under the deputy corps commander, Colonel Ladue, had attacked through the lines of the ROK 7th Division in the P'ungam-ni ( 37°42′50″N 128°11′02″E / 37.714°N 128.184°E / 37.714; 128.184 ) area to seize
13992-399: The bulk of the ROK 6th Division, which was being pinched out of its central zone by the converging attacks of the 17th and 21st Regiments, to move to the Corps' east flank and advance with the 7th Division to seize the road center. Leaving the 19th Regiment in the central zone to attack directly toward Chiam-ni until pinched out, General Chang Do-yong assembled the remainder of his division in
14151-486: The claim ROK troops attacked first and that the KPA were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin Peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that the 17th Regiment had counterattacked at Haeju; some scholars argue the claimed counterattack was instead the instigating attack, and therefore that the South Koreans may have fired first. However,
14310-476: The coast. The 2nd Division, less the 9th Infantry, which Almond ordered into X Corps' reserve and replaced in the area between Route 24 and the P'ungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road with the ROK 5th Division, was to continue clearing its zone. At the same time, the 23rd Infantry, following Task Force Baker , was to give particular attention to preventing enemy forces from moving above the Inje-Kansong segment of Route 24. In
14469-622: The codes used by the US to communicate with their embassy in Moscow , and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation. Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance . In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack
14628-412: The communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, ethnic Korean units in the PLA were sent to North Korea. In the fall of 1949, two PLA divisions composed mainly of Korean-Chinese troops (the 164th and 166th ) entered North Korea, followed by smaller units throughout the rest of 1949. The reinforcement of the KPA with PLA veterans continued into 1950, with the 156th Division and several other units of
14787-546: The corps boundary east as X Corps joined the counterattack. The ROK 7th Division, after advancing in its present zone for most of the day, was to relieve 1st Marine Division forces straddling Route 29 and prepare to attack on the Chuncheon-Hwacheon axis toward the road complex at the west end of the Hwacheon Reservoir. On his left, Hoge switched the zones of the 24th Infantry Division and ROK 2nd Division and ordered 24th Division commander General Blackshear M. Bryan to send
14946-414: The counterattack, the main effort was to be made on the Route 24 axis. The 2nd Infantry Division , with the 187th RCT attached, was to drive on Inje , the 1st Marine Division to advance on Yanggu . Almond's concept was that the two spearheads would trap the enemy forces east of Route 24 and lay them open to destruction by Corps forces advancing on the right. In the drive on Yanggu, the opening attack of
15105-565: The day before. In the Soksa-ri ( 37°38′17″N 128°29′42″E / 37.638°N 128.495°E / 37.638; 128.495 ) area, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment , had driven cross-country against hard resistance to a position commanding the lower end of a pass on the Soksa-ri- Habaejae ( 37°44′56″N 128°18′25″E / 37.749°N 128.307°E / 37.749; 128.307 ) road about midway between
15264-518: The defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council 's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would start that would marginalize the UN and encourage communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans, and the US immediately began using air and naval forces in
15423-417: The division's right, the 38th Infantry was to advance along the mountain road running northeast from P'ungam-ni to Hyon-ni ( 37°56′35″N 128°18′58″E / 37.943°N 128.316°E / 37.943; 128.316 ) and then turning northwest to Inje. The 9th Infantry was to sweep the division's central area. With the entire PVA 12th Army attempting to withdraw north between Route 24 and
15582-450: The east to oppose the advance. Nor had PVA/KPA forces on the western front shown much aggressiveness. PVA attacks had forced back some patrol base and outpost units and had tested the main line in both the US I Corps and US IX Corps sectors, but these attacks had been isolated affairs, not coordinated actions in a concerted holding operation. Judging PVA/KPA forces in the east-central area to be clearly overextended after he reconnoitered
15741-509: The economic and military aid promised by the Soviets. Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support. Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations. Chen Jian argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support. Citing more recent scholarship, Zhao Suisheng contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via
15900-452: The enemy's main withdrawal routes and on 24 May pressed Milburn, Hoge and Almond to quicken the pace of their attacks to seize their road center objectives. Van Fleet saw a particularly good opportunity to trap and destroy forces of the KPA II , III and V Corps and PVA 12th, 20th and 27th Armies in the area east of Route 24 with a squeeze by X Corps and ROK I Corps . Once Almond had captured
