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61-636: The Act was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1793 . The current Act was enacted in 1948. As interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States , the Act is a bastion of federalism and embodies the need to avoid "needless friction" between state and federal courts. Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793 provided that no "writ of injunction [shall] be granted to stay proceedings of any court of

122-456: A Senatorial committee put a bill forward in January 1793. The first three sections of the 1793 act concerned the structure of the court system. The first section authorised circuit courts to function with only one Supreme Court justice. With some exceptions in outlying areas, Supreme Court justices continued to sit as circuit court judges, one per circuit, until the Judiciary Act of 1891 created

183-430: A choice-of-law principle, a synonym for private international law , a rule of public international law , a moral obligation , expediency, courtesy , reciprocity, utility, or diplomacy. Authorities disagree on whether comity is a rule of natural law , custom , treaty , or domestic law. Indeed, there is not even agreement that comity is a rule of law at all." Because the doctrine touches on many different principles, it

244-698: A court of one jurisdiction affords to the court of another jurisdiction when determining questions where the law or interests of another country are involved. Comity is founded on the concept of sovereign equality among states and is expected to be reciprocal. The term comity was derived in the 16th century from the French comité, meaning association and from the Latin cōmitās , meaning courtesy and from cōmis , friendly, courteous. Comity may also be referred to as judicial comity or comity of nations. The doctrine of international comity has been described variously "as

305-416: A federal court has finally and fully decided. Likewise, the exception only applies when the state court itself has not yet ruled on the merits of a preclusion defense. Several commentators have suggested that this incentivizes defendants not to argue preclusion in state court, which may not be as receptive as a federal court to granting a motion to dismiss. Rather, one treatise counsels, "the person subjected to

366-495: A new means for courts to recognize foreign law where the application of English law would lead to injustices. Comity was most famously introduced to the American common law by the American jurist Justice Joseph Story in the early nineteenth century. Much like Huber, Story sought to develop a new system of private international law that reflected the new commercial needs of the United States. Similar to Lord Mansfield, Story stressed

427-476: A number of regulations related to court procedures. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had created, in addition to the Supreme Court authorised by the Constitution , two lower levels of courts. Federal district courts, each with a district judge, composed the lowest level. Their district boundaries generally matched state lines. Every federal district also fell within the circuit of one of the three second-level courts,

488-466: A repetitive suit in state court should immediately seek a federal court injunction." The Anti-Injunction Act can be seen as one of several abstention doctrines invoked by federal courts to decline to decide certain matters that would intrude upon the powers of another court. For instance, under so-called Pullman abstention , a federal court will generally abstain from deciding a case presenting unresolved state-law and federal constitutional questions if

549-488: A state court could clarify the state-law question to make the constitutional ruling unnecessary. Under Younger abstention , a federal court will generally abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Other important abstention doctrines include Burford abstention (abstain where state court has particular expertise in a complex area of state law) and Thibodaux abstention (abstain to allow state court to decide matters of great local importance). Like

610-513: A state." The provision has no legislative history . The traditional view, as advanced by the Supreme Court, is that the statute's prohibition promoted federalism by "unconditionally" prohibiting federal courts from interfering in state court proceedings. Some modern scholars have argued for a more limited reading: that the 1793 Act merely prevented a single Supreme Court justice riding circuit from enjoining state court proceedings. Nonetheless,

671-579: Is "respect for state courts," and it was "designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts." Accordingly, the Court has interpreted the three statutory exceptions narrowly and prohibits lower courts from creating new exceptions. The Anti-Injunction Act contemplates three circumstances under which its bar on injunctions of state-court proceedings does not apply. Specifically, federal courts are not barred from enjoining proceedings (1) “as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,” (2) “when necessary in aid of”

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732-416: Is not a matter of absolute obligation but rather a voluntary matter based on common interests. Comity is not only based on respect for foreign sovereignty but also convenience and necessity, and the court held that the principle of comity called for a more liberal approach to foreign judgments. The court chose to revise the common law test and enforce a judgment with a "real and substantial connection" between

793-423: Is not about enforcement of judgment but rather about the constitutional validity of provincial legislation and its effect on another province's legislation to the proceeding before it. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada rewrote the rules on the extraterritorial effects of provincial legislation. These extraterritorial effects of provincial legislation will be assessed according to the principle of comity. In

854-619: Is praised for adopting Huber's comity in the English law; he rejected Story's approach. Westlake states that conflict rules are an instance of domestic sovereignty and therefore, the duty to recognize foreign law must be found as a reason within English law itself. In the law of the United States , the Comity Clause is another term for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Article Four of

915-430: Is regarded as "one of the more confusing doctrines evoked in cases touching upon the interests of foreign states." The principle of comity has been questioned and even rejected by many scholars throughout the years; however, the use of the term remains present in case law . European jurists have been wrestling with the decision to apply foreign law since the thirteenth century . As the popularity of commerce outside of