16059-454: The face of strong rearguard action by the KPA 19th Regiment, 13th Division . Below the 38th, the 3rd Division's Task Force Charlie built around the 7th Infantry Regiment moved only 4 miles (6.4 km) toward Yangyang before minefields and a destroyed bridge blocked any further advance. To the north along Route 24, the attack of the 23rd Infantry also was stopped short. Sweeping one enemy group off high ground bordering Route 24 below Umyang-ni,
16218-562: The fighting became a war of attrition and the north suffered heavy damage from U.S. bombing . Combat ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement , which allowed the exchange of prisoners and created a 4-kilometre (2.5 mi) wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the frontline, with a Joint Security Area at Panmunjom . The conflict caused more than 1 million military deaths and an estimated 2 to 3 million civilian deaths. Alleged war crimes include
16377-459: The former Fourth Field Army arriving in February; the PLA 156th Division was reorganized as the KPA 7th Division. By mid-1950, between 50,000 and 70,000 former PLA troops had entered North Korea, forming a significant part of the KPA's strength on the eve of the war's beginning. The combat veterans and equipment from China, the tanks, artillery, and aircraft supplied by the Soviets, and rigorous training increased North Korea's military superiority over
16536-563: The front on 19 May, Ridgway enlarged his concept to take advantage of their vulnerability and ordered Van Fleet to attack across the entire front. Agreeing that the PVA/KPA forces could be trapped, Van Fleet laid out an operation that he believed could produce decisive results if the attack moved fast enough. Though stabilizing the line in the east remained a problem, he now viewed that task with no great alarm even though PVA/KPA forces were deepening and strengthening their penetration. If for no other reason, he expected their logistical difficulties in
16695-408: The general advance, the 89th Heavy Tank Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment blocked the road hub on 25 May, and all three of Milburn's divisions reached Line Kansas on 27 May. But the attack, as from the outset, was a fruitless pursuit. Easily outstripping Milburn's forces, all major enemy formations on the I Corps front had withdrawn above the 38th Parallel in the east and across
16854-451: The general since late afternoon. Hazel knew nothing of Ferenbaugh's whereabouts but could have correctly guessed that he had run into trouble at Sinjom-ni. Ferenbaugh and his group had come under the guns of the PVA blocking force about 16:30. PVA fire swept the jeep carrying the escorts, leaving two dead and a third wounded sprawled in the road, and chased the general, his aide, and driver to cover and concealment among rocks and foliage on
17013-472: The government and between 2,976 and 3,392 deaths. By May 1949, both uprisings had been crushed. Insurgency reignited in the spring of 1949 when attacks by guerrillas in the mountainous regions (buttressed by army defectors and North Korean agents) increased. Insurgent activity peaked in late 1949 as the ROKA engaged so-called People's Guerrilla Units. Organized and armed by the North Korean government, and backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had infiltrated through
17172-576: The government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed. For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea. Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the US Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed
17331-618: The government. At 02:00 on 28 June the ROK blew up the Hangang Bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the KPA. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing it, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge trapped many ROK units north of the river. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. Some South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and 48 subsequently pledged allegiance to
17490-400: The ground above Chuncheon after daylight found over 10,000 PVA jamming Route 17 and the secondary roads and trails leading to it. To the west and northwest of town they sighted another large mass of PVA, which they estimated in the thousands, moving through the ground between Route 17 and the Kap'yong-Chiam-ni road. Assuming that the tanks of Task Force Hazel entering Chuncheon on the 24th were
17649-420: The ground below the reservoir all but empty of PVA/KPA forces, and the ROK 6th Division's move to the lake's western edge confirmed the PVA escape. The division of the 20th Army deployed north and east of Hwacheon town and another division encountered on the fronts of the 24th and ROK 2nd Divisions to the west meanwhile showed well-organized defenses and a determination to resist any further IX Corps' advance toward
17808-466: The grounds it would not be fair, and many South Korean politicians boycotted it. The 1948 South Korean general election was held in May. The resultant South Korean government promulgated a national political constitution on 17 July and elected Syngman Rhee as president on 20 July. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948. In the Soviet-Korean Zone of Occupation,
17967-417: The headquarters and a company of the 2nd Division's 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion. It was mid-afternoon before Lt. Col. Thomas R. Yancey, the 15th RCT and task force commander, could organize the Able force and open the attack. The late start and rugged terrain, more than enemy opposition, held Yancey's gains on 23 May to little more than 1 mile (1.6 km), well short of Habaejae. In the 3rd Division zone,
18126-407: The high ground around Han'gye ( 37°48′22″N 127°59′28″E / 37.806°N 127.991°E / 37.806; 127.991 ). Passing through the 23rd Infantry, General Frank S. Bowen 's forces, with a battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment and two battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment moving forward on their flanks, had driven to their objective easily against light opposition. In
18285-799: The insurgent war and border clashes. The first socialist uprising occurred without direct North Korean participation, though the guerrillas still professed support for the northern government. Beginning in April 1948 on Jeju Island , the campaign saw arrests and repression by the South Korean government in the fight against the South Korean Labor Party, resulting in 30,000 violent deaths, among them 14,373 civilians, of whom ~2,000 were killed by rebels and ~12,000 by ROK security forces. The Yeosu–Suncheon rebellion overlapped with it, as several thousand army defectors waving red flags massacred right-leaning families. This resulted in another brutal suppression by
18444-493: The invasion force, the North had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as seaborne artillery for their armies. In contrast, the South Korean population was estimated at 20 million, but its army was unprepared and ill-equipped. As of 25 June 1950,
18603-403: The members of his force riding in thin-skinned jeeps and halftracks and continued up the road with eleven tanks. Once through the twisting pass under a hard but harmless pelting by rifle and machine gun fire, the armored column barreled into the Chuncheon basin and drove into the center of town late in the afternoon. Fanning out in twos and threes, Hazel's tankers searched the city and both sides of
18762-460: The mountains to slow if not stop their advance within a matter of days; they would have created only a "long bag" that could closed behind them by rapid drives to block their main routes of resupply and withdrawal. Van Fleet's plan called for I Corps, IX Corps and part of the US 1st Marine Division at the left of US X Corps to advance on 20 May toward the Munsan -Chuncheon segment of Line Topeka . Once
18921-498: The next 2 years of stalemate. On 18 May, in response to Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) and Korean People's Army (KPA) attacks on the east of the front in the Battle of the Soyang River , UN Commander General Matthew Ridgway suggested to US Eighth Army commander General James Van Fleet that he should attempt to relieve the pressure on his forces in the east by attacking in the west to threaten PVA/KPA lines of communication in
19080-496: The night. Attacking cross-country on the west flank of the 23rd Infantry, the 7th Marines met little resistance but moved no farther than to come abreast. Behind the roadblock, PVA 12th Army forces meanwhile had continued to stream across Route 24 and up the trail to the northwest until the 106th Regiment was all but wiped out. Then they avoided Task Force Gerhart by veering northeast, forded the Soyang, and headed toward Yanggu. The 38th Infantry's pursuit of enemy groups escaping up
19239-464: The operation and placed his executive officer, Colonel George H. Gerhart, in command of the task force. Despite all the haste, it was almost 11:00 by the time Brubaker reached Bowen's command post, 12:30 before Gerhart issued final instructions, and 13:00 when Brubaker started the armored point of the task force up Route 24. The point commander, Major Charles A. Newman of Brubaker's staff, led his tank platoon, engineer platoon and reconnaissance squad up
19398-411: The pass without harm except to prisoners riding atop the tanks, all but one of whom were hit. Hazel lost two tanks farther down the road, one that its crew put out of commission when it ran out of fuel, another that tumbled off the road into a deep gully in the darkness. At 32nd Infantry headquarters Hazel learned that his force, enlarged as arranged earlier, was to return to Chuncheon the next morning with
19557-495: The perimeter. The defending forces lost two killed and 20 wounded during the repeated attacks. PVA losses were 300 killed, an estimated 250 wounded and 450 captured. Other PVA groups in battalion strength attempted to punch their way north out of the trap during the early morning of 27 May, but were knocked back by the forces blocking the way in the Chiam-ni area. After these failures there were no more organized efforts to escape, only confused clumps of PVA moving around in search of