976-525: Is relevant in the consideration of determining what effect another state's laws or judicial power should have in England in a given case. Unlike the United States of America and Australia, the principle of comity or Full Faith and Credit of recognizing judgments across the country is not recognized in the Canadian constitution or other authoritative bases. However, beginning in the 1990s the courts started to discuss

1037-471: Is that sovereign states have exclusive jurisdiction in their territory. Therefore, before this decision, Canadian courts were conservative in recognizing foreign judgments, including those obtained in other Canadian provinces' courts. Justice La Forest acknowledges that the common law approach is not grounded in the realities of modern times as states cannot live in complete isolation due to travel, flow of wealth, skills and people. Especially interprovincially,

1098-497: Is to "prevent the harassment of successful federal litigants through repetitious state litigation." Litigation concerning the Relitigation Exception centers on whether the requirements of claim preclusion (also called res judicata ) and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel ) were met in a previously-decided federal action. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that the exception only applies to issues that

1159-519: The Supreme Court in the 19th century interpreted the statute to prohibit any federal court from enjoining state court proceedings. In 1874, the Act was amended to formally prohibit injunctions by both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Congress later inserted the provision, unchanged, into the Judicial Code of 1911 . During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts read in numerous exceptions to

1220-455: The 1789 Act, not the 1793 one, mentions writs of mandamus , critical to the decision in Marbury v Madison . Comity In law, comity is "a principle or practice among political entities such as countries, states, or courts of different jurisdictions , whereby legislative , executive , and judicial acts are mutually recognized ." It is an informal and non-mandatory courtesy to which

1281-513: The Anti-Injunction Act to allow injunctions, like the one in Toucey , to protect earlier federal court judgments. It also codified the two exceptions the Court had already acknowledged. The 1948 Act's legislative history states its purpose as "restor[ing] the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." The Act hasn't changed since 1948. It reads: "A court of

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1342-402: The Anti-Injunction Act, Pullman , Younger , Burford , and Thibodaux abstention are rooted in principles of federalism. Unlike the Anti-Injunction Act, they are not based in statute. For that reason, they have been prominently criticized as "judicial usurpation[s] of legislative authority in violation of separate of powers." This is because, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, "[i]n

1403-454: The Anti-Injunction Act. Some exceptions were based on statutes: the Act was held to allow injunctions to protect cases in federal court pursuant to the federal removal and interpleader statutes, legislation limiting shipowners’ liability and granting federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages, as well as federal habeas cases. The other exceptions came from the common law . For instance, a federal court could stay state court proceedings where

1464-535: The Canadian Constitution was created to form a single country; therefore, there is no foundation for differential quality of justice in the Canadian judicial structure. In response to modern-day values, Justice LaForest notes the Supreme Court of the United States' approach to comity in Hilton v Guyot and explains that comity is a necessary principle to ensure order and fairness in modern-day transactions. Still, it

1525-443: The Supreme Court decided Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co. The case began when New York Life prevailed in federal court on Toucey's claim to collect monthly disability insurance payments. Toucey then assigned his benefits to another individual, who sued New York Life in state court on functionally the same claim. On New York Life's request, the federal district court enjoined the state court proceeding. The Eighth Circuit upheld

1586-721: The United States Constitution , which provides that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States ." Article Four as a whole—which includes the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Extradition Clause , and the Full Faith and Credit Clause —has been described as the "interstate comity" article of the Constitution. In the case of Bank of Agusta v Earl,

1647-409: The United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." The modern Supreme Court has affirmed Toucey ’s understanding that the Act is rooted in notions of comity and federalism . Per the Court, the Anti-Injunction Act's "core message"

1708-504: The action or damages suffered and the adjudicating jurisdiction. This decision had important implications for both interprovincial and international litigations as Canadian courts began to engage with the comity in judgment enforcement. The following case addressing comity was Hunt v T&N ; the court elaborated on their decision in Morguard by stating that comity is "grounded in notions of order and fairness to participants". Hunt v T&N

1769-401: The case of Tolofson v Jensen , the court answers the question of which law should govern in tort when the interest of more than one jurisdiction is involved. The court determines that the law of where the tort occurred should apply, this is known as lex loci delicti. Justice La Forest clearly reaffirmed the importance of comity in private international law in the decision. The court states that

1830-510: The choice of law is where the tort occurred for reasons of comity, order and fairness. The court states that international comity helps ensure "harmony" in the face of potential conflicts of law. The Australian Constitution recognizes that the Full Faith and Credit should be afforded to all common law countries: "Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws,

1891-517: The circuit courts. Two Supreme Court justices and one district judge composed each circuit court bench; they traveled to each district to hear cases twice a year, at locations and times specified by statute. In 1792, Supreme Court justices and also the Attorney General, Edmund Randolph , had urged President George Washington to push for changes in this system; he included a call for some changes in his annual address to Congress that November, and