19716-423: The point of a large attack force following, the main PVA bodies had begun to swarm north during the night, to escape through Hwacheon town. Artillery fire and air strikes hit the retreating PVA from midmorning on added to the disorder of their withdrawal. By 09:30 Ferenbaugh had the full 17th Infantry motorized and en route to Chuncheon, whence about midday the regiment attacked north as the pursuit force following
19875-446: The reason for the halt. He ordered Newman to forget communications, to move his tanks at 20 miles (32 km) an hour, and to "keep going until you hit a mine." As Newman took his tanks forward in fifth gear, Almond flew south to check on the main body of the task force, which he found still forming. Exploding with impatience, he ordered Gerhart to get the tanks moving whether or not they had infantry support. When getting trucks out of
20034-423: The regiment reached and crossed the Soyang before midday. Leaving a battalion to protect engineers while they bridged the river during the afternoon, Chiles sent the remainder of his regiment toward Inje. But the advance ended some 5 miles (8.0 km) from the town when stubborn KPA 12th Division forces held blocking positions until well past dark. A swifter advance was clearly required if enemy passage through
20193-491: The regimental tank company were to reinforce him and bring along a resupply of rations, gasoline, and ammunition. Hazel took his force to the airstrip at the western edge of town where the flat ground allowed good fields of fire. While circling his tanks into a tight perimeter, he was asked by regiment if Ferenbaugh was with him. The division commander, his aide, and escorts had started up Route 29 in two jeeps some time earlier to contact Hazel's force, but there had been no word from
20352-490: The report that contained the Haeju claim contained errors and outright falsehoods. KPA forces attacked all along the 38th parallel within an hour. The KPA had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The ROK had no tanks, anti-tank weapons, or heavy artillery. The South Koreans committed their forces in a piecemeal fashion, and these were routed in a few days. On 27 June, Rhee evacuated Seoul with some of
20511-407: The retreating PVA 15th Army . A highlight of the attack was the recovery of eleven wounded men of the 2nd Infantry Division by 5th Marine forces advancing within 1 mile (1.6 km) of Hill 1051. For the 2nd Infantry Division's move on Inje, General Clark L. Ruffner assigned the main effort to the 187th RCT. With Company B of the 72nd Tank Battalion attached, Bowen's combat team was to take over
20670-489: The road coming up from Soksa-ri. Yet Ruffner's opening attack was no great surge forward. Average gains of 4 miles (6.4 km) matched those of the 1st Marine Division and took the 2nd Division only as far as its nearest intermediate terrain objectives in the high ground confining the Naech'on River on the north and northeast. As originally constituted for the attack to seize the Habaejae road junction, Task Force Able included
20829-538: The road northwest of Chaun-ni, the regiment by nightfall was still some 7 miles (11 km) short of its objective. Along the east side of the road, the 187th RCT, less its battalion with Task Force Gerhart , also had made only short advances against scattered enemy groups during the day. Thus the lateral trail, now located about halfway between the front of the Marine and airborne troops and Task Force Gerhart at Umyang-ni, remained open. Shortly before dark, air observers reported about 2,000 enemy troops moving west on
20988-415: The road slowly, as directed by Gerhart, with engineers in the lead probing for mines. Around 14:00 Newman halted his tanks about 6 miles (9.7 km) above Han'gye while engineers checked the road ahead and while he took time to correct faulty radio communications with the reconnaissance squad. Arriving over the scene by helicopter, Almond, already unhappy over the tardy start of the operation, landed to learn
21147-410: The road through Hyon-ni to Inje on 25 May was halted by stubborn resistance from two KPA battalions deployed at the junction with the road coming up from Habaejae 2 miles (3.2 km) below Sangam-ni. Supporting artillery battalions reached out for the PVA/KPA withdrawing behind the block, but many of the groups were already well up the road and out of range. To supply further evidence that the withdrawal
21306-422: The road's intersection with the trail to hold off attacks from the south. With no position established to the north, the intersection was open to seizure by Task Force Gerhart . But Gerhart sent no forces down the road, even after all but one of 20 trucks sent back for supplies were destroyed and all but two of the drivers were killed at the PVA position. Alerted by the ambush of the truck convoy, Ruffner ordered
21465-485: The sharp pitch of the bordering ridges as with knots of KPA delaying forces. After the 23rd Infantry established the Soyang bridgehead, Task Force Gerhart and the remainder of the 187th RCT were to assemble under corps control just south of Umyang-ni to form Task Force Baker for a rapid drive over Route 24, beginning on the morning of 26 May, to seize Kansong ( 38°22′41″N 128°27′54″E / 38.378°N 128.465°E / 38.378; 128.465 ) on
21624-467: The south. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative, the UN Security Council denounced the attack and recommended member states to repel the invasion. UN forces comprised 21 countries, with the US providing around 90% of military personnel. Seoul was captured on 28 June, and by early August, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and its allies were nearly defeated, holding onto only
21783-444: The southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely". On 23 June UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent. Chinese involvement was extensive from the beginning, building on previous collaboration between the Chinese and Korean communists during the Chinese Civil War. Throughout 1949 and 1950, the Soviets continued arming North Korea. After
21942-473: The towns. Almond ordered the 3rd Infantry Division to point its general attack at the remainder of the 2 miles (3.2 km) pass and, farther north, at a road junction some 2 miles (3.2 km) due east of Habaejae where the Soksa-ri-Habaejae road connected with another road winding northeast through the higher Taebaek Mountains to Yangyang on the coast. The seizure of these objectives, ordered before
22101-424: The trail onto Route 24 and beyond. They were from PVA 12th Army units, which continued to cross the road during the night, their movement not again picked up by observers until midday on 25 May as they entered the ground below the Hwacheon Reservoir in the IX Corps' zone. To protect their passage across Route 24, the PVA 106th Regiment, 34th Division organized a deep position extending over 2 miles (3.2 km) below
22260-536: The way and getting the last tanks out of the streambed onto the road took even more time, Almond relieved Brubaker of his battalion command. Despite pressure from the general, it was midafternoon before the tanks started forward with the rest of the task force following. Newman's point force drove rapidly through clumps of Chinese visibly rattled by the appearance of tanks and came upon the rear of some 4,000 PVA scrambling north under punishing air attacks about 1 mile (1.6 km) below Umyang-ni. Finding room to deploy in
22419-463: The west UN forces were unable to maintain contact with the PVA/KPA as they withdrew faster than the UN advance. In the central area the UN forces made contact with the PVA/KPA at chokepoints north of Chuncheon inflicting heavy losses. In the east UN forces had remained in contact with the PVA/KPA and progressively pushed them back north of the Soyang River. By mid-June UN forces had reached Line Kansas approximately 2–6 miles (3.2–9.7 km) north of
22578-525: The withdrawal of PVA/KPA forces from the Soksa-ri- Hajinbu-ri area became apparent, was aimed at blocking the two best roads behind the PVA. Almond reinforced the 3rd Division by attaching the ROK 8th Division , now fully assembled in Chech'on , and also gave the ROK 9th Division (received as a result of ROK III Corps' inactivation on 22 May) to General Robert H. Soule along with the responsibility for
22737-411: The wounded escort and determined where the general was. Stanaway's crews found space to turn around and parked as close to the hillside as possible. There, under a peppering of small arms and machine gun fire, they buttoned up and waited until full dark, when Ferenbaugh and the men with him worked their way one at a time to Stanaway's tank and got in through the escape hatch. The three reached safety behind
22896-454: The zone of the 23rd Infantry Regiment , which Almond had ordered into corps reserve, and attack up Route 24, initially (as Almond also had directed) to seize a bridge site on the Soyang River at Umyang-ni ( 37°57′58″N 128°04′34″E / 37.966°N 128.076°E / 37.966; 128.076 ), 6 miles (9.7 km) southwest of the Inje road center. On a parallel course at
23055-568: The zones formed their own governments in 1948. The DPRK was led by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang , and the ROK by Syngman Rhee in Seoul ; both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea and engaged in border clashes as internal unrest was fomented by communist groups in the south. On 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA), equipped and trained by the Soviets, launched an invasion of
23214-479: Was a military operation performed by the United Nations Command (UN) during the Korean War launched in response to the Chinese spring offensive of April-May 1951. It was the final large-scale offensive of the war that saw significant territorial changes. By 19 May the second phase of the spring offensive, the Battle of the Soyang River , on the eastern section of the front, was losing momentum due to reinforcement of
23373-414: Was almost entirely trained and focused on counterinsurgency, rather than conventional warfare. They were equipped and advised by a force of a few hundred American officers, who were successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against North Korean military (Korean People's Army, KPA) forces along the 38th parallel. Approximately 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police officers died in