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1952-524: The common law, comity was an attractive principle as the United States and England were in search for a foundational principle by which they could build conflicts of law rules. A century after Huber, Lord Mansfield , known for being Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in England for three decades, introduced the doctrine of comity to the English law. Lord Mansfield viewed the application of comity as discretionary, with courts applying foreign law "except to

2013-469: The court adopted Justice Joseph Story's doctrine of comity. At the end of the ninetieth century, the US Supreme Court delivered the classic statement on comity in the decision of Hilton v. Guyot (1895). The court stated that the enforcement of a foreign judgment was a matter of comity is viewed as the "classic" statement of comity in international law. The Court held in that case: "Comity," in

2074-568: The courts of appeals. Since courts with two judges (one Supreme Court justice, one district court judge) could cast tie votes, the second section stated rules for those. The third authorised and regulated special circuit court sessions for criminal cases, to be held at more convenient places or times than the statutory regular sessions offered. The remaining five sections regulated a variety of court practices. Section 4, as requested by Washington, dealt with who could take bail payments. Section 5 made rules for writs of ne exeat and of injunction ;

2135-502: The doctrine of comity on the basis that it is too vague as it promoted the recognition of foreign laws depending on option. Despite the debate on the role of the principle of comity in academia, the Supreme Court and the House of Lords have recognized the role of comity in England and Wales . However, the courts have yet to adopt a precise definition of comity. The case law indicates that comity

2196-682: The exception include the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ; and the Americans with Disabilities Act . Under the Aid of Jurisdiction Exception, federal courts can enjoin state court proceedings if "necessary in aid of" the federal court's jurisdiction. The exception's legislative history indicates that its purpose

2257-480: The exception is that, by expressly allowing stays of state court proceedings pursuant to certain statutes, Congress validly overrides the limitation that it imposed in the Anti-Injunction Act. To fall within the exception, the Supreme Court has held, a statute "need not expressly refer to" the AIA, but it must "clearly create a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court [that] could be given its intended scope only by

2318-425: The exception's seemingly permissive language, however, the Supreme Court has reiterated that it does not extend to in personam actions (i.e. cases not dealing with real property). In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers , Justice Hugo Black 's majority opinion held that the exception does not apply simply because there is duplicative litigation in state and federal courts, even if

2379-462: The extent that it conflicted with principles of natural justice or public policy ." He demonstrated this principle in Somerset v Stewart ( King's Bench 1772), which held that slavery was so morally odious that a British court would not recognize the property rights of an American slaveholder in his slave out of comity. English courts and scholars adopted Lord Mansfield ideas on comity and provides

2440-550: The federal court had previously seized the piece of property (also called a res) that was the subject of the litigation, or where a litigant who lost a federal case sought to relitigate a precluded claim or issue in state court (also known as the Relitigation Exception). Because of all these exceptions, a prominent law review article in 1932 declared that, by that year, the statute was “long . . . dead.” The modern era of Anti-Injunction Act doctrine began in 1941, when

2501-492: The federal court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction . Under the Relitigation Exception, federal courts can enjoin state proceedings if necessary to "protect or effectuate" a previous federal judgment. According to the Supreme Court, this exception is "designed to implement 'well-recognized concepts' of claim and issue preclusion ." The exception was included in the 1948 Act to expressly overrule Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co. Its purpose, according to one treatise,

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2562-618: The federal court's jurisdiction, or (3) “to protect or effectuate federal court judgments.” These three exceptions are known as, respectively, the Expressly Authorized Exception, the Aid of Jurisdiction Exception, and the Relitigation Exception. The Supreme Court has stated that the three statutory exceptions are exclusive and “should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.” Under the Expressly Authorized Exception, federal courts can enjoin state court proceedings "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." The theory behind

2623-566: The holder's education and experience (a practice called "licensure by comity"). Rules differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. By the end of the nineteenth century, comity had received judicial approval in English law as a foundational principle to private international law. In 1896, Professor Dicey published "Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws" that criticized

2684-421: The idea of sovereign independence. At the core of his ideas surrounding comity was the respect of one sovereign nation to another. Huber wrote that comitas gentium ("civility of nations") required the application of foreign law in certain cases because sovereigns "so act by way of comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to

2745-520: The importance of justice in comity and that comity is a stand-alone principle that derives from mutual benefit. Story's view, which ultimately prevailed, was that the consensual or voluntary application of comity doctrine would foster trust among states, "localize the effect of slavery," and reduce the risk of civil war . In the mid-nineteenth century, John Westlake advanced further the idea that States ought to act with comity for reasons of justice in his Treatise on Private International Law . Westlake