23532-582: Was an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula fought between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union , while South Korea was supported by the United Nations Command (UNC) led by the United States . The conflict was the first major proxy war of
23691-516: Was concentrated along Route 17 where PVA fought hard to hold open the Hwacheon town-Hwacheon Reservoir escape route for the columns moving northwest out of the ground below the reservoir. Rain and heavy clouds that had kept aircraft on the ground finally lightened in the afternoon of 27 May, allowing air strikes along with artillery fire to take a heavy count of the PVA scurrying to get above Hwacheon. The 17th Infantry meanwhile fought up Route 17 through stubborn resistance and entered Hwacheon at 14:00, but
23850-469: Was in full possession of the bridge site. With Task Force Gerhart occupying the lower bank of the Soyang, Almond late on 24 May issued instructions for attacks to carry out Van Fleet's earlier order for the two-pronged trap by X Corps and ROK I Corps. Coming out of Corps' reserve, the 23rd Infantry moving up Route 24 on the morning of 25 May was to pass through the Task Force Gerhart and establish
24009-493: Was no US policy dealing with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased its importance. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene ... The essential point ... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of U.S. policy toward Japan." Another consideration
24168-401: Was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson . Military strategists were more concerned with the security of Europe against the Soviet Union than that of East Asia . The administration was worried a war in Korea could quickly escalate without American intervention. Diplomat John Foster Dulles stated: "To sit by while Korea
24327-770: Was not the case. Rather, the soldiers were indigenous to China, as part of China's longstanding ethnic Korean community, and were recruited to the PLA in the same way as any other Chinese citizen. According to the first official census in 1949, the population of North Korea numbered 9,620,000, and by mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, Chuncheon , Uijeongbu , and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, 150 Yak fighter planes, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to
24486-532: Was outdistancing the pursuit, the 9th Infantry, moving through its central zone until relieved by the ROK 35th Regiment, 5th Division, made almost no contact, and the reinforced 3rd Division encountered only light, scattered resistance as the 7th Infantry came up to the division's road junction objectives east of Habaejae and as attached ROK forces on the extreme east flank moved into the ground above Route 20. Still hopeful of trapping and eliminating sizable enemy groups below Route 24, Almond urged Thomas to accelerate
24645-452: Was pressed for time to open the operation within the few hours Almond allowed. While having Brubaker flown to Han'gye, Ruffner assigned the mission to the 187th RCT, already operating along Route 24, and the two nearest tank companies; B of the 72nd, already attached to the regiment, and B of the 64th, a 3rd Division unit given to the 2nd Division earlier in one of the many unit shifts made under Corps' orders. Bowen selected his 2nd Battalion for
24804-498: Was reduced to a single man over the course of engagements by the ROKA 8th Division . The second was annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil maneuver by units of the ROKA 6th Division , resulting in a toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded. By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm. By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in
24963-644: Was the Soviet reaction if the US intervened. The Truman administration was fearful a Korean war was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the US committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia —a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin split —was vital to
25122-410: Was to occupy prominent high ground 4 miles (6.4 km) west of Umyang-ni to strengthen the hold on the bridge site and to control the trail, which Almond believed enemy forces would attempt to use as a withdrawal route. Thomas pulled the 7th Marine Regiment out of reserve for the mission, but because of a late start, a shortage of trucks and enemy resistance to the leading battalion on a hill bordering
25281-678: Was unpopular among Koreans, and riots broke out. To contain them, the USAMGIK banned strikes on 8 December and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and People's Committees on 12 December. Following further civilian unrest, the USAMGIK declared martial law . Citing the inability of the Joint Commission to make progress, the US government decided to hold an election under UN auspices to create an independent Korea. The Soviet authorities and Korean communists refused to cooperate on
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