2806-455: The injunction was inappropriate because the Relitigation Exception "patently violates the expressed prohibition of Congress." The Court declared its intention going forward to only recognize exceptions to the AIA where Congress had expressly authorized them or where a federal court first acquires jurisdiction over a res and seeks to exclude duplicative state litigation over the same res . Congress partially overruled Toucey in 1948 by revising

2867-401: The injunction, reasoning that the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply because the injunction at issue was necessary to "effectuate and preserve" the "fruits of the decree" in the initial federal case. The issue before the Supreme Court was the propriety of this application of the common-law Relitigation Exception. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter , held that

2928-400: The legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under

2989-446: The locality grew, the need to find a new way to resolve conflicts of law issues arose. The preexisting system known as statutism became too complex and arbitrary to keep up with the societal values of the time. A group of Dutch jurists created the doctrine of international comity in the late seventeenth century, most prominently Ulrich Huber . Huber and others sought a way to handle conflicts of law more pragmatically to reinforce

3050-476: The main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction." A number of other federal statutes are also referred to as "Anti-Injunction Acts." They are: Judiciary Act of 1793 The Judiciary Act of 1793 (ch. 22 of the Acts of the 2nd United States Congress , 2nd Session, 1  Stat.   333 ) is a United States federal statute , enacted on March 2, 1793. It established

3111-465: The majority adopted Justice Scalia's dissent. In the United States, certain foreign defamation judgments are not recognized under the SPEECH Act (a federal statute enacted in 2010), which supersedes the comity doctrine. The Act aims to stop " libel tourism ." In the United States, some states and territories recognize professional engineer licenses granted in a different jurisdiction, depending on

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3172-407: The opinion that one only considers comity where there is a "true conflict between domestic and foreign law". In the dissent, Justice Scalia argues that extraterritorial jurisdiction must consider international comity to ensure international law is not violated. More than ten years later, the Supreme Court heard the decision of F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v Empagran, S.A. where Justice Kennedy writing for

3233-410: The powers or rights of such government or of their subjects." Huber "believed that comity was a principle of international law" but also that "the decision to apply foreign law itself was left up to the state as an act of free will ." Huber did not believe comity was a stand-alone principle but rather saw it as a basis for building concrete rules and doctrines of law. At the time of its inception in

3294-417: The principle of comity as it relates interprovincially and internationally in a series of cases and adopted the principle of comity as a critical feature underlying Canadian private international law. Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye was the first case in this series considering comity in Canadian law. The common law reflected the principle from England that one of the basic tenets of international law

3355-547: The protection of its laws. This case continues to be the leading case cited by American courts when articulating the doctrine of comity. It is an important decision for the country as it articulates the definition of comity and does so in a more broad way than previously. Despite the broad definition in Hilton v Guyot, the court refused to enforce the French judgment based on reciprocity, as France would not have enforced an equivalent judgment.   This decision differed from Justice Joseph Story's idea of comity as his idea of comity

3416-659: The public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of any State." In case law, the High Court of Australia has never defined the meaning of comity in Australian law. However, the High Court has adopted and approved the definition of comity from the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v Guyot, with the first reference to it being in 1999 in the decision of Lipohar v The Queen. Comity has played an important role in

3477-463: The rules for injunctions, such as requiring notice to the target of the injunction, and barring federal injunctions from stopping state court activities, remain largely in effect to this day and are perhaps this bill's most lasting legacy. Section 6 authorised inter-district subpoenas , but these were not to require witnesses in civil cases to travel over 100 miles. Section 7 authorised courts to make their own rules; this codified existing practice, and

3538-556: The stay of a state court proceeding." The major Supreme Court cases interpreting the Expressly Authorized Exception are Mitchum v. Foster and Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp. According to a leading treatise, "[l]ower courts have struggled to reconcile" these two decisions. Statutes held to fall within the exception include the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Agricultural Credit Act . Statutes held to fall outside

3599-539: Was "to make clear the recognized power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the district courts." In other words, if a lawsuit begun in state court is removed to federal court, the federal court can enjoin the state court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction . The Aid of Jurisdiction Exception also applies "when the federal court first acquires jurisdiction in parallel in rem actions." Despite

3660-460: Was a reaction to a House amendment aimed at giving the Supreme Court rule-making authority over all the courts. Section 8 ordered that appraisals of property seized in execution of writs of fieri facias should follow the same rules as appraisals made for the relevant state courts. In some cases, a reference to the "Judiciary Act of 1793" actually points to the Judiciary Act of 1789; for example,

3721-585: Was concerned with sovereign interests and was rather concerned with reciprocity. The United States faced significant advancement in its global standing as a military and economic power after the Second World War , and this transformed the principle of comity into something that more closely resembled an obligation to apply foreign law. After the Cold War , the Supreme Court heard the case of Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California. In this case, Justice Souter gave

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